Source Information: Excerpt A from Colonel Richard Park Jr. Report on the O.S.S.



Possible Postwar Uses of the O.S.S.

The present activities of the O.S.S. are as follows:

1. Secret Intelligence

- a. Liaison with undergrounds, minority groups, and subversive groups in various countries throughout the world.
- b. Espionage.
- c. Interception (radio, telegraph, telephone, etc.).
- d. Dark chamber (cryptanalysis).

2. Secret Operations

- a. Sabotage.
- b. Subversive activities.
- c. Subversive propaganda.
- 3. Research and Analysis
- 4. Counterintelligence
- 5. Propaganda, counterpropaganda and miscellaneous activities

After the war activities under 1 a, 2 a, b, c, cannot be engaged in by any democratic nation which seeks peace and has no ambitions for conquest.

By Presidential directive activities under 1 c and d are assigned to agencies other than the O.S.S. and a Presidential directive in 1942 specifically forbids the O.S.S. to enter into these two fields.

The current O.S.S. Research and Analysis organization covering item 3 is excellent but it seems doubtful that they will be able to keep the high-level key men they now have who are engaged by the O.S.S.

Source Information: William Donovan (Director of OSS 1945) proposal for post-war intelligence agency outlined in memo to Mr. Harold D. Smith (Director of Bureau of the Budget) August 1945



Principles - The Soundness Of Which It Is Believed Has Been Established By Our Own Experience And A First-Hand Study of The Systems Of Other Nations - Which Should Govern The Establishment Of A Centralized Unites States Foreign Intelligence System.

The formulation of national policy both in its political and military aspects is influenced and determined by knowledge (or ignorance) of the aims, capabilities, intentions and policies of other nations.


All major powers except the United States have had for a long time past permanent worldwide intelligence services, reporting directly to the highest echelons of their Governments. Prior to the present war, the United States had no foreign secret intelligence service. It never has had and does not now have a coordinated intelligence system.

The defects and dangers of this situation have been generally recognized. Adherence to the following would remedy this defect in peace as well as war so that American policy could be based upon information obtained through its own sources on foreign intentions, capabilities and developments as seen and interpreted by Americans.

1. That each Department of Government should have its own intelligence bureau for the collection and processing of such informational material as it finds necessary in the actual performance of its functions and duties. Such a bureau


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should be under the sole control of the Department head and should not be encroached upon or impaired by the functions granted any other Governmental intelligence agency. Because secret intelligence covers all fields and because of possible embarrassment, no executive department should be permitted to engage in secret intelligence but in a proper case call upon the central agency for service.

- 2. That in addition to the intelligence unit for each Department there should be established a national centralized foreign intelligence agency which should have the authority:
 - A. To serve all Departments of the Government.
 - B. To procure and obtain political, economic, psychological, sociological, military and other information which may bear upon the national interest and which has been collected by the different Governmental Departments or agencies.
 - C. To collect when necessary supplemental information either at its own instance or at the request of any Governmental Department by open or secret means from other and various sources.
 - D. To integrate, analyze, process and disseminate, to authorized Governmental agencies and officials, intelligence in the form of strategic interpretive studies.
- 3. That such an agency should be prohibited from carrying on clandestine activities within the United States and should be forbidden the exercise of any police functions either at home or abroad.



Source Information: Telegram, George Kennan to James Byrnes ["Long Telegram"], excerpt, February 22, 1946. Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers.

It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it forward many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question (*) self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth---indeed, their disbelief in its existence--leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. is good reason to suspect that this government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers --- extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisers whom they never see and cannot influence---this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.

Source Information: Correspondence from Paul A. Neuland, May 6, 1947, with attached newspaper articles; Central Intelligence; Subject File; Elsey Papers.



wide criticism.

functions.

extensive

Act Like Gestapo Agents
Agents of the CIG have begun
operations on the pattern of the
soviet secret police the MVD, or
Nazi gestapo agents both of whom

usurped diplomatic and intelligence

and has effected the disbanding of the federal bureau of investigation's

South America.

CIG members scribed G-2, army navy intelligence and the FBI forcign operations as "rivals" and consider their first task is to dispose of other American intelligence

undercover

system in

Already the CIG has forced the war department to liquidate its world wide secret intelligence work

in his embassy. A CIG operative is frankly told the ambassador that y latter's Jurisdiction and would take considered himself outside the sorders and submit reports only to cIG headquarters in Washington.

