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Winter Campaign
Chapter section from:
Airbridge to Berlin --- The Berlin Crisis of 1948, its Origins and Aftermath
By D.M. Giangreco and Robert E. Griffin
© 1988
(Used with permission)
Another difficult commodity was salt and Berlin required 38 tons per day. Salt is difficult to transport because it eats through alloys and cables causing severe damage to airplane control systems. At first, the British Sunderland flying boats, which were treated to resist the corrosive action of salt water, were used. They operated out of the Finkenwerder seaplane base near Hamburg and landed on the Havel Lake in Berlin. However, when winter came and ice formed on the lake, the use of the Sunderlands had to be terminated. Thereafter, the British assigned Halifax bombers to haul salt. The salt was carried in special basket-like containers slung in the bomb-bay section.(1)
To build the new airfield at Tegel in Berlin, heavy construction equipment was necessary. In addition to the US C-82s and one C-74 Globemaster available to transport such heavy equipment, the British Bristol freighters were used for these awkward loads. Luebeck airfield became the receiving station for some 68,000 persons, mainly children and elder persons, evacuated from Berlin while Bueckeburg airfield operated a passenger shuttle system to and from the city.
The establishment of CALTF also changed the concept of the airbridge. Previously, the airlift´s mission was to assure the minimum daily required tonnage arrived in Berlin. Thereafter, the effort would be to increase tonnage from daily quotas to unlimited tonnage. In other words, if there was congestion in the Berlin air corridors and operations had to be slowed down, a US C-54 with ten tons of cargo took precedence over a Royal Air Force Dakota with three tons.
Of all the difficulties facing the airlift, one of the greatest single problems was weather. Low clouds, fog, freezing rain, turbulence, and ice were daily contingencies that had to met and overcome. With these facts in mind, airlift planners throughout the early days of the operation prepared flight procedures, traffic control measures, and landing aid installations that enabled the airlift crews to operate in weather conditions well below the established Air Force minimums.
Germany, with the latitude of Labrador and the temperature of the US mid-Atlantic coast, presents one of the most difficult forecasting areas in the world. During the winter the proximity of the warm Gulf Stream and the cold North Sea causes the inter-mixture of air masses of widely varying temperatures and humidity, and frequent frontal passages with inconsistent rates of movement made accurate forecasting a major problem. Newspaper reports such as these were not uncommon in November and December 1948:
Berlin, November 3, 1947, Der Kurier: "Although rain and fog during the last 24 hours greatly hampered operations, 412 US and British flights moved more than 4,000 tons of supplies to Berlin." Berlin, November 4, 1948, Der Kurier: "During the past 24 hours, 315 US and British flights carried more than 3,000 tons of supplies to Berlin. Due to unfavorable weather conditons, flying operations at the Gatow airfield had to be interrupted for ten hours...." Berlin, November 8, 1948, (AP): "During the night to Monday, a dense fog over Frankfurt and Wiesbaden greatly obstructed airlift operations." Berlin, November 18, 1948, Der Kurier: "Due to overcast conditions prevailing in Western Germany, only 25 airplanes were able to take off from Frankfurt. All of the crews had reported for duty voluntarily...."
By the end of October 1948, the airlift operational techniques were established. The necessary planes and personnel were in place. However, the question remained: Could the Airlift Task Force supply a city of more than two million people totally by air during the poor flying weather season from November through January? Many historians have wondered what the outcome of the Berlin Airlift would have been had the Soviets instituted the blockade in October instead of June.
The minimum conditions for the airlift airfields were 200 feet ceiling and one-half mile visibility, except Tempelhof (because of the apartment buildings) which was 400 feet ceiling and one mile visibility. The US Air Force, which before the airlift had a single weather squadron in Europe, did everything it could to beef up its weather forecasting. A B-29 squadron in England was assigned to conduct weather observation missions. Airlift pilot reports were used extensively, but a change of 1 degree in temperature or a few knots change in wind force could mean a variation of visibility and ceiling that could mean the difference between a successful landing or a pass over and return to base without landing the necessary supplies for Berlin.
Pilot Jeff Warren recalls several landings at Tempelhof when his altimeter read 100 feet and he could not see the landing strip. As Warren stated it would have been easy to refuse landing under such conditions and turn around for home. Why did pilots, who had three years earlier been bombing this same city, now risk their lives to feed and support it? Several pilots have stated it was a simple matter of pride. They had a mission to accomplish and they set out to prove to everybody and anybody they could fulfill that mission under any condition.
From July to October 1948, the tonnage delivered to Berlin increased each month. In July, 69,000 tons were delivered; in August, 119,002; in September, 139,623; and in October, 147, 581. In November, the first month of the bad weather period, the tonnage delivered declined to 113,588. What would happen in December, January, and February?
Several events occurred in November and December 1948 which turned things around for the airlift. The new Tegel airfield in Berlin and another new airport in the British Zone at Celle-Wietzenruch became operational. The US Air Force increased the total number of C-54s assigned to the airlift to 225. The number of British Royal Air Force planes was also increased and the number of chartered planes from private airlines increased.
The significance of the two airfields in the British Zone at Fassberg and Celle was immense. Because of their close location in two of the three air corridors, flying time between these two airports and Berlin was only about half that of Rhein-Main and Wiesbaden to Berlin. Celle and the most important and most carried commodity into Berlin. In December 1948, delivered tonnage to Berlin dramatically increased to 141,468 on 16,487 flights. This was 2,300 fewer flights than were required to carry almost the same tonnage in September when the C-47s were still being used. In January 1949, a new record monthly tonnage of 171,959 was delivered.
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