The situation in Korea remains precarious with the third of General Douglas MacArthur's four occupation Divisions committed from Japan. A sweeping North Korean attack from the west and continuing frontal assaults press the American and South Korean troops operating under the United Nations flag into a narrow defensive position around the port of Pusan and the temporary South Korean capital, Taegu. National security questions, including the island of Formosa, are studied by President Harry S. Truman's administration. Image: Lieutenant General Walton Walker talks with Colonel Alfred G. Katzin, personal representative of United Nations (U.N.) Secretary General Trygve Lie, July 24, 1950. Photo: U.S. Army. Source: Truman Library. Katzin had just presented the U.N. flag to General Walker. American troops in Korea were officially part of a joint U.N. command. By July 24, Walker's U.S. Eighth Army forces consisted of the newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division, which replaced the battered 24th Division astride the main highway at Yongdong south of Taejon, and the 25th Division operating in the central region. The 24th Division managed a single day's recovery before Walker was forced to move the 24th and two battalions of the 19th Infantry Regiment, just shipped from Okinawa, to the west in defense of a sweeping movement by the North Korean 6th Division. Responding to this new threat on the right flank, the ill-trained troops of the 19th's 3rd Battalion were almost immediately ambushed on July 27 at Hadong. Out of 757 men, 100 were captured and more than than 300 killed. Walker's concern mounted as the North Korean 4th Division, following the victory at Taejon, joined the enemy's flanking movement.      . . . I was at Yongdong where they [the First Cavalry Division] went into action. . . . There were a lot of guys out there in World War II that found themselves in a strange and difficult world [in Korea]. Hobart Gay, who was commanding general of the First Cav[alry], had been chief of staff to [General George] Patton in Europe. Keyes Beech [a reporter with the Chicago Daily News] who had covered them in Europe said, “My god, isn’t it pitiful; you think of Hobart Gay, who used to have thirty divisions under him, fanning out from the North Sea to the Adriatic, now standing on a dusty road in Kumchon wondering what the hell had happened to Charlie Company.” That’s the kind of war it had gotten down to. Correspondent, New York Daily News, Frank Holeman Oral history interview, June 9, 1987 Image: Wounded 1st Cavalry Division soldiers at an aid station outside Yongdong, July 25, 1950. Photo: U.S. Army. Source: D.M. Giangreco, War in Korea: 1950-1953 (Presidio Press). Following their victory at Taejon, the North Korean 3rd Division paused only 24 hours before engaging the 1st Cavalry. Employing their preferred encircling tactics, the North Koreans established a roadblock behind the 8th Cavalry Regiment on July 23. By the morning of July 25, the 1st Division's positions were so thoroughly infiltrated that a retreat was ordered by Major General Hobart Gay, who had been warned by Eighth Army Commander General Walton Walker, "There is no one but yourself to keep your back door open." To the east of the 1st Cavalry, Walker had shifted into line the 25th Division's 27th Infantry Regiment. In a hard fought delaying action over the five days beginning July 24, the Regiment absorbed 323 casualties, including 53 dead, while inflicting many times that quantity on its North Korean foe. The 27th Infantry was directed to withdraw through the 1st Cavalry lines near Kumch'on on July 29. Gay's Division had pulled back to this position fearing the flanking actions of the North Koreans on the west. During its first 10 days in action, the 1st Cavalry suffered 916 battle casualties, among them 78 killed.                "Twenty sixth of July, Sow turnips, wet or dry." If I'm not too far off the beam this should be your birthday--and I'm not saying for how many years! . . . I've had a hectic time since June 24th [1950] when Bess & I paid you a call. At 12:30 Sunday [June 25] the Secretary of State called me and said the U.N. had passed a resolution [on the invasion of South Korea] that needed my attention. . . . Well you know what happened on Sunday night [the Truman administration decided to respond forcefully to the invasion despite their fear of a global war with Russia and its Communist allies, including Korea's other great neighbor, China]. I had some terrible decisions to make. I made 'em and here we are. . . . Good luck to you both. How's the porch coming? Mary Jane [Truman, the President's sister] can't get her's finished. President Harry S. Truman Harry S. Truman to Mary Ethel Noland, July 26, 1950 Papers of Mary Ethel Noland           At the meeting this afternoon, with the President presiding, the NSC [National Security Council after discussing proposed revisions to NSC 76, U.S. Courses of Action in the Event Soviet Forces Enter Korean Hostilities] . . . . agreed that our representatives on the [NSC] staff should put this paper out in the proper form for Presidential approval. Under Item III [of the proposed revisions] I made the suggestion that reconnaissance should be undertaken on the Yalu River bridges in order to ascertain, by photographic proof if possible, if supplies and men were coming into North Korea from Manchuria . . . . This was agreed to and Secretary [of Defense Louis] Johnson said that appropriate instructions would be issued. Secretary Johnson’s memorandum to the President on the Formosa matter was discussed briefly and it was decided that this would be worked out by representatives of the two Departments [State and Defense] as quickly as possible. . . . [S]ubject to the proper paper being written for the President . . . [g]rant aid [for Formosa] was approved in principle [and] . . . . [i]t was agreed that a military survey team under General [Douglas] MacArthur’s command should be sent. . . . The President . . . . said that in regard to NSC 68 the responses to that paper, as he called them, were of increased importance, and