Oral History Interview with
Oscar L. Chapman
Assistant Secretary of the Interior, 1933-46; Under Secretary
of the Interior, 1946-49; Secretary of the Interior, 1949-53.
Washington, DC
January 12, 1973
Jerry N. Hess
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Transcript | Additional Chapman Oral History
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This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry
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Opened 1980
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri
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Oral History Interview with
Oscar L. Chapman
Washington, DC
January 12, 1973
Jerry N. Hess
HESS: To begin this morning, Mr. Chapman, Mr. Truman has passed away
since our last interview, his death occurring on December the 26th. And
a week ago today at Washington Cathedral, you and I were both present
at the memorial service held for him. Let's spend a few moments this morning
with reminiscences. What went through your mind during Mr. Truman's last
few days, and when you heard of his death, and perhaps what are your favorite
memories of Mr. Truman?
CHAPMAN: Naturally, when the news came to me of his death I was very
shocked and very grieved, more so than for any public official I ever
had the privilege of being associated with. Mr. Truman, as he has passed
on, and the reminiscence by the news media and the press and the other
publications have all, practically all, have given him a better setting
in his place in history than anyone ever dreamed that he would have--at
least his enemies certainly thought he would never have it. But there's
never been a man in public life that has gained recognition so fast in
the last couple of years of his life, and has gained such stature in the
minds of the people of America and the people of the world. You combine
the two together. I've never seen a man that had a public career so interlinked
with his foreign policies. That was the continuing growth and strength
of the man's work and his character and everything.
You could see it develop in your mind's eye as you sat there and listened
to that sermon, to the comments by the dean. And I was naturally very
touched by these things, because they brought to my memory many of the
fine things that Mr. Truman did for which he never got credit at
the time of the action that he took on certain subjects. And one particular
one that I have to clarify in my thinking on this, is his help in pushing
through the civil rights program that was so wide and extensive, so much
greater than--people who were working on it didn't realize how far-reaching
that program carried the whole principle of human rights, and the care
and attention that he had given to that subject, and to which he had given
so much thought. He knew the subject so well. The problems that were encompassed
in this whole subject were so far greater than, really, many of his people
who worked close with him realized. Some who worked close to him never
did catch the significance of the far-reaching effect of what he had done.
Most of them had, but there were a few who didn't quite catch the strong
significance of his efforts, of what he was doing. They got it and they
got it in a fine way; they got it through contact, of visiting with Mr.
Truman, just as we are visiting here this morning, and talking.
Mr. Truman was a man that wasted no words. When he had a conference with
you about something that he wanted to talk about, that he had on his mind,
like the civil rights issue, of the whole human rights problem as we think
of it today, he had so expanded that and studied it and had it so well
briefed in his mind that he could talk with a man about it in the most
minute detail, of where the injustices had begun, and where they continued,
and where they were still continuing as of today.
To bring that point to a head, he was a man that when he made a decision
he didn't worry about it. He had done the best he could to get the best
information he could on the subject matter before he made his decision.
There's where most people didn't understand him. He did that. He made
a very cautious study of the subject matter before he made a decision
on something that was very vital and important. Something comparable to
the recognition of Israel as a state was so well thought out by him that
he caught the reactions of the different ones of us who talked with him;
he knew those who were brought to the forefront in this fight in many
ways. Some came by way of--if I were putting it in religious terms, I
would say by expression of faith and a new development of the relationship
between ourselves. Putting it in the phraseology of the man on the street
we would say that we learn to live together, and we had to learn
to live together or we will not survive.
That is true, not only of the Jewish people, it's true in several other
areas of the world; that's still ahead of us to be worked out. Mr. Truman
was working on that phase of his problem, of that kind of a problem arising
from another group of ethnic people, of how they lived, and how they worked
with their fellow man.
The Jewish thing was close at hand to him; he knew the Jewish people
so well, and he had worked closely with them. He had always been sympathetic
to the fact that the Jewish people had been persecuted so many times during
the course of history, that they had taken such a terrific abuse in their
daily living, that he saw what they had gone through, and he had a very
deep sympathy for them and the problems that they had faced.
Now, I try to bring this together to tell you that is one of the reasons
why Truman was so recognized in his later years, differentiating from
his early years while he was in active duty; and they didn't give him
the recognition, the press, the other media for public communications,
never gave him a proper place in history in their comments and in their
thinking about Mr. Truman. And that is why they missed it. They missed
this phase of Mr. Truman in their thinking about him, because Mr. Truman,
as I said, wasted no words or time, or anything, but he would go straight
to the point in his conference, whatever the subject was, and discuss
the subject immediately from the heart and the core of the subject, and
discuss it with you in a very quick manner like that; he'd do it in a
very quick manner.
Now, he's a man that had a very deep sympathy for people. That was not
known generally to the public as a whole until in the latter years they
began to recognize his greatness. I began to see that they were
recognizing it in his latter years, his last two or three years in office.
He was beginning to be recognized then as a man of great stature, as a
man that made a decision, and that he had made it on such solid grounds.
It was based upon solid information so he didn't have to change his position
or make any changes in his position during the course of that time, because
he had done so much more studying of this subject than people ever dreamed
that he had done.
I know that you know these things, because of your fine relationship
with the President's family, and I appreciate your knowledge of them that
you would easily catch how what I'm saying is connected with the facts,
life as it developed during those eight years, almost eight, that he had
in office.
Another thing he did to go through and support his particular position
that he was taking on a special issue--I'll use the Israel subject as
an example that will bring us closer to the point. In that case there
were many differences among people close to him; they didn't agree entirely
with the question of how the Israel thing was handled. Some didn't think
that we ought to recognize them. Those who didn't want to recognize them
were not motivated by any prejudice against the Jewish people. Their feeling
about it was thought out and based upon other reasons involving their
desire to protect the interests of the United States and the American
people.
HESS: In a recent interview we were discussing Dean Acheson; what was
Mr. Acheson's views on this matter?
