9 May 1945.

The first informal meeting of the Committee was held in the S/W’s office for the purpose of explaining to the members the function of the Committee and to give them the general background of the project, the Quebec Agreement, the Combined Policy Committee, and the Combined Development Trust. The Secretary of War explained that the Committee had been established by him, with the approval of the President, to study and report on the matter of temporary war-time controls and publicity and to make recommendations on post-war research, development, and control, and on legislation necessary for these purposes. The Committee’s recommendations were to be submitted to the S/W, and through him to the President. The full membership was announced as follows: The Secretary of War, Chairman; Hon. Ralph A. Bard, Dr. Vannevar Bush; Hon. James F. Byrnes; Hon. William L. Clayton; Dr. Karl T. Compton; Dr. James B. Conant; and Mr. George L. Harrison, Alternate Chairman. All were present except Dr. Conant. Mr. Bundy was present by invitation.

(See notes of Meeting)

14 May 1945.

Bard, Bush, Byrnes, Clayton, Harrison, and General Groves (by invitation) were present at the second meeting.
The Committee agreed that a Scientific Panel should be established to advise the Committee not only on technical matters but also on any other phases of the subject on which the Panel might care to express its views. Membership was designated as follows: Drs. A. H. Compton, E. O. Lawrence, J. R. Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi.

It was suggested that a Military Panel might be organized with membership drawn from high levels in the Army and Navy. The Committee agreed that the views of representatives of those industries most directly concerned with the project should be obtained particularly with reference to the potentialities of industrial mobilization in this field in other countries, but that no Panel should be formalized.

At the suggestion of Harrison it was agreed that J. H. Armstrong should be appointed Secretary of the Committee.

It was agreed that William L. Laurence, a science editor of the New York Times, now under contract with the Manhattan District, should work up drafts of public statements that would have to be made after the use of the weapon. Page was to review the drafts before presentation to the Committee.

(See Notes of Meeting)

18 May 1945.

At the third meeting Bard, Byrnes, Clayton, Conant, and Harrison were the members present. Arthur Page and General Groves
were present by invitation. Consideration was given to the draft statements of publicity, it being agreed that publicity concerning the test should be kept to a minimum, that following actual use the President should make only a short announcement to the effect that the weapon had been employed and the S/W should release a longer statement giving the general story of the project. Other releases should be made later concerning the details of the program.

It was understood that under the terms of the Quebec Agreement the U.S. was obligated to secure U.K. consent to use the weapon against a third party, no prior consent being necessary, however, in conducting local tests.

Harrison reported that the British were considering the establishment of a similar committee to consider publicity and post-war controls.

(See Notes of Meeting)

19 May 1945

Page was assigned the job of preparing the Presidential statement; Arnason, a draft of the S/W's statement.

22 May 1945

Bundy discussed with the S/W the desirability of inviting certain representatives of industry to discuss with the Committee their experiences in connection with the project. The S/W agreed that they should be heard.
24 May 1945.

Bundy received from Roger Makins a copy of a letter proposing the establishment of a parallel British committee. Views forthcoming of problems involved. Letter shown to Harrison for his information.

25-29 May 1945.

Arrangements completed for meeting with representatives from industry and with the scientific panel.

31 May 1945.

All members were present at meeting with the four scientists. General Marshall, General Groves, Bundy, and Page present by invitation. (See Notes of Meeting)

1 June 1945.

All members were present at meeting with the representatives of industry, these being George H. Bucher, President of Westinghouse; Walter S. Carpenter, President of Du Pont; James Rafferty, Vice President of Union Carbide; and James White, President of Tennessee Eastman. General Marshall, General Groves, Bundy, and Page were present by invitation. (See Notes of Meeting)

Copies of A. H. Compton Report were given to Committee members.

7 June 1945.

Harrison discussed with S/N the recommendations of the Committee agreed at the 31 May and 1 June meetings: (1)
present program, including Chicago, be continued at present levels for the duration of the war; (2) the bomb be used without prior warning against Japan at earliest opportunity, the targets to be a military target surrounded by workers houses; (3) a Military Panel be established, and (4) work be started promptly on legislation. The S/W was in agreement on (1) and (2). He did not favor establishing a Military Panel. With regard to (4) the S/W wanted first priority given to legislation for domestic control, with the problems of international relations and controls to be dealt with by the Permanent Post-War Commission that would be established by law.