he asked that they be finished and laid before him by September 1. . . . Secretary of State Dean Acheson Meeting notes, July 27, 1950 Papers of Dean Acheson           The steps which we are now taking in the interests of our national security will have far-reaching effect upon the foreign, military and domestic situation. I am therefore concerned that, despite our preoccupation with the developments in Korea, we also attempt as best we can to project our plans and programs ahead for the next four or five years. Only by such future planning will the steps which we are taking follow an orderly sequence and lead to the eventual achievement of our objectives. Future planning of this nature was envisaged by Secretaries [of State and Defense Dean] Acheson and [Louis] Johnson in the report which I referred to the [National Security] Council in April as NSC 68. Recommendations of that report have, in my opinion, become more rather than less urgent since the Korean development. In view of this situation, as well as the need to be developing our 1952 budget plans beginning in September, I would like the Council to submit to me its response to NSC 68 not later than September 1st. President Harry S. Truman Minutes of the 62nd meeting of the National Security Council, July 27, 1950 Papers of Harry S. Truman: President’s Secretary’s Files           [T]he National Security Council [NSC] is terribly misunderstood. People have the idea that it’s an institution, that it decides something, or is like the House of the Senate. It couldn’t be. . . . All the NSC is is a method by which the President can meet with rather fewer of his advisors than he can in a Cabinet meeting. They look up things and come to the meeting prepared on something that’s to be decided. They don’t decide it. If they can get the facts, they lay them before the President, who decides the issue. If we ever get to the point where the NSC decides something, hold onto your hat . . . . Our government is fixed on the basis that the President is the only person in the executive branch who has the final authority. Everyone else is an agent of the President. That’s of vast importance, and people are always mixed up about it. The press gets it mixed up, and the Congress gets it mixed up. The President is the only person who has authority. If he doesn’t exercise it, you are in trouble. . . . If he exercises it wisely that’s good; but it’s better than not exercising it at all. The NSC is a rather small group of people. We had the head of the CIA, the Secretary of Defense, the [Chairman of the Joint] Chief[s] of Staff, the Secretaries of State and Treasury and [Special Assistant to the President W.] Averell [Harriman]. . . . There were deputies who would take the papers and work over them and get them to the point where they could be laid before the President. The great tendency is to get an agreed paper, and that’s the worst thing to do, absolutely. . . . I said “For God’s sake, let’s disagree and say exactly what we think.” What the President has to do is listen to disagreements and say, “I decide this way,” or “I don’t . . . “ If you don’t give him a choice to make, he can’t make a decision. . . . Secretary of State Dean Acheson Presidential memoirs interview, February 16, 1955 Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post Presidential Files           The National Security Council [created in 1947] - that was to advise the President on all matters relat­ing to the military and political situation throughout the world. The CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] was placed directly under the National Security Council [NSC]. . . . When President Truman came in [after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt], he knew nothing about our policies or why they were made - and neither could he find it. That never will occur again as long as there’s an NSC. The minutes of every meeting are written out precisely, and they are then passed out. Debates take place; changes take place; and it goes to the President with a recommenda­tion that he do so and so. If the President approves them, the Secretary of the Council writes on them: “The President has approved NSC so and so.” And he directs the departments and agencies concerned to carry out the terms therein. So, you see, it’s very formal. Then those are bound - for each Council meeting. That doesn’t destroy the system whereby the President is solely responsible for the making of foreign policy. And even though the President sits as chairman in the meeting and he appears to be agreeing, that is never the final step. The next day the staff sends the paper to him which says, “The Council met and considered such and such which met with his approval.” Then he signs it; so it is always his. I had feared at first that if the President sat in as chairman, he might express himself too quickly, and the rest of them would shut up and wouldn’t have any opposition. And he should have it all before him, be­cause he has to be fully informed when he makes a decision. . . . The Council should never decide. It is only advisory, but even so it is certainly fortunate he has such advice, because at least he has the right people giving him advice. It assures the President that they are not kibitzers who are giving it to him. . . . To me one of the greatest things, departmentalwise, was his creation of the NSC and its counterpart, or subsidiary, the CIA. Because, every time the Council is about to consider some policy - what do we do about Southeast Asia, for instance - immediately the Council requests the CIA to come up with an estimate of the effects of so and so, if we do it. The director of the CIA sits on the staff of the NSC and advises as they go along. He goes back and comes up with an estimate and that estimate represents a cross-section of the judgment of all the advisory councils of the CIA which are: G-2 [Army intelligence], A-2 [Air Force intelligence], ONI [the Office of Naval Intelligence], the State Department, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] representative - the Director of Intelligence of the