Dear Mr. President:

In handing you today my memorandum about our relations with Russia in respect to the atomic bomb, I am not unmindful of the fact that when in Potsdam I talked with you about the question whether we could be safe in sharing the atomic bomb with Russia while she was still a police state and before she put into effect provisions assuring personal rights of liberty to the individual citizen.

I still recognize the difficulty and am still convinced of the importance of the ultimate importance of a change in Russian attitude toward individual liberty but I have come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to use our possession of the atomic bomb as a direct lever to produce the change. I have become convinced that any demand by us for an internal change in Russia as a condition of sharing in the atomic weapon would be so resisted that it would make the objective we have in view less probable.

I believe that the change in attitude toward the individual in Russia will come slowly and gradually and I am satisfied that we should not delay our approach to Russia in the matter of the atomic bomb until that process has been completed. My reasons
are set forth in the memorandum I am handing you today. Furthermore, I believe that this long process of change in Russia is more likely to be expedited by the closer relationship in the matter of the atomic bomb which I suggest and the trust and confidence that I believe would be inspired by the method of approach which I have outlined.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Proposed Action for Control of Atomic Bombs

The advent of the atomic bomb has stimulated great military and probably even greater political interest throughout the civilized world. In a world atmosphere already extremely sensitive to power, the introduction of this weapon has profoundly affected political considerations in all sections of the globe.

In many quarters it has been interpreted as a substantial offset to the growth of Russian influence on the continent. We can be certain that the Soviet government has sensed this tendency and the temptation will be strong for the Soviet political and military leaders to acquire this weapon in the shortest possible time. Britain in effect already has the status of a partner with us in the development of this weapon. Accordingly, unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the partnership upon a basis of cooperation and trust, we are going to maintain the Anglo-Saxon bloc over against the Soviet in the possession of this weapon. Such a condition will almost certainly stimulate feverish activity on the part of the Soviet toward the development of this bomb in what will in effect be a secret armament race of a rather desperate character. There is evidence to indicate that such activity may have already commenced.
If we feel, as I assume we must, that civilization demands that some day we shall arrive at a satisfactory international arrangement respecting the control of this new force, the question then is how long we can afford to enjoy our momentary superiority in the hope of achieving our immediate peace council objectives.

Whether Russia gets control of the necessary secrets of production in a minimum of say four years or a maximum of twenty years is not nearly as important to the world and civilization as to make sure that when they do get it they are willing and cooperative partners among the peace loving nations of the world. It is true that if we approach them now, as I would propose, we may be gambling on their good faith and risk their getting into production of bombs a little sooner than they would otherwise.

To put the matter concisely, I consider the problem of our satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely connected with but as virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic bomb. Except for the problem of the control of that bomb, those relations, while vitally important, might not be immediately pressing. The establishment of relations of mutual confidence between us and the Russians could afford to await the slow progress of time. But with the discovery of the bomb, they become immediately emergent. Those relations may be perhaps irretrievably shattered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach them
now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon
rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their dis-
trust of our purposes and motives will increase. It will inspire
them to greater efforts in an all-out effort to solve the problem.
If the solution is achieved in that spirit, it is much less likely
that we will ever get the kind of covenant we may desperately need
in the future. This risk is, I believe, greater than the other,
inasmuch as our objective must be to get the best kind of inter-
national bargain we can — one that has some chance of being kept
and saving civilization not for five or for twenty years, but forever.

The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that
the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him; and the
surest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your
distrust.

If the atomic bomb were merely another though more devas-
tating military weapon to be assimilated into our pattern of inter-
national relations, it would be one thing. We could then follow the
old custom of secrecy and nationalistic military superiority relying
on international caution to prescribe the future use of the weapon
as we did with gas. But I think the bomb instead constitutes merely
a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too
revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts. I think
it really saps the climax of the race between man's growing technical
power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control — his moral power. If so, our method of approach to the Russians is a question of the most vital importance in the evolution of human progress.

Since the crux of the problem is Russia, any contemplated action leading to the control of this weapon should be primarily directed to Russia. It is my judgment that the Soviet would be more apt to respond sincerely to a direct and forthright approach made by the United States on this subject than would be the case if the approach were made as a part of a general international scheme, or if the approach were made after a succession of express or implied threats or near threats in our peace negotiations.

My idea of an approach to the Soviets would be a direct proposal after discussion with the British that we would be prepared in effect to enter an arrangement with the Russians, the general purpose of which would be to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war and as far as possible to direct and encourage the development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. Such an approach might more specifically lead to the proposal that we would stop work on the further improvement in, or manufacture of, the bomb as a military weapon, provided the Russians and the British would agree to do likewise. It might also provide that we would be willing to impound what bombs we now
have in the United States provided the Russians and the British
would agree with us that in no event will they or we use a bomb as
an instrument of war unless all three Governments agree to that use.
We might also consider including in the arrangement a covenant with
the U. S. and the Soviets providing for the exchange of benefits of
future developments whereby atomic energy may be applied on a mutually
satisfactory basis for commercial or humanitarian purposes.

I would make such an approach just as soon as our immediate
political considerations make it appropriate.

I emphasize perhaps beyond all other considerations the
importance of taking this action with Russia as a proposal of the
United States - backed by Great Britain - but particularly the proposal
of the United States. Action of any international group of nations,
including many small nations who have not demonstrated their poten-
tial power or responsibility in this war would not, in my opinion,
be taken seriously by the Soviets. The loose debates which would
surround such proposal, if put before a conference of nations, would
prove not so much favor from the Soviet. As I say, I think this is
the most important point in the program.

After the nations which have won this war have agreed to
it, there will be ample time to introduce France and China into the
covenants and finally to incorporate the agreement into the scheme
of the United Nations. The use of this bomb has been accepted by
the world as the result of the initiative and productive capacity
of the United States, and I think this factor is a most potent
lever toward having our proposals accepted by the Soviets, whereas
I am most skeptical of obtaining any tangible results by way of any
international debate. I urge this method as the most realistic
means of accomplishing this vitally important step in the history
of the world.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.