Minutes of meeting held at the White House on Monday, 14 June 1945 at 1530

Present

The President

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy —

General of the Army G. C. Marshall —

Fleet Admiral E. J. King —


The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson —

The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal —

The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy —

Secretary

Brig. General A. J. MacFarland

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DISTRIBUTION

Admiral Leahy

General Marshall

Admiral King

General Arnold

Intelligence

J. C. S. FILE COPY

RETURN TO J OINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

ROOM 2034, WASHINGTON, D. C.
THE PRESIDENT stated that he had called a meeting for the purpose of informing himself with respect to the details of the campaign against Japan set out in Admiral Leahy's memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 19 June. He asked General Marshall if he would express his opinion.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the present situation with respect to operations against Japan was practically identical with the situation which had existed in connection with the operations proposed against Germany. He then read, as an expression of his views, the following digest of a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the President (J.C.S. 1289).

Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced movement of Japanese shipping south of Korea and should in the next few months cut it to a trickle if not check it off entirely. Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order to block Japanese communications south of Korea.

General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff in selecting November as the target date to go into Kyushu because by that time:

a. If we press preparations we can be ready.

b. Our estimates are that our air action will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities.

c. The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.

d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions.

Important considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.

An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Pusan in the southeast corner and Keijo, well up the western side. To get to Pusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese areas. The operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears an equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu.

The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of attrition and appears to be the least costly worth-while operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a lodgement in Kyushu is essential, both to tightening our
We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

With reference to close-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to utilize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop up their own country.

Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific war is no exception as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers. Using various combinations of Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the conclusion that the cost of securing a worthwhile position in Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the Kyushu operation. Points on the optimistic side of the Kyushu operation are that General MacArthur has not yet accepted responsibility for going ashore where there would be disproportionate casualties. The nature of the objective area gives room for maneuver both on the land and by sea. As to any discussion of specific operations, the following data are pertinent:

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<th>U.S. Casualities</th>
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<th>U.S. Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed, wounded, missing</td>
<td>(not including wounded)</td>
<td>in Jun</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Leyte</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1:4.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>1:1.5</td>
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<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>34,000</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>(not a complete count)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The record of General MacArthur’s operations from 1 March 1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 U.S. killed as compared to 310,265 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to 1. There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Iwo Jima. It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of the people in harmony. Any irresolution in the leadership may result in costly weakening and indecision in the subordinates, it was thus basic difficulty with the prime
Minister which slowed and hampered all our preparations for the cross-channel operation now demonstrated as having been essential to victory in Europe.

An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action lowering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

In considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific war which the British wish to raise at the next conference, we must bear in mind the point that anything weakening of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Furthermore the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General Mac-Arthur's opinion on the proposed operation and had received from him the following telegram, which General Marshall then read:

"I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating wasteful operations of undecisive character. I regard the operation as the most economical one in effort and lives that is possible. In this respect it must be remembered that the several preceding months will involve practically no losses in ground troops and that sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Okinawa sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy in major combat. I most earnestly recommend no change in OAHIF. Additional subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties."

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was his personal view that the operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue. He felt that air power alone was not sufficient to put the Japanese out of the war. It was unable alone to put the Germans out. General Eaker and General Doolittle both agreed to this. Against the Japanese, scattered through mountainsous country, the problem would be much more difficult than it had been in Germany. He felt that this plan offered the only way the Japanese could be forced into a feeling of utter helplessness. The operation would be difficult but not more so than the assault in Normandy. He was convinced that every individual moving to the Pacific should be indoctrinated with a firm determination to see it through.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with General Marshall's views and said that the more he studied the matter, the more he was impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu, which he considered the key to the success of any stage operations. He pointed out that within three months the effects of air power based on Okinawa will begin to be felt strongly in Japan. It seemed to him that Kyushu followed logically after Okinawa. It was a natural step. It was his opinion that we should do Kyushu now, after which there would be time to judge the effects of possible operations by the Russians and the Chinese. The weather constituted quite a factor. So far as preparation was concerned, we must aim now for Tokyo Plain; otherwise we
GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that Kyushu was a necessity and pointed out that it constituted a landing in the Japanese homeland. Kyushu having been arranged for, the decision as to further action could be made later.

THE PRESIDENT inquired if a later decision would not depend on what the Russians agree to do. It was agreed that this would have considerable influence.