CHAPMAN: I'm just coming to that.
HESS: Good.
CHAPMAN: I'm just coming to that now, because he was so important in
this and being such a thoughtful man in return; he was a brilliant man,
and when he gave you a position on something, a statement on an issue
of this importance, he had given some careful study and thinking about
what and how this ought to be done.
I never had a chance to discuss this very much with Mr. Acheson, for
which I was very sorry. I wanted to and the opportunity just didn't get
around to where we could spend some time on it. Mr. Acheson worked out
in his own mind, and for his own reasons which he supported, why the United
States should not recognize Israel at this time. First, he had an approach
that I think was a little bit unsound. From the long range point of view,
it was a little unsound, where he really believed that we had had the
habit of following the English people so much that we would be following
them in this case instead of leading, and he felt we shouldn't appear
to the world that we were following England because she was doing this;
and that we ought to steer our own course, map our own course, and state
it to the world as to our position, and not to recognize Israel per
se as a state. And he felt very deeply about it--it wasn't just
a casual passing with him--he felt rather deeply about it, I think, and
I give him credit as being a man of deep sincerity and honesty. He felt
this was wrong for the American people and its future to continue the
course we had been apparently following. According to his thinking at
least, we had been following the British policy trends for a long time.
Certainly he was thinking it out in that direction far more than was actually
true. I don't think it was actually as clear as that, or as factual as
he put it, in those terms, to them. I don't think it ever met that test,
that we followed the English in that sense.
HESS: Do you think that the fact that the oil producing lands in the
area were mostly controlled and owned by the Arabs had any influence on
Mr. Acheson’s views on the non-recognition of the new State of Israel?
CHAPMAN: Well, now when you mention the oil you bring up another subject,
that is so powerful in its influence of the American position in the Middle
East, and what we did or did not do in that area. Dean felt, based upon
his knowledge, that the supply of the oil to the world was so heavily
bearing in the hands of the Arab people, that it could cause us unnecessary
trouble in the future, and one that would be extremely damaging
to us in our relationship with the rest of the Arab world, all the rest
of it, and their friends.
I did not think that the oil situation had as much influence on the world
picture as our oil boys over here thought, or as a lot of American
people thought. I don't think it had the influence that they thought it
had, because since that time we have made many discoveries that have brought
in new oil fields that will help us for a hundred years or more.
HESS: We still rely quite heavily on the oil producing nations though,
do we not, the Arab nations?
CHAPMAN: We do, but that's a very well thought out plan; let's use their
oil first, as long as we can.
HESS: And then use our own resources.
CHAPMAN: And then use ours when we have to. You see...
HESS: Was that thought articulated during the Truman administration?
CHAPMAN: Not too much, not too much. It was not articulated too much.
However, I had one good discussion on it.
HESS: With whom?
CHAPMAN: With the President.
HESS: With the President. What did he say?
CHAPMAN: He agreed with me part of the way on that. He thought that I
was probably leaning too far on the--putting too much hope, putting too
much...
HESS: Emphasis...
CHAPMAN: Let's say that I was putting too much stress in my discussions
about their power that they would have in relation to this whole
thing, if they had done this. Otherwise, he didn't agree exactly 100 percent
with my position on what we would do and what would happen if we did it,
you see; and he didn't agree with Dean's position on the precedent, because
Dean was being right out openly opposed to the program of recognizing
Israel, and Dean was a very cautious man. He was a typically trained and
developed State Department man.
HESS: Did he think that if we did recognize Israel that it might shut
off the oil flow from some of the Arab nations?
CHAPMAN: He did; he did very definitely. He felt that could happen in
a very short time after the action was taken. He didn't allow any time
element to evolve there; he thought it would be taken immediately by the
Arab nations and the friends of the Arabs.
HESS: What did Mr. Truman say when Mr. Acheson would give those views?
CHAPMAN: As I told you in the beginning, he never wasted any words in
a conference, and when he had his views made up on an issue that touched
upon human rights and the needs of human beings to have and need certain
things in life, he didn't hesitate to speak very quickly and very frankly,
and he told Dean--I wouldn't say he did this in my presence, because what
he did, he talked to Dean on the telephone out at his farm between 4 and
4:30 in the afternoon, as we got...
HESS: On the day of recognition?
CHAPMAN: Yes, on the day of recognition, and as we had come in on the
train trip, the Western trip, the 10th of May we got in here I think;
at least that date of recognition would give you the day that we got back
into the city from the Western trip.
HESS: From the Western trip in June of '48.
CHAPMAN: That's right.
HESS: But he phoned Mr. Acheson at Mr. Acheson's farm, is that right?
CHAPMAN: He phoned him out at his house and said, "Dean"--now, the President
tells me this...
HESS: Had you also heard the same thing from Mr. Acheson?
CHAPMAN: Not all of it, but parts of it. Parts of it; Dean was very cautious
about ever quoting what he was saying. He was probably more cautious than
I am about quoting the President.
HESS: So, you learned more of this from the President than you did from
Mr. Acheson?
CHAPMAN: I did.
HESS: What did the President tell you?
CHAPMAN: Well, he related to me his conversation with Dean that he had
over the telephone, which was more revealing than anything else that I
had had anyplace.
HESS: What did he say?
CHAPMAN: Remember in my last interview--I think it was the last or next
to it--I told you of the conference that Clark Clifford and I had had
with the President on the train, and it was done so quietly and so--nobody
knew a thing about it because we didn't discuss it, neither of us discussed
that to anyone. Now, there was a reception; I think the Democratic Women's
Club was giving a reception for Mrs. Truman and the President over at
the Mayflower Hotel at 6 o'clock that night, and as I said, we were getting
off of the train at 4 or 4:30 and he drove straight to the White House
and right to the phone and called Dean. When he got over to the reception
all of us were mixing around. So, he walked up to me and with a good big
smile on his face--"Well," he said, "you ought to be happy." He said,
"I signed it within fifteen minutes after they declared the State of Israel.
