Oral History Interview with
Michael H. Cardozo
FWith United States Lend-Lease and Foreign Economic Administration, 1942-45; Lend-Lease Representative in Turkey, 1943-44; with Office of Legal Adviser, Department of State, 1945-52; Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, 1950-52.
May 29, 1975
by Richard D. McKinzie
[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.
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the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.
Opened October, 1978
Harry S. Truman Library
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Oral History Interview with
Michael H. Cardozo
May 29, 1975
by Richard D. McKinzie
MCKINZIE: Mr. Cardozo, I think many historians, as they look back to
people who served in Government during and after World War II, ask, "Why'd
you go into that in the first place?" When you were a young man preparing
for law did you anticipate a career in Government service?
CARDOZO: Well, I didn't when I was in college or law school. I didn't
really know what I was
going to do, but I assumed I was going to be in a law firm, probably in
Wall Street. That's where I went after I left law school. I didn't take
a course in international law at law school or anywhere else, so I didn't
necessarily prepare for a Government career. It's true, though, that the
atmosphere at the Yale Law School in those days was very likely to encourage
somebody to get into Government. William [Orville] Douglas, Thurman [Wesley]
Arnold, Charles [Edward] Clark and Walton [Hale] Hamilton were all people
who, at one time or another, had a lot to do with Government. So, it wasn't
surprising that a lot of us did go into it. I got into Government because
one of my classmates at the Yale Law School called me one day and said
that he had been made Special Counsel to an investigation by the
SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission] and wanted to build up a staff.
He asked if I would come down for a few months to help with that investigation.
It was the Temporary National Economic Committee's investigation of life
insurance, and Gerhardt Gesell was the Special Counsel. So, I got leave
of absence from my firm to do that, and that particular job, instead of
lasting a couple of months, lasted 15 months or so. Then the New Deal
was in full activity here in Washington, and other jobs showed up for
all of us. I was invited to go to the Tax Division of the Justice Department,
which was a very interesting thing to do. I was, for two years, arguing
cases on appeal in various U.S. Courts of Appeal and still on leave from
the New York firm. It was while I was in
that job that the war started, and at that point I actually got into international
affairs. I went upstairs to the Justice Department, to the office of Oscar
Cox, whom I knew personally. He was then General Counsel of Lend-Lease,
as well as an officer of the Justice Department, and I asked what I could
do to help with the war effort. He suggested going into lend-lease. For
a couple of months I worked in what was then the War Department, on the
relocation of the Japanese and the Italian and German restrictions. Then
I went into lend-lease. That's how it came about: instead of being here
for two or three months, I was here for 13 years.
MCKINZIE: How did one get assigned to a place like Turkey? Was it just
a matter of doling it out or did you have some particular
expertise of a legal or other nature?
CARDOZO: This was a remarkable quality of Oscar Cox, again. I went to
the Lend-Lease Administration, in the Office of the General Counsel. The
Lend-Lease Administration was a remarkable conception. Oscar Cox wrote
the bill and had the idea as to how it should be run. The Office of Lend-Lease
Administration was a small office where the ideas came and the central
planning for the thing was handled. The actual carrying out of lend-lease
was done in other agencies: Treasury Procurement, military procurement
agencies, Agriculture; those organizations actually did the buying and
transferring of all articles. Lend-lease was just the office where the
requests came from the other countries; where they were screened, decisions
and then the action was parceled out. And it was an interesting, unusual
legal staff. Not only was Oscar Cox interesting in this respect, but he
also brought down the Dean of the Cornell Law School. Then we had Myres
[Smith] McDougal, who had become famous in international law; Lloyd Cutler;
Joe Rauh; and others that were in and out of the office. Just before I
went there, Frank Kaufman (another of the young lawyers from various backgrounds;
many of them were from Yale Law School) had been sent to Turkey to set
up a system of screening the needs of the Turks. Now, one might ask why
a lawyer? Well, it was a tricky and novel job that called for an incredible
kind of mediation between the State Department, military people, and the
Lend-Lease Administration. Somebody was needed who knew how government
operated and who could
get along with people like the Turks, in order to get things going there
despite the doubts of all kinds of people. He had to work closely with
the British who had dominated the area as far as military aid was concerned.
And Oscar would say to one of his staff, "How about going to Turkey?"
That’s what he said to Frank Kaufman, and he said the same thing
to Lloyd Cutler about North Africa. Cutler went to be the intermediary
between General Patton and the civilian people furnishing lend-lease aid
in North Africa. So, Frank Kaufman, who is now a judge in Baltimore, had
been there for about a year, had already gone to Turkey, and his time
to return had come. It was not supposed to be an indefinite assignment,
and anyway, in wartime people were restless and wanted to get into
different things, and so forth. So, they wanted someone to take his place,
and I was the next one in line, sort of. Along with a number of the legal
staff of lend-lease, I went out to take one of these foreign positions.
There were others, Thomas Washington went to Iran and Philip Kidd and
others went to various places.
MCKINZIE: Did you have a chance to talk with Mr. Kaufman before you went?
CARDOZO: No, I didn't before I went. He was there though; we were there
together for several weeks and I learned some of the ropes from him.
MCKINZIE: So, before you went, you weren't in the position to judge what
kind of relationship there would be between people in the
State Department and people (such as yourself) representing lend-lease,
people representing the Treasury, or people representing other agencies
of U.S. Government?
CARDOZO: No, it was terra incognita as far as Washington was concerned.
Only the people out in the field knew what it was. Frank Kaufman knew
the problems, but he was not in a position to send messages because the
State Department would probably be involved and would see them anyway.
So, nothing really had come back about the diplomatic problems of relations
between the Lend-Lease Administration and the State Department. Of course,
you later learn, after you've been in Government long enough, that that
kind of inter-departmental relationship is normal. Being able to make
work means that somebody has to "feel" the problem.
I think that what I learned in my first year at lend-lease was to become
an expert in how to get Government money spent fast and effectively. This
is what all the lend-lease staff learned to do. That was why when I came
back and the postwar foreign aid programs came about, I was brought into
that. I theoretically knew how to set up a system that would get billions
of dollars spent for the Marshall plan. So, my experience in lend-lease
was very important to that and also to the intermediate programs.
MCKINZIE: As a man who was, in a sense, walking tightrope in Turkey,
you had a number of clients; the Turks, the State Department, your own
agency. Did you at all think about what
was going to happen to Turkey come the end of the war?
CARDOZO: Well, not very much. We had picked up from President Roosevelt
the idea that we were now "Mr. Win the War;" that was our job.
