The President addresses the nation.
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Image:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff. Photo: U.S. Army. Source: D.M. Giangreco,
War
in Korea: 1950-1953 (Presidio Press).
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To the office at 9:30 in the President's office for
the morning briefing session. All of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were present. [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs] General [Omar] Bradley gave his briefing and then each of the [service] Chiefs -- General [J.] Lawton [Collins] for the army, Admiral [Forrest] Sherman for the Navy and General [Hoyt] Vandenberg for the Air Force -- supplemented his report.
The President had a fairly well filled list of appointments during the day with a regular cabinet meeting at 4 p.m.
Assistant Press Secretary to the President Eben Ayers
Diary entry, August 29, 1950
Papers of Eben A. Ayers
I know the Chiefs felt that they had access to the President at any time they had any opinions which they felt he ought to hear. . . . Either individually or collectively. After Korea broke out, and, for the last year after I became Chairman I used to see the President practically every day for a long time to give him the situation and to keep in touch with what he was saying. I would let him know what the Chiefs were thinking. And from time to time I would take all the Chiefs over because I found a little feeling - if I was going to see him every day, I thought the Chiefs of the three services should see him once in a while. I explained that to the President, and he fully understood. So once a month, or so, we would go over. And I fixed it so that they had something specific which they could present to him. I would give them 15 minutes, but you know how closely he had to schedule his time. Frequently we would all come over, and each Chief would get a chance to discuss his own problems with the President . . . we had access to him at all times. He always told me to come over any time I had something I felt he should see. 0f course I would call the White House switchboard beforehand. I saw him as late as 10:30 at night and as early as 6:30 in the morning. We felt very free to present to him anything we thought he should know or on which we wanted a decision.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley
Presidential memoirs interview, March 30, 1955
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post Presidential Papers
My own concern over the situation [the withdrawal of (General Douglas MacArthur’s controversial message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars] continued and I spent most of Monday trying to persuade [Press Secretary to the President Charles] Ross and [Special Assistant to the President W.] Averell Harriman that it would be advisable for the President to communicate personally with General MacArthur in order to remove as much of the sting as possible from the sharp rebuke which the President had been forced to give MacArthur. I was also concerned by the fact that, unless the President sent an official statement of our Formosa policy to MacArthur, we might not have MacArthur nailed down, and he might later wiggle out of this spot by saying nobody in Washington ever had informed him of the Government’s policy on Formosa. Accordingly, I drafted a couple of proposed messages to MacArthur, and at 9:15 on Tuesday, 29 August, the President agreed to send a message to MacArthur [on Formosa]. After the President had okayed it, I shot it to [Deputy Secretary of Defense] Steve Early for rapid transmission to MacArthur and Mr. Ross released the text of the President’s telegram at the White House about 11 A.M.
Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey
Memorandum for file, October 2, 1950
Papers of George M. Elsey
To the office and at 9:30 in for the [daily Korea] briefing session . . . .
We held our regular staff meeting at 10 o’clock and the President afterward had a crowded list of appointments that carried over into the afternoon. . . . The President will speak on the radio Friday night, a “fireside chat” or address to the people on the current situation [in Korea and the world].
Assistant Press Secretary to the President Eben Ayers
Diary entry, August 30, 1950
Papers of Eben A. Ayers
Image:Administrative Assistant
George Elsey. Source: Truman Library.
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These [staff meetings] were highly informal.
It was the practice to
convene at 9 o'clock in the President's office. The . . . longer he stayed in office, the later the meetings tended to be. I think toward the end [during the Korean War period], they were generally at 10 o'clock rather than nine.
The Appointment Secretary, the Press Secretary, the Special Counsel to the President, The Assistant to the President, John Steelman, usually the Administrative Assistants to the President, and the three military aides; it was a large group that would seat themselves informally in a large semicircle around the President's desk. The President usually started by asking the Appointment Secretary to run over the appointments for the day and Matt Connelly would comment, if comment were necessary, about the background of some of the appointments and other staff members were free to chime in if they had anything that they thought would be helpful or useful to the President in connection with that meeting.
