Final approval for the Inchon amphibious landing is given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The National Security Council approves military operations north of the 38th parallel. President Truman deals with a Marine Corps controversy and seeks the removal of the Secretary of Defense. North and South Korean forces battle for Yongchon. Sometime before Tuesday, September 5, the President decided that he would ask [Secretary of Defense] Lou Johnson to resign when he came over to see the President that day at 12:30 for his regular weekly appointment. The President, however, could not bring the matter up at that time because Johnson brought Francis Matthews, the Secretary of the Navy, with him to discuss some routine business. Press Secretary to the President Charles Ross Dictation of "circumstances of the resignation of Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson," September 13, 1950 Papers of George M. Elsey Image: Press Secretary Charlie Ross. Photo: U.S. Army. Source: Truman Library.           When I saw [in 1949 that Secretary of Defense] Jim Forrestal was cracking up under the pressures of the reorganization of the defense department, I looked around for a successor. Louis Johnson had been known to me since 1918. He had been . . . in the old War Department. He had worked on an industrial mobilization plan. He had helped me win the election of 1948. . . . I came to the conclusion that he could relieve Forrestal and do the unification job that needed to be done. He was appointed and did good work with Mr. Forrestal. Then something happened. I am of the opinion that Potomac fever and a pathological condition are to blame for the fiasco at the end. Louis began to show an inordinate egotistical desire to run the whole government. He offended every member of the cabinet. We never had a cabinet meeting that he did not show plainly that he knew more about the problems of the Treasury, Commerce, Labor, Agriculture than did the Secretaries of those Department. He played no favorites; all of them were included. . . . He never missed an opportunity to say mean things about my personal staff. Then he tried to use the White House press men for blowing himself up and everyone else down, particularly the Secretary of State. He had conferences with enemy Senators of mine--[Kenneth] Wherry, [Joseph] McCarthy, [Owen] Brewster, [Robert A.] Taft, [Bourke] Hickenlooper--and made terrible statements to them. After doing a good job on the unification plan which I'd drawn up after World War II, on the advice of every field commander, army, navy, and air, he almost wrecked the whole thing. He misrepresented the facts to every committee before which he appeared. All this was carefully reported to me factually by men who were present--I have no spy system! Finally along in June 1950 I made up my mind he'd have to go. I made a trip [on July 4] to Leesburg [Virginia] with my daughter and talked to Gen. [George C.] Marshall--about China, Formosa [Taiwan], Japan, [General Douglas] MacArthur, [President of the Republic of "Nationalist" China] Chiang Kai-shek and finally about the defense department. A most interesting morning. Finally things came to a head. Gen. Marshall was on his first real vacation in Michigan. I called him and asked him to come see me when he returned. About ten days after the call and perhaps two weeks before Sept. 11 the General came to see me. I told him I had to get rid of Johnson. I asked him if he'd act through the crisis as Sec. of Defense if I could get Congressional approval. President Harry S. Truman Diary entry, September 14, 1950 Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files           [Defense Secretary] Louis Johnson just got so he was not dependable in the sense that the President couldn’t depend on what Johnson told him, for one thing, and also he couldn’t depend on him to carry out his instructions on the other hand. Special Counsel to the President Charles Murphy Oral history interview, June 24, 1969           This was a hectic day at the office. There was the usual briefing by [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General [Omar] Bradley in the President’s office at 9:30. The President then had a meeting with a group of Senators on internal security legislation and at 10 o’clock our staff meeting. Thereafter he had a crowded schedule throughout the day. Our troubles arose from a letter which the President had written August 29th to Rep. Gordon L. McDonough of California in reply to one from the congressman [calling for recognition of the Marine Corps as a full branch of the armed serves. The President disagreed, describing the Marines as “the Navy’s police force,” vowing “as long as I am President that is what it will remain” and adding that the Corps possessed “a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin’s.”] Rep. McDonough placed [the exchange] . . . in the Congessional Record of September 1st . . . . It did not become public, however, until Senator [Bourke] Hickenlooper picked it up and sounded off although, as we later were told, John O’Donnell of the New York [Daily] News picked it up. The result, in any event, was a storm of protests and criticisms which were reflected in telegrams that poured in here during the night--about 125 of them--with