Everything was aimed at that. The British in Turkey suspected the Americans
of planning a postwar situation where, because of our lend-lease shipments
during the war, we would set up a dependence of the Turks on American
goods. They'd always dealt with the British before and the British were
terribly anxious not to let DuPont chemicals take the place of Imperial
Chemicals Industries. So, in the question of deciding where the Turks
would fill their needs for various kinds of things (such as tires -- Dunlop
tires or Goodyear tires) there was a little bit of jockeying over the
future, a concern for the future position of the trading nations. But
on our side we were very pure. In fact, we got the rare praise from the
British of being idealists. Frank Kaufman and I were characterized as
the most idealistic people they had ever encountered, by the British.
And idealism meant that we were there to do the job honestly and not to
try to do anything that would just set things up for the future. I think
that was addressed to even the commercial attaché in our Embassy,
who wasn't able to do his normal kind of thing very much because he was
concentrating on the war.
Now, on the other hand, of course, the lend-lease agreement contemplated
that we would not ask for a repayment for debts that would cause a postwar
situation that would
be impossible for the country to fulfill. The famous Fifth Report to Congress
on lend-lease was released, then withdrawn and rewritten. At first it
had had the words in it, "Victory and a sure peace are the only coin
in which we expect to be repaid." This caused some troubles back
here, because some people thought that we should get paid in more solid
coin than that for some of the things. They didn't want to commit us to
not getting paid anything for the lend-lease aid. So, they withdrew that
first condition of the Fifth Report and put out the other one with those
two sentences taken out.
Nonetheless, these reports to Congress on lend-lease contained all these
agreements, the so-called "lend-lease agreements." They had
an Article 7 which had been drafted by
Eugene Rostow on the lend-lease legal staff. At the time he also worked
for Acheson on lend-lease matters, when Acheson was in the Treasury Department.
That was a remarkable section of the agreement, in which it said that
"the benefit to the United States shall be such that the President
deems appropriate.." I remember the Turks had quite a time in translating
the words "benefit to the United States." "Does it mean
payment?" "No, it doesn't mean payment." "What does
it mean?" "Well, it means the things that make us happy."
That was in all the lend-lease agreements.
So, we were looking for a future when the lend lease settlements, which
involved billions of dollars, were to be used in a way that would not
be an economic burden on the other
country. The lend-lease settlements of '45 and '46 were models of how
to settle what could be called a debt without burdening the rest of the
world, unlike the World War I days. In that sense, we were looking into
the future, but not much.
MCKINZIE: In speaking with people who were in the economic sections of
the State Department and in reading a lot of the recently written literature
about World War II diplomacy, I can't help but have the impression that
the economists, at least, had a particular hope for the postwar world.
The kind of economists who came in during World War II believed in, certainly,
economic integration in the postwar period, if not political integration.
Was there a kind of mind set of the lawyers who came in? You mentioned
that a number of
people came in from Yale Law School. Would they have been in this internationalist
CARDOZO: Well, it was not predisposition, but I'm sure that all of us
who felt that we came in with the New Deal did have a free trade approach
to it rather than protectionists; very much so. This became very much
the policy of the whole State Department. Willard Thorp was the Assistant
Secretary for Economic Affairs and Acheson was Secretary. As a matter
of fact, all of them had that attitude, and the lawyers reflected it.
I don't think that any of the lawyers had any personal predilection in
favor of trade restrictions -- quite the opposite. As a matter of fact,
lawyers who came in through a different route -- such as Walter Surrey
and Seymour Rubin (who came in through
the economic warfare part of the war effort), who were both my predecessors
as Assistant Legal Advisor for Economic Affairs -- were architects of
free trade. Rubin went through the whole Havana agreement period trying
to create a system of free trade. This period led to the gap between different
types of trade later on. They were typical of the lawyers who were in
the Legal Advisers office at that time. But their clients were their mentors;
people like Willard Thorp, Charles Kindleberger, Isaiah Prank, Raymond
Vernon and so on. Of course, today, Stanley Metzger is the lawyer who
has written a great many things about trade, all carrying on this tradition
of free trade. Vernon is another good example of an economist in the State
Department who created this atmosphere. And the lawyers learned from them.
MCKINZIE: I note that when lend-lease was beginning to wind down, you
were then working in the FEA [Foreign Economic Administration].
CARDOZO: Yes, the FEA was created while I was in Turkey. I was a lawyer
and my job was to approve lend-lease requisitions. As a matter of fact,
the day that lend-lease shipments to Russia stopped was the day when I
had a phone call from somebody in the Treasury Department who said to
me, "Do you think we should stop these shipments or not?"
I said, "I think it's a wise thing to stop the shipments now and
find out later whether you were right or wrong." And they stopped
as a result of that conversation. Nobody quite knew that what was happening,
was Congress was refusing the money to carry on shipments to Russia. At
point it became clear that they were not going to appropriate the continued
money for the Russian shipments but would for the other countries. So,
when this became clear as a matter of congressional activity, the Treasury
began to worry about when they should get the word and stop. That was
where I was at the time.
MCKINZIE: Among those people there seems to have been quite a number
who were eminently pleased about the way planning had worked during the
war; you could say that the efforts of U.S. planners had been a significant
contribution to the victory. Those same people were arguing that the kind
of planning which had taken place during the war, materiel allocations,
industrial quotas, export-import controls, and so on, ought to continue
into the first years of the peace. I wonder if there is anything to the
speculation that people got so excited about the success of
planning that they wanted to continue this on into the peacetime period?
CARDOZO: Well, there was a very strong feeling beginning right after
about '45 that there should be multilateral efforts and agreements that
would deal with trade. The Havana Charter was a good example. The Havana
Charter never was really put into effect in its own terms, because there
were always certain protectionist problems in this country, and you couldn't
go as far as you wanted. I always was very interested in the development
of the Marshall plan, for example, and the extent to which that had been
a thought in the minds of, primarily, the State Department, but with some
Treasury economists and so forth, from its very earlier stage. Of course
we were going through a period of creating the United Nations, which was
a multilateral effort in the political sphere. If it had worked to
the fullest extent, we wouldn't have had a separate Marshall plan for
Europe. Originally, when General Marshall made his speech, Russia and
these Iron Curtain countries were included in his proposal. So, it was
to be a multilateral effort that would apply to the other regions later
on, certainly the Latin-American ones. It became more of a political thing,
of course, when the Russians wouldn't cooperate.
MCKINZIE: Did you think at the time that they would, though?
CARDOZO: I certainly wasn't surprised that they didn't, but I think,
equally, I would not have been surprised if they had. We were then in
the midst of negotiating the lend-lease settlement, a settlement that
has now been made after twenty years of negotiating. The
principles aren't different from what they were then. We were stuck on
minor parts of it which they would not concede, chiefly, returning some
ships which they called "junk" and which we seemed to think
they ought to return, and paying a larger sum of cash for the things that
were leftover. We couldn't get together on that, but on the principle
of the lend-lease settlement we had no difficulty with them. So, if they
had come into any aspect of the Marshall plan, it wouldn't have surprised
I did negotiate with the Russians in Turkey over some hazelnuts that
they wanted. We had bought them under pre-emptive purchasing to keep the
Germans from getting them, and the Russians needed them for vegetable
oils, very important to them. We, in due course, sent them to Russia,
through Iran or somewhere, as
a lend-lease transaction. We had bought them from the Turkish peasants,
who picked them off the ground, so the Germans wouldn't get them, and
turned them over to the Russians. I remember a Russian in Turkey saying
to me, "I'll bet you're going to ask us for gold for those things
when the war is over."
