Congressional leaders and the public are informed that the the President has ordered air and sea forces to give the South Korean government troops cover and support. The U.S. Seventh Fleet is directed to prevent any attack on Formosa (Taiwan) and to see that the Chinese ("Nationalist") Government on Formosa cease operations against the mainland People's Republic of ("Red") China. The United Nations Security Council adopts a resolution recommending that the members of the U.N. furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea in order to repel the attack and restore peace and security in Korea . Image: Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman. Source: Truman Library At 7:13 a.m., the President asked the White House operator to get [Ambassador W.] Averell Harriman (who was in Paris) on the phone for him. The call came through on overseas telephone lines and the President spoke with Harriman from 7:29 to 7:31 a.m. from the swimming pool. The President asked Harriman to come home as soon as he could. (The [actual] announcement of Harriman's appointment as [Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which was to have taken effect on the 1st of August] . . . had been made on [the] 16[th of] June.) Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey Memorandum for the record based on "Miss Hachmeister's records and G.M.E.'s notes," no date Papers of George M. Elsey           I called the President and he said, "Yes, why I would like you to come back," and he asked, "How soon can you get here?" I said, "Well, I'll leave this afternoon." So I left on four hours notice. Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman Truman Library Institute conference comment, May 1975 The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976)           At 9:50 A.M. the President met, in his office, with Secretary [of Defense Louis] Johnson, Under Secretary [of Defense Steve] Early, [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General [Omar] Bradley and [Army Chief of Staff] General [J. Lawton] Collins. At this meeting the draft of a statement - the second by the President - on the Korean situation was discussed. After this meeting several changes and minor revisions in the statement were made at the suggestion of the President and the Secretary of State [Dean Acheson] and the final statement [to the public] was submitted. Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey Memorandum for the record based on Eben Ayers' chronology of events, no date Papers of George M. Elsey           [Press Secretary to the President] Charlie Ross . . . got in about 10:00 planning to leave immediately for an appointment with his doctor at 10:30. He went in ahead of us to see the President, and when I went in he had a text of a proposed statement by the president on the Korean situation. Some changes had been made in the draft, and the president asked me to check these with Secretary [of State Dean] Acheson and then have twelve copies made for a meeting the president had called for 11:30 with members of the foreign affairs and foreign relations committees of Congress. . . . Ross came in . . . and at twelve o'clock or shortly before, he called in the newspapermen and gave them the statement [by the President]. . . . The correspondents went out of the office in a rush. The statement was the outgrowth of another conference which the president held last (Monday) night at Blair house with the same group which met with him Sunday night. At last night's meeting the final decisions covered by the statement were made and the orders to carry them out were sent out immediately afterward. Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers Diary entry, June 27, 1950 Papers of Eben A. Ayers           We had a meeting with the Congressional leaders on the 27th at which the President reported to them everything that had happened and all that he had instructed. We had also called another meeting of the U.N. for the afternoon of the 27th to put before them a resolution which would call upon all members of the United Nations to give assistance to the South Koreans. We were confident that this meeting was going to adopt the resolution; it had originally been planned for the morning of the 27th. However it was put over to the afternoon because the Indians had not yet gotten instructions and they thought if they waited until three o'clock they would have instructions. This produced a problem for us which has since given the Russians some propaganda. After we met with the Congressional leaders . . . . and people were going out, and everybody knew that there were hundred of newspaper men waiting outside--all of this would come out in all sorts of distorted [ways], and therefore we had a statement prepared . . . giving these decisions of the President which he had approved. It was decided to give that out. This created a difficulty in time, because as you see, this says that the U.S. air and sea forces are ordered to give South Korean forces cover and support. This is military action supporting South Korea. It wasn't until 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon that the U.N. asked us to