|
Winter Campaign Chapter section from: Airbridge to Berlin --- The Berlin Crisis of 1948, its Origins and Aftermath
By D.M. Giangreco and Robert E. Griffin
© 1988
(Used with permission)
. During October 1948, the 100th day of the airlift was celebrated with speeches, statements, and a special Berlin postal cancellation on mail. The initial stage of the airlift had been very successful, but the Soviets showed no signs of ending the blockade and the big test of winter was approaching. Would the Western Powers be able to continue the pace during the normal bad weather of late fall and winter in northern Europe? Would the Berliners continue to support the Western Powers if food and coal ran out? The Soviets were still betting the airlift could be not sustained during the winter and continually publicized the forthcoming withdrawal of the Western Powers from Berlin.
One of the problems still existing which thwarted maximum airlift efficiency was divided command. General William H. Tunner headed up the American effort which had been designated the 1st Airlift Task Force with headquarters in Wiesbaden under the USAFE commanded by General Curtis LeMay. The British effort was headed by Air Commodore J.W.F. Merer, commanding the No. 46 Group, under Air Marshal Sir Arthur P.M. Saunders, commander in chief of the British Air Forces of Occupation (BAFO). Some aspects of the airlift were coordinated, but if schedules could be consolidated at all participating airfields, smoother and more efficient operations could result. Tunner had already sent C-54s to the British airfield at Fassberg in August and desired to send more to take advantage of the short central air corridor.
At Tunner's suggestion, LeMay approached Saunders about establishing combined US-British airlift operations. The British, realizing the Americans would get the top post because the US airlift effort was much larger than theirs, were reluctant, but finally in the interest of a more efficient operation, the British agreed. On October 15, the British and Americans announced the establishment of the Combined Air Lift Task Force (CALTF) with Tunner commanding and Merer as deputy commander.
The central and northern Berlin air corridors into the British Zone of Germany were not only shorter, but over flatter terrain than the southern corridor leading into the US Zone. By October the airlift was utilizing six British Zone airfields -- Fassberg, Wunsdorf, Bueckeberg, Fuhlsbuettel, Luebeck, and Schleswig-Land -with a seventh nearing completion near Celle plus the seaplane base at Finkenwereder. Only Wiesbaden and Rhein-Main from the US Zone were being used.
The British, who had a very mixed fleet of military and civilian contract planes, could not fully use their better situated airfields. The Americans, who had by October 1 standardized their fleet with the larger C-54s, capable of delivering a ten ton load
per plane, were supplying more than 3,000 tons per day versus the 1,500 tons per day by the British. It made sense to station even more C-54s at the British fields where two planes could do the work for three from Wiesbaden or Rhein-Main and Tunner moved additional C-54s there when Celle was completed in December.
It also made sense to use the large C-54s for the basics, such as coal and foodstuffs, and use the British mixed fleet for more specialized cargos. Liquid fuels were supplied largely by a British civilian tanker fleet operating out of Wunsdorf. Prior to the arrival of the British tankers, liquid fuel had been hauled into Berlin in 55 gallon drums which were clumsy, space consuming, and had to be steam-cleaned in Berlin and lifted back out.
|