THE PRESIDENT then asked Admiral Leahy for his views of the situation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY recalled that the President had been interested in knowing what the price in casualties for Kyushu would be and whether or not that price could be paid. He pointed out that the troops on Okinawa had lost 12 percent in casualties, if this proportion were applied to the number of troops to be employed in Kyushu, he thought from the similarity of the fighting to be expected that this would yield a good estimate of the casualties to be expected. He was interested therefore in finding out how many troops are to be used in Kyushu.

ADMIRAL KING called attention to what he considered an important difference in Okinawa and Kyushu. There had been only one way to go on Okinawa. This meant a straight frontal attack against a highly fortified position. On Kyushu, however, landings would be made on three fronts simultaneously and there would be much more room for maneuver. It was his opinion that a realistic casualty figure for Kyushu would lie somewhere between the number experienced by General MacArthur in the operations on Luzon and the Okinawa casualties.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the total assault troops for the Kyushu campaign were shown in the memorandum prepared for the President as 765,700. He said, in answer to the president's question as to what opposition could be expected on Kyushu, that it was estimated at eight Japanese divisions or about 350,000 troops. He said that divisions were still being raised in Japan and that reinforcement from other areas was possible but it was becoming increasingly difficult and painful.

THE PRESIDENT asked about the possibility of reinforcements for Kyushu moving south from the other Japanese islands.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was expected that all communications with Kyushu would be destroyed.

ADMIRAL KING described in some detail the land communications between the other Japanese islands and Kyushu and stated that as a result of operations already planned, the Japanese would have to depend on sea shipping for any reinforcement.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stressed the fact that Kyushu was an island. It was crossed by a mountain range, which would be difficult for either the Japanese or the Americans to cross. The Kyushu operation, in effect, contemplated the taking of another island from which to bring increased air power against Japan.

THE PRESIDENT expressed the view that it was practically creating another Okinawa closer to Japan, to which the Chairman of Staff agreed.
THE PRESIDENT then asked General Harker for his opinion of the operation as an air man.

GENERAL HARKER said that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President. He had just received a cable in which General Arnold also expressed complete agreement. He stated that any blockade of Kyushu was dependent upon airpower on Kyushu; that the air plan contemplated employment of 60 groups of heavy bombers against Japan and that those could not be deployed without the use of airfields on Kyushu. He said that those who advocated the use against Japan of air power alone overlooked the very impressive fact that air casualties are always much heavier when the air faces the enemy alone and that these casualties never fail to drop as soon as the ground forces come in. Present air casualties are averaging 5 percent per mission, about 20 percent per month. He wished to point out and to emphasize that delay favored only the enemy and he urged that there be no delay.

THE PRESIDENT said that as he understood it the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after weighing all the possibilities of the situation and considering all possible alternative plans were still of the unanimous opinion that the Kyushu operation was the best solution under the circumstances.

The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so.

THE PRESIDENT then asked the Secretary of War for his opinion.

MR. STERNBERG agreed with the Chiefs of Staff that there was no other choice. He felt that he was personally responsible to the President now for political than for military considerations. It was his opinion that there was a large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never yet been felt. He felt sure that this submerged class would fight and fight tenaciously if attacked on their own ground. He was concerned that something should be done to arouse them and to develop any possible influence they might have before it became necessary to come to grips with them.

THE PRESIDENT stated that this possibility was being worked on all the time. He asked if the invasion of Japan by white men would not have the effect of more closely uniting the Japanese.

MR. STERNBERG thought there was every prospect of this. He agreed with the plan proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being the best thing to do, but he still hoped for some fruitful accomplishment through other means.

THE PRESIDENT then asked for the views of the Secretary of the Navy.

MR. FRANKENTAL pointed out that even if we wished to besiege Japan for a year or a year and a half, the capture of Kyushu would still be essential. Therefore, the sound decision is to press on with the operation against Kyushu. There will still be time thereafter to consider the main decision in the light of subsequent events.
MR. MCGOWAN said he felt that the time was propitious now to study closely all possible means of bringing out the influence of the submerged group in Japan which had been referred to by Mr. Bilasen.

The President stated that one of his objectives in connection with the next conference would be to get from Russia all the assistance in the war that was possible. To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that would have to be made in advance in order to occupy the strongest possible position in the discussions.

Admiral Leahy said that he could not agree with those who said that the President would obtain unconditional surrender of the Japanese unless we lose the war. He feared no menace from Japan in the foreseeable future, even if we were unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What he did feel was that our insistence on unconditional surrender would result only in making the Japanese desperate and thereby increase our casualty lists. He did not think that this was at all necessary.

The President stated that it was with that thought in mind that he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he did not feel that he could take any action at this time to change public opinion on the matter.

