

Source 1

Source Information: Telegram from John Leighton Stuart to Secretary of State George Marshall, December 22, 1947. President's Secretary's Files - Subject File.

Note: John Leighton Stuart served as Ambassador to China from July 4, 1946 to August 2, 1952. Stuart was born in China to missionary parents served as a missionary himself and later became the president of Yenching University in Beijing.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(b) and (D), (4)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1978
NL- HC, NARS Date 6-26-75

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Memorandum follows.

"1. The American plan for aid to China should be a long-range four-year project, the purpose of which would be to assist China to achieve political and economic stability, including currency reform. To attain this object, the funds for relief and rehabilitation to be obtained from the US would require 500 million US dollars for the first year, the same amount for second year, 300 million US dollars for third year, and 200 million US dollars for fourth year, totalling one and half billion US dollars.

"2. With regard to the relief fund obtained under the plan, The Chinese Government should appropriate a fund in Chinese currency, equivalent to the value of relief commodities supplied by the US. This fund should be put to such uses as to benefit production and to curb inflation. There should be consultation and agreement between China and US in mapping out schemes for spending of this fund; and the American Government should receive full information concerning its actual disbursement.

3. China will, on her accord, employ experienced American personnel to assist her in the planning for financial, monetary, and other administrative reforms. She will likewise employ American technical experts to participate in the execution of certain construction undertakings. The Chinese Government itself will express the aforesaid intention to the American Government at an appropriate moment, with request that the latter will assist in the selection of such personnel. The employment of these personnel will not, however, be made an international legal obligation of the Chinese Government in order to avert infringement on China's sovereignty and administrative integrity.

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Using Source 1

Sourcing Questions	Who is John Leighton Stuart? Why is he writing this account to George Marshall? How could the author's previous experience influence his work as an ambassador?
Contextualization Questions	What is going on in China at the time of this account? Who "ruled" China in 1947? Adjust the monetary value for inflation to modern day. How much money is Stuart proposing to be sent to China?
Corroboration Tasks	How does this source fit with the accounts in Document Set A? Do Stuart's recommendations fit with the situation you already learned about? Do you agree with his assessment?
Close Reading Questions	What kind of support is Stuart proposing to be sent to China? For what purpose? Reading this source literally, where would you assume Stuart's "aid" would go? What more do you need to know about his proposal?

Source 2

Source Information: Oral History Interview: Walter H. Judd, April 13, 1970.

Note: Walter H Judd was a Physician and missionary with experience in China, 1925-31 and 1934-38. Judd was a Republican member of Congress from Minnesota from 1943-62.

Walter Judd Oral Interview-

JUDD: '49. He [Truman] said, [in his inaugural address]

We shall have as our partners, countries which, no longer solely concerned with the problem of national survival, are now working to improve the standards of living of all their people.

So I dictated this comment:

In his inaugural address President Truman stated clearly the necessity of security if there is to be maximum economic improvement. He said that only when countries are no longer "concerned with the problem of national survival" will they be able to work as our partners "to improve the standards of living of all their peoples." But apparently, his State Department did not believe him, for it demanded of China impossible internal reforms as the first prerequisite of our assistance, even at a time when in some cases like China, Korea and the Philippines, their very survival, as independent nations, was in mortal peril. Both reform and security are necessary and each assists the other, but it is demonstrated that when a nation is threatened by Communists, it must give first priority to security because only if it remains free is there any hope for democratic reforms. Once taken by communism there will be no more chance for democracy than there is today in Poland or in Manchuria.

He didn't see the inconsistency, between, his "moving onto build an ever stronger structure of international order and justice," and "we shall have as our partners countries which, no longer solely concerned with the problem of national survival, are now working to improve the standard of living of all their people." Yet Chiang was expected to correct all the internal corruption and political deterioration, military deterioration, moral deterioration, economic deterioration, which were the result of eight years of war and invasion, if he was to get our help. It was like saying to the Chinese, "You've got pneumonia. You get well and then we'll give you some penicillin." But they couldn't get well without the penicillin. It's a tragic, tragic story. I repeat, I don't know that we could have succeeded if we had tried, but it's a misrepresentation to let the public think, as most of it still does, that we did all we could, but that conditions in China were so bad and the Chinese government was so uncooperative that it just wasn't possible to succeed.