I then said, "No, read the agreement. We're not going to ask for
that kind of thing." I was prepared to say, although I couldn't commit
us to this, that anything that was used up we never would ask them to
pay for. Later we had a terrific argument over the difference between
"used up" and "used." They translated the agreement
into Russian using the word that we would have called "used,"
that is, not new.
So, when we got into negotiations with them and said that they must return
things which were not "used up," they thought we were using
the word "used." Therefore, they said, "Well, these have
It wasn't until [Charles] Bohlen was in negotiations, and heard the Russian
word that he turned to our side and said, "You know, you're not using
the same word."
Then he got the agreement out and found that the translation was wrong.
The word "used" was in there instead of "used up."
"Consumed" was our word; "lost, consumed or destroyed."
“Consumed" was translated to them as "used." This
was one of the minor stumbling points of the negotiations that caused
a long delay.
MCKINZIE: Do you recall when this conversation took place?
CARDOZO: My conversation with the Russians was in
'44, but the argument over the settlement thing would have been in '46
or '47, a later one. When we were negotiating the settlement, it went
in waves. I went through two separate periods of negotiating the lend-lease
settlement, I don't remember the exact dates now. Only last year, they
finally signed the settlement agreement with the Russians.
MCKINZIE: To what extent were those settlements determined or achieved
with political goals in mind? Obviously, a difficult settlement could
affect a nation's future, and it would also be possible to give (on a
few points) and therefore give that nation some money for reconstruction
or for postwar development.
CARDOZO: Well, I think every country was really
treated very much the same in this respect. Our political aims were not
to burden the other countries with economic burdens of any kind that would
cause them trouble. We were to enable them to get from us the material
they needed for reconstruction. After lend-lease ended, somewhat abruptly,
we then quickly had to draft another act, which I think was called the
Relief and Rehabilitation Act. Then we quickly had to get the Marshall
plan thing going so that we could continue what really could have been
done as a matter of lend-lease, if we hadn't had to make the gesture of
stopping the wartime aid. But our assistance after the war -- and as a
matter of fact, by 1949 and '50, of course, it even had military elements
in it -- all had the main purpose of not creating burdens, but of creating
situations where there would be
free trade. As I remember, the lend-lease agreements had in them the provision
that the postwar world would be a world of free trade, which was a political
motive, I suppose, or possibly economic. They're so mixed up that you
can't separate them.
I don't recall that there were any cases where we put in special provisions
for political reasons or left them out. Now, I could be wrong. For example,
we were negotiating with Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was a lend-lease country,
of course, and this was a settlement of the lend-lease account. But they
also had come under the influence of the Soviet Union. Now, we had a pile
of gold over here in the name of Yugoslavia, which they wanted back. It
was gold that had been hidden somewhere, and our people had gotten hold
of it and had brought it over here for safekeeping. There was no
question that it was theirs, but there were certain obligations that we
wanted them to pay for. The Yugoslavs, and also the Czechs, owed us some
money for the claims of the American companies for confiscated things;
in the Iron Curtain countries they had nationalization and expropriation.
We wanted them to pay our people, and we held onto the gold; it just didn't
move. They were very anxious to get it and they came through with a settlement
that we found acceptable. We did a little self-help of that kind sometimes
in conjunction with negotiations over lend-lease, but it wasn't really
a part of the lend-lease thing, it was just at the same time. I wouldn't
say we were using the lend-lease settlement as a political weapon. For
example, South Africa was a lend-lease country. It was semi-independent
from the British at that time, and they got lend-lease aid but on what
was called "cash
reimbursement lend-lease." That meant they were going to pay for
it, because all the gold in the world seemed to be coming from South.
Africa, and they could pay. It was the countries that lacked gold or dollars
that needed lend-lease aid, because they couldn't pay for it. South Africa
paid us, in one part of the settlement, a hundred million dollars. I remember
when the checks came in, two separate checks; I had on my desk a check
for fifty million dollars written in longhand. We passed it around so
everyone could see it. But that wasn't really political; it was just an
economic reality that they could afford it. It just wasn't going to cause
them any economic hardship or anything. If we'd asked the French or the
British to pay anything like that relatively, it would have been a definite
MCKINZIE: Mr. Cardozo, you indicated in your recent book that the requirements
of American diplomacy are now so complex that it requires an entirely
different kind of individual than it required, say, before World War II.
I wonder if I might use the Office of the Legal Adviser as a case in point?
You can use your own career, in short, to illustrate the major theme in
CARDOZO: Well, the Office of the Legal Adviser before the end of World
War II was a place where there were scholars in public international law,
who dealt with questions of public international law, such as extradition
claims and things like that. They really only dealt with questions that
other people recognized as involving legal matters. In 1945 or '46 Greene
Hackworth, and old-time
type legal adviser, retired. I think Charles Fahy was the first new one,
and then there was Ernest Gross, Adrian Fisher, and people more like that.
These lawyers, who had been involved in the political process in one way
or another had a different view of the function of the lawyer in the State
Department. They felt :that his function was to give advice as a lawyer
on any matter that came up. And the difference between what I had been
doing and what Hackworth and his staff had been doing was exemplified
by the day after lend-lease had been merged into the State Department
itself. He was the top lawyer, instead of the General Counsel of Lend-Lease.
I had a document that had to be signed by the lawyer, and then the Secretary
of State, allocating appropriated funds under the lend-lease appropriation
to, let's say, the
Treasury Department. It would then spend the money by buying things and
sending them out. I took this document, called an allocation letter, which
had been flowing through the Lend-Lease Administration without any trouble
for years, to get Mr. Hackworth to sign it. Well, he had no conception
of that function of a lawyer, to sign a document saying that this allocation
is legal, is authorized under the Lend-Lease Act. The Lend-Lease Act merely
said that the President may transfer defense articles to governments that
he had found to be important to the defense of the United States. We could
allocate, say, a billion dollars to the Treasury Department to spend for
a multitude of different kinds of things. The reason the lawyers were
in on it was because they theoretically knew what Congress intended to
be done under the act. When the lawyer
signed this document he was saying that this is within the intentions
of Congress in passing this act. And the kind of question you had was
not the transfer of guns or fighting plane or something, but the transfer,
for example, of fertilizer to make wine in France. Take something like
lipstick. You have the question of whether it is within the act; if lipstick
could be used to mark casts on wounded soldiers, it might be the best
thing to use for it, and for that purpose it would be a "defense
article." But to put on lips, it might not be. Anyway, this was the
kind of thing that the lawyers had to look into, and they were quite a
different kind of lawyer: people who knew the processes of appropriation
and legislation, how to draft them and how to get them through Congress.