The President said he considered the Kyushu plan all right from the military standpoint and, so far as he was concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could go ahead with it; that we can do this operation and then decide as to the final action later.

The conversation then turned on the situation in China.

General Marshall stated that General Wedemeyer's operations were moving toward Canton. He thought it was evident that the Japanese would hold Fortress troops there and in other places. It might be necessary to go around these Fortress troops as had been done in France or to take other courses with respect to them.

In reply to a question from the President, General Marshall outlined the present status of Chinese divisions as to completeness of personnel and equipment. He said the military ability of the Chinese generals was not very good. He had already asked General Wedemeyer whether it would be possible to use with the Chinese troops one or more of the U.S. Army commanders with their staffs, who were now returning from France. General Wedemeyer's reply, while not conclusive, had been, in general, favorable. General Marshall thought that if the generals of the Chinese could accept the use of these commanders for control of Chinese groups, it would be a very excellent thing.

The President then inquired as to the possibility of getting an overall commander in the Pacific.

General Marshall and Admiral King both agreed that under the circumstances existing in the Pacific there was little prospect of it. Admiral King pointed out that it was undesirable to accept divided command with the British and that we would lose more than we would gain if we brought about in the Pacific the situation that had existed in France.
GENERAL MARSHALL stated the American commander would always have to think of his government's policies. In connection with this, he recounted the difficulty experienced in Malta in obtaining British agreement to General Eisenhower's plans for the invasion of Germany. Their reluctance in the matter was due to their belief that General Eisenhower was influenced by the American commanders.

THE PRESIDENT said he was simply interested in finding out whether an overall commander for the Pacific would be an advantage or a liability.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that from the large point of view there was no question about its being a liability.

In connection with British participation in the Pacific, General Marshall said that the President would find the Prime Minister very articulate. He is interested in showing that the British Government has played a full part in the defeat of Japan and that it had not been necessary for them to wait for the United States to recapture Singapore for them. The Americans, of course, were glad to have any real help or any assistance that would result in giving a real blow, but that British participation in some ways would constitute an embarrassment. However, the British were under American overall command in the Pacific.

THE PRESIDENT referred to the Portuguese participation in the Southwest Pacific and stated that he wished to get the air program definitely settled with the Portuguese before we do anything more about them.

THE PRESIDENT reiterated that his main reason for this conference with the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go in the Japanese campaign. He had hoped that there was a possibility or preventing an invasion from one end of Japan to the other. He was concerned on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation.

With reference to operations in China, GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the opinion that we should not seek an overall commander in China. The present situation in which the Generalissimo was supporting General Weyohsing, acting as his Chief of Staff, was entirely satisfactory. The suggestion of the appointment of an overall commander might cause some difficulty.

ADmiral King said he wished to emphasize the point that regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not indispensable and he did not think we should go as far as to beg them to come in. While the task of defeating Japan would be greater, there was no question in his mind that we could handle it alone. He thought that the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand in the forthcoming conference.

THE PRESIDENT and the Chiefs of Staff then discussed certain other matters.

2. RESTORATION OF LEASE-LEASE SUPPLIES TO THE FRENCH

ADmiral Leahy read a telegram in which General MacArthur requested that Lease-Lease supplies to the French be reinstated after the French withdrawal from northern Italy had been completed. He asked the President's view.
THE PRESIDENT stated that he agreed with General McNarney's recommendations and felt that he should be supported.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his appreciation of the results of his conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said it cleared up a great many points in his mind and that he now felt satisfied and reassured.
Minutes of Meeting Held at 10 a.m.
White House on June 12, 1945, at 10 a.m.

Present

The President

Admiral William S. Leahy

General D. D. MacArthur

Admiral B. J. King

General I. C. Baker

[Acting for General Arnold]

The Secretary of War

Mr. Harry Hopkins

Mr. James M. Forestal

Mr. E. R. Stimson

Mr. A. B. McCoy

Secretary

Brig. General A. J. Mclander
THE PRESIDENT stated that he was interested in informing himself in connection with the proposed operations against Japan for the purpose of forming his views with respect to the details of the campaign against Japan. He asked General Marshall if he would express his opinion.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the situation with respect to operations against Japan was practically identical with the situation which had existed in connection with the operations proposed against Normandy. He then read as an expression of his views the following digest of the memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the President:

Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced movement of Jay shipping south of Korea and should in the next few months cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely. Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order to block Japanese communications south of Korea.

General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff in selecting 1 November as the target date to go into Kyushu because by that time:

a. If we press preparations we can be ready...

b. Our estimates are that our air action will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities.
c. The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.

d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions.