Agents Are Supreme
High CIG officials have said that their operatives will be above milliary and naval attaches. A youthful uniformed CIG operative may Issue orders to a general or an admiral on duty at an embassy, a CIG official said.

The FBI acknowledged that its Latin-American organization was disbanded and the last of its secret operatives returned in April. The liquidation of the FBI system was brought about by CIG over protests of American diplomatic missions that the FBI had made many friends and main ained valuable liaison with officials of the governments in which they operated.

Since the enforced withdrawal of the FBI, CIG agents have not used the channels of communication established by the FBI. In the Nicaraguan revolution, the state department received up to the minute reports on the progress of disturbances.

Army Had Own System

The army's world-wilds.

Army Had Own System

Army Had Own System
The army's world-wide intelligence system was an independent system having no connection with American diplomatic establishments and offices abroad. It gathered invaluable data on the strength and intentions of enemies and potential enemies. The CIG is not yet authorized b

iw, operating one a Presidential diective. It proposes to spend 30 to 0 million dollars, which does not how in the budget because the unit expects to draw on the army, navy, tate department and on funds placed at the personal disposition of the President.

The Presidential directive establishing the unit was issued Jan. 22 altho the directive was composed of igh sounding words, it was recog-ized that the agency was created analyze information regarding ar plans and potentials of foreign overnments.


Sets Up Own Spy System

The avowed purpose of the unitas to correlate and study informaon made available to the Presiden y government departments. How ver, the new agency promptl ound a loophole in the charte which enabled it to establish which enabled it to establish orld-wide system of collecting is ormation as well as evaluating that others collected.

A joker in the directive gave that the right to perform "successof common concern" as common concern as common concern as common concern.

more efficiently accomplished cocally. Heads of CIG decided the

Source Information: Congressman Harold F. Youngblood, R-Detroit to Harry S. Truman, March 8, 1948 with attached petition reply from Matthew J. Connelly, Truman's Appointment Secretary



Mr. Harold Youngblood Washington, D. C.

668 Piper Blvi, Detroit, 15, Wich.

Dear Sir:


Today another European Nation fell by the same Gestapo methods of Hitleril! May we count on you to URGE the President.

TOTALISM. to Call BACK into ACTION, ALL FORMER MEMBERS of the formion of Strategic Services", requesting very earnestly, that he appoint a highly qualified CITIZEN as the CHIEF, who would be able to co-ordinate the information of all other Government Agencies battling forces that will destroy Freedom for all Feeple for All Time.

Clause Des Services 1688 Pefer Blod Debroit 2-24.

Clause Des Johnston, 668 Paper Blod, Debroit 2-26-48 Outel Buckland ail 1318 faker au Detroit 16-70 uh 2400 W. Ild. Blod Datian 3-24-48 1131 Maryland S. P. Mich. 2 26-48 Margaret Weimer Janethe E. L. Vriene 14765 Hillowne Detroit 325 Marlborough Detroit 2-26-4 Ella n. Cummings 484 manistèque " 226,40 Clive Hoay 1133 Dechewon Jane spetce 2.2648 891 Bhilip 2.2648 rabell Edme 2-26-48 represent Hayer Watel Kinss 1377 Philip " 2-26-4/8 " 2-26-48 2-26-48 Mar H. Jan Kampin 414 Jakewood ded This W. E. Gerkon 879 Beaconstilled Ila hindsay 1289 Alread 11 2-26.48 Bertha Gendrai 1289 Drivel 2- 26 48 Mrs. c. v. mills . 842 Barrington Rd. 2. 26.48 Emona & Kindsay 1284 Ereft are 2-2648

March 9, 1948



My dear Mr. Youngblood:

This is in acknowledgment of your letter of March eighth with the enclosed petition transmitted to you by Miss Clarice Dee Johnston.

The President thought you might like to tell Miss Johnston that there has been established a Central Intelligence Agency, provided for in the National Security Act of 1947. As you, of course, know Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillankoetter has been appointed Mirector of this Agency.

Very sincerely yours,

MATTHEW J. CONNELLY Secretary to the President



Honorable Harold F. Youngblood, House of Representatives, & Washington, D. C.

Source Information: Telegram, Joseph McCarthy to Harry S. Truman, February 11, 1950, with Truman's draft reply; McCarthy, Joseph; General File; PSF; Truman Papers.