The very reason that the
Lend-Lease Administration had been set up, instead of having it administered
in the State Department, was because the State Department just didn't
consider itself and the people in it as an administrative agency that
could carry out a program of that kind. The Foreign Service officers and
the typical office of the State Department just had no conception of that
part of Government activity. The lend-lease people all became experts
in how to draft legislation; how to get it before the right committees,
how to convince the committees to report it, and how to get it through
Congress. We spent many hours writing, helping the staff to write reports
to give the legislative history helpful for administration. This kind
of thing was a wholly different job.
MCKINZIE: The point you make is a strong point. The State Department did
not want to become an administrative agency, nor did it wish to become
an operating agency. It did not wish to have operatives in the field;
it didn't wish to become the operating agency for the occupation of Germany
after some of the military problems were resolved; nor did it wish to
operate the foreign aid program, Point IV, which President Truman had
wanted them to do. Now, would these kinds of people you're talking about
have been willing and eager to have gone further than getting the bill
through Congress? Would they have been willing and eager to have implemented
it in the field or to have overseen it?
CARDOZO: Yes, and they were not unwilling to; they were the people who
did it. In a proper
relationship with the State Department, people abroad or here, there was
a close collaboration. Some of the Foreign Service officers worked closely
with the different people in the aid programs, very effectively, so that
they were able to help see that the proper foreign policy of the United
States was being carried out by these programs. This, of course, was the
only justification for doing them. A country like Turkey is a very interesting
one in this respect. During the war when we were applying lend-lease in
Turkey, what is it we were doing? What were we trying to get Turkey to
do? This was a diplomatic relationship, as to what we were trying to get
them to do. But the aid program, the lend-lease program and all the other
activities going on there were to carry out that. We had, of course, a
Board of Economic
Warfare activity in Turkey, parallel with the lend-lease program. It was
economic warfare aimed at trying to get the Turks to help us keep the
Germans from getting important materials from Turkey, such as copper,
chrome, nuts of various kinds for oils and tanning materials, and all
those kind of stuff. Turkey was helping us to get them, as long as we
pretended we wanted them. The Turks were also the best source of opiates
for medical purposes, opium. We depended on getting a good deal of that
from them. So, that was economic warfare, and lend-lease was sent to Turkey
in order to make the Turks feel able to resist the German pressures. Turkey
was neutral during almost the whole time, and it was a see-saw battle
between the two sides to influence the Turks. Now, they probably wanted
our side to win all
the time. They weren't always sure we were going to, but when they were
fairly sure of it they helped us in all kinds of ways, in this economic
warfare. But in order to make :them feel that we were trying to support
them, if they got in trouble with the Germans, we sent these arms under
lend-lease to them.
The question of how to influence the Turks and how to get them to be
on our side was a question of foreign relations, where the diplomats should
have been the ones best able to do that. As a matter of fact, in the case
of Turkey we had at least one Foreign Service officer in the State Department
who knew Turkey very well. [George, Jr.] Lewis Jones was in the State
Department back here and sat in on all the planning sessions about what
we should do about Turkey. He
could tell what the reactions of the Turks would be. This is where a diplomat
is important, when people like me are sent out there, never having spoken
to a Turk before in my life. I didn't even have a little understanding
of their history. I read a good deal of their history after I got out
there, but I needed the advice of experts on whether to recommend certain
kinds of things. We had control over what went into Turkey from our side,
from the British and American side, and that's what I was there for, to
work with the British and decide what should come into Turkey. Well, what
would their reaction be?
Now, for instance, malaria was always a big problem in Turkey, and the
Turks put in many requests for quinine. Quinine was in very short supply
-- we had need of it all over the world -- but atabrine had been discovered
as a substitute for quinine, and worked very well. The Turks kept saying,
"Well, don't give us atabrine; we want quinine."
A lot of people would say, "Well, they're just being sticky. Why
do they insist on quinine instead of atabrine?"
A Foreign Service officer who knows the Turks and knows something about
Turkish peasants could tell us that the trouble is that atabrine is yellow
and quinine is white. A Turkish peasant is accustomed to taking a white
pill for malaria, and you can't get him to change and take a yellow pill
all of a sudden. This is where the State Department, with its knowledge
of the background of places, is very important for the aid program people,
the newcomers to these things. Of course, it's also where anthropologists
who know these other countries very well are important. I always felt
that we never used them enough.
And that's the new kind of operation. This knowledge in the State Department
hadn't really been put to work before. It was very interesting to me that
old line Foreign Service officers were in Turkey who could answer this
kind of question; but you had to ask it. They weren't doing this job.
I can remember a number of them who just seemed to be not helping very
much. The trouble was that we didn't always know how to involve them.
Of course, the old-fashioned Foreign Service officer, at that time, didn't
even learn the language, and we had no Foreign Service officers who could
speak Turkish in the Embassy. We had some staff people who could. We had
an assistant naval
attaché brought in from archaeology who could speak Turkish fluently,
and we had two assistant military attachés, brothers, who had been
born in Turkey and who were fluent. But no Foreign Service officers could,
so, they couldn't go out into the hinterland and find out anything. Today,
you have lots of Foreign Service officers who speak Turkish and every
other language, because that's one of the things they do now. That's a
new kind of world.
MCKINZIE: How did the old line Foreign Service officers look upon you
and the people who came after you who were lawyers and had a different
approach to these kinds of problems? Did you find those people particularly
cordial to you and to what you had to offer?
CARDOZO: No, they were not very cordial. I thought
they were able people, but they were tied up with their traditions too
much. They were not imbued with the philosophy that came from the lend-lease
people and other parts of the Government in wartime; "Get it done,
somehow, get it done." And I could cite a number of instances in
my own case, in Frank Kaufman's case, and, of course, in the case of the
economic warfare people where we did vary on the usual things. For example,
there was a typhus scare in Turkey, and we arranged to bring in a lot
of typhus vaccine, partly for an experiment to test it but partly to use
for the top Turkish people to make them feel safer and better. Well, we
were going to get crates of typhus vaccine, but it had to be kept under
refrigeration. I was told that it was coming in on a certain plane (I
was involved in it, because it was only typical
that I would be because of lend-lease) and to be sure that there was a
refrigerator to hold it. Well, I bought the biggest refrigerator in Ankara
from a restaurant. They were getting a new one, I discovered, so we got
a truck and moved the refrigerator up to the garage of the Embassy annex.
It was an icebox for which you had to get ice all the time to put in it.