Important considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.

An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Pusan in the southeast corner and Keijo, well up the western side. To get to Pusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese areas. The operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu.

The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangulation and appears to be the least costly worth-while
operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a lodg-
ment in Ryukyu is essential, both to tightening our strangle
hold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing
capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every
weapon and all the forces we can employ and there is no reduction
in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade,
while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations.

It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate
short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it
when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by

(1) Destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea
blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the
firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3)
the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our
objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs
in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese
to a point where, with assistance of American air power and
some supplies, they can mop out their own country.

Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific war is so
diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give
any estimates in numbers. Using various combinations of
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leyte</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>78,000</td>
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<td>Luzon</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>156,000</td>
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<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>35,000 (Marines)</td>
<td>81,000 (Navy)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7,700 (Navy)</td>
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<td></td>
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Normandy

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9 In considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific war which the British wish to raise at the next conference, we must bear in mind the point that anything smacking of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Furthermore, the obvious ineffectiveness of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives.

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"I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating..."
wasteful operations of nondecisive character. I regard the operation as the most economical use in effort and lives that is possible. In this respect it must be remembered that the several preceding months will involve practically no losses in ground troops and that sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. I most earnestly recommend no change in OLYMPIC. Additional subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties."

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was his personal view that the operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue. He felt that air power alone was not sufficient to put the Japanese out of the war. It was unable to do it in Germany. General GIBBONS and General Dusooshowo both agreed to this. In operation, against the Japanese, living in scattered, mountainous country, the problem would be much more difficult than it had been in Germany. He felt that this plan presented the only way in which the Japanese could be forced into a feeling of utter helplessness, in the face of the might against them that would result in surrender. The operation would be difficult but not more so than the assault in Normandy. He was convinced that every individual moving to the Pacific should be free with a firm determination to see the job through.
ADMIRAL KINO agreed with General Marshall's report and said that the more he studied the matter, the more he was impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu, which he considered the key to the success of any siege operations. He pointed out that within three months the efforts of air power based on Okinawa will begin to be felt strongly in Japan. It seemed to him that Kyushu followed logically after Okinawa. It was his opinion that we should develop the island of Kyushu after which there would be time to judge the effect of possible operations by the Russians and the Chinese. The weather constituted quite a factor. As far as preparation was concerned, we must prepare now for Tokyo Plain; otherwise we will never be able to accomplish it. Unless preparations go forward now, they cannot be arranged for later. Once started, they can always be stopped if necessary.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that Kyushu was a necessity and pointed out that it constituted a landing in the Japanese homeland. Kyushu having been arranged for, the decision as to further action could be made later.

THE PRESIDENT inquired if a later decision would not depend on what the Russians agree to do. He was assured that this would have considerable influence.
The President then asked Admiral Leahy for his views of the situation. He had been
interested in knowing what the price in casualties for crushing the German armies in
Europe would be. He pointed out that the troops on the Eastern front were not as
well trained and had less combat experience than those on the Western front. He also
noted that the battles in Russia had been more costly in terms of casualties than
those in Western Europe.

Admiral Leahy replied that he believed the Eastern front would be more costly than
the Western front due to the size of the German armies and the lack of industrial
infrastructure in the Soviet Union. He estimated that the total casualties would be in
the hundreds of thousands, with 20-30% non-combat deaths and 80-70% combat
casualties. He also pointed out that the troops on the Eastern front were less
well trained and had less combat experience than those on the Western front.

The President asked Admiral Leahy for his views on the use of atomic
weapons. Admiral Leahy replied that he believed the use of atomic weapons would
be necessary to end the war quickly and save lives. He estimated that the total
casualties would be in the hundreds of thousands, with 20-30% non-combat deaths
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The President then asked Admiral Leahy for his views on the use of biological
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total casualties would be in the hundreds of thousands, with 20-30% non-combat
deaths and 80-70% combat casualties. He also pointed out that the troops on the
Eastern front were less well trained and had less combat experience than those on
the Western front.
opposition could be expected on Kyushu, General Marshall said
the Japanese divisions on Kyushu were or about
300,000 troops, and other (7) divisions. He said that reinforce-
ment from other areas was possible but it was becoming increas-
ingly difficult and painful. Divisions were still being raised
in Japan, and that

"...political support ..."

THE PRESIDENT asked if was interested in the possibility for
arming of our reinforcements of Kyushu, forth from the other Japanese
islands.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was expected that all
communications with Kyushu would be destroyed.