Some years ago I wrote a piece on "The Five Lies About China." I've got copies, but I won't bother you with the whole of it. The first lie was that we did everything we could, and of course, you can document the falsehood of that all the way down the line. For example, we never gave them one word of moral support in eight years. Not one word, just vilification.

Second, that we gave them enormous aid. Of course, that wasn't true either. State will tell you we sent two billion dollars worth of aid during the war. Well, some seven hundred million dollars of that was the cost in America of supplies which we had started to China under lend-lease. They got as far as Assam at the India end of the Hump. Most never got to China. Piles of that aid were in Assam at the end of the war. They were tying up Marines to guard them, were deteriorating, so were taken out in barges and dumped in the Indian

Ocean. But that still is charged on the books as seven hundred million dollars worth of aid to China.

Another was surplus supplies that cost us some six hundred million dollars that we sold to China for about twenty-one cents on the dollar. That was stuff we had piled up on Guam and about fifteen other islands for use against Japan. A fourth of it was five hundred pound bombs that we had stockpiled to use against Tokyo, etc. Then the Japanese caved in. Some of the most sophisticated equipment we brought home. Most of the rest we were just bulldozing over the cliffs into the ocean to get rid of it so our boys could come home. The Chinese offered to buy it for salvage. They couldn't use five hundred pound bombs, but they would take them apart to get the chemicals and the metal. (They save everything.) Only about 2 percent of the total amount, our men estimated, was usable ammunition for the Chinese. So out of that some six hundred million dollars, in lieu of nothing, we got something like a hundred and sixty million dollars, as I recall. This wasn't a grant. By selling it to the Chinese we were a hundred and sixty million dollars better off than we would otherwise have been.

You see at the time he proposed the Truman Doctrine for Europe--I'm interrupting myself now--Walter Lippmann and a whole group of "liberals" opposed him bitterly because the government in Greece wasn't a good enough government to suit them. It was corrupt, it was ineffective, it was rotten, it was semi-fascistic, it was divided, it looked like any government. does that's gone through years of war and invasion. It was a mess. It took fifty years for Georgia to recover from one year under Sherman, and yet we expected Greece, or Chiang Kai-shek to come out from eight years of invasion and occupation by the Japanese and be all streamlined overnight.

I argued that you can't save Europe in the end unless you save Asia too. You have got to contain both ends of the barrel if you want to contain either. The Truman policy in Europe was to help independent and friendly governments, even like the Greek Government. It wasn't as good as we'd like, but it was at least Greek, and it was fighting for Greek independence. It wasn't part of the world Communist conspiracy which was our enemy. Truman was right with the Truman Doctrine and we supported him in it. The Greek Government pulled through as it couldn't have without our assistance. I wanted him to adopt the same policy in Asia. I said to him, "In Europe we didn't say to the Greeks, or the Italians, or the French when those countries were hanging on the ropes, "We'll help you if you take the Communists into your government." Instead we said, "We'll help you if you keep the Communists out of your government. If you're resolutely against Communist expansionism in your area, we will support you." The policy was right, it opposed Communism, it succeeded.

But Truman did the exact opposite in Asia. He tried to appease Communism. He sent [General George C.] Marshall to China to tell the Chinese we wouldn't help them unless they took the Communists into their government. His policy was right in Europe, it succeeded. His policy was wrong in Asia, it failed.

And I said, "You can't stop Communism and have it fall apart unless you resist all along the line, including the support of some governments we don't like," and I'm reading again from my notes.


Using Source 2

Sourcing Questions	What are the strengths and limitations of oral interviews such as this one? What idea is this section of the oral interview about? What is Judd's perspective about President Truman's policies towards China? How did Judd's experience possibly impact his point of view towards China?
Contextualization Questions	What happened in China in 1949? What was the Marshall Plan? What was its goal? What was the Truman Doctrine? What was its goal? What is appeasement? What was Judd referring to when he used that word?
Corroboration Tasks	What might Walter Judd say to Ambassador Stuart about aid to China? Does Judd's perspective fit with or conflict with others in this document set?
Close Reading Questions	What does Judd say about previous efforts to aid China? What does Judd say about Marshall's mission to China? What does Judd say the US policy towards China should have been?

