Following the general meeting between the President and General MacArthur, [Special Assistant to the President W. Averell] Harriman and I had some further conversation with General MacArthur. . . . I mentioned to General MacArthur the fact that the Chinese have threatened privately to enter the Korean war if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. He said he did not fully understand why they had gone out on such a limb and that they must be greatly embarrassed by the predicament in which they now find themselves. I said that we assumed that under great Russian pressure it might not be impossible (though improbable) that Red China might declare war on the United States. Such a declaration might cover merely a stepping-up of indirect support to North Korea. I asked General MacArthur whether he thought such a declaration should be treated with contempt or what he thinks our attitude should be. He said that he did not believe that Peiping would declare war on the United States without assurances of Russian support, that they would not declare was as a gesture, and that we should treat any such declaration with the "utmost seriousness." . . . General MacArthur expressed the greatest admiration for the ability of the South Koreans to reorganize their forces into an effective combat force during the period of general retreat and discouragement in the opening weeks of the war. . . . He said that, had the South Koreans not pulled themselves together and fought well, the war might have had quite a different result. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk Memorandum October 14 [15], 1950 Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume VII, 1950

. . . [A]fter the conference, [Ambassador at Large] Mr. [Philip] Jessup, [Special Counsel to the President] Mr. [Charles] Murphy, [Press Secretary to the President] Mr. [Charles] Ross, perhaps others, worked up a communiqué which was to be issued covering the reports as to what took place. That communiqué was submitted to the President and approved, and submitted to me, and I initialed it. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Congressional testimony, May 3, 1951

Personal Secretary to the Ambassador at Large Vernice Anderson Source: Truman Library

The President outlined the major items to be included in the communiqué. The General added a few items. Then [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General [Omar] Bradley, Ambassador Harriman, and Ambassador Jessup, with the assistance of Mr. Ross, dictated to me various portions. I typed each segment from their dictation, and these were assembled in a very rough copy. This draft was then taken to the President and the General, who were still in the building, for their preliminary clearance. It was during this interval that I spoke to the General and he made the remark which Brigadier General Courtney Whitney attributes to him in his book. I thanked the General again for his hospitality to us during our visit to Japan earlier in the year and told him how grateful we had been for [MacArthur's pilot] Colonel [Anthony] Story's fine escort services to us in Japan and Korea. So you see, my presence at the meeting was not unknown to the General. Personal Secretary to the Ambassador at Large Vernice Anderson Oral history interview, February 2, 1971

We [the Press] were in a bad fix. We had to settle on something that reporters never like to agree to, because they want to compose and write their own reports and their own dispatches, with their own name over the story. We had to agree there would be two stories written, both were what were called pool stories. This meant that the three press association correspondents together would write one dispatch. My recollection is that this was limited to five hundred words at the most; it may have been longer. The several other reporters that represented the individual newspaper press, not only of the United States, but of such things as the [British] Reuters agency, pooled together on a single story themselves. It had to be done, so we faced it. Then we found out that in addition to these two stories, that [Press Secretary Charles] Ross had agreed with the representative of the New York Times (who had apparently raised enough Cain to make him finally say okay), that he was to be privileged to write his own individual story. Well, all hell-fire broke loose! . . What Ross' reasons were, who could say. The New York Times, as I've said before, has great prestige, and this may have been it. All in all, it was not a happy situation. The representatives of the other newspapers who felt they were just as important as a reporter from the New York Times, got onto him. So much Cain was raised, that my understanding is, that this was rescinded. The place was in an uproar in either event. The circumstances wound up so that the Truman-MacArthur conference was very poorly and very inadequately covered. International News White House Correspondent Robert Nixon Oral history interview, November 4, 1970

President Truman awards fourth oak leaf cluster to the Distinguished Service Medal to General Douglas McArthur. Photo: The Album, The President's Trip to Wake Island, October 15, 1950. Source: Truman Library.