ADMIRAL KNOX described in some detail the land communications
between the Japanese islands and Kyushu and stated that as
a result of operations already planned the Japanese would have
to depend on sea shipping for any reinforcement.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stressed the fact that Kyushu was an island,
covered by a mountainous range, which was difficult for either the
Japanese or the Americans to cross. The Kyushu operation
continued in effect taking another island from which to bring
increased air power against Japan.
THE PRESIDENT said that he understood it was practically creating another Gideon closer to Japan. The Chiefs of Staff agreed.

THE PRESIDENT then asked General Eaker for his opinion of the operation as an air man.

GENERAL EAKER said that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President. He said that in addition, he had just received a cable in which the French Army had referred to complete agreement. He stated that the blockade of Honshu was dependent upon aircrews on Kyushu; that the air plan contemplated employment of 50 groups of heavy bombers against Japan and that these could not be deployed without the use of airfields on Kyushu. He said that those who advocated the use of air power alone against Japan overlooked the very impressive fact that air casualties are much heavier when the air forces face the enemy alone than when these casualties never fall to drop as soon as the ground forces come in. He also said that the present air casualties were averaging about 2 percent per mission, or 30 percent per month. He wished to point out and to emphasize that delay favored only the enemy and he urged that there be no delay.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that as he understood it the Joint Chiefs of Staff would assess all possibilities.
the situation, all possibilities in mind, the Chief of Staff finally reached the unanimous conclusion that the

Eisenhower operation was the best solution under the circumstances.

The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so.

The President then asked the Secretary of War for his

opinion.

STimson stated that he agreed with the Chiefs of Staff

that there was no other choice. He said that he was personally

acquainted with the terrain between Tokyo and Manchuria and it was

not in his opinion suited for a war of movement. He felt that

he was personally more responsible to the President for political

considerations than military considerations. It was his opinion

that there was a large submerged class in Japan who do not favor

the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never

yet been felt. He felt sure that this submerged class would fight

their own

and fight tenaciously if attacked on any ground. He was concerned

and

that something should be done to arouse them in order to develop

any possible influence they might have before it became

necessary to come to grips with them.

The President stated that this possibility was being worked

on all the time. He was also aware that the situation of Japan by

American forces turned against the Axis was in writing the

story. The effect of moves

closely meeting these Japanese.
Mr. Smith said in the afternoon that the time was approaching to make an announcement about the departure of the Japanese government from the conference, and that the decision to proceed with the operation against Kamakura would be essential. Therefore, the problem of how to proceed with the operation against Kamakura would still be essential.

The President then asked for Mr. Smith to consider all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to prepare the essential announcement in the afternoon.
who said to him that unless we forced the Japanese into unconditional surrender that we will have lost the war. He feared no menace from Japan in the immediate future, even if we were unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What he did fear was that our insistence on unconditional surrender would only result in making the Japanese desperate and thereby increase our casualties. He did not think that it was at all necessary.

The President stated that he had had that thought in mind when he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he did not feel that it was possible for him to take any action which would change public opinion on that matter.

Concerning the Kyushu plan, he had told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it was his opinion that it was all right from the military standpoint, and, as far as he was concerned, they could go ahead with it. He thought it was necessary to do this operation and then decide as to the final action. The conversation then turned to the situation in China.

General Marshall stated that General Wedemeyer's operations were pointing towards Canton. He thought it was evident that the Japanese would hold fortress troops there and in other places. It might be necessary to go around these fortress
troops as had been done in France or to take other courses with preference to them.

In reply to a question from the President, General Marshall outlined the present status of Chinese divisions with respect to completeness of personnel and equipment. He said with respect to the ability of the Chinese generals they were not very good. He had already asked General Wedemeyer whether it would be possible to use with the Chinese troops one or more of the U.S. Army commanders with their staffs who were now returning from France. General Wedemeyer's reply, while not conclusive, had been in general favorable. General Marshall thought that if the Generalissimo would accept the use of these commanders for control of Chinese groups, it would be a very excellent thing.

The President then inquired as to the possibility of an overall commander in the Pacific, which he thought would be a good thing. General Marshall, and Admiral King explained that under the circumstances existing in the Pacific with the variety of troops to be operating there, with the number of nations involved, that there were little prospects of achieving that. They pointed out that it was undesirable to accept divided command with the British and that we would lose more than we would gain if we brought about
GENERAL MARSHALL stated the American commander would always have to think of his government's policies. In connection with this, he recognized the difficulty in obtaining British agreement for changes to General Eisenhower's plan for the invasion of Germany. Their reluctance in the matter was due to their belief that General Montgomery was influenced by the American commanders.

