

March 26, 1948

## *Pakistan File*

General Marshall, representing the Executive branch of the Government in this matter, has two heavy burdens: the finding of some solution for a highly complicated problem, and the persuading of important groups of American and other opinion to cooperate with a proper solution. General Marshall has been using for these two purposes the regular staff of his Department. The question is whether it would be useful for him, in addition, to select and make use of special assistance.

It is in the great and long-standing American tradition for the American government <sup>to</sup> ~~not~~ make use of two practical principles of government in a matter of this sort:

(1) To bring in additional and resourceful brains, whenever useful, for the purpose of possibly finding new ideas for straightening out kinks that seem to be difficult or impossible. Sometimes the Government calls in a man already in the Government, and sometimes it calls in some satisfactory person who happens at the moment not to be in the Government.

For example, when considerable sections of American public opinion were critical of the course of our Government in China,

and even of the kind of understanding and factual reports our Government in Washington was getting from the Government's representatives in China, General Marshall was sent out on a special mission to China. This resulted in unifying American opinion in support of the Government.

Another example: in order similarly to satisfy public opinion at home, and even to meet the complaints of the Russian government at the time that the American government's representatives in the Balkans were doing an unfair job, our Government sent Mark Etheride to the Balkans to ascertain the facts, to report, and to straighten out kinks that were proving so difficult for the regular men on the spot in the Balkans.

(2) A second well-established principle of the American government, in every one of its branches, is that when it becomes desirable to obtain the cooperation of any group, it may become useful to employ for that purpose a person who is trusted by the group that has to be persuaded to give its full cooperation.

For example, even within Congress, when it is necessary

to straighten out differences of opinion, the usual practice is to seek that Senator or that Member of the House who has the most influence with the opposing or contending group of Senators or Representatives.

So deeply ingrained is this principle in American government practice that when quite recently a District Judge in the District of Columbia decided to preside over a case, despite the objection that he would necessarily be biased, the Appellate Court over-ruled him and said that even though a District Judge were not biased, he should refuse to try a case once his bias was brought into question, even though incorrectly and unjustly charged.

The present Palestine problem presents an example: No matter how the problem is solved, no matter how the present proposal may be modified, Secretary Marshall's representative dealing with the Jews will have to say to them on important points - NO. Wherever their

cooperation may be asked, whether on the subject of agreeing to a truce or anything else, that cooperation will have to be requested in spite of the fact that the answer to them on at least some important points will unquestionably have to be, NO. Who is more likely to succeed in getting them to accept a rejection of their position on any point? An aide of General Marshall whom they deem (whether rightly or incorrectly) biased against themselves? Or an aide of General Marshall whom they respect and trust?