I then retyped the final version of the communiqué and it was taken to the President and the General for their formal clearances. As soon as we all could collect our papers, and I got my typewriter and supplies, we were driven in the antiquated bus back to our planes. The President had left the building immediately to rest briefly at the home of the local Pan American manager. General MacArthur departed about an hour later and joined him at this location for another private conversation of about a half hour. Then they came to the runway. Before departure the President presided over a brief runway ceremony awarding a fourth oak leaf cluster to the Distinguished Service Medal to the General, and the Medal for Merit to Ambassador Muccio, our Ambassador to Korea, who had accompanied him. The citation read " . . . for valor and courageous devotion to duty and superlative diplomatic skill." Personal Secretary to the Ambassador at Large Vernice Anderson Oral history interview, February 2, 1971

In pinning the medal for the "Citation for Merit" on me just before departure, President Truman whispered how pleased he was that I got on well with the General. He added that he felt that a great deal had been accomplished at the conference." Ambassador to Korea John Muccio John Muccio to John Wiltz, February 18, 1976 Truman Library Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection

As soon as the ceremony was completed and the photographers had taken their last "one more," we said our farewells and took off in our respective planes. Once aloft, we caught our breath, had a bite of lunch, and then General Bradley spoke to us. The thrust of his comments were that this had been an extremely important and historic meeting. He indicated that some of us may have been surprised at some of the things we had heard, and, truly, it had been a very enlightening conference for all. He proposed that immediately all of us write our impressions, recollections, and understandings of the meeting to the last detail and to the best of our ability. He agreed he would then make a composite record of this event for the official record. Personal Secretary to the Ambassador at Large Vernice Anderson Oral history interview, February 2, 1971

I was very surprised to find that Miss [Vernice] Anderson had been taking down these notes; as she said afterward, I believe, it was just more or less automatically. I was very surprised to find that she had taken down quite a bit of conversation, and was able to fill in some of the notes that Mr. Jessup had taken, [Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs] Mr. [Dean] Rusk, Colonel Matthews of my office, and myself; so we took all of those notes that each of us had taken, and we compiled what we called or thought was a rather complete report of the meeting. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley Congressional testimony May 22, 1951.

She [Vernice Anderson] was not instructed to take notes, but it was entirely natural that she should - and all of us expressed appreciation later that she had; it greatly assisted the preparation of the record. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk Dean Rusk to Harry Truman, December 21, 1953 Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post Presidential Files

As I have said, we would have had practically as full notes without hers. It was very helpful to have them checked from hers, but we had notes ourselves, in longhand. Everybody saw us making the notes. We all had pads, around the table, as you have, here. We all took notes at the time, and we would have been able to put them together in about the same way. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley Congressional testimony May 22, 1951.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thus having spoken, we all sat down with pad and pencil in hand and began. Since I was the only one lucky enough to have a typewriter--my world traveled portable which still serves me well, thanks to the Royal Company--I started typing my shorthand notes. They were quite complete, but not absolutely verbatim. Ambassador Jessup dictated to me his quite complete notes, which I typed also before we landed in Hawaii. General Bradley in due time collected all these notes, including those of the people of ambassadorial and secretarial stature (Ambassador Harriman, Secretary [of the Army Frank] Pace, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Jessup), and the junior staff (Colonel Matthews, Major [Vernon] Walters, and me). Major Walters, an expert in international forums, has a phenomenal memory. It was incredible in comparing our notes later to find that entire paragraphs which he wrote from memory after the meeting were identical to my notes written in shorthand during the meeting. . . At the beginning of this exercise we all revealed what type of notes, if any, we had taken. Personal Secretary to the Ambassador at Large Vernice Anderson Oral history interview, February 2, 1971

On the return flight, . . . he [the General] was his sparkling best, and, for MacArthur, effervescent. Ambassador to Korea John Muccio John Muccio to John Wiltz, February 18, 1976 Truman Library Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection