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE
IN A LINCOLN DAY SPEECH AT WHEELING THURSDAY NIGHT

I STATED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HARBORS A NEST OF

COMMUNISTS AND COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS WHO ARE HELPING TO

SHAPE OUR FOREIGN POLICY, I FURTHER STATED THAT I HAVE IN

MY POSSESSION THE NAMES OF 57 COMMUNISTS WHO ARE IN THE

STATE DEPARTMENT AT PRESENT. A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN

COMMUNIST IN THE DEPARTMENT. YOU CAN CONVINCE YOURSELF OF
THE FALSITY OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT CLAIM VERY EASILY.

YOU WILL RECALL THAT YOU PERSONALLY APPOINTED A BOARD TO
SCREEN STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES FOR THE PURPOSE OF
WEEDING OUT FELLOW TRAVELERS. YOUR BOARD DID A PAINS-TAKING
JOB. AND NAMED HUNDREDS WHICH IT LISTED AS "DANGEROUS TO
THE SECURITY OF THE NATION", BECAUSE OF COMMUNISTIC
CONNECTIONS.

WHILE THE RECORDS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO ME, I KNOW

TO THE SECRETARY FOR DISCHARGE, HE ACTUALLY DISCHARGED ONLY APPROXIMATELY 80. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS DONE AFTER LENGTHY CONSULTATION WITH ALGER HISS. I WOULD SUGGEST THEREFORE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU SIMPLY PICK UP YOUR PHONE AND ASK MR. ACHESON HOW MANY OF THOSE WHOM YOUR BOARD HAD LABELED AS DANGEROUS, HE FAILED TO DISCHARGE. THE DAY THE HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE EXPOSED ALGER HISS AS AN IMPORTANT LINK IN AN INTER-NATIONAL COMMUNIST SPY RING, YOU SIGNED AN ORDER FORBIDDING THE



TATE DEPARTMENTS GIVING TO THE CONGRESS ANY INFORMATION
IN REGARD TO THE DISLOYALTY OR THE COMMUNISTIC CONNECTIONS
OF ANYONE IN THAT DEPARTMENT, DISPITE THIS STATE DEPARTMENT
BLACKOUT, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO COMPILE A LIST OF 57
COMMUNISTS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THIS LIST IS AVAILABLE
TO YOU, BUT YOU CAN GET A MUCH LONGER LIST BY ORDERING THE
SECRETARY ACHESON TO GIVE YOU A LIST OF THESE WHOM YOUR OWN
BOARD LISTED AS BEING DISLOYAL, AND WHO ARE STILL WORKING
IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. I BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING IS THE
MINIMUM WHICH CAN BE EXPECTED OF YOU IN THIS CASE



(1) THAT YOU DEMAND THAT ACHESON GIVE YOU AND THE PROPER CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE THE NAMES AND A COMPLETE REPORT ON ALL OF THOSE WHO WERE PLACED IN THE DEPARTMENT BY ALGER HISS, AND ALL OF THOSE STILL WORKING IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO WERE LISTED BY YOUR BOXARD AS BAD SECURITY RISKS BECAUSE OF THE COMMUNISTIC CONNECTIONS.

(2) THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD A CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE OBTAIN ANY INFORMATION OR HELP FROM THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT IN EXPOSING COMMUNISTS.

FAILURE ON YOUR PART WILL LABEL THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF
BEING THE BED-FELLOW OF INTER-NATIONAL COMMUNISM. CERTAINLY
THIS LABEL IS NOT DESERVED BY THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF
LOYAL AMERICAN DEMOCRATS THROUGHOUT THE NATION, AND BY THE
SIZABLE NUMBER OF ABLE LOYAL DEMOCRATIES IN BOTH THE SENATE
AND THE HOUSE

JOE MC CARTHY U.S.S. WIS...

Draft

My dear Senator:

no Conthey Tile

I read your telegram of February eleventh from Reno, Nevada with a great deal of interest and this is the first time in my experience, and I was ten years in the Senate, that I ever heard of a Senator trying to discredit his own Government before the world. You know that isn't done by honest public officials. Your telegram is not only not true and an insolent approach to a situation that should have been worked out between man and man but it shows conclusively that you are not even fit to have a hand in the operation of the Government of the United States.


I am very sure that the people of Wisconsin are extremely sorry that they are represented by a person who has as little sense of responsibility as you have.

Sincerely yours,

[HST]

CONTAINMENT

Question: In general, how important do you think it is for the United States to try to stop the spread of Communism in the world—very important, only fairly important, ort important at all?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, April, 1950.