12 June 1945.

Arneson met with A. H. Compton concerning a memorandum prepared by certain of the Chicago scientists on "Social and Political Problems."

13 June 1945.

Arneson delivered to, and discussed with, Byrnes copy of Quebec Agreement and other documents dealing with negotiations leading to the Agreement, with particular reference to exchange of information concerning plant and construction data. Documents revealed that no interchange was made on plant and construction information.

15 June 1945.

Arneson reported to Harrison on his discussions with Compton and Byrnes. Harrison decided that the Scientific Panel
and not the Committee should consider the memorandum from the Chicago scientists.

Arneson turned over to Harrison the first draft of the proposed public statement of the S/W.

15 June 1945.

Harrison talked with A. H. Compton by telephone concerning the Chicago memorandum, stating that he thought the Committee should consider it only after the Scientific Panel had made its comments. Compton agreed and promised to have available for Committee consideration at the next meeting the views of the Panel on the subject memorandum. He also agreed to submit the Panel's recommendation as to the disposition of the Chicago group after the war.

18 June 1945.

Copies of draft statements for President and S/W sent to Groves' office for comment.

20 June 1945.

Arneson discussed with Considine suggested changes in statements. Some changes accepted and incorporated in redrafts. Suggestion that references to OPC and CDP be omitted in S/W statement was held in suspense pending consideration by the Committee.
21 June 1945.

All members, except S/W, present at sixth meeting of Committee. Groves, Bundy, and Page present by invitation. The draft statement for the President was approved with minor changes. It was agreed that specific references to CPC, CDT, and the Quebec Agreement should be omitted.  S/W Statement.

It was agreed that releases that would be necessary after the statement of the S/W was made public should be handled by Groves' organization in cooperation with Page.

For other matters discussed see Notes of Meeting.

25 June 1945.

Discussions with the British led to the conclusion that the most appropriate manner in which to record British assent to our use of the weapon against Japan would be to make it a minute of the CPC.

26 June 1945.

Draft statements incorporating changes made in accordance with Committee decisions taken 21 June presented to the S/W by Harrison and Bundy. S/W approved both statements with minor verbal changes and authorized Bundy to make copies available to Makins.

Harrison presented a memo to the S/W outlining the Committee's view that the President, after consultation with the Prime Minister, should be prepared to tell the Russians at
the Conference that we were working on the weapon and expected
to use it on Japan, but that he should not open up the question
of international control for the present. S/W approved this
recommendation and authorized Bundy to make a copy of this memo
available to Makins.

Bundy handed copies of the Presidential and S/W statements
and copy of memo to Makins.

27 June 1945.

Harrison wrote A. H. Compton informing him that Committee
felt that the Scientific Panel should not be enlarged at this
time to include Urey but that the Scientific Panel should hold
itself free to receive any views that any scientists on the
project might wish to present.

1 July 1945.

Bundy received from Makins certain suggested changes
in the draft statements. Changes in President's statement were
minor and were incorporated in a redraft. In the S/W's statement
it was felt that the section dealing with the history of nuclear
physics leading up to the war was incomplete and therefore inaccurate,
that no mention should be made of the successfulness of several
processes, and that Tolman, Chadwick, and Mackenauie should be cited
as Scientific Advisers to CPD Members.
2 July 1945.
Armsen delivered to Byrnes copies of President's
and S/W's statements, British suggestions, Harrison memo to
S/W on Russia, Harrison to S/W transmitting Bard memo, and
Bard memo to S/W concerning warning to Japan.

5 July 1945.
Armsen turned over to Kyle for delivery to Bundy at
Potsdam sealed package containing copies of Quebec Agreement,
Combined Development Trust Agreement, compilation of documents
leading up to Quebec Agreement, President's statement, S/W's
statement, and British suggestions.