I remember that Christmas Day was when we moved that thing from the truck
into the garage. Ambassador [Laurence A.] Steinhardt; the counselor of
the Embassy; and all the other people around were carrying this enormous
thing, each on a corner of it, into the garage. The vaccine was very valuable
stuff; it was life and death, they felt.
Then when the time came to pay for it, the man in charge of the Embassy
accounts said, "You can't buy an ice box without competitive
bids." And this again was where the lawyer part of it helped. I knew
that the Lend-Lease Act said, "Notwithstanding any other law, the
President may spend this money."
And I said, "Whatever statute you have in mind that says you have
to get competitive bids to buy an icebox, the Lend-Lease Act will take
care of it and we're buying it out of lend-lease funds."
Whether we really could buy it out of lend-lease funds without having
gone through the process was another question, but I assumed that we had
ingenious people back in the lend-lease office who would be able to take
care of it. We were constantly fighting with the General Accounting Office
over this kind of thing, too. We won all the battles in the end, but we
had to fight a lot. This is what I mean by using ingenuity, and
the State Department was always kind of putting up roadblocks. For example,
they had told Frank Kaufman, and then later me, that we couldn't be on
the diplomatic list. This became important, because this was the only
way we could get to the different dinners and parties where we would be
able to talk to people informally and find out what they were really thinking
about. Our work called for this kind of informal contact. The right attitude
among State Department people would have been to say, "We'll help
you to do your job by somehow working it out so that you'll be on the
diplomatic list." Instead of that, I went to the nephew of the Foreign
Minister and got him to get the Foreign Minister to ask the Ambassador
what my status was. And the Ambassador couldn't say anything at that
point other than that I was alright to be on the diplomatic list. Otherwise,
I couldn't have been invited to these affairs. So, they were not helpful,
and I think there's still an atmosphere in the Foreign Service that's
something like this. You run into some who are quite different, but they
get so imbued with the need for dealing with the top political people
of the country where they are that they tend to forget these other aspects
of American relations with the country. It's a long, complicated story.
MCKINZIE: After Mr. Hackworth left the Office of Legal Adviser, did you
have a feeling that the people who worked in it felt that they were having
a larger voice in the affairs of the Department?
CARDOZO: Well, there's no doubt about it. Some
of them had to be dragged screaming into the postwar era, the ones who
had been there before. But you have to remember that with the new legal
adviser came new people. Some of them merged in from other agencies, some
were new appointments, and it was a great expansion of the office. It
became a much bigger office. Some of the traditional things that had been
going on, went on, like the drafting of the Digest of International
Law that Marjorie Whiteman had worked on under Greene Hackworth.
She continued to do that. It was a great contribution to scholarship in
the field and so forth, but it wasn't the new kind of work at the Legal
Adviser's office. I think that some of the assistant legal advisers and
other staff people who had been there before were somewhat reluctant to
involved. The newer people were not. They wouldn't have gotten the newer
people in there if it hadn't been that kind of a thing.
As a matter of fact, my own experience is interesting in this respect.
When the war started I was in the Justice Department. All of us had re-employment
rights after the war in the agencies where we had been before the war,
so I had re-employment rights in the Justice Department. One of the most
interesting legal offices in the Government was then called "Assistant
Solicitor General." It was a position that Oscar Cox had had, and
at the end of the war, a man named George Washington was in the position
(he later became Judge George Washington). Charles Fahy had become the
legal adviser in the State Department, and I was debating whether to exercise
my re-employment rights (this was in '45-'46) at the
Justice Department in that very interesting legal office. It's now called
the Office of Legal Counsel, and it still has the greatest variety of
legal problems. I also had the choice of staying in the Legal Advisers
office of the State Department. Charles Fahy won me over by saying, "This
is the place where there is the 'New Deal of today' for a lawyer. This
is going to be the most interesting place for a lawyer to be." I
think he was right for that period of time. My job, my section, became
the office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs. We had
the economic matters, trade, shipping, and fisheries of all the world,
plus all the foreign aid programs, the military assistance programs, and
so forth, again worldwide. So, it was the most, I guess, interesting part
of the Legal Adviser's Office and it has helped to further careers.
For example, Seymour Rubin, who was the first Assistant Legal Adviser
for Economic Affairs in '45, is now Executive Director of the American
Society of International Law. He has had a very distinguished career in
various kinds of posts and private practice. Surrey was his successor,
and he's now the senior partner in a law firm. Metzger succeeded me. And,
of course, the staff was filled up with all new people, new after the
Hackworth era. So, of course, they felt as though they were involved in
everything important, and it was very interesting.
MCKINZIE: You mentioned that Dean Acheson, particularly, used the office
differently. Could you amplify on that?
CARDOZO: Well, he insisted on having, as a legal adviser, a lawyer whose
ability as a lawyer
and whose judgment in politics and statesmanship could be greatly respected.
He got Adrian Fisher for that, and he involved him in all of the political
and other activities that he himself was involved in. The Secretary of
State always is involved in a lot of controversial things, and here we
had the McCarthy era, the attack on the whole concept of Foreign Service
and the State Department, and a terrific controversy over what to do about
China, who had "lost China." Fisher was always at Acheson's
right hand when he was dealing with other people about these things. Wherever
he went, Fisher's office was backstopping him, getting all the necessary
background information so he'd be prepared for any kind of question that
came up. Of course, Acheson's own approach to being Secretary of State
such that when you took an agreement to him to be signed, his chief question
was "By what authority do I sign this?" And whoever brought
it to him to get it signed, had to be ready with the answer that would
satisfy a lawyer -- "by what legal authority" -- as well as
what it provides and so forth.
MCKINZIE: This must have put people in the office in the position of
having to be personally very knowledgeable about a wide range of foreign
CARDOZO: Well, yes, but here we were helped by the rest of the State
Department. For instance, the day after General Marshall made his speech
at Harvard on the Marshall plan, Surrey and I were called in by the legal
adviser, who said, "Will you, by next Monday, when so and so is going
to Europe to talk to
the other countries, come up with a memorandum or something on what we
have to do -- what we have to get through Congress and so forth -- in
order to carry out this plan?"
Well, that meant we had to understand the plan somewhat, and in order
to do that we had Charles Kindleberger, who was an able economist. He
sat with us to draft the outline as to what we were going to have to do
in order to carry out what General Marshall was supposed to have said.
That was one example. In connection with China, as another, we were dealing
with the group of airplanes that'd been the property of Chinese National
Airways Corporation. They were flown to Hong Kong, and then the crews
defected and wanted to take them back to Communist China (this was in
this period of 1950 or so when China was changing). And the question was
who was going to get those planes? They were very important in war and
economics. There we had the Chinese experts; they hadn't been exiled yet.