President Truman at the airport upon his return from Wake Island flanked by from left Special Assistant W. Averill Harriman, Defense Secretary George C. Marshall, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Ambassador Philip Jessup, Treasury Secretary John Snyder, Army Secretary Frank Pace and General Omar Bradley. October 18, 1950. Photo: Abbie Rowe, National Park Service Source: Truman Library

When we came back it was decided that General Bradley and I would have an off-the-record conference with the press about Wake Island, which we did, which was promptly leaked the next day. The general trend of the discussion became public in almost no time at all. . . It was a very disappointing process from my point of view. I mean, I realize a lot of off-the-record things are treated casually, but I felt that this one was really one that should not have been. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Oral history interview February 17, 1972

When we returned to the United States, General Bradley prepared the official record of the meeting. It was circulated in draft form for the clearance of the participants before being typed in final form by General Bradley's secretaries. Since it was a top secret document, a very limited number of copies were made, each one, of course, being numbered and controlled. Five copies were sent to General MacArthur . . . . Personal Secretary to the Ambassador at Large Vernice Anderson Oral history interview, February 2, 1971

When we were returning from the old State Building where the press conference was held, the president told Charlie [Ross] and me again how he felt about it all, that MacArthur was a good soldier and loyal. He said that when he and MacArthur talked alone for an hour at Wake Island, MacArthur spent some time apologizing for the Veterans of Foreign Wars statement [which Truman had “withdrawn” because it did not match the President’s policy in Formosa and the Far East]. It seemed clear to me that the president’s feeling toward MacArthur had changed from what it may have been before the meeting and that he now looked upon him far more favorably and in a far more friendly spirit. Charlie Ross had what was a form of transcript of the meeting which was held at Wake Island after the president and MacArthur talked alone. This second meeting was participated in by General Bradley, the state department and staff members including Charlie Ross. Ross said no stenographic record was made of the conference and the so-called transcript was prepared from notes. There was one woman stenographer on the trip, secretary to Philip Jessup of the state department. Charlie said she was in an adjoining room and took some notes. He questioned the ethics of this. The transcript showed that during the session the president said there was no need to discuss Formosa, that he and General MacArthur were in complete agreement. The president told us that the reason he stopped any discussion of Formosa was because of MacArthur’s apology to him in their discussion and his desire to avoid any possibility of humiliating MacArthur before the others. Assistant Press Secretary to the President Eben Ayers October 19, 1950 Papers of Eben Ayers

I did not read the copies-the copy that was sent me. I merely put it in the file. I have no idea whether it was authentic or whether it represented it or not. By that time . . . that incident was about as dead as the dodo bird. They had no bearing on what was taking place in Korea then. . . . I have no doubt that in general they are an accurate report of what took place. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Congressional testimony, May 3, 1951

Someone spoke of an interview in some newspaper or magazine with the secretary who accompanied Philip Jessup to the Wake Island Conference. She was the only girl who made the trip. The story quoted her as saying that she took the notes that formed the basis of the president’s speech in San Francisco. The president commented that he thought at the time she should have been left in Honolulu. Assistant Press Secretary to the President Eben Ayers October 25, 1950 Papers of Eben Ayers

Two weeks later [after the Truman-MacArthur Wake Island Conference] (i.e., the first week in November while I was on consultation in Washington), President Truman told me that he was pleased that a better understanding with MacArthur had come out of the conference. My considered opinion is that President Truman's purpose was to impress on the people of the U.S. how far he had gone to get MacArthur to collaborate; in case the General should continue his intransigence and public confrontation became inevitable. It should be borne in mind that in July [actually early August] he had sent Governor Harriman out to talk to MacArthur with no success. Truman was so genuinely preoccupied by the threats of the then still monolithic communistic world that the Korean aggression could not be dealt with as an isolated or detached incidence. For a while, Truman acted as though he felt that he had succeeded in avoiding such a confrontation with the General. Ambassador to Korea John Muccio John Muccio to John Wiltz, February 18, 1976 Truman Library Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection

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