I have signed the appropriate communications, to the officials of the
State of Israel."
And I said, "You're going to have some problems with my friend, I'm afraid,
on that."
"No," he said, "that fellow even works with your friend; he knew we had
an honest difference of opinion about this. Having that honest difference
of opinion he recognized my right to my opinion as he did his, and in
this case I didn't agree with him."
HESS: He had phoned Mr. Acheson, though, before signing the recognition.
CHAPMAN: He phoned him to say to him--Dean says, "I'll come right in."
Now the President tells me all this. He says, "Mr. President, I'll be
right in to prepare the wire right away."
He said, "Oh, don't go to all that trouble." He said, "The boys here
know enough about that to do it." He said, "I'll get some of the boys
to draft it here and we'll send it out." And he had Charlie Murphy and
Clark Clifford in mind to help draft it, I know. From the way he talked
that's what he had in mind. And he said, "No, Dean, don't bother with
coming in; it's a long way in here and it's late," and he said, "You shouldn't
bother about doing it and I don't want you to go to that trouble." And
he said, "You won't like my position on that anyhow, and maybe it's just
as well you don't bother with it, just let it go."
Dean said, "Well, I'll be very glad to come in and do it for you the
way you want it, just what you want. I know Mr. President I don't agree
with you; as to the future I'm afraid that we will pay for it during my
lifetime."
The President told him, "I don’t agree with you, Dean, that this
will happen. I don’t believe it will happen that way you think it will,
and I don’t put the same emphasis of power in the hands of the Arab people
because of the oil that you do."
Now, I caught that in my talks with Mr. Truman that Dean didn't quite
put the power in their hands that they thought they had; he didn't presume
they had that much power, or would have, because of the production of
oil.
Now, you see, when you open up a big oil field, and you strike a big
field, and you got a fabulous flow of oil, you bring that oil up very
fast; it comes out very fast, and it produces from that field clear out
of proportion to the amount of oil that's being used to the amount of
oil that's being produced. It's out of proportion to it, and if you're
a small country and you hit a pool of oil, before you know it that pool
of oil has sunk to a very low production level. In going through the reviews
of all these fields, you've got the most conservative minds and you've
got very liberal minds among the geologists. Describing the difference
between a liberal point of view in a geologist and a conservative one
may be simply illustrated. Mr. DeGolyer is, I think, one of the greatest
geologists in the world, on oil and gas. I think he was absolutely the
leading man in his field. Mr. DeGolyer was a conservative thinker in making
his reports and in commenting upon his finding of fact on this particular
field that he has surveyed. You will find that he has made a more conservative
evaluation of that field than some people have ever thought that he would
do. But I had known Mr. DeGolyer almost as long as his son-in-law, George
McGhee, had known him. I had known Mr. DeGolyer for many years, and I
saw his work. I saw how he translated his evaluation of a field, on a
given field; how he gave the evaluation of that field differently from
what another man over here would. For instance, Bob Nathan--he's not a
geologist in that sense that Mr. DeGolyer was at all; he wasn't at all.
Now, Mr. DeGolyer did try to support our Government position on this;
actually I turned his support and his endorsement of the oil companies'
position 180° around, because if he was correct in saying that we would
use up all the oil that we've got, entirely out of proportion to our consumption
and our production, then he was saying that we would be out of oil. That
raises my question of using the foreign oil first.
Now, there are two schools of thought on that question clear across the
board, on using foreign goods whenever you can, where it's a natural product,
and where it's a removable product, and shall I say, a very limited product
that will be destroyed...
HESS: Depletion, I believe is the word they use isn't it?
CHAPMAN: That's a very bad word; I don't use it. I testified once before
the Congress and I used that word, and I created quite a conference on
that word. An entirely new set of questions was raised immediately; they
came up from the source that I would expect, and I was expecting it when
I gave it. I knew that this was raised when I...
HESS: Who raised it?
CHAPMAN: Well, in the first place, a liberal from Texas raised it. [Ralph
W.] Yarborough was quite a liberal from Texas. When you speak of a man
as to whether he was a liberal or not, you've got to take into consideration
his environment, the atmosphere that he was raised in and so on.
HESS: Did he oppose the oil depletion allowance?
CHAPMAN: No, he supported it.
HESS: He supported it?
CHAPMAN: He supported it. He later changed; he later changed, but at
that time he supported it. That surprised me, because I thought he was
just on the other side.
HESS: The Secretary of State in 1948 at the first recognition of Israel
was not Acheson, but it was Marshall.
CHAPMAN: No.
HESS: What do you recall about George Marshall's view on the recognition
of Israel as he was the man who was Secretary of State in 1948?
CHAPMAN: That was Dean.
HESS: Well, I believe he was out of Government at that time. He had been
Assistant Secretary a little earlier, but I believe he was out of Government
at this time. He was back in in January of 1949, at the time of the de
jure recognition.
CHAPMAN: Yes. Yes, that's right, that's right.
HESS: But I believe that the de facto recognition came first
CHAPMAN: That came...
HESS: In June of '48.
CHAPMAN: ...in June of '48.
HESS: Yes, and I don't think Mr. Acheson was in Government at that time;
he later came in of course, the day after inauguration day of '49, January
the 21st of 1949.
CHAPMAN: Yes.
HESS: I believe he had been out of Government for a couple of years.
CHAPMAN: He had been out for awhile. Wasn't he in the Treasury Department
for a while?
HESS: He certainly was.
CHAPMAN: He was in the Treasury for a while.
HESS: I think Assistant Secretary or something like that.
CHAPMAN: Yes.
HESS: And then he came back. Do you recall what George Marshall's views
were on the recognition of Israel?
CHAPMAN: I don't know it well enough to be certain about it. What I would
give you would have to be purely a guess job and I would be simply guessing
on what he had done. I got the impression; I had the impression,
and I don't know whether I'm correct or not, because I never sat down
with Marshall and had a chance to talk with him like I did Dean, as I
had with Dean, and as I had with some other members of the group.
