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Week of Decision: June 30, 1950 |
 The President authorizes General MacArthur to use ground troops in Korea. Also approved are bombing missions on military targets north of the 38th parallel.
General [Douglas] MacArthur spent the day [in Korea] talking in succession with President [Syngman] Rhee, myself, the American and Korean military and going up for a fleeting view of the Han River. Before leaving he told me he had decided to report to Washington that what was needed were some regular U.S. armed units to firm up the Koreans--"Say, some two divisions."
U.S. Ambassador to Korea John Muccio
Early on the morning of June 30, a telegram from General [Douglas] MacArthur informed the J[oint] C[hiefs of] S[taff] and the Department of State that after a personal reconnaissance of the Korean battle area, the South Korean Army was incapable of united action, and there was grave danger of a further breakthrough. He said further that the only assurance of holding the Han River line [south of Seoul] and to regain lost ground would be through the commitment of United States ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. Accordingly, he stated, if authorized, it was his intention to move immediately a United States regimental combat team to the combat area in Korea as the nucleus of a possible buildup of two divisions from Japan for early offensive action in accordance with his mission of clearing South Korea of North Korean forces. As a result of this recommendation a teleconference beginning about 3:40 A.M. was held between General MacArthur and staff and General [J. Lawton] Collins and staff, Mr. Dean Rusk being present to represent the Department of State. In this conference General MacArthur was asked by Collins if the existing authority granted him the night before would be adequate for him, and he replied that it did not give him sufficient latitude for efficient operation in the present situation. During the course of the teleconference, General Collins got in touch with the Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, who called the President [at] 4:57 A.M., and at the end of the teleconference MacA[rthur] was given authority to move a regimental combat team immediately to the combat zone and was told that he would be advised about the proposed buildup to two divisions later.
Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey
I don't know how they do it these days, but in those days you'd go into this so-called telecon room, and the telecon would be like an old-fashioned movie screen. It would come out on print--a statement or a question that the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] wanted to ask. Then General MacArthur (or somebody would do it for him) would write down, or dictate, the answer. It'd go back in the machine and appear on the screen in Washington.
Lieutenant Colonel John Chiles
[Secretary of the Army] Frank Pace called at 5 A.M. E.D.T. I was already up and shaved. Frank said [General Douglas] MacArthur wanted two divisions of ground troops. Authorized a regiment to be used in addition to the authorizations of yesterday, to be used at Mac's discretion.
President of the United States Harry S. Truman
"Well Frank, do we have to make that decision tonight?" [said President Truman]. I remember saying, "No sir, we don't, but the fact that we don't have to make a decision is one that you should make rather than I." And . . . [the President] said, "Well, Frank, I feel that we'd do a better job on this in the morning," and so he deferred the decision on that [authorizing the additional two divisions] until the next morning. . . . Well, in any event, as a result of this we did decide to commit ground troops, which was a much more fundamental decision than the original one [of June 26 authorizing use of air and sea forces against North Korea] although it was largely overlooked at the time.
Secretary of the Army Frank Pace
Lieutenant Colonel John Chiles
Political Advisor to Commander in Chief Far East, William Sebald
What that will do to Mau Tze Tung we don't know. Must be careful not to cause a general Asiatic war. Russia is figuring on an attack in the Black Sea and toward the Persian Gulf. Both prized Moscow has wanted since Ivan the Terrible who is now their hero with Stalin & Lenin.
President of the United States Harry S. Truman
I know my own opinion was--and I think it was pretty generally held--that the chance of Russia or China coming into the war in South Korea was rather remote. There was that possibility, and it was considered, but we did not think they would be coming in to the fighting in South Korea.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley
As I recall it, we had a meeting [at 9:30 on June 30] in the White House, which may have been a cabinet meeting[,] . . . and at that time it was decided to call in the [Congressional] leaders again in the afternoon of the 30th and tell them about this [Presidential decision to commit ground forces in Korea]. . . . I had no feeling that I should have been consulted [about the morning's decisions to dispatch a Regimental Combat Team from Japan to Korea and then to add two entire divisions], or that there would have been any doubt about it if I had; that this was a necessary step to be taken, and it was one that you had to do. Of course, it was a very fateful step; it seemed to me to be a quite right and proper step.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
Image: President Truman with his Cabinet and top advisors in the Cabinet Room of the White House, 1950. Photograph: National Park Service. Source: Truman Library
[Press Secretary to the President] Charlie Ross came in a little late; . . . and we finally got Steve Early, undersecretary of defense in Ross' office and he went over the situation as discussed at the meeting and was told of plans that had been made. Steve said the situation in Korea was bad, that the morale of the South Koreans had largely collapsed, and their forces were being driven back. He said they were armed only with rifles. . . . The conference broke up shortly before ten o'clock when our staff meeting [with the President] was held. There was little discussion of Korea. In the meantime, however, the president called a meeting for eleven o'clock in the cabinet room to inform the cabinet and congressional leaders of the decisions reached. . While the meeting was on, a statement [to the public] was completed and mimeographed for release here. . . .
Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers
At the meeting of the [Congressional] leaders . . . [on June 30], there was an observation made which later took on a great deal of significance but it took on very little at the time. Senator [Howard] Smith of New Jersey, in the course of the meeting, asked whether or not it would be a good idea to ask Congressional approval for the President's action in regard to North Korea. This was referred to my by the President, and I said that it was a matter which we ought to take under advisement and think about. . . . The fact of the matter was that I thought about it, not very deeply, but just enough to come to the conclusion that this was one of those steps like the one more question in cross-examination which destroys you, as a lawyer. We had complete acceptance of the President's policy by everybody on both sides of both houses of Congress. Now the question is, should we bring a Joint Resolution in the Congress approving this? The hazards of that step seemed to me far greater than any possible good that could come from it. Now that may have been a mistake in light of subsequent events. But looking at it from the point of view of June 30, 1950, you can see that this would be introduced, it would then be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs in both Houses, and to the Military Committees, you'd have great hearings at which everybody would ask all sorts of ponderous questions; by the time you through with this you might have completely muddled up the situation which seemed to be very clear at the time. So I recommended that we just drop this idea, since there was no great pressure about it, to go ahead on our own.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
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Back to Week of Decision Go to June 29, 150 Go to July 1, 1950
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