The President said that it was difficult to find out whether an over-all commander for the Pacific would be an advantage or a liability.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that from the large point of view there was no question about this being a liability. In connection with the British participation in the Pacific, General Marshall said that the President would find the Prime Minister very articulate. He is interested in showing that the British Government has played a full part in the defeat of Japan and that it had not been necessary for them to wait for the United States to recapture Singapore for them. The Americans, of course, were glad to have any real help or any assistance that would help to strike a real blow but that British participation in some way or another would constitute an embarrassment. However, the British were under American over-all command in the Pacific. He stated that the British wanted the Australians to take over as far as the Solomons. The Australians wanted to take over their own situation.
The Australian Deputy Prime Minister had recently conferred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the Australian role in the war and that the British had suffered some embarrassment because they have not yet been able to agree definitely with the Australians. The

President referred to the Portuguese participation in the Southwest Pacific and stated that he wished to get the air program definitely settled with the Portuguese before he does anything more about Timor.

The President reiterated that his main reason for this conference with the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go into the Philippines.

He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an invasion from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation.

With reference to operations in China, General Marshall expressed the opinion that we should not seek an over-all commander in China. The present situation in which the Generalissimo was supporting General Weydemeyer, acting as his chief of staff, was entirely satisfactory. The suggestion of the appointment of an over-all commander might cause some difficulty.
ADMIRAL KINSA said he wished to emphasize the point that, regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not indispensable and he did not think we should go to any great lengths to induce them to come in.

While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater, there was no question in his mind but that we could handle it alone. He thought that the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand in the forthcoming conference.

ADMIRAL LEAHY read a telegram in which General McBarney recommended that the supplies to the French be resupplied. The withdrawal from northern Italy had been completed. He asked the President to approve.

The President stated that he agreed with General McBarney's recommendations and felt that he should be supported.

The President expressed his appreciation of the results of his conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said he had cleared up a great many points in his mind and that he now felt satisfied and reassured.

The President and the Chiefs of Staff then discussed certain other matters.
PRESENT

The President
Admiral William D. Leahy
General G. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
General I. C. Eaker
(Acting for General Arnold)
Mr. Henry L. Stimson
Mr. James R. Forrestal
Mr. J. J. McCloy

Secretary
Brig. General A. J. McFarland

JUL 20 45
THE PRESIDENT stated that he was interested in informing himself in connection with the proposed operations against Japan on the points raised in the memorandum which he had given to Admiral Leahy. He asked General Marshall if he would express his opinion.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the situation existing now with respect to operations against Japan was practically identical with the situation which had existed in connection with the operations proposed against Germany. He then read the following digest of the memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the President:

1. Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced movement of Jap shipping south of Korea and should in the next few months cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely. Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order to block Japanese communications south of Korea.

2. General MacArthur and Admiral Mitscher are in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff in selecting 1 November as the target date to go into Kyushu because by that time:
   a. If we press preparations we can be ready.
   b. Our estimates are that our air action will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities.
o. The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.

d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions.

Important considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.

3. An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Pusan in the southeast corner and Keijo, well up the western side. To get to Pusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese areas. The operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears an equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu.

4. The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangulation and appears to be the least costly worth-while.
operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a ludge-
ment in Kyushu is essential, both to tightening our strangle
hold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing
 capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

5. We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every
weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction
in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade,
while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations.
It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate
short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it
when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by
(1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea
blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the
firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3)
the entry of threat of entry of Russia into the war.

6. With reference to cleanup of the Asiatic mainland, our
objective should be to get the Japanese to deal with the Japa-
ese in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese
to a point where, with assistance of American air power and
some supplies, they can mop up their own country.

7. Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific war is so
diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give
any estimate in numbers. Using various combinations of
Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the con-
clusion that the cost of securing a worth-while position in
Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the
Kyushu operation. Data on the optimistic side of the Kyushu
operation are that General MacArthur has not yet accepted
responsible for going ashore where there would be dispro-
portionate casualties. The nature of the objective area gives
room for maneuver, both on the land and by sea. As to any dis-
cussion of specific operations, the following data is pertinent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>U.S. Casualties</th>
<th>Jap Casualties Killed and Prisoners (Net Including Wounded)</th>
<th>Ratio U.S. to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leyte</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>1:4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td>1:5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>1:2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>34,000 (Ground)</td>
<td>81,000</td>
<td>1:2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,000 (Navy)</td>
<td>(not a complete count)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normandy</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The record of General MacArthur's operations from 1 March
1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 U.S. killed compared to
210,168 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to 1.