Source Information: Central Intelligence Agency Report on Iranian Political Situation 12 October 1951

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 1999-040 #7

By SO NARA, Date 7/16/07

SECRET

Sign

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 OCTOBER 1951

FROM:



EO 12958 3.4 (bX1)

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

(IT IS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT NO DISTRIBUTION OF THIS REPORT BE MADE OUTSIDE OF THE AGENCY.)

1. BACKGROUND.

- A. XENOPHOBIA. IRAN NOW IS ANTI-WESTERN BUT IS VIOLENT ONLY IN ITS MANIFESTATION AGAINST THE BRITISH BECAUSE THEIR PRESENCE IN IRAN UP TO THIS TIME HAS BEEN MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN THE PRESENCE OF ANY OTHER WESTERNERS (FOR EXAMPLE, THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL COMPANY, BRITISH BANK AND BUSINESS FIRMS BACKED BY A LONG HISTORY OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN IRAN). MOSSADEQ CAME TO POWER ON A WAVE OF XENOPHOBIA, THE FORERUNNER OF WHICH WAS THE ANTI-RAZMARA AND ANTI- COURT MOVEMENT (RAZMARA AND THE SHAH DESCRIBED AS SERVANTS OF THE BRITISH). IF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO SIDE SPECTACULARLY WITH THE BRITISH (FOR EXAMPLE, HARRIMAN'S REFUSAL TO PASS TO THE BRITISH MOSSADEQ'S "ULLTIMATUM," AND THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE \$25,000,000 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOAN), THE BRUNT OF ANTI-WESTERN FEELING COULD EASILY COVER THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS GREAT BRITAIN.
- B. DICTATORSHIP OF THE STREETS. THE MOSSADEQ GOVERNMENT IS THE PRISONER OF THE "STREETS." THE "STREETS" ARE COMPOSED OF TWO MAIN GROUPS: THE FOLLOWERS OF MULLAH KASHANI AND THE TUDEH PARTY (WITH SATELLITE FRONTS), BOTH OF WHICH ARE EXPLOITING TO THE FULLEST A WAVE OF GENUINE NATIONALISTIC FEELINGS OF A BROAD SECTION OF THE UPPER MIDDLE CLASS. ALTHOUGH KASHANI'S FOLLOWING IS POSSIBLY MORE NUMBEROUS THAN THAT OF THE TUDEH, THE FORMER HAS NEITHER THE ORGANIZATION, DISCIPLINE, NOR REVOLUTIONARY AND CONSPIRATORIAL TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE OF THE LATTER. ACCORDINGLY, OF THE TWO THE MORE POWERFUL IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE TUDEH PARTY.
- C. THE TRADITIONAL IRANIAN POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND GREAT BRITAIN. THE IRANIAN POLITICAL PENDULUM IS NOW SWINGING DANGEROUSLY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION BUT GIVEN OPPORTUNITIES THE IRANIAN SHOULD REACT AND TURN TOWARD THE WEST FOR SUPPORT (PROVIDING THE WEST IS NOT REPRESENTED BY GREAT BRITAIN ALONE).
 - 2. MOSSADEQ'S COVERNMENT HAS POWERFUL POPULAR SUPPORT.
- A. MAJLIS OPPOSITION TO MOSSADEQ COLLAPSED ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1951. ABDUL RAHMAN FARAMARZI ANNOUNCED THAT THE OPPOSITION WOULD CEASE TO ATTACK THE GOVERNMENT AS LONG AS THE OIL DISPUTE WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SOURCES BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE COLLAPSE OF THIS OPPOSITION IS FINAL. THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE IS A FACE-SAVING EXCUSE. THE OPPOSITION HAS GOTTEN "OUT ON A LIMB," DEPENDING UPON BRITISH POWER AND ROYAL COURT SUPPORT. BOTH FAILED TO COME THROUGH WITH THEIR SUPPORT AND THE OPPOSITION DEPUTIES FEAR FOR THEIR VERY LIVES.

SECRET

Source Information: Ambrose, Stephen (historian), *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938*, revised edition 2010.

In the Third World, however, the application of a little force or a little money could have dramatic results. Allen Dulles's first triumph came in 1953 in Iran. Premier Mohammed Mossadegh had, in the view of the Dulles brothers, drawn too close to the Tudeh, Iran's Communist party, and would have to be overthrown before he made a deal with the Russians. Mossadegh had already nationalized Iran's oil fields, to the consternation of the British, who previously had enjoyed a monopoly on Iranian oil production. Mossadegh was also thought to be a threat to Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi's retention of his throne.