HESS: You had a better working relationship with Mr. Acheson, is that
right?
CHAPMAN: Much better. Much better.
HESS: How did Mr. Marshall's relationship stack up with the other members
of the Cabinet. Was he a little distant from them, too?
CHAPMAN: Well, let's put it this way: You first put it in the terms that
he was a little distant to his colleagues, but you soon, after you worked
with him for a while, you soon learned that that bore no inference whatever
towards an issue for or against an issue. He liked the man and trusted
him or he didn't, and he worked pretty much on that level.
HESS: Well, those were my words. I probably should have expressed it
a different way, "What were his relationships with the other members of
the Cabinet," instead of slanting it one way or the other as I did.
CHAPMAN: Well, your slant that I got out of it really supported what
I was somewhat uncertain about, but had the belief, that Marshall at first
was not favorable to this, but he later became--well, it was this way--Marshall
was trained as a military man and he...
HESS: He was a VMI graduate.
CHAPMAN: He was very definitely a VMI graduate, and he had grounded into
him the absolute belief and the idea that you had to support the Chief.
The President's office was entitled to your support and if you couldn't
give it you should quit. And he felt that very keenly, and we had almost
a whole evening's conversation on that subject one night.
HESS: With General Marshall?
CHAPMAN: Yes.
HESS: At his house?
CHAPMAN: Yes. Just he and I.
HESS: What did he have to say about it? What was the occasion?
CHAPMAN: Well, the occasion came up because we both were from Virginia,
and he was a little surprised to learn that.
HESS: To hear that you were from Virginia?
CHAPMAN: Yes, he was surprised to hear that I was from Virginia, and
then we got to reminiscing about some of the old-timers where they--passing
of a generation, was passing. I was just coming into this new generation
and Marshall was going out. Time is going in that direction, see.
Now, I said to him, "Well, Virginia is changing and I believe that the
attitude of the people of Virginia is changing a great deal, and I believe
in another ten years you will have a different Virginia than you have
now in the expressions of their public officials on social issues, particularly
about their expressions on social matters, such as the civil rights issue,
the question of social security, and matters of that kind.
HESS: What did he say?
CHAPMAN: He said, "Well, I think you're partly right, but I don't think
it's going as fast as you think it will. But," he said, "I think the ultimate
end will be--change will be what you are reaching for, and I think you
will get it in time; you will get it."
"Now, of course, it's a question of timing; it will be a question of
how energetic and how successful you are in working your relationships
with Congress, to a degree of successful relationships with Congress,
and if you do that," he said, "I think you can bring your question to
the front, and get it discussed in an atmosphere that's much more favorable."
HESS: In your opinion, what were General Marshall's views on civil rights,
and here I mean mainly black citizens’ civil rights.
CHAPMAN: That's right. For Marshall, it was a personal matter with him.
If he didn't like a fellow, he didn't like him; then he just wouldn't
have anything to do with him. But whether he was a Negro or not, he wouldn't
let that influence him as to what he did.
HESS: Did you ever hear him make any comments on civil rights matters
or on the aspirations of the blacks?
CHAPMAN: I never heard him make a derogatory remark about the Negroes
in any respect whatsoever. I've heard him comment upon the rights of the
Negroes. He said, "The trouble you and I are in--of course, you're just
coming in, I'm going out;" he put it that way. And I said, "The energy
that you show around here betrays your words. You would never make me
or anybody else from Virginia think that you are going out, anyway. You're
going to be right here helping us carry through these programs; and it's
going to be men like you that are going to bring around these other fellows
who are leaning towards the support of the civil rights issue and the
rights of the Negro."
And I said, "I think you are far enough along in your thinking about
the Negro's rights that in the end you are going to be more help than
a lot of these hot liberals that are now shouting, 'We shall learn now,'
and so on."
HESS: We shall overcome.
CHAPMAN: We shall overcome. I said, "You are going to be there; you will
be at the gate right when we come."
He chuckled a little bit and said, "Well, I don't know about that;" he
said, "let me put it this way, I'll be at the second gate if I'm not at
the first."
Now, what he meant by that in the terms of our conversation, was that
he was leaning that way and if Truman got the thought and wanted to do
it, he was going to support him. He was going to do it on the basis of
two principles. First, you should do it or resign from your office, if
you can't support him. The other was, the time has come for some change,
and how we handle that change will determine how fast we will be able
to accomplish the rights we are trying to obtain for them. He says, "I
don't agree with them on their methods of trying to get what they think
is coming to them; however, if I had waited a hundred and fifty years
for my rights to be recognized, I guess I'd be just as hot about
it as they are."
HESS: He made that statement?
CHAPMAN: Yes, he made that statement to me. Now, it didn't mean to me
that he was out and out for the civil rights issue and its people, and
all they stood for; I didn't get it that he meant all of that. But I got
it to mean to me that here's a man that at the right time, his reputation
is so established, that he can support the civil rights issue with President
Truman without getting hurt. He's not in politics, so he wouldn't be hurt
politically, in that respect; so, he would be one of the first types of
man, the kind of men that would be real valuable to Truman to help put
this program across. He would be worth more to Truman than any man he
had on his Cabinet in regard to the question of civil rights when it got
down to the end, because he never wasted any shots; he always saved his
ammunition until it counted, and that's what he did, and that's the way
he was handling the civil rights thing. He was going to support the President's
position. I'm convinced that he was going to support the President's position.
Now, I don't know what he has written about it and I don't know what he
said about it or what anybody else has said about him.
I would like to go back to say that Secretary Marshall was not a man
given to a lot of public speeches to attract attention, and to try
to attract attention on that basis; but he did try, on a conversational
basis, to get with a man that was of some importance and to try to talk
with that man. If he was trying to win him over to his side, he would
take the opportunity, that kind of an opportunity, to talk with him about
it.