6 July 1945.
At the seventh meeting of the Committee Bush, Compton,
Comant, Harrison, and Groves (by invitation) were present. The
British suggestions on the President's statement were accepted
in toto. With regard to the S/W's statement, it was agreed
to omit reference to processes by name; it was felt however
that no purpose would be served by omitting reference to the
fact that several processes had proven successful. It was also
agreed to make only very general mention of the world wide
interest and work in nuclear physics before the war started,
without giving the names of any of the scientists who contributed
during that period. Certain verbal changes were also accepted.
(See Notes of Meeting)

Harrison saw Makins at 3:00 P.M. and showed him the
changes we had made in line with the British suggestions.

7 July 1945.

Arnesson delivered to Makins copies of the redrafts
containing suggested British changes.

10 July 1945.

Further British suggestions received from Makins.
Largely in the nature of changes consequential to the original
amendments which we had accepted, these were incorporated in toto.

11 July 1945.

Redrafts incorporating further British suggestions
delivered by Arnesson to Makins' secretary. It was understood
that Makins would make known to the Chancellor our acceptance
of the suggestions.

16 July 1945.

At 8:00 A.M. E.W.T. Groves called Harrison reporting
success of the test. At 9:00 A.M. Groves called in further
details. Results even better than expected. Harrison prepared
a cable to send to the S/W which he turned over to Pasco to
prepare for transmittal. At 9:30 A.M. Harrison showed a copy
of the cable to Lovett and then to Patterson. After Patterson's
approval, Harrison authorized dispatch of cable at 11:15 A.M.

At 1:00 P.M. Considine came over to show Harrison a
copy of the statement that had been released to the local press
in New Mexico at 11:00 A.M. M.W.T.
Harrison had tried to get in touch with Makius during the morning. At 3:00 P.M. Makius came over and was shown the telegram. Harrison told him about the press release that had been issued in New Mexico to cover the curiosity that had been aroused locally. It was agreed that Makius should inform Halifax immediately but only in very general terms to the effect that the test had been successful and that results had exceeded expectations. It was understood further that Chadwick's report would be transmitted to Makius through Groves.

17 July 1945.

Groves called Harrison from Nashville at 8:00 A.M. E.W.T. reporting that he would arrive in Washington about 1:00 P.M.

Harrison advised Bard of the success of the test at 9:00 A.M.; E.H. Compton, at 9:30 A.M.; Page, at 1:00 P.M.

At 3:00 P.M. with Page, Comenden, Mrs. O'Leary and Arnason present, Groves reported to Harrison the results of the test in some detail. All evidence points to much greater success than had been expected. No casualties occurred and the speculation aroused locally was successfully taken care of by the local press release. Comenden stated that he thought the story was of only one day's interest and would not give rise to any difficulties later.

Groves said that he felt a news story should be released in New Mexico after actual use giving information in general terms about the test. He also suggested a minor verbal change in the President's statement.

[Signature]  
[Stamp: S.C. K.ER R.MEA 45]
In the presence of the group Harrison prepared a cable to the S/W in line with Groves report. Cable given to Passo at 4:15 P.M. for dispatch.

19 July 1946.

General Royall and Marbury met with Harrison and Arnason.

The bill which Royall and Marbury had drafted was read and discussed in general terms. It was learned that General Groves has had two young lawyers, Lts. George S. Allan and George L. Duff, working on legislation for some period and that they had compiled a most useful document of background material which Royall and Marbury have found most useful. Harrison called Groves to suggest that Allan and Duff should sit in on the meeting on the 19th during discussion of draft. Groves agreed to have them present.

19 July 1946

At the ninth meeting of the Committee Bush, Compton, Comett, and Harrison were the members present; Groves, Royall, Marbury, Allen and Duff were present by invitation. The principle topic for consideration was the draft bill.

(See Notes of Meeting)

Makins handed to Harrison a proposed statement to be made by Churchill after use of the weapon with a request for comment and criticism. Groves and Harrison went over the statement.
together and concluded that they had no objection to it provided present conditions did not change.

20 July 1945.

In accord with the decision of the Interim Committee at the 19 July meeting the memorandum drafted by Bush and Conant for dispatch to the Scientific Panel from the Committee was sent out to the members of the Panel with certain verbal changes incorporated. A letter of appreciation and congratulations was also sent to Oppenheimer by Harrison on behalf of the S/W and the Committee.