do what we said we were going to do at 11:00 or 12:00 in the morning. [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Y.] Vishinsky has always had a great time with this, saying that all this idea that we were carrying out U.N. Orders was perfect nonsense, because the President was doing this four hours before the U.N. thought of it, etc. etc. Secretary of State Dean Acheson "Princeton Seminar" comment, February 13, 1954 Papers of Dean Acheson           The [United Nations Security Council resolution of June 27] . . . did not pass unanimously. That was drafted in my office. . . . I remember that at one stage . . . [Deputy U.N. Represenative Ernest] Gross and Senator [Warren] Austin [the U.N. Representative] were on the telephone and said, "'We've gone as far as we can. If we could postpone this another 24 hours, we might get the Indian vote, but we're not at all sure, What do we do?" I've forgotten what the lineup was, but the Indian vote would have been important. . . . I said, "I'll check this with the Secretary, and call you back, but I don't think we can wait. You've given all the arguments and they know this thing. There's a UN Commission in Korean. There was; and they reported there had been aggression and the North Koreans did it." I said, "What more can you say than that?" [Secretary of State Dean] Acheson confirmed what I said and I reported back to Senator Austin at the UN, India and one or two other states abstained but the resolution passed. Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs John Hickerson Oral history interview, June 5, 1973           [Undersecretary of State] Jim Webb told me . . . that [at] his meeting with the President at 6:15 at the Blair House on Tuesday, June 27, 1950 . . . Webb talked with the President about [Secretary of Defense] Louis Johnson's "leaks" to reporters about the Blair House meeting of Sunday, June 25, and Monday June 26. Johnson was feeding stories to the reporters that [Secretary of State Dean] Acheson had been "soft" on Formosa and he, Johnson, was responsible for the President's order that Formosa be neutralized. A reporter had come directly to Webb from Johnson's office to tell Webb that this kind of thing was going on and Webb came straight to Blair House to report it to the President. Administrative Assistant to the President George M. Elsey Memorandum for file, June 30, 1951 Papers of George M. Elsey Go to June 26, 1950    Back to Week of Decision    Go to June 28, 1950

Back to Week of Decision Go to June 26, 1950 Go to June 28, 1950 Document links June 27, 1950 See the record from which the decisions were made Presidential calendar of appointments for June 27, 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Matthew Connelly Files. (2 pages) Memorandum of conversation, dated June 27, 1950, by Philip C. Jessup summarizing a meeting at which key officials briefed congressional leaders on the situation in Korea. Papers of Dean Acheson. (4 pages) Notes, dated June 27, 1950, by George M. Elsey regarding a June 26, 1950, meeting at which President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson briefed key Senators and Congressmen on events in Korea. Papers of George M. Elsey. (11 pages) Statement, dated June 27, 1950, by President Harry S. Truman, announcing his order to send U.S. air and naval forces to help defend South Korea and explaining the rationale for his decision. Papers of George M. Elsey. (1 page) Message, dated June 27, 1950, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, notifying U.S. commanders in chief in various theatres of command of President Harry S. Truman's recent military decisions regarding the defense of South Korea. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Naval Aide Files, (2 pages) Memorandum by Lucius D. Battle, dated June 27, 1950, recounting a telephone conversation between Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Press Secretary Charles Ross. Papers of Dean Acheson. (1 page) White House press release, dated June 27, 1950, releasing the text of Harry S. Truman's telegram thanking New York Gov. Thomas E. Dewey for expressing support for Truman's Korea policy, and the text of Gov. Dewey's telegram in response. Papers of George M. Elsey. (1 page) Resolution dated June 27, 1950, from United Nations Security Council recommending that the members of the United Nations furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea in order to repel the attack and restore peace and security in Korea. Papers of Eben A. Ayers. (1 page) Address at the Laying of the Cornerstone of the New U.S. Courts Building for the District of Columbia, June 27, 1950. Public Papers of the President, 1950. Summary, dated June 28, 1950, of military and political events surrounding President Truman's announcement that U.S. air and naval forces would be used to assist in the defense of South Korea. Papers of George M. Elsey. (4 pages) Image: The first evacuees from South Korea arrive at an air force base in Japan, June 27, 1950. Many American evacuees left via Inchon, near Seoul, on a Norwegian fertilizer ship. Photo: U.S. Air Force. Source: D.M. Giangreco, War in Korea: 1950-1953 (Presidio Press).