On the other hand, he'd let that opportunity also be used to convince
himself of the other fellow's position, let him convince him. He was the
type of fellow who'd want you to support your position. If you said so
and so, what do you back it up with? That's a very good, really a very
good policy to follow, to learn the habit of supporting your statements
that you make that are sometimes shocking to some people, probably not
to others. And he was that kind, and he wanted you to support your position
on it.
I had the highest regard for Marshall; I had a very high regard
for him. I felt he never once attempted to use his friendship with Mr.
Truman to promote himself or his interests whatsoever, not in any respect.
Now there are people who will attempt to use their friendship with Truman
, and sometimes they push--when a man is doing that he usually overplays
his hand and...
HESS: Who do you have in mind?
CHAPMAN: Well, a few friends of mine who were in that Cabinet I liked
very much, but they overplayed their hand a little bit in trying to impress
people of their closeness to the President and their power with the President.
I don't like to use people's name in a way that's not complimentary
when the man has passed away though.
I'll speak freely with you about Louis Johnson who is a very active,
hard working man, tough as a mule, and he'd do anything to gain his point
and win a position. And he'd make you think that he just slept with the
President and that's the reason he was late for breakfast with the Vice
President. He did that to a degree that was revolting to those of us that
really knew the picture, and Johnson and myself had worked together very
closely in the American Legion.
HESS: He had been national commander, had he not?
CHAPMAN: Johnson wanted to be.
HESS: What's that?
CHAPMAN: Wanted to be national commander.
HESS: Wasn't he one year?
CHAPMAN: No, he missed it.
HESS: Oh.
CHAPMAN: I don't think he got it. I know he wanted it; I know he wanted
it, and I'd traded with him. I was in that convention and I traded a little
bit with him, because I was the one who really got the child welfare program
resolution through the convention, to support child welfare, a child welfare
program set up under a format that I had given to him for this resolution.
HESS: At an American Legion convention?
CHAPMAN: At an American Legion convention.
HESS: Roughly what year was that, do you recall?
CHAPMAN: That's back in--should be around, somewhere around between '28
and '32, somewhere within that period.
HESS: You were representing Colorado at that time?
CHAPMAN: Yes, I was a delegate that year.
HESS: Did you hold a state office?
CHAPMAN: No, I never did. I never held a state office politically, or
that way either. I never held a state office.
HESS: And Johnson had come up through West Virginia's
CHAPMAN: That's right.
HESS: ...American Legion.
CHAPMAN: He had, and he had gone quite strong among the Legionaires throughout
the country, and...
HESS: Well, we can check on that, but I'm pretty sure that he was national
commander one year.
CHAPMAN: Let's see if he was; he might have been.
HESS: We will check it.
CHAPMAN: He might have been commander. If he was a commander it makes
a real good story in relation to the child welfare program.
HESS: What was that?
CHAPMAN: Because he was opposed to the child welfare program in the Legion.
You see, I had put in a resolution, I had put in a resolution and I put
it a lot of times, to set up a child welfare division in the headquarters
of the American Legion, working directly under the national commander,
an experienced professional worker who had had experience. So, he got
this woman, and she was an experienced woman, and she knew how to handle
those men like a charm, she was really marvelous at it, at handling these
men. Johnson was opposed to the welfare program, and the reason I was
thinking that he, while he ran for it, he missed it.
HESS: It could have been another year that he was commander.
CHAPMAN: Yes, it could have been another year.
HESS: Because I'm not sure what year he was commander.
CHAPMAN: I'm not either, I'm not either, but he might have been, because
he was very active.
HESS: He opposed your idea?
CHAPMAN: He opposed this idea and here's what I did. You can check this
timing with Paul McNutt. Now, Paul McNutt was running that year against
Johnson; those two were pitted against each other, and this is what I
did. I had the resolution with a certain number of copies all put together,
and in my room that morning, Paul McNutt came to my room first, they found
that I had four states of the West committed to me, that they would support
whomever I supported for national commander, if they would agree to support
the resolution on the child welfare program.
So, I had Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico and Nevada; I had four states.
I think those were the four. I had five states, I had five states.
I had one more state in there. And they were committed to me, not for
me as commander, but committed to support whomever I supported for national
commander on the basis that they had agreed to support the child welfare
amendment--resolution.
So, Paul McNutt came into my room that morning before I got dressed and
I went ahead and was dressing while we were talking. He said, "Oscar,"
he said, "can you support me?" He said, "Now, I haven't got the chance
to know you very well, but," he said, "I think you and I could get along
well together, and I'd be delighted to have you in my setup in some way;
things that you are interested in, I think I'd be interested in."
"Well," I said, "that could be settled in a very few minutes. Are you
interested in this child welfare resolution and have you read it?"
He said, "I read it last night." He said, "Some woman came to me last
night and asked me if I had read it and said if I hadn't read it I ought
to see you." This is the woman he finally got put in there to run it later,
because she was an expert, really an expert on the thing."
Paul McNutt said, "I read it and I see nothing wrong with it." He said,
"What you're doing, you're not limiting the future conventions. You're
committing the present convention to put aside 25 cents of every dollar
that came in, that came in for dues; 25 cents out of every dollar that
came in for dues would be set aside for the child welfare program and
be spent solely for that and nothing else."
I said, "That's exactly what it does, and that's what I want, unless
you think we can get 50 cents."
He said, "I don't think you can get 50 cents, but," he says, "I believe
you can get 25 cents."
"Well," I said, "if it didn't, you'll give us enough money to really
set up a skeleton organization to really run a one-man show, as this would
have to be by the nature of the thing, a one-man show." He said, "And
that's what this looks like you're doing; you are trying to get it started
and later on try to get some more."
I said, "That's exactly my position there. Later on I'm going to ask
for another 25 cents." And I said, "Now, I'm going to double this as long
as I can and keep on chiseling on the fees and dues until I've got enough
in that fund to really get some woman that would be a person interested
in child welfare."
