A REPORT

TO THE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

on

FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO HUAR

November 17, 1945

WASHINGTON
NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ON
FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN

Reference: Agenda for 27th NSC Meeting on Thursday, Nov. 18, 1948, dated Nov. 12, 1948.

At the request of the Acting Secretary of State the enclosed copy of a telegram dated October 27, 1948 from the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly outlining the future course of action to be followed with respect to the Berlin case, is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its discussion of Item 3 on the agenda for the NSC 27th meeting on November 18, 1948.

The Department of State stated that the United States Delegation was proceeding on the basis outlined in the enclosure. No action on the enclosure was requested.

SIDNEY W. DOUGLAS
Executive Secretary

Distribution:
The President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, National Security

Resources Board

DECLASSIFIED
by Acting Sec NSC and NSC-51

Effective date 4-20-71

NSC 24/1
From: Paris
To: Secretary of State

# Unclassified

At meeting with Secretary yesterday approval was given to memo relating to future courses of action in Berlin case, summary of which is set forth below.

Memo based on assumption that case remains on SC agenda and any program would be fully coordinated with French and UK.

1. Reference to SC. Although we would probably receive overwhelming supporting vote in SC, recommended that this step not be taken at present stage on ground that it would make actual settlement of case more difficult and mere SC condemnation would not result in lifting blockade; furthermore present flexibility and potential of EWA or other influential delegation would be lost.

2. Unit and see period of ten days to three weeks. This course would involve deliberate non-action in UN and at same time taking steps in Berlin first of which would be introduction Western mark 3 as sole currency in eastern sectors. Recommended that this step not be taken until after other measures have been tried on the ground that it would indicate a conclusion that there is no likelihood of securing Soviet agreement to any solution of problem and that steps taken in Berlin would be interpreted in SC and elsewhere as deliberate aggravation of the situation.

3. Attempt to carry out SC resolution despite Soviet veto. This program would be put into effect by a letter to SC President referring to UN statement that it wants a settlement and that blockade measures are necessary to protect economy of Soviet Zone. Letter would inform President that Western powers would present rail, road and large traffic at border Soviet Zone on stated future date, that such traffic would be subject to safeguards against currency abuse, that meeting of Military Governors would be called, that restrictions imposed by Western powers would be lifted and thereafter a SC meeting held. If traffic were permitted to move through Soviet Zone Military Governors would immediately meet. Recommendation that this procedure not be followed at present stage on ground that no indication that Soviets would acquiesce and that it would exclude the six neutral members of SC from participating in attempt to find a solution.

4. Implementation of arrangements for currency, etc., through an intermediary. This procedure would make use of intermediary actually to frame the kind of regulation for currency in Berlin which under SC resolution would have been drawn up by Military Governors. Procedure has many variants, one of which was suggested.
posted in Department's 4124 of October 22. Another variant would be for SC to ask the UN to have operational arrangements prepared and authorize him to use such exports as he desired. Another variant would be to have President make similar request to UN in order to avoid formal SC resolution. Both Soviet and Western Powers might be invited to supply S30 or neutral exports with suggestions as to terms of satisfactory operational arrangements.

Authority of SRE or export group might be either to prepare operational arrangements which would be submitted to SC for consideration and adoption as recommendation to the parties or for submission to the parties for voluntary agreement. Consideration should be given to timing of lifting the blockade in relation to report of S30 or export group.

Recommendation that immediate steps be started along this line. WHO's variation and flexibility of possibilities within general framework of this procedure make it desirable to discuss forthwith with British and French so that we may obtain their general reaction and so that we can work on elaboration of details of the plan.

Secretary is meeting British and Schuman this afternoon, but not probable that program set forth in paragraph 4 above will be discussed.

MARSHALL