|
|
With General "Ned" Almond's detatched X Corps closing on Seoul and Walton Walker's 8th Army breaking out of the Pusan perimeter, the North Korean Army appears on the verge of destruction. Policy makers consider available intelligence and next steps.
Image: Major
General Edward "Ned" Almond, Commander X Corps, driving his
own jeep following a meeting at the Marine Command Post, Kimpo Airport,
September 19, 1950. Photo: Frank Lowe Report. Source: Truman Library.
The 7th Division, the second major unit in Almond's Corps,
landed shortly
after the 1st Marine Division and by September 19 had taken
responsibility for the southern portion of the perimeter with the goal of
protecting the 1st Marine Division's rear by blocking any North Korean
troops coming to the defense of Seoul from the Pusan Perimeter area. When
General Douglas MacArthur left the area on September 21, Almond
officially took command of X Corps, by then 50,000 strong. Almond's first
goal: to liberate the Korean capital, Seoul, by September 25, three
months since the initial North Korean invasion.
[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General [Omar] Bradley’s briefing [to the President] showed the change in the picture of things in Korea, now that U.S. forces have made the landing on the west coast at Inchon. This is a brightening picture. He reported that more than 28,000 men have been landed and more than 14,000 vehicles have been put ashore, a remarkably high proportion, as he pointed out - nearly one vehicle for every two men. . . . On the main battleline [of the Pusan perimeter] the United Nations forces are making some gains and this was reflected in the chart as he presented it.
Assistant Press Secretary to the President Eben Ayers
Diary entry, September 19, 1950
Papers of Eben A. Ayers
Image: The remains of a North Korean boxcar that had been heading for Seoul, when hit by Air Force B-26 bombers, near Susaik, September 21, 1950. Photo: U.S. Air Force. Source: Truman Library.
Then a big question arose. Would we stop at the 38th parallel or would our forces go on into North Korea and force the surrender of the North Korean army. The primary reason that this was a very important question was Communist China. Would this bring China into the war and enlarge a relatively small though fierce conflict into a major war? Lurking over Communist China was Communist Russia. Would this bring Russia into the war? If so, all the bars were off and here was World War III, with us trying to fight seven thousand or more miles from the United States, with all the problems of communication and supply. There were perhaps mingled thoughts about this in Washington. But my recollection is, that asked this very important question at one of his press conferences, the President either said, or indicated, that we would go no further.
International News Service White House Correspondent Robert G. Nixon
Oral History Interview, November 4, 1970
. . . I have
not [decided what our troops will do when they reach the 38th parallel in Korea]. That is a matter for the United Nations to decide. That is a United Nations force, and we are one of the many who are interested in that situation. It will be worked out by the United Nations and I will abide by the decision that the United Nations makes.
President Harry S. Truman
Press conference response, September 21, 1950
Public Papers of the President, 1950
Now you have to understand the context in which this was happening. General [Douglas] MacArthur had finished the [Inchon] Landing which many people had serious doubts about at the time the instructions were given as to whether he could pull that off or not. He had succeeded in doing that and the press here went wild, they were saying “Why is the President holding back General MacArthur?,” “Why is he not being permitted to cross the 38th parallel?” and so on. That was the line of the argument. So that was the setting and it was a very intense one. . . .
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Lucius Battle
Background interview for British Broadcasting Corporation, January 24, 1984
Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection
The State Department has only one direct way of getting intelligence, and that is through its own missions abroad.
However, through the CIA [the Central Intelligence Agency] the intelligence which comes to the other branches of the Government, is put together and that is made available to all branches of the Government so that there is a pool of information and intelligence on various subjects which is made up of some that comes to the State Department, some that comes to the various armed services or to any other branch of the Government; that is put together and made available to us. . . .