Source 3

Source Information: Memorandum from Secretary of State George Marshall to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal with Attachment, February 11, 1947. President's Secretary's Files - Subject File.

Note: James Forrestal served as Secretary of the Navy from 1944 - 1947. He was made the first Secretary of Defense after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Forrestal [questioned](#) Marshall and Truman's policies outlined in this source:



Using Source 3

Sourcing Questions	What is the purpose of Secretary of State Marshall sending a memo like this to Forrestall?
Contextualization Questions	What happened in China in 1947?
Corroboration Tasks	Compare these recommendations with other sources you have examined? Who would agree and disagree with these recommendations?
Close Reading Questions	What do these recommendations say about aid to China? What is to be valued/not valued? What rationale for this approach is mentioned by this source?

Source 4

Source Information: Memorandum from General George C. Marshall to Secretary of War Robert Patterson, March 4, 1947. President's Secretary's Files - Subject File

Note: Robert Patterson served as Secretary of War under President Truman from 1945 - 1947. He was instrumental in the creation of the Tuskegee Air Corps during WWII.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have read your letter handed to me at the February 26 meeting of the three Secretaries regarding our policy toward China.

I am in general agreement with the comments made by you on Recommendation (1) in my memorandum of February the 11th. Recent events certainly make it questionable whether the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party can work together in the National Government, but this obstacle does not invalidate our policy of encouraging the Chinese to achieve unity and democracy by peaceful methods. We have a clear practical purpose in mind. We desire a unified democratic China because we believe that such a China would contribute towards peace and progress in the Far East. We do not think that a Communist dominated China could make such a contribution anymore than we think that a feudal-fascist China could do so. Without sacrificing any legitimate national interest, including our security, it is important to prevent China from becoming a dangerous irritant in our international relations, particularly with the U.S.S.R. I believe that we should pursue our objective with patience and perseverance in the hope that the Chinese themselves, with our encouragement, will find a satisfactory solution. We should not be deterred or deviate because of obstacles and delays; nor should we assume that Chinese military action will prove to be capable of eliminating Chinese Communism.

With regard to your comments on Recommendation (2), the President said on December the 18th last that "when conditions in China improve, we will be prepared to give China economic assistance." In my statement of January

the

The Honorable
Robert P. Patterson,
Secretary of War.



Using Source 4

Sourcing Questions	Why did Secretary Marshall send this memo to Robert Patterson, the Secretary of War?
Contextualization Questions	
Corroboration Tasks	What is the connection between this document and Source #3? What does Marshall say is his goal in China? How does that goal influence the policy outlined in Source #3?
Close Reading Questions	What does Patterson say about cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communists? Does Patterson agree with Marshall's policies? How do you know? What does Marshall say about the USSR in this source? What is his fear concerning the USSR?

Optional: Source 5

Source: Telegram from John Leighton Stuart to the Secretary of State, November 19, 1946. President's Secretary's Files - Subject File.

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COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

INFORMATION
COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973
By NLT-HC, NARS Date 6-24-75

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Action: FE

Info :

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C
SA/M
OCD
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Control 5867

Rec'd November 19, 1946
10:30 p.m.

FROM: Nanking via War
TO : Secretary of State
NO : 1908, November 19, 1 p.m.

When Chou En-Lai called on General Marshall to inform him that he wished to return to Yen-an and to ask for transportation, he said that his trip should not be interpreted as action on his part to break off the negotiations but rather that he was going back for a short time for instructions and reorientation. He added that he was leaving Tung Pi-Wu as head of the delegation of some forty Communists in Nanking and ten in Shanghai and that he hoped the negotiations could be resumed before long.

In distinction to the above, Chou has two separate occasions during the last few days told American correspondents that his return to Yen-an does, in fact, constitute a termination of negotiations.

STUART

ECB:DHC



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Using Source 5

Sourcing Questions	Who wrote this letter? Why?
Contextualization Questions	When was this in comparison to China turning Communist?
Corroboration Tasks	How is this different from the way other sources have viewed Gen. Marshall's efforts in China?
Close Reading Questions	What does this source say about George Marshall's efforts in China by 1946?