The President would always ask the Press Secretary if there were anything special, any particular problem that the Press Secretary saw coming up during the course of the day, or comment on anything that appeared in the morning papers that should attract presidential notice or comment. After that, it was a general discussion. The President would usually just move around the semicircle, asking each person in turn if he had anything on his mind or anything that should be taken up by the group as a whole. . . .
The atmosphere was very friendly, very relaxed, and even the junior members of the staff, such as I, felt we had the right, and did have it, to take matters, in that body, directly to the President in the presence of everybody else. . . .
Administrative Aide to the President George Elsey
Oral history interview, February 17, 1964
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There continue to be repercussions and reactions from the [General Douglas] MacArthur episode [of August 27-28 when the President ordered MacArthur’s written speech on Far East policy “withdrawn”] and the [intemperate remark apparently endorsing a preventive war with the Soviet Union by Navy Secretary Francis] Matthews [delivered in a] speech. The Washington Star carried on its first page a column by Doris Fleeson [on the MacArthur matter] . . . . She talked with [Press Secretary] Charlie Ross and also with [Deputy Defense Secretary] Steve Early and others in preparing it and had it very accurate so far as those parts with which we were familiar was concerned.
Assistant Press Secretary to the President Eben Ayers
Diary entry, August 30, 1950
Papers of Eben A. Ayers
This folder has a number of clippings and various other annotations about the White House reaction to both the [General Douglas] MacArthur and [Navy Secretary Francis] Matthews statements. This really was the beginning of the period of extreme tension, vis-a-vis General MacArthur . . . . Some of these news clippings you may wonder why they're here but--this is an interesting one here; the Doris Fleeson story in the [Washington] Evening Star of August 30, 1950. The interesting part I think . . . is my comment in the margin. "This is a full and accurate story based on much research," that is much research by Doris Fleeson, "and on interviews with Steven Early," who was a Deputy Secretary of Defense, "and Charles Ross," who was, of course, still the President's Press Secretary, this was an effort to try and get the Formosa-MacArthur statement put in its proper perspective. And it was because these situations were so tense, and so fraught with potential trouble, that I was keeping clippings, I was annotating them. I was talking myself with correspondents when directed and when approved.
Administrative Aide to the President George Elsey
Oral history interview, April 9, 1970
During the briefing by [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs] General [Omar] Bradley this morning, the President asked him if there was anything to the charge that United States airmen had bombed or strafed an airfield in Manchuria. Bradley said he did not believe there was. He said that one plane, on a Korean flight had become lost and got over Manchurian territory but that it dropped no bombs. He suggested that the United States ask that the United Nations appoint a commission to investigate.
At [Press Secretary] Charlie Ross’s press conference, newspapermen asked few questions. He was [next] . . . wanted in the President’s office. Later he called me in and told me what had happened. When he went in he found [Appointments Secretary to the President] Matt Connelly and [Special Assistant to the President W.] Averell Harriman with the President. Matt was urging the President to cancel the radio address already announced for Friday night. Harriman also favored canceling it.
Matt, as a matter of fact, had indicated some opposition to it at the staff conference at which it was decided the speech was to be delivered. As a result of the President’s OK at that time to announcement to the press when radio arrangements were completed, Ross had made definite announcement that the speech would be delivered between 10 and 10:30 p.m., Friday.
Charlie said that Matt urged the cancellation for a couple of what seemed to us pretty flimsy reasons. One was that the time, Friday night, was not a good time, as it would not provide a normal audience, as people would be starting away on Labor Day holiday. Also, he said it was a poor speech. Harriman said that [Secretary of State Dean] Acheson had seen a draft and he did not like it.