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
Congressional testimony, June 1, 1951
You see the Central Intelligence Agency was organized at my direction by Admiral [William] Leahy and Admiral [Sidney] Souers . . . . You know we have four or five departments - State, every branch of Defense, Agriculture and Commerce - all with foreign connections. They used to get stacks of messages three feet high, and the President had no way of finding out what was in those messages unless he read them all. That couldn’t be done, so the Central Intelligence Agency coordinates the information that comes to every department, as well as to the President . . . , and that way the President has a viewpoint that no other man has, or can get.
President Harry S. Truman
Mr. Citizen interview, September 9, 1959
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post-presidential Files
There was no doubt what the President wanted . . . . The President must have had it in mind that he wanted a Central Intelligence outfit. . . . He wanted to digest every day a summary of the dispatches flowing from the various Departments, either from State to our ambassadors or from the Navy and War Departments to their forces abroad, wherever such messages might have some influence on our foreign policy.
Special Consultant to the President Admiral Sidney Souers
Presidential memoirs interview, December 15, 1954
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post-presidential Files
You see, the State Department and the Defense Department, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Commerce all had foreign relations. They all received immense numbers of messages. I finally got those things all coordinated. That's when they set up the Central Intelligence Agency . . . . But unless the President has complete information on world affairs, he can’t make sensible decisions. . . . It’s absolutely essential that he have advice, but he doesn’t have to have directions, because he makes the directions. . . . It doesn’t make any difference what comes up. The final decision is made by the President of the United Sates, the man who makes the foreign policy of the United States and who tries to inform the Congress what the domestic policy ought to be. Nobody can make those decisions but the President.
President Harry S. Truman
Mr. Citizen interview, October 22, 1959
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post-presidential Files
The general state of information which came to us [on the situation in Korea in 1950], I think I can describe this way: That in the period from 25th of June to the 23rd of September, the general intelligence estimates which were put together regarded intervention as improbable, barring Soviet decision to precipitate global war.
That was the conclusion which was drawn from all the bits of information that came in.
>From September 23 to 26, it seemed that the same result was probably true.
Now, I have to caution about all these things, that one should not suppose that when you make a conclusion of that sort, that then turns into fact.
This is one’s best guess as to someone’s intentions.
You also have information as to whether you think it is possible or probable; and the general view was that it was improbable and everyone continued to express the idea that you couldn’t dismiss the possibility.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
Congressional testimony, June 1, 1951
I remember we once got some intelligence which I personally thought was good, about a talk by [Soviet Politburo member Mikhael] Suslov to the members of the Cominform . . . in which some of the Cominform fellows asked, “What are you going to do if United States intervention is successful?” And Suslov said, “We guarantee you that the United States will not be permitted to defeat the North Korean regime.” . . . . This, I think, the Russians had determined right off the bat after we had intervened in the very first instance, that they were going to do what was necessary, or get done what was necessary, in order not to have one of their puppet regimes destroyed; this was something they just could not tolerate. . . .
There is one point, though, that is important. And that is the point that prior to crossing the 38th Parallel we felt that if the Russians really took this Suslov position seriously they had an option as to what they could do and that is to move their own forces or Chinese forces overtly down to the 38th Parallel prior to the time we got there. And this would make it pretty clear they were committing their prestige to the 38th Parallel; then we could make a deal. Then we could call this thing off, because then they would have taken responsibility up to their place and we would have taken it up to ours, and this would have given you an adequate solution.
Department of State Policy Planning Staff Director Paul Nitze
"Princeton Seminar" comment, February 13, 1954
Papers of Dean Acheson
Image: Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Source: Truman Library.
|
|
After the Inchon landings, the United Nations forces had cut the North Korean armies in two, so that one part of that army was retreating north of the thirty-eighth parallel, towards its capital in one section; and toward the east coast in another; and a very considerable body was trapped in South Korea.
And, the instructions which were given had to do with the reduction of both of those forces.
|
Part of his effort had to go toward capturing the troops left in the south, which I believe amounted to pretty close to 100,000 men, if not more.