AEC. So that when the estimate comes up to the policy makers they have the best coordi­nated judgment, the best of all the intelligence of all those organizations as well as the CIA, plus their own judgment. . . . The President created the NSC, and I think it will be with us for life. Special Consultant to the President Sydney Souers Presidential memoirs interview, February 15, 1954 Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post Presidential Files           General [Douglas] MacArthur came to Taegu [the temporary South Korean capital] in person on . . . July [27, 1950] and spent a day there. I had an hour with him alone. And during this visit, MacArthur in great detail outlined to me the situation he faced in South Korea. That there were no additional forces, ground forces, available at that time in the Far East and would take four or five more weeks to get them out from the Hawaiian Islands and from the United States, and that we were going to have a very difficult five or six weeks. And it wouldn't be until the end of that period that he could do anything about "easing the situation," as he put it. As he was about to leave I suggested that he drop in--that we drop in on the United Nations Commission that was using the building next to the one I was using in the Presbyterian Compound. And without batting an eye he went in there and greeted the secretary of the commission and one or two of the members that happened to be in there at the time. We stayed about ten minutes. . . . As you know, MacArthur was not an enthusiastic admirer of the United Nations. . . . Even the top echelons of the U.S. military reflected the idea--the lack of understanding as to why we should have the United Nations flag flying over headquarters in Taegu, the U.S. headquarters at Taegu. Secretary General Trygve Lie sent Colonel [Alfred G.] Katzin to Tokyo with the UN flag, and from there came over to Taegu to Eighth Army headquarters. General Walker accepted this flag and put it up over his headquarters in Taegu, alongside the U.S. flag and the Korean flag. Up to that time the U.S. flag had been flying alone over the headquarters. Propriety of this was talked about at length by our military. And there's a great deal of feeling that I heard directly from officers as to why should we be fighting under the emblem of the United Nations, we're fighting here for the United States. Ambassador to Korea John Muccio Oral history interview, February 18, 1971 Go to July 19-21, 1950    Back to Holding the Line    Go to July 29-August 2, 1950

Back to Holding the Line Go to July 19-22, 1950 Go to July 29-August 2, 1950  Document links July 22-28, 1950 See the record from which the decisions were made Press release, dated July 24, 1950, announcing the President’s official request to Congress for a supplemental appropriation to the defense budget of almost 10.5 billion dollars as outlined in the President’s message of July 19, 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman: White House Central Files-Official File. (2 pages) United Nations memorandum, dated July 25, 1950, transmitting the First Report to the Security Council by the United States Government on the Course of Action Taken under the Unified Command (USG) in Accordance with the Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Selected Records Relating to the Korean War. (8 pages) Press release, dated July 25 1950, announcing the President’s letter to Senate Finance Committee Chairman Walter F. George calling for changes in pending tax legislation to increase revenues needed to offset budget increases caused by the Korean situation. Papers of George M. Elsey. (2 pages) Memorandum from James S. Lay to the National Security Council, dated July 25, 1950, transmitting for consideration the comments of the Department of State and the National Security Resources Board on "U.S. Courses of Action in the Event Soviet Forces enter Korean Hostilities (NSC 76)." Papers of Harry S. Truman: President’s Secretary’s Files. (5 pages) The President' s News Conference, July 27, 1950. Public Papers of the President, 1950. Memorandum of conversation, dated July 28, 1950, describing a meeting between the President, the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister of Australia regarding the prospects for Australian participation in the United Nations force in Korea. Papers of Dean Acheson. (2 pages) Message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Douglas MacArthur, dated July 28, 1950, describing periodic reports to be prepared by MacArthur's command for submission to the United Nations Security Council similar in nature to the initial U.S. submission of July 24, 1950, describing the course of the war to date. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Naval Aide Files. (1 page) Image: A South Korean soldier comforts a wounded buddy before he is evacuated, July 28, 1950. Photo: Department of Defense. Source: Truman Library. Troops of the Republic of Korea (ROK) were responsible for defending the eastern portion of the peninsula. The U.S. 25th Division's 24th and 35th Infantry Regiments and the ROK II Corps defended the central and eastern portion of the line with the aim of holding Sangju, a crossroads 45 miles northeast of United Nations headquarters at Taegu. By July 28, with the 24th Regiment failing to hold positions on its left, the 35th had retreated to the outskirts of Sangju. Further to the east in the central mountain region, the ROK I Corps stubbornly battled the North Koreans for control of Andong and the upper Naktong River crossing there. On the eastern coast the ROK 3rd Division spent the latter half of July defending the city of Yongdok. This lone success was due, in great part, to overwhelming firepower from supporting U.N. artillery, air power and off shore naval forces.

Return to Truman Library home page The Harry S. Truman Library and Museum is one of thirteen Presidential Libraries administered by the National Archives and Records Administration. 500 W. US Hwy. 24. Independence MO 64050 truman.library@nara.gov; Phone: 816-268-8200 or 1-800-833-1225; Fax: 816-268-8295.