SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

The armed basic intention of the USSR is to engage in "competition" with the US until the US is destroyed, or forced to capitulate. The Soviet concept of "competition" with the US is -- demonstrably -- to wage a relentless, unceasing struggle in which any weapon or tactic which proves possible is admissible.

Appreciation of the fundamental nature of this struggle is often confused by preoccupation with the question of whether the USSR plans at a given moment to launch an all-out military attack on the US. The fact that the USSR has not resorted to a Pearl Harbor-type of military move, or to a formal "declaration of war," or does not necessarily intend to, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the struggle does not differ in its potential effect on the US (the enemy) from what is usually considered "war." While the struggle is limited for the moment in that military weapons are eschewed, it is not limited from the standpoint of finality or exhaustiveness of the ultimate objective. It consequently cannot be described as merely "political struggle," or a "cold war," or a "limited war." In the eyes of the Kremlin, it is war, in the broadest sense of the term, a war to the death.

The failure to employ military weapons is merely a case of adhering to the old stratagem of choosing one's ground and weapons so as to maximize one's resources against those of the enemy. Given a situation where the use of armed action promised decisive results, it can be assumed that Soviet leaders would resort to armed action. While Soviet leaders have shown a definite preference for attempting to achieve their ends by other than military force, nothing about their conduct since 1918 suggests that they have an aversion to the use of armed force per se. To the contrary, they have shown a ready willingness to resort to force when particular situations appeared decidedly favorable, or no other course was open.
There is no prospect that the USSR will abandon its struggle against the US and its own Bolshevism. The USSR is motivated by a combination of factors springing from its unique world position. As a state in a system of states, the USSR pursues a policy conditioned by the need to safeguard its national interests. As the successor to the Russian Empire, the USSR inherits a tradition of expansionism apparently inherent in its historical and geographic position. As a totalitarian dictatorship, the USSR is ever-driven to new conquests, internal and external. As the center of the world Communist movement, the USSR is irrevocably identified with an increasing struggle for world revolution.

The USSR thus joins together a national center of state power with an international crusading ideology. Without either the state power or the crusading ideology the world position and policy of the USSR would be decisively changed. The peculiarly dangerous nature, however, of Soviet aggression -- its persistence, immensity, and scope -- is principally a product of the association of the USSR with Communism.

Soviet leaders profess to believe that the downfall of capitalism and the world triumph of Communism is a historical necessity that will inevitably result from the workings of immutable laws of social science. Because Soviet leaders adhere to this doctrine, it cannot be assumed that they regard their role as a passive one of sitting back and waiting for the fruits of victory to fall automatically into their laps. On the contrary, Soviet leaders and Marxists generally believe that the overthrow of capitalism and the institution of proletarian rule are inevitably because of what humans do, not irrespective of what they do. Individuals are driven by the force of natural law to act in a certain way, but it is only because they act in this way that changes are effected. Thus, Communists have no choice under terms of Marxism but to militantly seek not wait for, power.
The position of Stalin on the issue of "building socialism in one country" has often been construed as a kind of insular socialism, implying the withdrawal of the USSR from the world revolutionary struggle. Actually, Stalin always looked on the USSR as the base of world revolution. He argued that the solidification of Communist rule in this base was the greatest immediate contribution which could be made to the ultimate spread of proletarian rule. But he always insisted victory of socialism could be effected only as the remainder of the world was brought under proletarian rule. Thus "quiescence" and "passivity" are automatically rejected for Communists possessing state-power, as well as for Communists aspiring to state power. The militant activity of the USSR in extending the revolution is, for all Marxists, taken for granted.

It is not alone because of this strictly ideological demand, however, that Moscow's association with Communism made it necessary for it to follow a policy of unceasing aggression. The world power position of the USSR is in large measure derived from the world Communist movement. The Kremlin cannot permit either a diminution in the strength of world Communism or a relaxation of its own control over the movement.

