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Holding the Line: July 22-28, 1950 |
 The situation in Korea remains precarious with the third of General Douglas MacArthur's four occupation Divisions committed from Japan. A sweeping North Korean attack from the west and continuing frontal assaults press the American and South Korean troops operating under the United Nations flag into a narrow defensive position around the port of Pusan and the temporary South Korean capital, Taegu. National security questions, including the island of Formosa, are studied by President Harry S. Truman's administration.
. . . I was at Yongdong where
they [the First Cavalry Division] went into action. . . . There were a lot
of guys out there in World War II that found themselves in a strange and
difficult world [in Korea]. Hobart Gay, who was commanding general of the
First Cav[alry], had been chief of staff to [General George] Patton in
Europe. Keyes Beech [a reporter with the Chicago Daily News] who
had covered them in Europe said, “My god, isn’t it pitiful; you think of
Hobart Gay, who used to have thirty divisions under him, fanning out from
the North Sea to the Adriatic, now standing on a dusty road in Kumchon
wondering what the hell had happened to Charlie Company.” That’s the kind
of war it had gotten down to.
Correspondent, New York Daily News, Frank Holeman
I've had a hectic time since June 24th [1950] when Bess & I paid you a call. At 12:30 Sunday [June 25] the Secretary of State called me and said the U.N. had passed a resolution [on the invasion of South Korea] that needed my attention. . . . Well you know what happened on Sunday night [the Truman administration decided to respond forcefully to the invasion despite their fear of a global war with Russia and its Communist allies, including Korea's other great neighbor, China]. I had some terrible decisions to make. I made 'em and here we are. . . . Good luck to you both. How's the porch coming? Mary Jane [Truman, the President's sister] can't get her's finished.
President Harry S. Truman
Under Item III [of the proposed revisions] I made the suggestion that reconnaissance should be undertaken on the Yalu River bridges in order to ascertain, by photographic proof if possible, if supplies and men were coming into North Korea from Manchuria . . . . This was agreed to and Secretary [of Defense Louis] Johnson said that appropriate instructions would be issued. Secretary Johnson’s memorandum to the President on the Formosa matter was discussed briefly and it was decided that this would be worked out by representatives of the two Departments [State and Defense] as quickly as possible. . . . [S]ubject to the proper paper being written for the President . . . [g]rant aid [for Formosa] was approved in principle [and] . . . . [i]t was agreed that a military survey team under General [Douglas] MacArthur’s command should be sent. . . . The President . . . . said that in regard to NSC 68 the responses to that paper, as he called them, were of increased importance, and he asked that they be finished and laid before him by September 1. . . .
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
Future planning of this nature was envisaged by Secretaries [of State and Defense Dean] Acheson and [Louis] Johnson in the report which I referred to the [National Security] Council in April as NSC 68. Recommendations of that report have, in my opinion, become more rather than less urgent since the Korean development. In view of this situation, as well as the need to be developing our 1952 budget plans beginning in September, I would like the Council to submit to me its response to NSC 68 not later than September 1st.
President Harry S. Truman
If we ever get to the point where the NSC decides something, hold onto your hat . . . . Our government is fixed on the basis that the President is the only person in the executive branch who has the final authority. Everyone else is an agent of the President. That’s of vast importance, and people are always mixed up about it. The press gets it mixed up, and the Congress gets it mixed up. The President is the only person who has authority. If he doesn’t exercise it, you are in trouble. . . . If he exercises it wisely that’s good; but it’s better than not exercising it at all. The NSC is a rather small group of people. We had the head of the CIA, the Secretary of Defense, the [Chairman of the Joint] Chief[s] of Staff, the Secretaries of State and Treasury and [Special Assistant to the President W.] Averell [Harriman]. . . . There were deputies who would take the papers and work over them and get them to the point where they could be laid before the President. The great tendency is to get an agreed paper, and that’s the worst thing to do, absolutely. . . . I said “For God’s sake, let’s disagree and say exactly what we think.” What the President has to do is listen to disagreements and say, “I decide this way,” or “I don’t . . . “ If you don’t give him a choice to make, he can’t make a decision. . . .