Robert Barnett was still around town and there was [0. Edmund] Clubb,
and Tony Freeman; these people were old China hands, could speak Chinese
and really knew everything about China. They were around to give us advice
on the politics of it. So, we learned a lot, but we never became the real
experts, the people that were sitting on the political desks and so forth.
This is where collaboration was very important.
MCKINZIE: Are you being modest about all this? Weren't there a few cases
where you were able to say to the people in the positions of policy, "Look,
the legalities of this are such and such and unless you want to change
it will be necessary for you to do the following things?"
CARDOZO: Oh, well, I don't think it's a question of being too modest.
There are not too many cases where we were at odds with the people there.
In the fisheries, for example, it was always the question of the extent
to which we were going to let other countries fish in waters so many miles
off our shore. Now, the fisheries people were restrictive trade people
as distinguished from the free trade kind. They were an anomaly in the
State Department, and the fisheries industry had, in effect, gotten their
representatives in the fisheries part of the State Department. The aviation
people were a little bit that way, but not so much, because it was to
the interest of the American airlines to be freer
around the world. But these two parts of the State Department represented
industries that had a certain amount of restrictive attitude, and we did
have some differences with them as to how to carry out general policy.
Similarly, in connection with trade with Morocco, we got into the International
Court of Justice because of it. I think that the lawyers would have said,
"The way to carry out the real will of Congress is not to
let the American traders in Morocco import anything they want regardless
of the effect on the economy of Morocco and France." It was hurting
that part of the program. Still, certain politicians -- and they got the
Congressmen involved in this too -- were trying to help these Americans,
who seemed to be the victims of violation of an ancient 18th century treaty
with the Sultan of Morocco.
Well, I always felt that in the Legal Adviser’s Office we were,
let’s say, ingenious. We wanted to get this before a court, and
let a court decide. We got it into the International Court of Justice
that way. We felt that the American policy of helping these few American
ex-GI’s in Morocco would undermine all that we were trying to do
with the Marshall plan by letting goods go in freely into that area when
they couldn’t go into France. That would be bad policy, and bad
law. So, there were some cases where the Legal Adviser’s Office
might have differences with the political officers in some way or another,
but not very often. We usually worked together very well. The only difference
usually is in the question of how to do something. I think that is what
happened in the Chinese airplanes case, which was somewhat ingenious
again, but one that I don’t think that the Foreign Service officers
would have even undertaken. I think that the trouble is that the Foreign
officer’s mind doesn’t want to get into a wrangle with the
other countries if they can avoid it. We asked the British, that is, the
United States finally did, to have the Privy Council order the court in
Hong Kong to decide in a certain way, in effect, in our favor. It was
sort of an unheard of process and something that we might not want anybody
to tell our courts to do, but it worked; the planes didn’t go to
the Chinese Communists. Well, it’s that kind of thing, such as asking
the British to do something that is a little bit shocking, that they might
not want to do. It’s like the time the U.S. Foreign Service officers
in Turkey said that there was no way to get a visa for
a medical officer in our armed forces. He wanted to get a few dozen eggs,
experimentally inoculated with typhus vaccine, to Cairo within 24 hours,
because they wouldn't be effective otherwise. They said that the foreign
office was closed, it was after 5 and there was no way to get a visa that
night so that he could get to Cairo in time. But there was a way. Again,
I called a friend at the foreign office, a relative of the Foreign Minister
(which is typical in places like Turkey), and he said, "Meet me in
the foreign office in 15 minutes." He had a key and a flashlight,
found a desk with a rubber stamp and stamped the officer's passport with
an exit visa, and off he went. I don't think to this day that the State
Department Foreign Service officer can believe that it happened. It would
never occur to
them to ask anybody. But I wouldn't hesitate here. I do ask people to
do things like that when it's worth it, and that's the difference between
the kind of people who were in the Legal Adviser's Office and the kind
of people who had been involved in the State Department before. A lot
of Foreign Service officers, of course, have done ingenious things like
that, too. It is just that the mass of them give the impression that they
don't. There are a lot of them who are able. I suspect that when they
get in a situation like what they just did in Vietnam, they're doing heroic
MCKINZIE: You say in your book that you believe that there comes a point
when a man has, in a sense, used himself up in a particular assignment.
You implied at one point that you thought that frequent rotation of post
good idea. Am I misinterpreting that statement a little bit?
CARDOZO: People in Foreign Service tend to get either so involved with
the people of the country where they are that they are too much of their
advocates, or they get to dislike the people so much that they tend to
be too much opposed to them. I think you have to watch out for that. Again
using Turkey as an example, it was an exasperation for Americans to feel
right about the Turkish system of doing things. This is true of many countries,
of course, where they're not nearly as efficient as we are. They can't
do things quickly and it's just unheard of to call up and say, "Can
I come up and see you right now?"
They'd say, "A week from Thursday," or something like that.
Then there's this inefficiency. They lose papers, they attach papers together
which shouldn't be, or something like that. There were certain kinds of
inefficiencies that create frustrations in Americans, so that the diplomats
tend to get sarcastic about people that they're supposed to be friendly
to and helping, making better relations. That happens sometimes.
And the reverse can happen, where people get to like the people of the
country too much. I think sometimes you see this in particular kinds of
countries where there's struggling and so forth, like India, Israel, and
sometimes in Ireland. They are so much the friends of those people that
they forget that they represent the interests of the United States. I
don't think they really forget, but it's hard for them to be as effective
as they might. That's what I had in mind.
I don't think that this is particularly relevant to my own experience
in Turkey, but I must say that there was mighty little affection for the
Turks, it seems to me, among our Embassy people. The Turks and various
things about Turkey irritated our Foreign Service people, and all the
others there, to an extreme. Still, some of us got to find them very good
company, very pleasant people, and even today the friends I made among
them are still very good friends. I don't see them very much, but a certain
amount of affection still exists. So, it's nothing in the people themselves,
but something in the society that's different from ours that can create
MCKINZIE: After World War II, there seemed to be a lot more emphasis
on something called "compliance
control" in foreign affairs. A lot of people were concerned about
whether or not they were "covered" by the regulations or whether
or not, in fact, they were entitled to undertake some action under the
regulations. Does the higher visibility of the Office of the Legal Adviser
have anything to do with that phenomenon among Foreign Service people,
their preoccupation with the regulations and being covered by them?
CARDOZO: I don't think so. There are two kinds of regulations that you
might be talking about. One is regulations concerning what the individual
American officer does or may do, and how he must do things in carrying
out his duties. I don't notice any change from what there was before.
Through all the years we've had the General Accounting Office looking
over everybody's shoulder and so forth,
and I don't think there was any change. If anything, the Legal Adviser's
Office would have contained the kind of people who tended to go in the
But there was another kind of compliance. That was in the aid program,
the compliance with the requirements of Congress that the other countries
use the materials and services they were getting in the way the Congress
intended, that they not do things that we considered wrong in other respects.