Allen Dulles decided to save Iran by sending his best agent, Kim Roosevelt (Theodore Roosevelt's grandson), to Teheran, along with General H. Norman Schwarzkopf (father of General Norman Schwarzkopf, who led the U.S. Army during the Gulf War of 1991), who had organized the Shah's secret police after World War II. (Organizing and equipping the police force and army of small nations was another method of control often used by the United States in the Cold War.) Roosevelt and Schwarzkopf, spending money as if they did not have to account for it—as they did not—organized demonstrations in the streets of Teheran that overthrew Mossadegh, who went to jail, and brought the young Shah back from exile. The new Premier then divided up Iranian oil production to suit the West: The British kept 40 percent; American oil companies got 40 percent; the French got 6 percent; and the Dutch 14 percent. It would be years before the Iranians tried again to take control of their own resources, and then it would be the Shah that the CIA saved who would do the taking. Meanwhile, however, the Communist tide had been stopped.

Source Information: Interview of Harry S. Truman 1961-62, as presented in Plain Speaking; the Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman by Merle Miller

JJ

THE CIA

I SAID earlier that Mr. Truman was not much given to second thoughts, and I learned not to expect any. But one morning as we were yet again waiting for a cameraman to change film, I said, Mr. President, I know that you were responsible as President for setting up the CIA. How do you feel about it now? A few days earlier we had been discussing the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

"I think it was a mistake. And if I'd known what was going to happen, I never would have done it. I needed . . . the President needed at that time a central organization that would bring all the various intelligence reports we were getting in those days, and there must have been a dozen of them, maybe more, bring them all into one organization so that the President would get *one* report on what was going on in various parts of the world.

"Now that made sense, and that's why I went ahead and set up

what they called the Central Intelligence Agency.

"But it got out of hand. The fella . . . the one that was in the White House after me never paid any attention to it, and it got out of hand. Why, they've got an organization over there in Virginia now that is practically the equal of the Pentagon in many ways. And I think I've told you, one Pentagon is one too many.

"Now, as nearly as I can make out, those fellows in the CIA don't just report on wars and the like, they go out and make their own, and there's nobody to keep track of what they're up to. They spend billions of dollars on stirring up trouble so they'll have something to report on. They've become . . . it's become a government all of its own and all secret. They don't have to account to anybody.

"That's a very dangerous thing in a democratic society, and it's got to be put a stop to. The people have got a right to know what those birds are up to. And if I was back in the White House, people would know. You see, the way a free government works, there's got to be a housecleaning every now and again, and I don't care what branch of the government is involved. Somebody has to keep an eye on things.

"And when you can't do any housecleaning because everything that goes on is a damn secret, why, then we're on our way to something the Founding Fathers didn't have in mind. Secrecy and a free, democratic government don't mix. And if what happened at the Bay of Pigs doesn't prove that, I don't know what does.

"You have got to keep an eye on the military at all times, and it doesn't matter whether it's the birds in the Pentagon or the birds in the CIA."*

*I should add that publicly Mr. Truman continued to uphold the CIA. This was one of the few areas in which what he said publicly differed from what he said privately.

On a disastrous day at the Army Command and General Staff School that Bob Aurthur described in detail in the August, 1971, issue of Esquire, Mr. Truman was asked about the CIA by a young Army officer who was a veteran of Korea. On that occasion Mr. Truman said, "When I took over the Presidency he received information from just about everywhere, from the Secretary of State and the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Department of Agriculture. Just everybody.

"And sometimes they didn't agree as to what was happening in various parts of the world. So I got a couple of admirals together, and they formed the Central Intelligence Agency for the benefit and convenience of the President of the United States. . . . So instead of the President having to look through a bunch of papers two feet high, the information was coordinated so that the President could arrive at the facts.

"It's still going, and it's going very well."

On the other hand, now that I've looked at it again, that's pretty faint praise.

Moreover, it has recently been revealed that as far back as February, 1947, General Marshall in a memorandum to President Truman said of the agency five months before it was set up :"The Foreign Service of the Department of State is the only collection agency of the Government which covers the whole world, and we should be very slow to subject the collection and evaluation of this foreign intelligence to other establishments, especially during times of peace. The powers of the proposed agency seem almost unlimited and need clarification."