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FOLD HERE PER PARAS 51 and 60A (4) AR 310-5

TELEX NUMBER: TT 9300 DATE: 2 APRIL 1948
TIME STARTED: 021815Z APRIL TIME FINISHED: 021907Z APRIL

PRESENT WASHINGTON:
Hon. Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army
Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, USA

PRESENT BERLIN:
Gen. L. D. Clay, CINCFRUS
R/Gen. William B. Hall, Col. R. A. Willard,

SUBJECT: "EYES ONLY"

DA-9300 (April 1948)

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SECRET

NO: DA-TT-9300

WASHINGTON:

DA-1

From Bradley

We are receiving many inquiries from members of Congress as to why we do not evacuate dependents from Berlin.

Evacuation now might be plausible because it would reduce number to be supplied by air.

Such evacuation might be interpreted as either start of withdrawal from Berlin entirely, or on the other hand as a clearing of decks for action if necessary. What is your thinking on this subject in view of new situation?

(End DA-1)

BERLIN:

Re DA-1:

Please read my message prepared prior to start of Telexman which I believe will answer your DA-1.

Message follows:

Dy-1

To: Dept of Army

1. Highway and air traffic conditions are normal today. Civil freight for Germans moving normally. Military freight into Berlin appears to be moving normally so far free from attempted search. Passenger trains not moving in view of Soviet action. Also, no outward movement by rail of military

DA-77-9300

(April '48)

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freight as no loadings can be made without Soviet permission and this we will not ask.

2. Compromise believed impossible to attain now as in my view this is only Soviet first step. British Deputy visited Soviet Deputy last evening to find opening and found none.

3. We can continue under present conditions indefinitely and in my opinion should do so although this will require substantial increase in air passenger lift. British wish to propose compromise but I cannot agree that such an offer would serve any useful purpose except humiliating rebuff.

4. I do not believe we should evacuate now. In emergency, we can evacuate quickly. However, evacuation now would play into Soviet hands and frighten rest of Europe.

5. I propose (A) to sit tight, spending most of my time in Berlin for immediate future. (B) to let dependents who are nervous go home. (C) to speed up planned transfer of employees to Frankfurt. (D) to gradually more unessential employees. This will be done over weeks rather than days so that such additional aggravation will find our support problem lessened.

In general, in spite of some imaginative correspondents' reports, our people are calm and continuing their everyday life normally.

6. While Soviets won their victory in success in stopping move, I am sure our position has topped for time being further interference with air and highway movements which would require force to implement.

7. I anticipate in next few weeks, Soviet demand for our withdrawal because of failure of act to govern Germany. I think we should await such demand before making any decision to evacuate non-combatants.

8. While British would like to find a compromise, Robertson assured me today he would stick with us. French are fine now but not wholly reliable.

DA-FT-9300

(April '48)

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9. Finally, there are few dependents here who have any thought of leaving unless required to do so. I do wish to emphasize there is little nervousness among them here. Our state is too high and evacuation would deceive no one as to military intent.

(End DW-1)

WASHINGTON:
DA-2

From Royall

Do you think situation has reached stage where it should be taken up with Moscow by Washington? Or should we await further conference by you in Berlin?

(End DA-2)

BERLIN:
DW-2

Re DA-2

I think we should await further clarification here. Robertson and I will make joint recommendation to US/UK Governments when believe Government action timely.

(End DW-2)

DA-27-9300
(April '48)
WASHINGTON:
DA-3
From Royall

We have been studying in connection with State and
Commerce what general retaliatory commercial measures
we could adopt against Russia, but have not yet received a
report. If we found it possible to adopt measures which
might adversely affect Russia to a material extent, what
effect would such courses have on your situation in Berlin?
(End DA-3)

BERLIN:
DW-3
Re DA-3

I think retaliatory measures would be very effective
particularly in shipping. Have Soviet ship loading in Bremen
now and are having great difficulty in finding fuel. However,
if measures are not substantial effect can be bad. I would
appreciate knowing if effective measures are found but would
recommend withholding application until you have further word
from us. Measures would be on ace in the hole to us if there
are such.
(End DW-3)
WASHINGTON:
DA-A
FROM Rogell

With the strong feeling about evacuation of dependents in Congress and elsewhere we will have to consider further what course to follow. However, Bradley and I are inclined to support your views as are the JCS.

(End DA-A)

BERLIN
DA-A
Re DA-A

Evacuation in face of Italian elections and European situation is too almost unthinkable. Our women and children can take it and they appreciate it. I cannot over-emphasize my fear of consequences. Your support in this greatly appreciated.

(End DA-A)

WASHINGTON:
DA-6

After study on retaliatory measures is completed will discuss it with you before taking any positive action.

(End DA-6)

DA-TP-5300 (April '48)

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WASHINGTON:

DA-5

From Regall

In case your views are approved here would your situation be helped by a statement from here fully supporting your position? If so, is there any reason why we should not at the same time state all the facts.

(End DA-5)

BERLIN:

DW-5

Re DA-5

I see no reason for not stating facts. If statement is made would appreciate coordination prior to release with British Government. On the other hand, there is perhaps some advantage now in saying situation is in the interest of the Theater Commander who is in the spot and able to use his own judgment with respect to dependents.

(End DW-5)

BERLIN:

DW-6

Having annual West Point-Annapolis dinner tonight. May I convey personal greetings and best wishes from Secretary.
and Chief of Staff.  

(End DW-6)

WASHINGTON:

DA-7

Please extend the greeting of Secretary Forrestal, Secretary Royal and General Bradley to the graduates attending your dinner.

Bradley and Collin attending similar dinner in New York.

(End DA-7)

BERLIN:

DW-7

For General Bradley

Please convey our greetings from Berlin to New York meeting.

(End DW-7)

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