Since Communism above all is a militant ideology, Soviet leaders are compelled to pursue an aggressive policy to preserve the Communist ideology as a vital force. For a relaxation of Soviet militancy -- any subduing of the class struggle motif serves to lessen the rank and file of foreign Communist Parties and to breed conditions which make for restlessness over the Kremlin's iron mastery. Only by keeping alive the concept of permanent conflict between Communists and non-Communists can Moscow retain a militant foreign organization willing to undertake direct action in the interest of the USSR. Even a temporary rapprochement, as with the "United Front" of the 1920's or the war-time alliance, weakens the movement and reduces the effectiveness of Moscow's control. Any genuine reconciliation between the USSR and
The capitalist powers would completely disrupt, if not disintegrate, world communism, and accordingly undermine the power position of the Soviet Union. Thus, unless the Kremlin should become willing to sacrifice international Communism, it must remain involved in a perpetual process of deliberately generating friction with non-Communists, thereby intensifying non-Communist counteraction, which in turn creates a greater urgency for the USSR and its Communist followers to increase their military. Moscow cannot even pause for an extended period to consolidate its gains, despite the increasing need to consolidate as its empire grows. Success in one instance of aggression only creates added pressure for new aggression.

III. The over-all capabilities of the Soviet Union to achieve its ultimate aim of bringing about the defeat or capitulation of the US and its allies appear on the basis of a surface examination shockingly inadequate.

Even granting optimistic Soviet reports of production, the total economic strength of the USSR compares with that of the US as roughly one to four. This is reflected not only in gross national income (1949: USSR $65 billion; US $250 billion), but in production of key commodities in 1949:

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<th>US</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>European and Combined</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ingots steel (million net. tons)</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>56.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary aluminum (thousands net. tons)</td>
<td>617.6</td>
<td>250-335</td>
<td>140-145</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electric power (billion kw.)</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crude oil (million net. tons)</td>
<td>276.8</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>39.9</td>
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Even if there were added to Soviet and orbit capacities those of all continental Europe, the balance would still strongly favor the US — without taking account of...
The resources which the US could command in various other parts of the world.

The discrepancy between over-all Soviet economic strength and over-all US economic strength is likely to remain for the foreseeable future. Although Soviet leaders can be expected to continue their forced drive for expanding production and although their specific goal will still be to equal US levels, neither Soviet resources nor past performance justify an assumption that the USSR can substantially reduce present US superiority. It is even inconceivable that the repercussions of a major depression in the US would drastically narrow the gap.

In event of a full-scale military contest between the USSR and the US, the discrepancy in over-all economic strength would precipitously widen. The USSR today is on a near maximum production basis. No matter what stringent efforts Moscow might make, only a relatively slight change in the rate of increase in over-all production could be brought about. In the US, on the other hand, a very rapid absolute expansion could be realized.

In other fields — scientific development, general technological competence, skilled labor resources, productivity of labor force, etc. — the gap between the USSR and the US roughly corresponds to the gap in production.

IV. The ability of the USSR to achieve access to a life-and-death struggle with the US cannot, however, be determined on the basis of a comparison of over-all strength in economic and related fields. Its actual capabilities far exceed the apparent capabilities.

a. The Soviet Government can bring to bear on a particular effort a very large share of its total strength. Since the Soviet economy has not been developed to serve consumers' needs, and has not brought about a basically simple economic and social structure, an unusually large proportion of its industrial production is not...
above the conventional requirements of the people and can be devoted to extraordinary purposes without appreciable adverse effects. Consequently, the USSR with its existing economic strength can sustain a total war effort for a prolonged period. It prosecuted the last war with an annual steel availability of less than 10 million tons. It is estimated that in a future all-out military conflict it could successfully equip and supply the maximum number of men it could put in the field with a total steel production appreciably less than the present rate. The same is true of other commodities, except fissionable materials about which the situation is not known.