more during the day. They came from people all over the country, marines, former marines, mothers and fathers and others. Assistant Press Secretary to the President Eben Ayers Diary entry, September 6, 1950 Papers of Eben A. Ayers           Oh God! And I was on the receiving end of a good deal of it because, being the President’s Naval Aide, the good old mail room or somebody would dump most of this stuff on me. It was incredible to read some of it, but it represented a really bitter, emotional reaction [to the President's letter apparently deriding the Marines]. This is an example of what we all were terri­fied about, of the President getting up early in the morning and going down and writing his own correspondence. . . . and then all hell broke loose. Naval Aide to the President Admiral Robert Dennison Oral history interview, November 2, 1971           [Press Secretary to the President] Charlie Ross brought [the Marines controversy] . . . up at the staff meeting. There was some brief discussion and the conference went on then through the usual routine. Ross then brought it up again, making plain that he felt something must be done to meet the situation. The Marine Corps League is meeting in convention and the delegates there sounded off. Ross proposed that the President go to the meeting and address the crowd. This was backed up by [Administrative Assistants to the President] George Elsey and Donald Dawson but met a half-hearted response from some and was opposed by [Appointments Secretary to the President] Matt Connelly. The suggestion was also made by [Naval Aide to the President] Admiral [Robert] Dennison that the President address a letter to someone. It was left to be settled later. Afterwards Dennison and Elsey went to work on a letter. Dennison got in touch with the commandant of the Marine Corps, General [Clifton] Cates and he assigned a man. In the late afternoon the letter was completed. General Cates was called to the White House at 5 p.m. and the letter, addressed to him, was given him, with a copy of a letter to Commandant [Clay] Nixon of the Marine Corps League. The [President's] letter to Nixon was sent by a White House messenger together with a copy of the letter to General Cates and was delivered to Nixon at the Statler Hotel between 5 and 5:30 and was read by him to the meeting. It was greeted by some catcalls and boos but there were shouts to read it again and the commandant did that. The general reaction was good. Assistant Press Secretary to the President Eben Ayers Diary entry, September 6, 1950 Papers of Eben A. Ayers           . . . I got another call from the President to come over and see him, again with [Press Secretary Charles] Ross, also the Secret Service. There may have been somebody else there, but Ross and I were the only ones really involved in it. The President said, “It seems to me that I was invited to a Marine reunion here in Washington. Is that correct?” I said, “Yes, and also in accordance with your policy of not being able to attend all these things, you regretted. It’s at the Statler Hotel.” The President said, “Well, I’m going.” It was to be the next morning. Even I thought this unwise, but I didn’t say so, and I let the Secret Service take care of that. They had all the reasons why he shouldn’t do it; that emotions were so high that somebody might throw a beer bottle at him or embarrass him or something. And he said, “Well, I don’t care about that. I’m going to go.” Then he turned to me and said, “What time is this meeting?” “Oh,” I said, “I don’t know, I think it is 9 o’clock.” “Call up [Marine Corps Commandant] General [Clifton] Cates and ask him to stop by the White House and pick me up.” Naval Aide to the President Admiral Robert Dennison Oral history interview, November 2, 1971           The [National Security Council] paper [NSC 81, U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Korea, authorizing General Douglas MacArthur’s troops to cross the 38th parallel] has been approved, subject to the senior staff members from State and Defense getting together, principally on Paragraphs 15 and 17. [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General [Omar] Bradley’s comments seemed to be that the paper contem­plated a stabilization at the 38th Parallel, whereas, if General Mac­Arthur could destroy the North Korean forces, then [South Korean] President [Syngman] Rhee might proclaim an election and police the whole country north of the 38th Parallel with Korean forces. He had not had time to study the paper closely but felt that it would preclude this. I said that it had no such effect, and that Paragraph 15 should be rewritten to make it clear that if there was to be an actual invasion north of the 38th Parallel with fighting forces-American, etc.,- that decision had to be made in Washington. I also explained the trouble with Paragraph 17. The President, Secretary Johnson and General Bradley agreed and thought there would be no problem about the paper. I am attaching General Bradley’s memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, copy of which he gave me. . . . 