The main question that arose in the north was what he should do in regard to forces which were retreating northward, and the sound military decision was made, I believe, that if he could pursue those forces and either surround them and get their surrender or destroy them as a military unit, he would have accomplished a great stroke both in repulsing the attack which was made on the Republic of Korea and in opening the way for a political reunification of Korea, and that is what General MacArthur undertook to do. . . .
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
Congressional testimony, June 5, 1951
The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that if we were required to stop at the 38th Parallel, nothing would have been done to solve the real problem.
In other words, if you stopped at the 38th Parallel, then the North Koreans, supported by the Chinese and the Russians, could once again attack when they were ready to. The 38th Parallel had no defensive merit whatsoever; therefore, General MacArthur recommended that he be permitted to go on. The Joint Chiefs supported his recommendation that we continue the attack, at least to a point where a good defensive line could be held.
Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins
Truman Library Institute conference comment, May 1975
The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976)
General [Douglas] MacArthur was strongly in favor of pursuit. I knew we were not prepared to use all available force against a Chinese intervention. I made my criticisms known within the Department of Defense, to the Chief of Staff, Secretary of Army, to each of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the Secretary of Defense. . . : “We must not engage in any military engagement for which we are not wholly prepared to do whatever it takes to succeed. This will be a new adventure. Unless we are prepared to do whatever it takes to succeed, we will lose what we have gained if we do not repeat the success we have had to date. We have repulsed the enemy to the line of departure of his aggressive assault against the South Koreans. He has lost face. If we cross the 38th parallel, we will be undertaking a major new adventure, and we should stop now unless we are prepared to engage and destroy the Chinese capacity to fight. As certainly as night follows day, if we enter North Korea, the Chinese will intervene."
Assistant Secretary of the Army Karl Bendetsen
Oral history interview November 21, 1972
Image: President Truman pins the silver
insignia of General of the Army on the shoulder of Omar Bradley, making
him the ninth five-star General. Mrs. Bradley looks on. Source: Truman
Library.
Bradley's promotion placed him at a rank equal to the Commander in the
Far East, General Douglas MacArthur, thus eliminating one aspect of the
difficult relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by
Bradley, and MacArthur, who commanded all forces in Korea.
Yes, there were
a great many discussions on this. Again I don't remember any contrary opinions. If there were, I just don't recall. It seemed a very natural thing that in order to bring some sort of order to that area, it would be necessary to consolidate the successes that had been achieved at Inchon and to really try to restore some universality to Korea rather than leaving it as a divided land. The opinion of almost everybody that if you did that, there was going to be constant trouble, an inability to grow and develop. I'm quite sure that I favored going north . . . . You've got to remember that the Red Chinese had been threatening throughout the period. . . . Quite frankly, I guess it's a case of crying "wolf" that often. I do not believe that at that time anybody seriously believed that the Red Chinese were going to enter the war. Certainly General MacArthur had very clear ideas that they would not, and I have to say that after Inchon I was very impressed with General MacArthur's capability to assess problems out there on the ground.
Secretary of the Army Frank Pace
Oral history interview February 17, 1972
|
|
September 15-18, 1950
Back to How Far to Go
Go to September 26-30, 1950
Document
links
September 19-September 25, 1950
See
the record from which the decisions
were made |
The
President's news conference, September 21, 1950. Public Papers of
the President, 1950.
Message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander in Chief Far East General Douglas MacArthur, dated 22 September 1950, requesting transmittal of plans for reestablishment of Syngman Rhee's ROK government, prior to implementation. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Naval Aide Files.
(2
pages)
Message from Commander in Chief Far East General Douglas MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 23 September 1950, pertaining to ROK government reestablishment plans. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Naval Aide Files. (1 page)
|
|
|
Image: Vicinity of Yongdongpo. A DUKW
loaded with Marines crossing the Han River headed for Seoul, September
24, 1950. Photo: Frank Lowe Report. Source: Truman Library.
While X Corps Commander General Edward Almond desired the recapture of Seoul
by September 25, the 7th and 1st Marine Regiments advanced somewhat deliberately
from the west and south. The Marines fully expected street to street fighting in the capital
city.
|
|
