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Accompanying Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway, Air Force Chief of Staff Lauris Norstad and Presidential representative General Frank Lowe, Averell Harriman meets with MacArthur. The President's Formosa policy and other sensitive topics are discussed. Although the Pusan perimeter remains under attack, MacArthur makes a compelling argument for an ambitious operation to regain the initiative.
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Image:The Dai
Ichi ("Number One") building. Tokyo headquarters for General
Douglas MacArthur's Far East Command. Photo: U.S. Army. Source: Truman
Library.
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The major point that I want to make here is that General [Walton] Walker [Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea] was not a popular man, either publicly or, frankly, within the army. But his handling of the defense of the Pusan perimeter was masterly.
One of the toughest things to do is to shift reserves, particularly when you have no reserves. Walker did a magnificent job, in my judgement, with the Twenty-seventh Infantry, with the Fifth Regimental Combat team . . . and with the First Marine Brigade in shifting these three units as needed, to meet the persistent attacks of the Communists against the Pusan perimeter.
If we had not been able to hold the Pusan perimeter we would have had to withdraw from Korea . . . .
U.S. Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins
Truman Library Institute conference comment, May 1975
The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976)
During August I spent most of my time in [the provisional capital of] Taegu and [and the key port of] Pusan, mainly in Taegu. You might recall that as the enemy closed in and forced us into that small perimeter area, it was a holding operation, and quite a desperate holding operation . . . . We were fortunate to have as capable leadership as we got from General [Walton] Walker and [Fifth Air Force Commanding] General [Earl E.] Partridge. I don't think General Walker got the credit he deserved for the brilliant operation that he and General Partridge gave in South Korea at that time. They were inspiring leaders and very, very dedicated.
The thing that impressed me most about the whole U.S. operation, the U.S.-U.N. operation in Korea, was that the U.S. military leadership . . . were men who were still in their physical and mental prime, who had come to the fore during World War II. And it was really a tremendous satisfaction to have dealings, direct dealings, with men of that caliber. I think that we should be very proud of the leadership that we had available at that time, right in the prime of their physical and mental vigor, it was a tremendous experience.
Ambassador to Korea John Muccio
Oral history interview, February 18, 1971
Image: Marine Corps message center, August 9, 1950. Photo: U.S. Army. Source: D.M. Giangreco, War in Korea:
1950-1953 (Presidio Press).
The newly arrived 1st Marine Provisional Brigade and the 5th Regimental Combat Team were attached to the 25th Division of Major General William Kean at the southwestern portion of the Pusan perimeter. On August 7th Task Force Kean launched the first U.S. offensive of the war from the area west of Masan with the goal of securing the Nam River line. However, this advance ran into an attack by the North Korean 6th Division aiming to capture Masan. After several days of fighting the enemy offensive was checked and on August 9 the Marines were able to breakout along the coastal road to Kosong. Less progress was made to the right of the Marines and by August 11 Kean received a radio message that the Marines, a regiment of Koreans and the 5th Regimental Combat Team would likely be withdrawn for use elsewhere along the hard pressed Pusan perimeter.
We [Generals Matthew Ridgway, Lauris Norstad, Frank Lowe and Special Assistant to the President
W. Averell Harriman] went to Tokyo [on August 6, 1950], spent a day in Korea, and another
half-day in Tokyo. In the time that I was in Tokyo, both before and after I went to Korea, I
had a total of over eight hours of personal talk with [General
Douglas] MacArthur [Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in the Far East]--that’s not
including the meals we had. The last couple hours was with Ridgway and Norstad. . . .
On the political side, I discussed at some length the political situation; I underlined the
fact that the President did not want to give the appearance that we were backing Chiang
Kai-shek [leader of the nationalist Chinese on Formosa] and that he should be careful about it
[because the government’s “neutralization” policy was not to ally itself with Formosa, but to
ensure that no pretext was offered for Communist Chinese invasion]; and MacArthur ended the
discussion by saying he didn’t agree with the President but he was a soldier and would obey
orders.
Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman
"Princeton Seminar" comment, February 14, 1954
Papers of Dean Acheson
The sending of [Special Assistant Averell] Harriman was to try to
prevent his visit to Chiang Kai-shek from involving us in a war on the Asiatic continent.
I was trying to confine the thing to Korea without any more outside interference than the
Russians furnishing equipment to the North Koreans. I was afraid that [General Douglas] MacArthur's [July 31 - August 1]
visit to Chiang would inflame the Chinese into entry into Korea at that time. It would have been
very disastrous then.
President Harry S. Truman
Presidential memoirs interview, November 14, 1954
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post-presidential Files
. . . [General Douglas] MacArthur had a very strong view that he wanted to support Chiang Kai-shek [the Generalissimo on Formosa] or anybody who was ready to fight Communists; he even wanted to get Chiang Kai-shek’s air force to attack the mainland. That was one of the things he proposed. I told him he could recommend that to the president; I would certainly oppose it. . . .
Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman
Truman Library Institute conference comment, May 1975
The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976)
. . . Sunday [August 6] was devoted to a briefing at General [Douglas] MacArthur’s headquarters [in Tokyo], a luncheon at this home, after which I had a private conference with him for one hour and twenty minutes. Our party left Tokyo at 5:30 a.m. Monday and flew to Korea; jeeped to [Eighth Army Commander] General [Walton] Walker’s headquarters for a briefing; then to headquarters of General [Earle] Partridge, [Commander of the Fifth] Air Force, for more briefing; lunch with General Walker; jeep to headquarters of his left flank Regiment and thence to its left flank Battalion; jeep back to airport and Tokyo about 8:30 p.m.
Military Aide to the President General Frank Lowe
Frank Lowe to Harry Truman, August 8, 1950
Papers of Harry S. Truman: President’s Secretary’s Files
The following morning, which I think was August 8, [General Douglas] MacArthur presented to us in his brilliant manner the program for the Inchon landings. We had known something about it, but I guess we all thought it was impossible because of the tremendous tides. The three of us [Harriman and Generals Matthew Ridgway and Lauris Norstad] were enthralled by General MacArthur. He had a specific number of troops he needed and that schedule was given us. . . .
Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman
Truman Library Institute conference comment, May 1975
The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976)
. . . I was one of the many . . . opposed to this plan when I went out
there, but the magic of General [Douglas] MacArthur’s presentation
convinced me, as I think it did the others who were present. . . . I sat up all night trying to summarize our views and compose a little, condensed memorandum [of MacArthur's August 8 presentation]. I gave it to [the President’s Special Assistant] Governor [W. Averell] Harriman on the plane before we got back to Washington, and it had his approval. . . .
U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway
Truman Library Institute conference comment, May 1975
The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976)
We returned to Washington about the time that Mr. Truman got to his office in the morning. I went directly to see him about seven o’clock in the morning and told him of the recommendation which General [Matthew] Ridgway and General [Lauris] Norstad were going to make to him. I described [General Douglas] MacArthur’s plan [to make an amphibious invasion on the port of Inchon] to him and he said, “You better get over to the Pentagon as fast as you can and talk to [Secretary of Defense Louis] Johnson and to [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar] Bradley.”
I had a fast breakfast and shaved and I guess it must have been between half past nine and ten o’clock when I got to the Pentagon. Louis Johnson said to me, “What the hell have you been doing to the president?”
I said, “What do you mean?”
“He’s been calling me up every fifteen minutes to know what the decision is.”
Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman
Truman Library Institute conference comment, May 1975
The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976)
The [Joint] Chiefs of Staff were in the room, and I was rather embarrassed, because - I said, “I haven’t talked any military matters with the President; I was there entirely for political reasons,” and I simply explained what the recommendations were. He [Defense Secretary Louis Johnson] said, “Well, the President has told me he wants this plan of [General Douglas] MacArthur’s [to land at Inchon] supported.” . . .
Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman
"Princeton Seminar" comment, February 14, 1954
Papers of Dean Acheson
In any event, the Joint Chiefs [of Staff] made this decision and within twenty-four hours . . . . the president approved the plan in principle. Then the details were worked out, and of course, it was a tremendously ambitious plan. [General Douglas] MacArthur had his view which was that the North Koreans had to be defeated and defeated fast, He did not think that the Russians or the Chinese would come in, but he knew all the risks. It wasn’t 5,000 to 1, but it was surely a military risk that he was ready to stake his whole life’s reputation on.
Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman
Truman Library Institute conference comment, May 1975
The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976)
[United Nations commander] General [Douglas] MacArthur has asked and badly needs immediately, . . . beyond the elements already slated for his command if he is to bring the Korean operations to a successful conclusion before winter sets in, which he feels he can do if given this added support. It is needless to point out the distinct advantages of such a result, both from the standpoint of holding American casualties to a minimum and raising the political power and prestige of the United States in the Far East to a maximum.
. . . I think this is the Argonne [offensive in World War I] all over again. You know that General [James] Pershing threw everything he had at the Germans, down to the last camp follower, in November 1918, all to the end that we would not be held to a winter campaign in the Argonne. You and I [who participated in the offensive] profited by that decision. There would have been many more American dead buried in France, and mostly from sickness and disease, if it had not been for this decision and action by General Pershing. I think this situation is identical. We must break off action before winter sets in, and that means a deadline of December 1st, and we must not break off action short of a complete victory. Success in this plan will reflect tremendous and everlasting credit to our country and to all concerned.
Military Aide to the President Frank Lowe
Frank Lowe to Harry Truman, August 8, 1950
Papers of Harry S. Truman: President’s Secretary’s Files
This has never been said, but I do not see any reason why it should not be said. After this trip in August 1950, General [Lauris] Norstad and I recommended to the president that General [Walton] Walker be relieved and that General [Matthew] Ridgway be appointed in his place. This was on August 9 . . . . I made that recommendation to the president and he said, “Talk to [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Omar] Bradley about it” . . . .
Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman
Truman Library Institute conference comment, May 1975
The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976)
I take my military advice from the military leaders, and I am optimistic, as they are.
President Harry S. Truman
Press conference
response, August 10, 1950
Public Papers of the
President, 1950
Image:A 57-MM. anti-tank gun is moved
into position by South Korean artillerymen, August 10, 1950. Photograph
U.S. Army. Source: Truman Library.
The North Korean army, aware that its best hope lay in quick victory
attacked at all points along the Pusan Perimer beginning around the night
of August 4. The South Korean 3rd Division was surrounded on the eastern
coast below Yongdok by August 11 and ultimately had to be withdrawn by
sea. Task Forces of American and Korean troops patched together by Eighth
Army tried to hold the line further south around P'ohang. In the meantime,
the Korean Capital Division, which was to have maintained contact with the
3rd Division was thrown back. Further west, however, on the northern portion of the
perimeter, the Korean 8th Division held its ground and mauled the opposing
North Korean 8th Division.
On the central front, three South Korean divisions were attacked
immediately and pushed back toward key city of Taegu, which housed South
Korean President Syngman Rhee and the United Nations military command. An
initial crossing of the Naktong River opposite the American 1st Cavalry Division was repulsed
by August 12, but more North Korean forces were massing at several
locations.
On the lower reaches of the Naktong where the river curves to form a
bulge, the North Korean 4th Division made a successful night crossing that
pierced the positions of the 34th Infantry Regiment's 3rd Battalion on the
morning of August 6. An attempted counter attack by the 1st Battalion
resulted in the virtual destruction of its advance company, but the
remainder of the battalion was able to retake some ground. The situation
was serious enough for Major General John Church to commit his 24th
Division reserve, the 19th Infantry Regiment. Reinforced by a subsequent night's crossings, the North Koreans, occupied the high ground of Obong-ni Ridge and Cloverleaf Hill that dominated the action in the Naktong Bulge. As attempted advances stalled, Church committed the 9th
Regimental Combat Team freshly arrived from the United States. By August
11, despite daily American assaults, the North Koreans held their
position, while other of their forces began to appear further to the south
in the 24th Division sector.
I appreciated very much your letters of the eighth informing me on the
situation in general and General [Douglas] MacArthur in particular. I am
most happy that things are in good shape and that the health of [MacArthur] the Far Eastern Commander is so good - he and I seem to travel parallel paths in that line.
I’ll appreciate it if you will inform yourself thoroughly and completely as to the situation and keep me confidentially informed whenever you have the opportunity.
Please say to General MacArthur I have never had anything but the utmost confidence in his ability to do the Far Eastern job and I think I’ve that by action, as well as words.
President Harry S. Truman
Harry Truman to Frank Lowe, August 11, 1950
Papers of Harry S. Truman: President’s Secretary’s Files
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August 6-11, 1950
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Special Message to
the Congress on the Internal Security of the United States, August 8,
1950.
Public Papers of the President, 1950.
Report to the National Security Council, dated August 8, 1950, "The Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Siuation" (NSC 73/2). Papers of Harry S.
Truman: President's Secretary's Files. (20 pages)
Undated memorandum of conversations prepared by W. Averell Harriman
describing meetings in Tokyo, Japan, on August 6 and 8 (Tokyo time), 1950,
between Harriman and General Douglas MacArthur at which the political situation in the Far East, particularly in terms of Formosa, was discussed. Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files. (8 pages)
Undated summary by Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway of a conference in
Tokyo, Japan, on August 8 (Tokyo time), 1950, at which General Douglas
MacArthur outlined his military needs and advocated an early offensive in Korea. Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files. (3 pages)
Memorandum by Major General Frank Lowe to the President, dated August 8,
1950, reporting on the physical health of General Douglas MacArthur.
Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files. (2 pages)
Response from William Hassett, dated August 8, 1950, and letter from
Betty Williams, dated July 18, expressing approval of the Presidential
action with regard to Korea. Papers of Harry S. Truman: White House
Central Files-Official File. (2
pages)
Response from William Hassett, dated August 8, 1950, and letter from
Nancy Wigand, dated July 19, expressing approval of the Presidential
action with regard to Korea. Papers of Harry S. Truman: White House
Central Files-Official File. (3
pages)
Response from William Hassett, dated August 8, 1950, and letter from
Mr. and Mrs. Gilbert Ward, dated July 19, expressing approval of the
Presidential action with regard to Korea. Papers of Harry S. Truman: White
House Central Files-Official File. (3
pages)
The President's
News Conference, August 10, 1950.
Public Papers of the President,
1950.
Response from Dean Acheson, dated August 10, 1950, to a note from
Henry Wallace, dated July 26, asking about the validity of stories that
South Korean military action had prompted the war. Papers of Dean Acheson.
(8 pages)
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