4. After the meeting General Bradley and Secretary Johnson raised with the President another bombing of Rashin. They said that one-quarter of the oil supplies of North Korea were at this point, and Secretary Johnson thought that it was the point through which most of the tanks came. They wanted to bomb the installations and marshalling yards. They said they would do this, if the President approved, in daylight so as to be certain of not violating the border. . . . I said that I was not so much worried about violating the border as I was about bombing so close to the Soviet border and in so sensitive a spot; that it might provoke attack on the bombing expedition or Soviet reaction in the direction of occupying some or all of North Korea. If these eventualities occurred, or either of them, we would lose far more than we would gain by knocking out the gasoline. . . . The President expressed considerable worry about the matter and asked the JCS to review the situation, asked me to review it, and asked that Defense and State get together and discuss the matter before laying it before him. Secretary of State Dean Acheson Memorandum of conversation, September 7, 1950 Papers of Dean Acheson           You are one up on me for letters. That is not customary. . . . Tomorrow I have to break the bad news to [Secretary of Defense] Louis Johnson. I think I have a way to do it that will not be too hard on him. General [George C.] Marshall came to see me yesterday. I told him what I had in mind. He said, "Mr. President, you have only to tell me what you want, and I'll do it. But I want you to think about the fact that my appointment may reflect upon you and your administration. They are still charging me with the downfall of Chiang [Kai-Shek]'s [Nationalist] government in China. I want to help, not to hurt you." Can you think of anyone else saying that? I can't, and he's of the great! [Special Assistant to the President] W. Averell Harriman went to Leesburg [Virginia] and had lunch with him today, and they talked it out. Wonder of wonders, Mrs. Marshall is for it! He could not possibly hurt me. I'm hoping that I can get Louis Johnson to say publicly that he thinks because of the attacks on him I should ask General Marshall to take over. He can make himself a hero if he'll do that. If he doesn't, I shall simply fire him as I did [Commerce Secretary Henry] Wallace and [Secretary of the Treasury Henry] Morgenthau. As usual I'm having hell and high water every day. But I seem to thrive on it, and Dr. [Wallace] Graham can't find a thing wrong except my propensity to gain pounds when I eat what I want . . . . Send me another note, and I'll return a longer and more complicated communication. President Harry S. Truman Harry Truman to Bess Wallace Truman, September 7, 1950 Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post-Presidential Files           To the office and at 9:15 called the press association men to tell them it would be well for them to go to the Statler Hotel where the Marine Corps League was meeting. I suggested they be there at 9:45. It had been decided late yesterday that the President would drop in on the meeting. Later this morning I learned that the President had about decided, over night, that he would not go in view of the letter yesterday. [U.S. Marine Corps Commandant] General [Clifton] Cates was in at 9:30 and he and [Press Secretary] Charlie Ross urged the President to go. Cates admitted that he had told Commander Nixon of the League that the President would drop in. So the President agreed to go and left about 9:40. . . . Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers Diary entry, September 8, 1950 Papers of Eben A. Ayers           It all happened so fast that nobody had any idea that the President was anywhere around. We waited outside of the place where they had the gathering. [Marine Corps Commandant General Clifton] Cates walked out on the stage and of course the Marines nearly tore the place down. They expected him to give a rally-around-the-flag sort of speech, you know, but instead of that Cates said, “Gentlemen, the President of the United States,” and there was absolute dead silence. . . . Here they were all ready for a hell of a speech and the President walked out. I thought the place was going to fall down. Hell, nobody threw anything at him. They admired his guts, which they all could well recognize. And he got up--not got up, he was up, he never sat down--and really told the Marines what he thought about the Marine Corps and all fooling aside. He certainly didn’t overdo it, but it really came through. It wasn’t very long. He didn’t have any prepared speech [for the Marine Corps League]. Nobody could write that one for him. I thought the hotel was coming down before he spoke and I was sure it was after he spoke. And the chairman, I forget what rank he was, but anyway a Marine, took a medal off his own chest and pinned it on the President. We left as soon as the Presi­dent could get out of the place. Everybody wanted to shake hands with him. If that wasn’t a personal triumph I never saw one. What guts he had. Naval Aide to the President Admiral Robert Dennison Oral history interview, November 2, 1971           While we concur in launching a counter-offensive in Korea as early as is feasible, we have noted with considerable concern the recent trend of events there. In light of all factors including apparent commitment of practically all reserves available to the Eighth Army, we desire your estimate as to the feasibility and chance of success of projected operation if initiated on planned schedule. We are sure that you understand that all available trained Army units in the United States have been allocated to you . . . and that minimum of four months would elapse before first of partially trained National Guard Divisions could reach Korea in event that junction of main Eighth Army Forces [inside the Pusan Perimeter] with Tenth Corps bridgehead [following the planned Inchon landing] should not quickly be effected with forces now available . . . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Chiefs of Staff to Douglas MacArthur, September 7, 1950 The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume III, Part 1           [T]here is no question in my mind as to the feasibility of the [amphibious] operation [at Inchon] and I regard its chance of success as excellent. I go further and believe that it represents the only hope of wresting the initiative from the enemy and thereby presenting an opportunity for a decisive blow. To do otherwise is to commit us to a war of indefinite duration, of gradual attrition and of doubtful results, as the enemy has potentialities of reinforcement and build-up which exceed those of our own availability. . . . The situation within the [Pusan] perimeter is not critical. It is possible that there may be some contraction and defense positions have been selected for this contingency. There is no slightest possibility, however, of our forces being ejected from the Pusan beachhead. The envelopment from the north will instantly relieve the pressure on the south perimeter and, indeed, is the only way that this can be accomplished. . . . The success of the enveloping movement from the north does not depend upon the rapid juncture of the X Corps and the 8th Army. The seizure of the heart of the enemy distributing system in the Seoul area will completely dislocate the logistical supply of his forces now operating in South Korea and therefore will ultimately result in their disintegration. . . . Caught between our northern and our southern forces, both of which are completely self-sustaining because of our absolute air and naval supremacy, the enemy cannot fail to be ultimately shattered through disruption of his logistical support and our combined combat activities. The prompt junction of our two forces, while it would be dramatically symbolic of the complete collapse of the enemy, is not a vital part of the operation. For the reasons stated, there are no material changes under contemplation in the operation as planned and reported to you. The embarkation of the troops and the preliminary air and naval preparations are proceeding according to schedule. I repeat that I and all of my commanders and staff officers, without exception, are enthusiastic and confident of the success of the enveloping operation. General Douglas MacArthur Douglas MacArthur to Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 8, 1950 The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume III, Part 1           . . . [W]e approved the plans [for the amphibious assault on Inchon]; . . . [Chief of Naval Operations] Admiral [Forrest] Sherman and I went out to [the Far East, August 19-25, 1950, to] find out just exactly what these plans were. Frankly we were somewhat in the dark, and as it was a matter of great concern, we went out to discuss it with General MacArthur. We suggested certain alternative possibilities and places and everything of that sort [such as landing at Kunsan, some distance south of Inchon], which General MacArthur looked into, and then he finally gave us the recommendations, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan. Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins Congressional testimony, May 26, 1951 Go to August 29-September 4, 1950    Back to Holding the Line    Go to September 9-14, 1950

Back to Holding the Line Go to August 29-September 4, 1950 Go to September 9-14, 1950  Document links September 6-8, 1950 See the record from which the decisions were made Letter from Harry Truman, dated August 29, 1950, to Gordon McDonough commenting on the United States Marine Corps Attached is McDonough's letter to the President dated August 19, 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files. (2 pages) Report to the National Security Council, dated September 1, 1950, "U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Korea" (NSC 81). Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files. (17 pages) Letter from Harry Truman, dated September 6, 1950, to Clay Nixon transmitting the President's letter to Clifton Cates on the subject of the Marine Corps. Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files. (3 pages) The President's News Conference, September 7, 1950 Public Papers of the President, 1950. Press release, "Remarks of the President to the Marine Corps League at the Satler Hotel, September 7, 1950." Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files. (1 page) Letter from Clay Nixon, dated September 8, 1950, commenting on the President's recent statements in print and in person to the Marine Corps League. Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files. (1 page)

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