Now, I . . . perhaps had something to do with that Truman-MacArthur episode. I had talked to General [Douglas] MacArthur in 1947 in Tokyo. I knew he saw the whole Pacific theater, not just one skirmish here or there. So I sent a message to him after the aggression against South Korea, to this effect, “Wouldn’t it be advantageous now that you have been named by the United States and the U.N. as theater commander, for you to take a look at all the elements in your theater. You’re charged also with the defense of Taiwan.” (The President’s own declaration said the Seventh Fleet would see that this was done and the Seventh Fleet was under MacArthur’s charge.) “So I would suggest it might be I advantageous if you made an inspection trip to Taiwan.”
Whether that was the reason or not, I don’t know, but he went to Taiwan and all hell broke loose against him here in Washington, although he was merely discharging his responsibility to defend the area. . . .
Congressman Walter Judd
Oral history interview, April 13, 1970
Oh, there was, I would say, almost consternation [about General Douglas MacArthur’s trip to
Formosa] here, not only in the State Department, though. We had no notion, we had no knowledge
of the plan for the trip. And . . . effectively, there wasn’t any real prior notice, as I recall. . . And, of course, this concerned not only State Department, but also concerned the President, very obviously.
Deputy Director, State Department Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson
Oral history interview, June 19, 1975
With reference to question as to why there was a two-way restriction on Formosa (i.e., [the U.S. 7th] fleet [in the President’s announcement of June 27, 1950, was ordered] to prevent [any] attack on Formosa and [also] to prevent [the] Chinese on Formosa from attacking [the] mainland), Secretary [of State Dean Acheson] said: At that time the great effort was to protect Formosa from being attacked. So there could be no provocation. If Formosa had been attacked and lost at the same time that Korea might have been lost, it would have been of the utmost seriousness. We could not be in the position of having the other side say there had been provocation by Chinese attack [by Chiang Kai-shek's troops] on [the] mainland. We would have lost all international support. (Mr. [Dean] Rusk [the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs] added that the situation with which we were confronted [at the time of the North Korean invasion] was one in which no one could tell what might happen - whether the situation would lead to general war. It was absolutely necessary that the hostilities be limited to Korea.)
Personal Assistant to the Secretary of State Barbara Evans
Meeting notes “re testimony on MacArthur Hearings,” May 15, 1951
Papers of Dean Acheson
I reported to the President the very difficult situation which was arising on Formosa as a result of General [Douglas] MacArthur’s visit. I pointed out that our representative, Mr. Strong, and the Service Attaches knew nothing of what had gone on. I pointed out that we had urged General MacArthur through the Defense Department not to go to Formosa himself at this time but to send a senior officer for the purpose of gathering information. We thought that he should go later after a political program had been worked out so that he could use his prestige for the results this Government wished. However, the discretion had been left to him and he had exercised it. Neither the State Department not the Pentagon nor our people on the Island knew what had been said or done.
We had a report that three squadrons of jet fighters were to be stationed on the Island [later denied by MacArthur] and some parties had already arrived. I asked the President whether he had authorized this which had not been included in any orders which I had heard. The President said that he had not and was opposed to it. I said that I would discuss the matter further with [Special Assistant to the President] Mr. [W. Averell Harriman] Harriman and Secretary of Defense [Louis] Johnson tonight.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
Memorandum of conversation, August 3, 1950
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Records Relating to the Korean War
General [Douglas] MacArthur has advised me that as theater commander his discussion with the
GIMO [Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek] and Chinese military authorities were entirely limited to
arrangement for effective military coordination between the American and Chinese forces
respectively under his and Chinese Nationalist Government command, as envisaged in the press
statement and aide memoire, and that he was most meticulous in confining his discussions with
Chinese Government officials to military problems of a technical nature. With reference to his
main discussion, General MacArthur has pointed out that he invited the Army, Navy, and Air
attaches of the Embassy to be present and that [the U.S. charge' on Formosa Robert] Strong
would undoubtedly be in a position to report the consensus of their views.
As ancillary to his visit General MacArthur told me in confidence of his definite impression of
deep resentment in Chinese official circles resulting from what was taken to be an attitude of
general hostility on the part of State Department representatives in Taipei. Without entering
into any discussion of the relative merits or demerits of the issues which may be involved, he
believers there has been a very definite failure to establish a relationship based on that
degree of confidence and cordiality which is so essential to diplomatic success. He is
particularly concerned over the adverse effect the continuance of such a situation might have
upon his efforts to maximize the military coordination indispensable to the success of joint
operations in the defense of Formosa.
Political Advisor to the Commander in Chief Far East William Sebald
William Sebald to Dean Acheson, August 3, 1950
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Records Relating to the Korean War
General [Douglas] MacArthur would say that he needed a political advisor the way a Pope needed
an ecclesiastical advisor, and so he never regarded [Political Advisor to the Commander in Chief
Far East] Bill Sebald or anyone else as a real political advisor. He regarded him as the chief
of one of his staff sections. He almost never asked the Political Advisor’s Office for political
advice.
First Secretary to the Political Advisor to the Commander in Chief Far East Niles Bond
Oral history interview, December 28, 1973
I have one announcement to make, . . . [Special Assistant to the President W. Averell] Harriman,
[Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff] General [Lauris] Norstad and [Military Aide to the President]
General [Frank] Lowe will leave tomorrow for Japan for a political brief with General [of the
Army Douglas] MacArthur on the political situation in the Far East. . . . I have not made up my
mind as yet on whether to give him [Harriman] instructions or not. I don't think he needs any,
but I will discuss that with him.
President Harry S. Truman
Press conference announcement, August 3, 1950
Public Papers of the President
I found out from [Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff] General [Lauris] Norstad that he was going to
Japan and Korea with [the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff] General [Matthew] Ridgway, so I think I
talked to . . . [Secretary of State] Dean [Acheson] . . . and the President about whether the
President wanted me to go out and have a talk with [General Douglas] MacArthur about the
political aspects of the situation there--you will recall that there had been a minor incident
just before that, when MacArthur went to Formosa, which surprised everybody and there was a
picture of him kissing the hand of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, which caused some concern. In any
event, the President readily approved the idea of my going. . . .
I asked the President what he wanted me to tell MacArthur. He said, “Tell him two things. One.
I’m going to do everything I can to give him what he wants in the way of support; and secondly,
I want you to tell him that I don’t want him to get us into a war with the Chinese communists.”
Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman
"Princeton Seminar" comment, February 14, 1954
Papers of Dean Acheson
It [the Formosa question] required an international political viewpoint. And of course a
military man has only a . . . military viewpoint. [Special Assistant W. Averell] Harriman had
the whole picture and was informed on international policies. . . .
[General Douglas] MacArthur never did have a world viewpoint. His was always local, and in
this instance it was confined entirely to the Asiatic and Japanese situations. That was true
throughout his whole career. In World War II he was never aware of the fact that the war had to
be won in Europe before it could be won in Asia.
President Harry Truman
Presidential memoirs interview, November 14, 1954
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post-presidential Files