For example, we're giving a country a certain amount of aid, and they
nationalize the property of an American business interest there. Constantly,
Congress has tried to write into the acts various provisions saying that
aid must be cut off if they don't pay compensation for expropriated goods.
Also, the Turks recently seemed to be misusing the arms we
were sending them, in connection with Cyprus. Therefore, aid was cut off
I was imbued with the feeling that that method of doing something was
wrong, and I'd even written a piece on the impropriety in using aid as
a means of coercing other countries to do things that are not directly
relevant to that aid. It's in a new book called Intervention,
of which I was one of four or five contributors. It has a tricky title;
I can't even remember it offhand, myself. It was published in Ohio State.
At any rate, I argued there -- and it's been picked up by people from
time to time and cited for this point -- that it's improper for us to
threaten to or actually cut off aid in the form of food, advice, Point
IV kinds of things, or even sending building equipment
because a country, for example, is refusing to let people emigrate to
Israel. (I think that, of course, in the case of Russia, it wasn't aid
to Russia but it was just mere trade that we were cutting out.)
In the first place, this is not effective and it doesn't do the job; it
creates ill will. But the more important thing is that we give aid, so-called,
to another country not to help that country, primarily, but to help ourselves.
We wanted the European countries to be strong after World War II, so we
created a Marshall plan. Even under lend-lease we wanted our allies to
have weapons to kill the common enemy with, and therefore we provided
the weapons to them without charge, if necessary. So, it isn't just aid
to the other countries, it's in our interest. And if it isn't in our
interest, it's not constitutional. We can't spend American money under
the Constitution to help other people; we do it to help ourselves. Therefore,
this question of compliance with the restrictions that Congress writes
in is something that has plagued the programs all along. We've created
a comptroller's office and people like that to watch over compliance in
this respect. And it's perfectly proper if you're trying to see whether
trucks that are sent to move agricultural goods are really being used
to move agricultural goods instead of moving military goods or something
like that. That kind of compliance is directly relevant. We feel it's
in our interest for them to move goods around the country so that the
people will be fed, the people will be strong and not go Communist, or
whatever it is. But if
you impose the other kind of condition and say they mustn't prevent emigration
and must obey human rights -- important as human rights are -- it's wrong.
We should use other kinds of influences. We're not sending aid there primarily
for human rights (sometimes it is, of course, in order to get them to
have a better atmosphere), and to cut it off is counterproductive. If
you want them to feel better about you, you do the wrong thing when you
cut off aid. When they're denying human rights and you want to get them
to listen to you, you don't accomplish that if you cut off their aid.
MCKINZIE: Can you shed any light on why the European Recovery Program
contained provisions for counterpart funds? Did you have anything to do
with setting up the operational procedures
for counterpart funds? Historians talk glibly about it and rarely understand
CARDOZO: When lend-lease aid was being given to other countries, we did
not concern ourselves with counterpart funds primarily, because most lend-lease
aid was military and things that were not re-sold in the other countries.
But in England we sent a lot of food. The food went from this country
into the hands of the Government of the United Kingdom, they would sell
it to grocery stores, and then grocery stores would sell it to the public.
The British Government put aside the money it got and used it in an intelligent
way, to prevent the kind of damage that might otherwise occur. When we
got into massive civilian aid in the relief and rehabilitation program
-- UNRRA [United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration] had started it -- we were sending clothes,
food, and fuel that were being sold to individuals in the other countries.
Everybody perceived that if you gave this to the people so they didn't
have to buy the food, the clothing, the fuel, and so forth, the money
that they would have used for that would be used for other things, luxuries,
causing an enormous inflation. If you required the consumer to pay for
it at the store but didn't require the store to turn that money over to
the Government, then it would have an enormous inflationary effect. So,
if you, on the other hand, had the store turn it over to the Government
and then the Government used it for uneconomic things, that is, for buying
more consumer goods instead of doing capital investments with it, again
you would create inflation. So, any misuse of the
counterpart, the funds that were developed as a result of the aid that
we gave, could cause terrific inflation, really the old type of inflation
after World War I. It was early realized by the people in the State Department
who were creating the UNRRA program and others that the way to avoid that
was to get the recipient country to agree to immobilize those funds into
a counterpart account. The only part I played in this was in helping to
draft the agreements under which those counterpart funds were put aside
and their use restricted to purposes to be agreed between us and, later
in the Marshall plan, by the OEEC, the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, and its successor. In other words, it became a multilateral
operation, not just a bilateral operation, as to what could be done with
the counterpart funds that were
collected. It was very important to prevent inflation and, of course,
it had to be part of the budget of the other country in a very limited
way. They were only allowed to put a small part into their regular budget.
It could be used for construction and recovery purposes of a capital kind,
with the approval of the United States or of a multilateral group.
MCKINZIE: Do you remember the discussions about that? Were there fears
that this had to be carefully done or that that could be abused?
CARDOZO: You mean our consents on it?
MCKINZIE: Didn't the United States have the prerogative of spending 5
percent counterpart for vital or strategic materials available...
CARDOZO: Oh, yes, they were used for a great
many things, including Congressmen's travels, for example. Some of them
were also used for the expenses of our aid missions. I have had a meal
at the finest restaurant in the world, Le Grand Vefour, in Paris, on counterpart
funds. I was on a trip to Paris with others and somebody said, "This
meal is on counterpart funds."
I wouldn't say that that's an abuse, because that's a very small amount
of it. They were used for the expenses of American officials traveling
in the interest of the program, and the aid missions did get financed
out of that to a certain extent. Congress would say, "Why can't we
use some of these funds to save our taxpayers money?" And since that,
of course, wouldn't have a significant impact on the economy of other
countries, that was easily agreed by both
countries. There was always a lot of negotiating as to what to do with
it. Again, I was on the periphery of it, helping to draft the agreements,
with the economists at the table telling us what it is that must be done
and what kind of restrictions must be put on it so that we could put it
in the language. You'll find in all these agreements that there were these
restrictions on how it could be used. I can remember discussions of these
in meetings of the OEEC people in Paris. At various times, I participated
in some of those discussions. I don't think I had anything to do with
the counterpart funds, but I did on the tax agreements. We were not permitted
by Congress to use any of our aid money to pay taxes. That's another part
of the picture; we were always going backwards a step after going ahead
and this tax thing was an example. Congress said that none of our aid
money may be used to pay taxes in the other countries. So, when we were
buying food and material for our military people in Europe and the other
military people in different countries, we had to sort out the tax element
in what we were paying for these things and not pay it. And finding out
the tax structure of the other country was a very complex thing.