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
When President Truman came in [after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt], he knew nothing about our policies or why they were made - and neither could he find it. That never will occur again as long as there’s an NSC. The minutes of every meeting are written out precisely, and they are then passed out. Debates take place; changes take place; and it goes to the President with a recommendation that he do so and so. If the President approves them, the Secretary of the Council writes on them: “The President has approved NSC so and so.” And he directs the departments and agencies concerned to carry out the terms therein. So, you see, it’s very formal. Then those are bound - for each Council meeting. That doesn’t destroy the system whereby the President is solely responsible for the making of foreign policy. And even though the President sits as chairman in the meeting and he appears to be agreeing, that is never the final step. The next day the staff sends the paper to him which says, “The Council met and considered such and such which met with his approval.” Then he signs it; so it is always his. I had feared at first that if the President sat in as chairman, he might express himself too quickly, and the rest of them would shut up and wouldn’t have any opposition. And he should have it all before him, because he has to be fully informed when he makes a decision. . . . The Council should never decide. It is only advisory, but even so it is certainly fortunate he has such advice, because at least he has the right people giving him advice. It assures the President that they are not kibitzers who are giving it to him. . . . To me one of the greatest things, departmentalwise, was his creation of the NSC and its counterpart, or subsidiary, the CIA. Because, every time the Council is about to consider some policy - what do we do about Southeast Asia, for instance - immediately the Council requests the CIA to come up with an estimate of the effects of so and so, if we do it. The director of the CIA sits on the staff of the NSC and advises as they go along. He goes back and comes up with an estimate and that estimate represents a cross-section of the judgment of all the advisory councils of the CIA which are: G-2 [Army intelligence], A-2 [Air Force intelligence], ONI [the Office of Naval Intelligence], the State Department, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] representative - the Director of Intelligence of the AEC. So that when the estimate comes up to the policy makers they have the best coordinated judgment, the best of all the intelligence of all those organizations as well as the CIA, plus their own judgment. . . . The President created the NSC, and I think it will be with us for life.
Special Consultant to the President Sydney Souers
And during this visit, MacArthur in great detail outlined to me the situation he faced in South Korea. That there were no additional forces, ground forces, available at that time in the Far East and would take four or five more weeks to get them out from the Hawaiian Islands and from the United States, and that we were going to have a very difficult five or six weeks. And it wouldn't be until the end of that period that he could do anything about "easing the situation," as he put it. As he was about to leave I suggested that he drop in--that we drop in on the United Nations Commission that was using the building next to the one I was using in the Presbyterian Compound. And without batting an eye he went in there and greeted the secretary of the commission and one or two of the members that happened to be in there at the time. We stayed about ten minutes. . . . As you know, MacArthur was not an enthusiastic admirer of the United Nations. . . . Even the top echelons of the U.S. military reflected the idea--the lack of understanding as to why we should have the United Nations flag flying over headquarters in Taegu, the U.S. headquarters at Taegu. Secretary General Trygve Lie sent Colonel [Alfred G.] Katzin to Tokyo with the UN flag, and from there came over to Taegu to Eighth Army headquarters. General Walker accepted this flag and put it up over his headquarters in Taegu, alongside the U.S. flag and the Korean flag. Up to that time the U.S. flag had been flying alone over the headquarters. Propriety of this was talked about at length by our military. And there's a great deal of feeling that I heard directly from officers as to why should we be fighting under the emblem of the United Nations, we're fighting here for the United States.
Ambassador to Korea John Muccio |
Image: A South Korean soldier comforts a wounded buddy before he is
evacuated, July 28, 1950. Photo: Department of
Defense. Source: Truman Library.
Troops of the Republic of Korea (ROK) were
responsible for defending the eastern portion of the peninsula. The U.S.
25th Division's 24th and 35th Infantry Regiments and the ROK II Corps
defended the central and eastern portion of the line with the aim of
holding Sangju, a crossroads 45 miles northeast of United Nations
headquarters at Taegu. By July 28, with the 24th Regiment failing to hold
positions on its left, the 35th had retreated to the outskirts of Sangju.
Further to the east in the central mountain region, the ROK I Corps
stubbornly battled the North Koreans for control of Andong and the upper
Naktong River crossing there. On the eastern coast the ROK 3rd Division
spent the latter half of July defending the city of Yongdok. This lone
success was due, in great part, to overwhelming firepower from supporting
U.N. artillery, air power and off shore naval forces.
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Image: Lieutenant General Walton Walker talks with Colonel Alfred
G. Katzin, personal representative of United Nations (U.N.) Secretary General
Trygve Lie, July 24, 1950. Photo: U.S. Army. Source: Truman Library.
Image: Wounded 1st Cavalry Division soldiers at an aid station
outside
Yongdong, July 25, 1950. Photo: U.S. Army. Source: D.M. Giangreco, War in Korea:
1950-1953 (Presidio Press).