There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in
Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It
is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to vic-
tory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to
maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of
their subordinates. Any irresolution in the leaders may result in costly weakening and indecision in the subordinates. It was this basic difficulty with the Prime Minister which delayed and hampered all our preparations for the cross-channel operation now demonstrated as having been essential to victory in Europe.

8. An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

9. In considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific war which the British wish to raise at the next conference, we must bear in mind the point that anything masking or combining command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Furthermore the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives.

General Marshall said that he had asked General MacArthur’s opinion on the proposed operation and received from him a telegram, which General Marshall proceeded to read:

"I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating
wasteful operations of indecisive character. I regard the operation as the most economical one in effort and lives that is possible. In this respect it must be remembered that the several preceding months will involve practically no losses in ground troops and that, sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. I most earnestly recommend no change in policy. Additional subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final local casualties.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was his personal view that the operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue. He felt that air power alone was not sufficient to put the Japanese out of the war. It was unable to do it in Germany. General Macar and General Eisenhower both agreed to this. In operations against the Japanese living in scattered mountainous country the problem would be much more difficult than it had been in Germany. He felt that this plan promised the only way in which the Japanese could be forced into that feeling of utter helplessness in the face of the might against them and which could result in surrender. The operation would be difficult but not more so than the assault in Europe. He was convinced that every individual moving to the Pacific should be filled with the determination to see the plan through.
ADIMIRAL KNOG agreed with General Marshall's remarks and stated that the more he studied the matter, the more he was impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu which he considered the key to the success of any siege operations. He pointed out that within three months more the effects of air based on Okinawa will begin to be felt strongly in Japan. It seemed to him that Kyushu followed logically after Okinawa, Okinawa, then Kyushu, with the possible action to be expected from the Russians and from the Chinese seemed to be a natural setup. It was his opinion that we should decide now to do Kyushu, after which there would be time to judge the effect of possible operations by the Russians and the Chinese. The weather constituted quite a factor. So far as preparation was concerned, we must prepare now for the battle for Tokyo Plain; otherwise we will never be able to accomplish it. Unless all preparations go forward now, they cannot be arranged for later. Once started they can always be stopped if necessary.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that Kyushu was a necessity and pointed out that it constituted a landing in the Japanese homeland. Kyushu having been arranged for, the decision as to further action could be made later.

THE PRESIDENT inquired if a later decision would not depend on what the Russians agree to do. There was consensus that this would have considerable influence.
ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the President had been interested in knowing what the price in casualties for Kyushu would be and whether or not that price could be paid. He, Admiral Leahy, was interested in finding out how many troops will be used in Kyushu with a view to determining therefrom the number of casualties which might be expected. He pointed out that the troops on Okinawa had lost 35 percent in casualties. If this percentage were applied to the number of troops to be employed in Kyushu, he thought from the similarity of the fighting to be expected that this would give a good estimate of expected casualties.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out what he considered an important difference in Okinawa and Kyushu. There had been only one way to go on Okinawa. This meant a straight frontal attack on a highly fortified position. On Kyushu, however, landings would be made on three fronts simultaneously and there would be much more room for maneuver. It was his opinion that a realistic casualty figure for Kyushu would lie somewhere between the number experienced by General MacArthur in the operations on Luzon and the Okinawa casualties.

GENERAL MARSHALL called attention to the troops allocated to the Kyushu campaign as set out in the memorandum prepared for the President. The total combat troops was
766,000. In answer to the President's question as to what opposition could be expected on Kyushu, General Marshall said that there were eight Japanese divisions on Kyushu now or about 356,000 troops and 200 (?) aircraft. He said that reinforce-ment from other areas was possible but it was becoming increasingly difficult and painful. Divisions were still being raised in Japan.

The President said he was interested in the possibility of any reinforcement of Kyushu south from the other Japanese islands.

General Marshall stated that it was expected that all of the communications with Kyushu would be destroyed.

Admiral King described in some detail the land communications existing between the Japanese islands and Kyushu and stated that as a result of operations already planned, that the Japanese would have to depend on sea shipping for any reinforcement.

Admiral Leahy stressed the fact that Kyushu was an island crossed by a mountain range, which was difficult for either the Japanese or for the Americans to cross. The Kyushu operation constituted in effect taking another island from which to bring increased air power against Japan.
THE PRESIDENT said, as he understood it, it was practically creating another Okinawa closer to Japan. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so.

