

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ALT (PSF-SUB) 99

Department of State

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

~~TOP SECRET~~

864

L  
Action  
SS

Control: 5591  
Rec'd: September 14, 1950  
10:54 a.m.

Info  
DCR

FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 8, September 14, 10:32 a.m.

NIACT

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ACHESON.

In discussions held during first two days Mr. Bevin, Mr. Schuman and I have reviewed the general question of establishment of forces for defense of Europe, possible role of Germany in connection with these forces and reaction of German public opinion, some other technical problems with reference to Germany and the question of admitting Greece and Turkey to the NATO. I have reviewed in detail privately and together with both Ministers the views of the US Government with respect to the establishment of the defense forces, pointing out the great significance of your decision to commit US troops to defense of Western Europe and our feeling that this decision was dependent upon establishment of total collective forces adequate to the task of this defense.

Both Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman have expressed their deep gratification over this decision but do not seem to me to have yet grasped its full significance and implications. The major issue which has arisen so far has concerned the utilization of German units in these forces for the defense of Europe. Mr. Schuman has expressed the very strong and firm opposition of his government to any decision which would provide for the recreation of purely German military units. He is apparently under firm instructions on this point, and intimated that no French Government could face the French Assembly or French public opinion with the proposition of reestablishing at this time German units which might in any way build the framework for the possible recreation of a German army. Mr. Bevin did not support our position, but he did not at least oppose it, and his questions served to bring out very clearly and sharply the issues which we have raised. There are intimations that the British will be willing to go along, and we are meeting privately this morning in an effort to find some formula

which the French

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12812 U.S. 1950 Vol. III  
PAGE 301  
DATE 11-27-79

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-#SECTO 8, September 14, 10:32 a.m. from New York.

which the French can accept. I think Mr. Schuman personally wishes to help devise such a formula. I believe we are about to reach a satisfactory solution of the issue concerning a central German police force.

Mr. Bevin has challenged our thinking most directly on the question of appointment of a supreme commander for the proposed new forces. He feels that it is essential to establish the supreme command relationship immediately in order to give firm and strong direction to the early steps of this force. He seems to want us to contribute a supreme commander as a stimulus to European action, instead of accepting our view that they must first demonstrate their capacity and willingness to act. Mr. Schuman agrees with Bevin that the recent experience of the Brussels Pact countries under a combined staff has not been happy, but he agrees with us that it is not desirable or necessary to appoint a supreme commander until there are forces in being. We may finally have to agree to recommend to the NAT Council that this question be referred to the Defense Ministers for their recommendation as to the best manner in which to handle this from a military standpoint, which they will be asked to review on an urgent basis along with questions of the organization and composition of the proposed forces. We expect to state this in such a way as not to compromise our position.

The US proposal turning down the Turkish request for admission to the NATO was accepted by the Ministers but only after Mr. Bevin had urged that this might better be handled by a reaffirmation of the French and British treaty with Turkey and a strong declaration by the US in support of that country. I pointed out that we already have heavy commitments in proportion to our military strength, and that while we could undoubtedly meet aggression in Turkey as we would in any other part of the world, we could not at this time undertake a further commitment. We did desire, however, that both Turkey and Greece be allowed to associate themselves with the planning activities of the NATO in the Mediterranean area.

On the other questions concerning Germany and the NATO satisfactory progress has been made in our discussions so far, though the rate has been so slow that meetings will probably be held on next Monday before the opening of the General Assembly and perhaps occasional meetings after that to firm up our planning on the forces for European defense.

We will start

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-#SECTO 8, September 14, 10:32 a.m. from New York.

We will start this morning our discussion of Far Eastern questions but I told Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman privately yesterday our position on a Japanese peace treaty.

Mr. Bevin since his recent illness has not recovered his old vigor and this factor has slowed up our proceedings.

ACHESON

MRM:CM

Note: Advance copy to S/S 9/14/50, 11:05 a.m., JRL.

~~TOP SECRET~~