Harrison met with Makins to report that he and Groves saw no objection to the proposed statement of the Prime Minister, provided present conditions did not change, and that he was prepared to recommend that the S/W approve the release if it was finally decided by the British that they wanted to use it. Harrison requested that final approval of our public statements be cleared promptly in view of the fact that the time is growing short.

Makins promised to report our wishes to London immediately.

As regards the scientific release Makins indicated that while his government did not like the idea of a scientific release it was willing to consider the rules of release approved and raise no objection to the statement provided Chadwick certified
that it came within the rules.

Bush indicated his dissatisfaction with the Royal/Marbury draft and suggested that his comments and a copy of the Foundation bill should be sent up to Allan and Duff for their consideration. Arneson arranged for this to be done. Allan and Duff explained to Arneson when he called them that Royall had given them only a limited objective to work on, namely, that they were to make only minor changes in the draft along the general lines of the discussion of the Committee on 19 July without changing the basic approach of the document. On being informed of this, Bush expressed the view that further discussion concerning the basic approach would be necessary, but that in any event his comments and the Foundation bill should be sent up to Allan and Duff for their use before they returned on Monday. Allan and Duff indicated to Arneson over the telephone that they had some doubts about the basic approach of the Royall/Marbury bill and proposed to submit a memorandum on that point to Royall when they came down on Monday.

25 July 1945.

Makins saw Harrison this morning. He explained that the situation with regard to the clearance of the public statements of the President and the Secretary of War as reflected in Harrison's memorandum of 20 July remained unchanged. He had cabled London
of our desire to secure speedy clearance and had received a reply stating that while the Prime Minister's advisers approved the statements Churchill might want to discuss the matter at Potsdam. Harrison pointed out that the time was growing short and that he was prepared to recommend release of the statements without the specific approval of the Prime Minister should the 'use' date make this necessary. Makins remarked that if he were in Harrison's place he would do the same under the circumstances. Harrison suggested that the British should also feel free to release their statement without specific approval from our highest level if events made this necessary after our statements had been made public.

As regards the "scientific" release, Makins stated there was nothing new to report. Accordingly, it is assumed that the decision taken by the Combined Policy Committee at its last meeting stands unaltered.

Harrison suggested a minor change in the draft letter to Halifax concerning the agreement concluded with Brazil. This change states that "the interest of the United Kingdom was disclosed to the Brazilian Government at these negotiations."

Makins stated that he was in agreement with the proposed change. Harrison said that he wished to await the return of the Secretary of State or at least the Secretary of War before giving final clearance to the exchange of letters.
Marbury turned over to Harrison copies of the third draft of a bill to establish a Commission on Atomic Energy. He explained that perhaps 75 percent of Bush's objections had been met in the redraft. A copy was sent to Bush for further comment. One was also sent to Groves' office for dispatch to Conant. Hard saw a copy this afternoon and returned it without comment.

Considine discussed with Arnesson the mechanics of releasing the statements. He suggested that the President's statement should be turned over to the President's press secretary, Charles Ross, for any final changes that might be deemed necessary and for distribution to the press. The S/W statement can be mimeographed on machines being arranged for by Considine.

27 July 1945.

Considine reported that arrangements have been made through Col. Matthews (temporarily assigned to Groves' organization from BPR) to release the S/W statement through BPR, and that a specially guarded mimeograph room of the AGO can be used to run off copies.

Arnesson discussed with Harrison an addition to the S/W statement, suggested by Matthews and Weymann, to the effect that the War Department was to be the sole releasing agency for information on the project. Harrison agreed to bring this point up in going over changes with the S/W.
Page and Arneson made certain changes in the Presidential
Statement which went into the Potsdam proclamation of 26 July.
These changes were approved by Harrision.

28 July 1945.

Makins reported to Harrision by telephone this morning
that the proposed statement of the Prime Minister had not been
approved in London. In view of the election results it was
assumed that certain changes would need to be made. It was
expected that the changes when made would be cabled to Washington.

Makins had no further word on our two statements but
assumed that Bundy would be able to report on this matter when
he returned.

As regards the scientific statement, Makins stated that
both he and Chadwick were much concerned about the amount of
information it revealed.