THE PRESIDENT then asked General Baker for his opinion of the operation as an air man.

GENERAL BAKER stated that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President. He said that in addition he had just received from General Arnold a cable in which he also gave his agreement. He stated that any blockade of Honshu was dependent upon airbases on Kyushu; that the air plan contemplated employment of 40 groups of heavy bombers against Japan and that these could not be deployed without the use of airfields on Kyushu. He said that those who advocated the use of air power alone against Japan overlooked the very impressive fact that air casualties are very much heavier when the air forces face the enemy alone and that these casualties never fail to drop as soon as the ground forces came in. He stated the present air casualties were averaging 2 percent per mission, or 30 percent per month. He wished to point out and to emphasize that delay favored only the enemy and he urged that there be no delay.

THE PRESIDENT then stated that as he understood it the present Chiefs of Staff had considered all other possibilities in
the situation, all other possible plans, all contingencies, and as a result had reached the unanimous conclusion that the Kyushu operation was the best solution under the circumstances. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so.

THE PRESIDENT then asked the Secretary of War for his opinion.

MR. STimson stated that he agreed with the Chiefs of Staff that there was no other choice. He said that he was personally acquainted with the terrain between Tokyo and Osaka and it was not in his opinion, suited for a war of movement. He felt that he was personally more responsible to the President for political considerations than military considerations. It was his opinion that there was a large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never yet been felt. He felt sure that this submerged class would fight and fight tenaciously if attacked on the ground. He was concerned that something should be done to arouse them in order to develop any possible influence they might have before it came to grips on the ground.

THE PRESIDENT stated that this possibility was being worked on all the time. He was interested to know the extent to which the invasion of Japanese homeland by the white man in uniting the Japanese (to be continued)
Mr. Stimson thought there was a very large chance. He agreed with the plan proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that being the best thing to do, but he still hoped for some additional means to be found through efforts that could be made from the outside.

The President then asked for Mr. Forrestal's views. Mr. Forrestal pointed out that even if the decision were to be a siege of Japan for a year or a year and a half, that the capture of Kyushu would still be essential. Therefore, the sound decision is to proceed with the operation against Kyushu. There will still be left time thereafter for the main decision, which can be made in the light of subsequent events.

Mr. Mogilj said he felt that the time was propitious now to study closely what efforts could be brought to bear in bringing out the influence of the submerged group in Japan which had been referred to by Mr. Stimson.

The President stated that one of his objectives in connection with the conference would be to get all the assistance from Russia in the war that was possible. To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to occupy the strongest position possible in the discussions.

Admiral Leahy said that he could not agree with the opinion
of any who said to him that unless we force the Japanese into unconditional surrender that we will have lost the war. He feared no menace from Japan in the reasonable future, even if we were unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What he feared was that our insistence on unconditional surrender would simply result in making the Japanese desperate and thereby result in large casualties. He did not think that such a result was necessary. 

The President stated that he had had that thought in mind when he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he did not feel that at this time it was possible for him to take any action with reference to public opinion on this matter. He said with reference to the Kyushu plan that he considered it all right from the military standpoint and, as far as he was concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could go ahead with it; that we could do this operation and then make decision as to the final action later.

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The President then inquired as to the prospects of an overall commander in the Pacific, which he thought would be a good thing.

Both GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING explained that under the circumstances existing in the Pacific with the variety of troops to be operating there, with the number of nations involved, that they thought there were no prospects for it. As was pointed out, it was undesirable to accept divided command with the British and that we would lose more than we would gain if we brought about
in the Pacific the same condition as had existed in France.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that American commander always
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this, he recounted the difficulty obtaining British agreement in
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Their reluctance in the matter was due to their belief that General
Eisenhower must be influenced by the American commanders.

THE PRESIDENT said that it was simply his idea to find
out whether an over-all commander for the Pacific would be an
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The President reiterated that his main reason for this conference with the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go in this operation. He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation.

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ADMIRAL KING said he wished to emphasize the point that regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, that as they were not indispensable and that he did not think we should go to any great lengths in begging them to come in. While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater, there was no question in his mind but that we would handle it alone. He thought that the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand in discussing matters with the Russians.

ADMIRAL LEHRY read a telegram in which General McBarney had recommended that the reinstatement of supplies to the French take place after the French withdrawal from northern Italy. The President stated that he agreed with General McBarney's recommendations and felt that he should be supported. The President expressed his appreciation of the results of his conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said this cleared up a great many points in his mind and that he now felt satisfied and reassured.