Ross was upset and said he spoke rather strongly. He and I agreed it would be a tragic mistake to cancel the speech now that it has been announced and radio arrangements made. It would be impossible to offer any satisfactory explanation and there would be all kinds of speculation. It would be surmised that something important had happened, presumably in the international situation or the Korean war, that necessitated the action. Another line would be that the administration was again confused and uncertain. In view of the [General Douglas] MacArthur and [Navy Secretary Francis] Matthews episodes [provoking the appearance of policy disarray in the administration] I pointed out that a cancellation of the speech now would be disastrous.
Charlie and I both felt that, from indications which the President had given in discussing it, that he would stick to his decision to deliver the address. . . .
There was a presidential press conference at 4 o’clock this afternoon and before the conference we held the usual briefing session with the President. The President was on the telephone when we went in his office and afterward he said he had been busy since lunch in connection with the report which came up this morning at the Bradley briefing of U.S. airplane bombings or strafings in Manchuria. He said there appeared to be some truth in them.
The Press conference was marked by quite a number of pointed questions on
a variety of subjects but the President handled them well. One dealt with
the Formosa situation but he declared we had no designs on Formosa and
that when the war in Korea is over the Seventh fleet would not be needed there. The fate of Formosa he reiterated should be settled by the Japanese peace treaty and in a peaceful way.
[The President's News
Conference, August 31, 1950]
Assistant Press Secretary to the President Eben Ayers
Diary entry, August 31, 1950
Papers of Eben A. Ayers
I usually held a press conference at least once a week. If something extra came up, I held it twice. . . . It’s one of the most important things in the Presidential set-up. It’s the President’s contact with all the people, and he can judge very easily what is going on by the manner of questions asked by the newspaper reporters. They are always in close touch with what is going on. . . .
I never had any difficulty with press conferences. Oh, once in a while they would garble things, but they would always straighten them out. Of course, there was always an argument between me and the press owners and the publishers, but never between me and the working press. . . .
President Harry S. Truman
Presidential memoirs interview, February 15, 1954
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post Presidential Files
The President held a regular cabinet meeting at 10 o’clock and [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs] General [Omar] Bradley gave his briefing before the meeting for the benefit of cabinet members as well as the President.
Our staff meeting was at 11 o’clock and afterward the President had a number of appointments.
Last night the President worked with the speech writers until 10 p.m. or later on the radio address scheduled, for tonight. It was not completed then, however, and the final session was held during the afternoon. I was called in and found a dozen or more people in the Cabinet room with the President. There were the regular speeçh writers . . . and some state department and other aides. . . . I was in and out getting finished copies which I went over and then had sent to the staff room for mimeographing.
About 6:30 p.m., we received the copies and called the newsmen into [Press Secretary] Charlie Ross’s office and gave them out--for automatic release at 10 p.m., when the President was to start speaking. . . . The President spoke, seated at a desk, instead of standing as he has for some of his radio talks. There were a number of people present, mostly those who helped in preparation of the speech, with some of the wives.
In this connection there was an interesting incident during the late afternoon. While work was going on in the Cabinet room on the speech, I received a telephone call, in my office, from [Appointments Secretary] Matt Connelly. He told me it had been decided there would be no audience in the movie room. This struck me as strange as the President appears to like an audience and to do better with one. I also had the feeling that the President had not been consulted, After the Cabinet room session broke up, I told Charlie Ross and he expressed surprise as he said the President had invited all those in the room to attend the broadcast. Later [Administrative Aide to the President] George Elsey said he told them to bring their wives also. I called Connelly back a little later to tell him and he said he had heard that the President had extended the invitation. He added that showed that we had a boss who did things on his own. He tried to explain his own call to me by saying that it had seemed better not to have an audience so that the President could concentrate on television. When I told Charlie Ross that Matt had said he scoffed a little and added that Matt had been “sour” on the whole thing--the President’s making an address.
[Radio and
Television Report to the American People on the Situation in Korea,
September 1, 1950]
Assistant Press Secretary to the President Eben Ayers
Diary entry, September 1, 1950
Papers of Eben A. Ayers