Part of the purpose of these aid programs was to get those other countries
to have enough goods that they had to pay for with dollars. If we were
to buy something in the other country, giving them dollars for it would
help eliminate the need for aid and get back to trade. So, what we were
doing with this tax thing was reducing the price of what we were paying
so they would get less dollars, and then we'd have
more aid to give them. We were constantly trying to satisfy one aim of
Congress and the American people while trying to satisfy the needs of
MCKINZIE: Did you find that any of the Secretaries of State during that
period ever got impatient with the legal division?
CARDOZO: Acheson was, interestingly enough, more suspicious of legalistic
approaches to international affairs. He didn't think international law
had any real reality.
Still, we never ran into impatience among top people at all. Of course,
this is a reflection of the kinds of people who were involved. The legal
advisers were, during the period that I was there, wise, statesmanlike,
diplomatic people who were greatly trusted by the Secretaries of State,
the Assistant Secretaries and so forth.
Sometimes we had to make a little more effort to be sure that they didn't
forget to bring us into the picture, but usually there was no problem.
In dealing with General [George] Marshall, who was a terrific figure of
a human being and so impressive a person, he wanted things to come to
him with a single page memorandum explaining it. Well, lawyers should
be able to put into a single page a full description of a complex thing,
so, there was a good deal of drafting of that kind of thing in that period.
I guess I judge people a good deal by whether they seem to have ulterior
motives, are very outgoing and clear as to what they want, or seem to
have political motives beyond their immediate jobs, looking ahead. When
we were dealing with General Marshall and Dean Acheson, they struck me
who were terrifically secure. They didn't expect to be President, weren't
anxious about their position, and if they lost their job, it wouldn't
hurt them at all. That kind of person is great to work for. When you're
working for someone who has his eye on the next job of some kind, you
have to wangle things and figure out how to get them. This is true in
all governments, of course. But during my period in the State Department
both the legal advisers, who were my immediate bosses, and the Secretaries
of State were great people to work for.
MCKINZIE: So, why did you leave?
CARDOZO: I left because I got an invitation to go to teach at Cornell
Law School at a time when I had 13 years in the exciting things of Government
and didn't feel that I had to
go on forever with them. Another kind of career in the law was very tempting
to me, and I have no regret about that, any more than I have because after
10 or 11 years at Cornell I accepted the job as Executive Director down
here. It simply looked like a fascinating job, and it turned out to be.
I changed jobs every 10 years or so and I don't regret that. I've been
happy in all of them and I don't regret making changes.
There wasn't a notable change from working in foreign affairs or in Government
under Roosevelt to that under Truman. Still, when Roosevelt was in we
had all the people in the White House, like Harry Hopkins, Sam Rosenman
and that kind of person. Ideas kept coming from the White House to the
rest of us to carry out. The ideas of how things should be done and what
should be done, policies
and so forth -- on big things, of course, but on smaller things too --
kept coming from the White House. That was the focus of ideas. Adlai Stevenson
was around there during the war, and there were many people turning up
ideas. After, when Truman came in, you got the feeling that, to a certain
extent, it stopped. He didn't surround himself with imaginative people
with all kinds of ideas to be fed out to other people. He wanted the ideas
to come in to him from everywhere, and he knew which ones to accept. One
of the great things about him was his acceptance of policies which, I
think, were the right ones, on smaller things as well as big things. You
got a feeling that the rest of us out there had more responsibility to
think up how to do things and send them in. So many ideas had been coming
out of Roosevelt's entourage that there wasn't much
room for anyone else. This is an interesting difference between Truman
and Roosevelt. You can visualize Roosevelt thinking, "Why don't we
do this, why don't we do that?" On the other hand, Truman listened
to all of these things and said, "All right, we'll do that, we'll
do that." He wasn't the kind of person who seemed to be originating
MCKINZIE: Mr. Cardozo, we thank you very much.
CARDOZO: Well, it was fun to talk about myself.
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List of Subjects Discussed
Acheson, Dean, 14, 16, 51-53,
Arnold, Thurman, 2
Barnett, Robert, 55
Board of Economic Warfare, 36-37
Cardozo, Michael H., background, 1-4
China, Chinese National Airways Corporation Case, 54-55,
Clark, Charles E., 2
Clubb, O. Edmund, 55
Cornell University Law School, 80-81
Cox, Oscar, 4, 5, 6,
Cutler, Lloyd, 6, 7
Douglas, William O., 2
DuPont Chemicals, 11
European Recovery Program counterpart funds, 70-77
Fahy, Charles, 31, 49, 50
Fifth Report to Congress/Lend Lease, 13
Fisher, Adrian, 31, 52
Foreign Economic Administration, 18
Foreign Service, U.S.:
"compliance control," emphasis on, 64-70
Freeman, Tony, 55
frustrations in assignments, 62-64
Free trade, advocates of, U.S. State Department, 15-17,
General Accounting Office, 65
Gesell, Gerhardt, 3
Germany (Nazi), pressure on Turkey, 37-38
Turkey, commercial interest in, 11, 39
Gross, Ernest A., 31
U.S. aid, counterpart funds, 71
Hackworth, Greene, 30-31, 32, 47,
Hamilton, Walton H., 2
Havana Charter, 20
Imperial Chemical Industries, 11
Jones, George L., 38-39
Kaufman, Francis, 6, 7, 8,
9, 12, 43, 46
Kidd, Philip, 8
Kindleberger, Charles, 54
Lend lease, 4-29, 31-34, 36-42,
Lend Lease Act, 32, 45
Lend lease agreements, 13-14
Lend lease settlements, 14-15, 23-25,
McDougal, Myres S., 6
Marshall, George C., 79
Marshall Plan, 20-21, 22, 26
Metzger, Stanley, 17, 51
Morocco, U.S. trade with, legal questions re, 57-58
Office of Assistant Solicitor General, 49-50
Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. State Department, 30-34,
47-49, 50-70, 78-80
Office of Lend Lease Administration, 5
Organization of European Economic Cooperation, 73,
Patton, George S., Jr., 7
Rauh, Joseph, 6
Relief and Rehabilitation Act, Foreign Aid, 26
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 11, 81-83
Rostow, Eugene, 14
Rubin, Seymour, 16-17, 51
Securities and Exchange Commission, U.S., 3
South Africa, Union of, lend lease settlement with, 28-29
lend lease shipments to, cancellation of, 18-19, 21-22
Steinhardt, Laurence A., 44
lend lease settlements with, negotiations on, 23-25
Marshall Plan, rejection of, 21-22
Surrey, Walter, 16, 51, 53
Temporary National Economic Committee, 3
Thorp, Willard L., 16, 17
Truman, Harry S.:
policies as President, compared with FDR, 82-83
Turkey, lend lease program in, 4, 6-7,
10-12, 14, 36-42,
State Department as an administrative agency, favored, 35
Vernon, Reymond, 17
United Nations, 20
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, 71-72,
Washington, Thomas, 8
Whiteman, Marjorie, 48
Yale University Law School, 2, 6,
Yugoslavia, lend lease settlement with, 27-28
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