"Well," he said, "now, you're interested in child welfare because you've
worked with the Juvenile Court of Colorado."
I said, "Yes, I did."
"Well," he said, "you've got some friends in your delegation; they think
the world of you, they will do whatever you want, because not that they
think you are such a strong Legionaire, but that you are strong on the
human issues that you are interested in." And he said, "I'm interested
in that." He said, "When I was Governor I got a good record to show you
that I supported those things as much as I possibly could and still be
re-elected."
"Well," I said, "all right, Paul, if that's your word, I'll give you
my word and I will support you and will do my best to get the five states
signed up; and, now, I've got to work fast, because we vote today."
He said, "Yes."
We voted that afternoon. Johnson in the meantime came in to see me. At
noon I still hadn't had breakfast, and he came in around before noon and
wanted to talk with me and I said, "Fine, sit down and have a talk." I
said, "Lou, I don't want to waste your time or mine; right now time is
of the essence here on my votes, you've got a long time to keep fighting
for yours." And I said, "If you are for that resolution, I'd like to get
your ideas on that, and then I'll have to make up my mind between you
and Paul," and I said, "Paul has given me a pretty good endorsement."
"Oh, he won't keep his word about it anyway, so it don't make any difference
because he ain't going to keep his word," said Johnson.
"Well," I said, "I have never had that about Paul; I've never had that
experience about him. And I have the feeling that he did keep his word,
although you may not always agree with him."
Well, we kept on; we were haggling for a few minutes and I said, "I've
got to go down and meet some fellows for lunch and breakfast," and I said,
"I've got to go down, so you let me know what you'll do about it right
now."
"Well," he said, "I can't support that resolution. I read it and everything;
I can defeat that resolution easily." He was as dogmatic as he could be
and he was just that way.
I said, "Well, maybe you can, but I'm not too sure you can. I've got
more support for that than I thought I had when I first got here. I have
whipped up the welfare organizations in the country and got them interested
as a kind of a silent partner, being able to help them in their states
on legislation that they needed for welfare work, and I'd get the Legion
to support them if we had your support, too." And it was a good starting
point, helpful, legislative trading; it is just like what goes on every
day, and I traded. I said, "Well, all right, Lou, we will just consider
then that you are not going to be for the resolution and I appreciate
your honesty in telling me about it."
"Well," he said, "that's the way I do business, Oscar. I do business
right over the table, nowhere else; therefore, I have to tell you that
I can't support your resolution."
He, of course, thought that he had it licked, and he didn't. I knew he
didn't, but I knew it was close, and when Paul got up--I had done a lot
of traveling around that hall during the next three or four hours. Along
sometime in the afternoon we got to nominating our candidates for national
commander--and when the ballot got to Paul McNutt, Paul got up and made
a speech and he did a pretty good job. He did a pretty good job of it
and in it he took this welfare thing and wrapped himself all around it
like the American flag, and I got a little nervous; wondered if he hadn't
made a deal some way or another. I got a little bit nervous about it,
and he kept on selling it in the speech and he kept telling them about
it; and he talked welfare and he discussed how it would be of help to
their own people. And that speech so moved that convention; and Paul was
surprised at the support he got from that. Then, of course, he went to
work hard when he saw that was coming up and then Lou was on the
other side, so far. They both caught it as a hot issue, all of a sudden;
nobody had hardly heard of it, and it hadn't been an issue at all. They
had made it an issue in the way it was brought out. But the thing went
to the point where Paul was elected, and Lou always blamed me for defeating
him, and he said...
HESS: How did you get along during the time that you were both on the
Cabinet?
CHAPMAN: We got along perfectly fine. Well, as a matter of fact, we got
along all right because of the fact Ickes hated him. Ickes had no use
for him at all, and didn't have much respect for his word or his ability,
and he'd give him a swat every chance he got because he just...
HESS: In newspaper columns that Ickes was writing at the time?
CHAPMAN: When he was in the Cabinet.
HESS: I don't believe that they were in the Cabinet at the same time
were they; wasn't Ickes in them earlier?
CHAPMAN: Weren't they in there for a very brief period?
HESS: Well, when he was Harry Woodring's assistant?
CHAPMAN: Assistant, yeah. He was in there...
HESS: Just before the Second World War.
CHAPMAN: That's right, and he was...
HESS: But that is the time that Ickes and Johnson did not get along.
CHAPMAN: That's right. They didn't get along at all. Of course, Woodring,
and Johnson didn't...
HESS: Didn't get along either.
What is your opinion as to why Louis Johnson was selected to replace
James Forrestal in March of 1949?
CHAPMAN: I could never understand that myself, thoroughly, as to why
that was done, because I didn't think that Johnson had done enough to
be in a position at the time to the President and his close associates
to justify his being awarded with that kind of an appointment, to build
himself up. I don't know how to interpret that, how to work it out, because
I couldn't see where Johnson had really made many particular contributions
any more than quite a lot of people had.
HESS: But he had been financial director, or what was the term, what
was the...
CHAPMAN: Chairman of the Finance Committee.
HESS: Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Democratic National Committee.
CHAPMAN: That's right.
HESS: Did you work closely with him during the 1948...
CHAPMAN: Yes, we worked quite closely.
HESS: What is your opinion of the job that he did as chairman of the
Finance Committee?
CHAPMAN: Very lukewarm.
HESS: Could have been much better, is that right?
CHAPMAN: Obviously we could have got a lots more money if they had got
somebody else.
HESS: Anyone in particular that you have in mind?
CHAPMAN: Well, no, I think Forrestal himself would have gotten more money.
I didn't realize that Forrestal was pushing for it very much, anyway;
but I think Forrestal would have gotten more money than Lou did. No, I
know Lou well, and we worked together in an official capacity pretty good
there.
HESS: According to my recollection, Mr. Forrestal was criticized in some
areas because of an almost total lack of activity during this campaign.
CHAPMAN: That's right. Now, I mean some of that was justified, sitting
from my position.
