Admiral Leahy wrote (Page 383) that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in meetings on June 14, 15 and 19, with the addition of a new White House conference with the President on June 18, adopted the basic plan that became, with some modifications, the military part of the Potsdam Conference. He said it was agreed to seek the earliest date the unconditional surrender of the Japanese and pending the President's approval, it was decided on June 14 that invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands would be the main effort.

He wrote that the Joint Chiefs also agreed to encourage Russian entry into the war in accordance with the conditions accepted by Roosevelt at Yalta. He wrote that Stalin had told Harry Hopkins he expected the Russian forces to be in position to attack by August 8.

Leahy wrote (Page 384) that the White House conference was held primarily to discuss the necessity and practicability of invading the Japanese home islands. He said Marshall and King strongly advocated the invasion of Kyushu at the earliest possible date. Leahy had been opposed to invasion of the Jap mainland, had held that such an attempt on Kyushu would cost in casualties more than 50,000 of the 150,000 combatant troops estimated necessary for the invasion.

Leahy says the President approved the Kyushu operation to withhold for later consideration a general invasion of Japan.

June 29th meeting of the Joint Chiefs set November 1 the invasion date for Kyushu and the JCS insisted on stating that this operation was to get into position for the decisive invasion of industrial Japan through the Tokyo plain.
June 28, 1945. The Interim Committee recommended that the bomb should be used against Japan, without specific warning, as soon as possible, and against such a target as would make clear its devastating strength. (Stimson says this in his book, Page 617). (Byrnes in his book, "Speaking Frankly", Page 261, gives the date of this recommendation as July 1, which apparently was incorrect. He says that with the exception of Hard, the committee recommended that it be used without warning and he says this last question had been carefully considered).
The Joint Chiefs of Staff held a special meeting to hear details of the pending Pacific operation to defeat the Japanese, prepared by the planning staff. These plans contemplated invasion of the Japanese mainland. Leahy wrote that, more than knew the potentialities of the atomic bomb but it was his opinion and he urged it strongly on the Joint Chiefs that no major invasion of the Japanese mainland was necessary to win the war. He wrote: "The JCS did order the precontingency preparation of plans for an invasion but the invasion itself was never authorized." (Page 245).
July 7, 1945.
Truman and party leave Newport News at 7 a.m. on the AUGUSTA (the same ship on which FDR met Churchill off Newfoundland in August, 1941, when the Atlantic Charter was announced.

July 15, 1945.
Truman arrived at Antwerp, Belgium at 10:00 a.m.


are... are there

11 a.m., left the ship and drove to airfield near Brussels

and there took off in President's plane at 12:55 p.m.

and flew to Gatow airfield near Potsdam.

Greeted by seven guard of honor. Then drove ten miles to

houses prepared at Greblitz Lake.

July 16, 1945.

Stalin delayed and opening session of conference put over a day.

Truman, Leahy and Byrnes toured Berlin, sightseeing.

ATM B-29 successfully tested at Alamagordo, New Mexico and result of test sent to Stimson at Potsdam.

(Ed Stimson tell it to that night?)

Churchill meets Truman for first time.

July 17, 1945.

Stalin arrived at Potsdam; conference opened.

Group of scientists (67?) petitioned Truman not to use atom bomb against Japan without advance warning. (LOOK)

July 16-26, 1945

Some time during this period — probably on the 16th
July 24, 1945...

Potsdam: At the plenary session on July 24, Truman walked over to Stalin and (in the words of Leahy) "told him quietly that we had developed a powerful weapon more potent than anything yet seen in war. The President said later that Stalin's reply indicated no special interest and that he had not seen to have any conception of what Truman was talking about. It was simply another weapon and he hoped we would use it effectively."

James Byrnes, in his book says that at the close of the Big Three meeting on July 24th, Truman walked around the big circular table to talk to Stalin and after a brief conversation he rejoined Byrnes and rode back to the house where they stayed. He said he had told Stalin that after long experimentation we had developed a new bomb far more destructive than any other bomb and that we intended to use it very soon unless Japan surrendered. Stalin's only reply, he said, was that he was glad to hear of the bomb and he hoped we would use it. Byrnes says he was surprised at Stalin's lack of interest and concluded he had not grasped its importance.

The President told me, in a talk August 6, 1951, that he told Stalin during the Potsdam conference that the U.S. had perfected a powerful new weapon. He said he did not tell Stalin that it was an atomic bomb or weapon. He said Stalin did not seem particularly impressed but he smiled and said that was fine.
August 2, 1945: The President and his party left Falmouth, and flew to Harrowbarrow, near Plymouth. Byrnes flew in a separate plane from the President.

The President first went aboard the cruiser Augusta, which was to take him home and then went with others to the battleship USS Iowa where he was greeted by King George VI who was host at Luncheon.

These present included Admiral Leahy, Secretary Byrnes, V. Lord Wavell, Lord Leathers, Admiral Leahy and Capt. Campbell. Leahy talked with the King about the atom bomb (Leahy's book, Page 450). Leahy did not think it would be as effective as expected - "it sounds like a professor's dream to me."

Byrnes wrote later (in his book,) that the King had learned from Churchill about the bomb test and was eager to know all about it. He said most of the luncheon conversation was devoted to the bomb. He said the only sceptical one was Leahy and that the King joked with him about his skepticism.

The President and his party returned to the AUGUSTA and the King then came aboard for a brief farewell.

August 5 - Ford was received aboard the ship, then on the Atlantic of the death of Senator Kerr Johnson.

August 6 - News of the Hiroshima bombing was received aboard the ship. Byrnes and Leahy wrote of this: Leahy added (Page 450) that "only the British, the Dominion of Canada and Canada had any information regarding the talks of the manufacture of this atomic weapon."

August 7 - The President landed at Newport News and returned by train to Washington, arriving at 10:30 P.M. (see EAA diary).

Koizumuro Nomura, former Japan ambassador to US warned Japanese not to expect any cessions of the allies surrender terms. He characterized the Potsdam ultimatum as height of impertinence. Tokyo radio broadcast.

August 8 - Nago declared Soviet entry into war with Japan.

August 9 - Nagasaki bomb; second atom bomb.

August 10 - Japan sued for peace.

Smyth report on atomic bomb released.