HESS: Wasn't his help requested?
CHAPMAN: I don't think it was. Now, to tell you the truth, I don't think
it was.
HESS: Why wasn't it?
CHAPMAN: I don't know. I don't know why it wasn't.
HESS: Because there are those that say that his lack of activity in the
campaign of '48 played a role in the fact that he left in March of 1949.
CHAPMAN: Well, I don't have any firsthand conversation with anybody about
that that I could depend on about it. I don't really know, but I had a
feeling that he had not been asked to. For instance, I knew that Ickes
was not a supporter of Jim Forrestal, because Ickes was trying to get
Tommy Corcoran appointed as Under Secretary of Navy, and Forrestal was
Secretary; he wanted him to appoint him, and he…
HESS: But he wouldn't appoint him.
CHAPMAN: He wouldn't appoint him, because Ickes never forgave you for
anything like that, and he thought he should have had it, and he wanted
to get it for Tommy; but I don't think that Tommy had very much support
at the White House.
HESS: What type of a job did Louis Johnson do as Secretary of Defense?
He went in in March of 1949; he was there during the beginning of the
Korean conflict and he left in September of 1950. So he was there about
a year and a half through a very interesting time, but what type of a
job did he do?
CHAPMAN: Very interesting. Frankly, I don't know too much about the military
phase of our operation during that period.
HESS: Well, let me jog your memory on just a point or two; one of his
first actions after he became Secretary of Defense was to cancel the aircraft
carrier, the U.S.S. United States...
CHAPMAN: That's right.
HESS: ...and John L. Sullivan, who was Secretary of the Navy at that
time, resigned because of that action.
CHAPMAN: That's right.
HESS: Which gives rise to the very big subject of the reduction of the
armed forces and the Department of Defense at this time. Why was it reduced;
whose idea was it to reduce our armed forces; was Mr. Truman trying to
balance the budget at that time? I've also read that to try to gain money
for domestic programs and domestic spending, that foreign programs and
the Department of Defense were cut back to try to channel more money into
domestic spending. But anyway, it's a long and involved subject.
CHAPMAN: It's a very involved story, one that you have to have some close
association of work with to really get the truth of that story.
HESS: Did you feel that Louis Johnson was cutting back the armed forces
and was reducing the armed forces perhaps more than Mr. Truman
and the Bureau of the Budget was calling for him to do, or was he just
following orders?
CHAPMAN: No, I think he was doing that on his own.
HESS: Carrying orders further than what had been...
CHAPMAN: Yes.
HESS: ...the President's wishes.
CHAPMAN: I felt that he was.
HESS: Because at the beginning of the Korean war, in June of 1950, our
armed forces were down and Mr. Johnson received sort of a bad press at
the time...
CHAPMAN: That's right.
HESS: ...because we were not ready to meet the situation that arose,
because we had been cutting back the armed forces at the time. So, you
think that he cut back the armed forces somewhat more than Mr. Truman
had ordered him to.
CHAPMAN: That was my impression at the time, but as I said, I didn't
have any close working relationship with Johnson as I did with some of
the other Cabinet members like Secretary of Agriculture and even John
Snyder, the Secretary of the Treasury; and there were other Cabinet members
that I was closer to than I ever was to Johnson.
HESS: Okay, fine, that is a very important topic, and I think we might
as well get on that right now. You mentioned John Snyder at Treasury;
you mentioned Agriculture, which was of course, Clinton P. Anderson, and
then later Charles Brannan.
CHAPMAN: That's right.
HESS: But what Cabinet members did you have the best working relationships
with?
CHAPMAN: I had the best relationships with the Cabinet members--first
now let's take them with the Roosevelt administration.
HESS: Yes.
CHAPMAN: A few minutes with that, and I had a good relationship with
Henry Wallace.
HESS: At Commerce.
CHAPMAN: Well, no, it was Agriculture.
HESS: That's right, it was Agriculture.
CHAPMAN: I had very good relationships with him, and I had very good
relationship with Charles Sawyer, and Sawyer, in fact, didn't agree on
a lot of the public issues with me.
HESS: That was at the time when Mr. Sawyer was Secretary of Commerce,
right?
CHAPMAN: That's right, Secretary of Commerce.
HESS: All right, tell me a little bit about Mr. Sawyer; what kind of
a man is he and what were the issues that you disagreed on?
CHAPMAN: He and I disagreed on the civil rights issue. He was not very
helpful in that.
HESS: And he came in in May of 1948.
CHAPMAN: That's right.
HESS: And he stayed there until the end of the Administration. The three
Secretaries of Commerce were Henry Wallace, who was appointed in '45,
in March of '45, and he left, of course, when he went up to Madison Square
Garden and made his speech...
CHAPMAN: That silly speech.
HESS: ...in September of '46, and then Averell Harriman was there from--also
from '47; he was nominated and confirmed--he was not sworn in until October
of '46, it says here, and...
CHAPMAN: There's something wrong with that date.
HESS: Well, there's something wrong someplace isn't there? Because we've
got a couple of '47s in here which I don't understand.
CHAPMAN: Well, probably what happened, he was nominated in...
HESS: Oh, certainly.
CHAPMAN: ...and wasn't sworn in for quite a little while.
HESS: Congress was probably not in session during that period of time.
CHAPMAN: Well, I think that was what happened.
HESS: But why they have this date here I don't know. What we're looking
at here are dates on all of our Cabinet members. But, anyway, Harriman
was there until April of 1948 and then Charles Sawyer.
CHAPMAN: And I had a very good relationship with Averell Harriman. Averell
himself was strange in a way; Averell came from a background totally different
from mine, he...
HESS: Totally different from most, shall we say?
CHAPMAN: Yeah. That's true, and yet I got along swell with Averell and
got help from him. When I say I'm getting along with a fellow if I'm working
on a crusade, and I'm really working on something and I want it, and I
go to those fellows and sit down and talk with them and try to get their
support, and I don't get it, I just consider myself not in their picture,
consider myself not on their team. I just forget it and go on to the next
fellow.
Well, in this case with Harriman, at first I thought, "Oh, I don't know
about this fellow; we're not going to agree on anything," and I kept my
mouth shut, didn't say anything, kept very quiet; and he soon showed his
hands though on two or three issues, and I was quite surprised and pleased
at the position he'd shown on two or three things. Yet, on one of the
things he went to Russia for, I thought he overplayed that a little bit,
for his own good and for the good of the Administration; I thought
that he had overplayed it.
HESS: What did he do wrong?
CHAPMAN: Well, I think what he did wrong there, he came back here, and
then, in ways that I wouldn't have handled it. He didn't give any credit
to the right place at the right time to the President. I didn't think
he was giving him the credit for certain things that had been done that
I knew the President had done and had worked on. But later I got to liking
Averell; later when we got a better working relationship, we got along
together very well, later on. So, highly with that I rated Averell quite
liberal in most things, not everything; in most things, in the latter
part of our administration there, and…
HESS: What would he not be rated liberal on? What was he conservative
on?
CHAPMAN: Well, I guess you could put it that way; it's awfully difficult
to classify him. He's awful hard to classify in simple terms, but he's...
HESS: Is Mr. Sawyer somewhat easier to classify?
CHAPMAN: Yes. He was very definitely conservative.
HESS: Very definitely conservative?
CHAPMAN: Right down the line.
HESS: Well, he even titled his book, Concerns of a Conservative Democrat,
and in his book, which I reread the other day, he mentions that one of
the reasons why he accepted Mr. Truman's proposal to join the Cabinet
was so that he could represent business, the leaders of business, and
to try to change the views of the Democratic administration from being
one of total anti-business attitudes.
CHAPMAN: Yes. Yes.
HESS: Does that sound like what Mr. Sawyer was doing?
CHAPMAN: Yes, that's exactly what he tried to do. He really tried to
do just that very thing.
HESS: He was businesses' representative?
CHAPMAN: He was, and he really tried it in an honest way. I think...
HESS: Was that normal for the Secretary of Commerce to be a business
representative on the Cabinet?
CHAPMAN: That's just what he does; he represents the opinions of the
businessman in most cases. I felt that John Snyder pretty much represented
that position, to a certain extent, more than Morgenthau. I thought that
Snyder represented--when I say represent them, I don't mean that he was
representing them, but what he was doing...
HESS: Fred Vinson was in there, too.
CHAPMAN: Yes, and Fred was in the same position in my mind as Snyder
was; they both could be classified as semi-conservatives, both Snyder
and Fred Vinson. Now, I think John somehow had a better knowledge of the
technical side of money than Fred did.
HESS: Mr. Snyder had been in the banking business for a good many years.
CHAPMAN: Exactly. Well, he knew the mechanics of money, you see; if you
don't know the mechanics of money--I don't. I'd make the worst Treasurer
in the world, because I'd be the--Roosevelt offered me a judgeship, if
I'd take a judgeship.
HESS: In Colorado?
CHAPMAN: No, here in Washington…
HESS: Here in Washington.
CHAPMAN: ...the District, there was one open here.
HESS: About what time was that?
CHAPMAN: That was about, let's see...
HESS: First or second administration?
CHAPMAN: It was in the second, it was in the second administration.
HESS: In the second term, the second term.
CHAPMAN: Yes, and he…
HESS: Why didn't you take it?
CHAPMAN: Well, in the first place, I wouldn't make a good judge, and
I didn't like that kind of work.
HESS: Why don't you think you'd make a good judge...
CHAPMAN: I haven't got the patience; I like to keep moving, I like to
keep working. I like to keep working on things with people. I like to
keep working with people.
HESS: Well, that's maybe the kind of judges we need, to cut down on some
of the backlog.
CHAPMAN: I think probably that is true. But I told the President; I said,
"Mr. President, frankly I don't want a judgeship." I said, "I'm too much
of an active person to want to get shelved, and that's what I'd feel like."
"Oh," he said, "you'd make a good judge." He said, "You'd scare the hell
out of them, but," he said, "you would make a good judge. If you made
any errors up here," he said, "the circuit court will correct you."
I said, "Well, that's a good way to put it, and that's what I have learned
my lesson in the conservation field. I was interested in conservation
before I took the job as Assistant Secretary," and I said, "in spite of
the fact that Harold Ickes is the hardest man in the world to work with,
I don't want this. I have honestly tried, and tried hard to get along
with him and work with him because I wanted to work there. I liked the
work; I like that kind of work;" and, I said, "I'm dealing now with people
where the rights of an individual, the rights of corporations--that's
why I like Interior. I don't know; I know probably the Secretary doesn't
like me and I don't know of anybody that he does like, particularly, but
one person; Tommy Corcoran is the only person he likes.
HESS: I have a question about Charlie Sawyer; you mentioned him a while
ago.
CHAPMAN: Yes.
HESS: He was the representative of business. Let's see if we can find
an example where you may have been on one side and he may have been on
the other, and what I have in mind is the Columbia Valley Administration.
CHAPMAN: Oh, yes.
HESS: Mr. Truman had asked that a CVA be set up much as TVA had, and
some of the major opponents of that were the power interests of the West.
CHAPMAN: That's right.
HESS: Were the power interests of the West actively represented in that
matter by Charles Sawyer?
CHAPMAN: Well, I would say he was as active as he could be and not get
thrown out on his ear.
HESS: All right, CVA was not established.
CHAPMAN: No.
HESS: What degree of credit, or blame, could be given Charles Sawyer
in the fact that CVA was not established even though Mr. Truman wanted
it established?
CHAPMAN: I think it was not because Mr. Sawyer had so much power that
he could do that. It was the fact that the local people in the co-op districts
were very much disturbed about these co-ops being set up, and these dams
being built, whether they were losing a part of their power and losing
anything that they had.
HESS: I think we had better shut off here.
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