b. For the type of struggle now under way, and even more for the initial stages of an armed contest, the USSR enjoys an advantage in that it is already in a state of virtual mobilization for war, both organizationally and in the allocation of labor and materials. Organizationally, the Soviet planned economy makes possible mass production shifts as the changing situation demands. The government, not only has retained a large number of men under arms, but has kept its entire labor force comparatively free before the Second World War, in a state of mobilization by retaining almost intact the strict labor laws of 1918.

c. Many social, political, historical, and geographical factors increase the capabilities of the USSR. The population is large (200 million) and youthful — as of 1950 more than half had been born since 1917. The population is hardly accustomed to deprivation, and able to live off the land. Soviet women can and do perform heavy labor reserved for men in other countries; they have, in fact, shown themselves able to participate directly in military operations. Psychologically the Soviet citizen is accustomed to discipline. He is conditioned to accept the idea of war as inevitable and is provided with an elaborate rationale for fighting, Russian fatalism and callousness toward suffering has military value. Military train
[1] Soviet interests benefit from the mere existence of the idea of Communism which not only produces a splitting effect on Western society, but also attracts foreign support to the USSR as the citadel of this secular faith. Communism's emphasis on the privileged and the underprivileged--segments of the working class, minorities, colonial subjects--and the underlying confidence among the privileged by constantly changing inequalities, abuses, and hypocrisy is designed not only to facilitate the building of Communist parties as instruments of Soviet power, but to set class against class and country against country, to create confusion, and to cast doubt on the validity of the very principles that underlie the non-Communist way of life. In turn Communism promises the discontented a Utopian society. The bright prospects offered by Communism are enhanced by its universalist appeal (unlike fascism); its apparent plausibility and ostensible altruism; its constant self-assurance and messianic fervor; and its constant claim to be scientific and infallible because it allegedly harmonizes with the predetermined pattern of world history.
(2) In its organizational aspect, Communism has led to the creation of mass political parties in many countries and underground organizations in others with an estimated total membership of some 10 million persons. These parties, by their influence in both the political and economic life of foreign countries, cause division and operate as an open pressure group in support of Soviet policy. In addition, the hard core of the Communist Parties is available as a disciplined and fanatic force for espionage, sabotage, and subversion on behalf of the USSR.

(3) Parallel with the Communist Parties, a variety of national Communist-front organizations, ostensibly dedicated to peace and international friendship, serve to rally foreign sympathy for Soviet policy or at least to create doubts and fears over US policy. Similarly Communist infiltration of national liberal organizations has often served to divide and discredit the non-Communist left. On the international level, the USSR has developed trade union, women, and youth organizations that have been particularly employed to court colonial peoples.

3. The Soviet Union operates under the dictatorial control of a small clique that is able to make quick decisions and support them by the arbitrary concentration of national capabilities without reference to general public opinion or special interest groups. By the same token the Soviet leadership can operate with little regard for ethical values and accepted international norms. In contrast to Western governments, the USSR thus is not limited in its choice of tactics, but can resort to any approach that appears potentially effective.

4. The Soviet Union and, to a lesser yet increasing extent, its satellites possess an almost complete monopoly on influencing the thinking of their peoples. All domestic information media and educational systems are Communist-controlled. Local inhabitants are forbidden to travel abroad, and only selected foreigners are permitted to enter. Soviet jamming now blocks out about 50 percent of foreign
Western publications are generally not available to the Soviet public. As a result the Soviet Government has virtually a free hand to mold for its people the picture of the world that it wants them to have. This also assists the USSR in perpetrating its myth of a Communist Utopia by preventing a first-hand comparison between Soviet claims and reality. At the same time Moscow is able to make the effort of foreign powers to obtain information concerning the USSR an increasingly critical problem. Foreign press correspondents are being increasingly refused admission into the Soviet orbit. Western diplomatic missions are being steadily restricted in their operations, and Bulgaria's declaration of Minister Reeth as persona non grata may mark a systematic campaign to end diplomatic representation in the satellites. Contact between local people and Westerners is curtailed by embassy state secretaries and by police surveillances.

b. Moscow's monopolistic control of the means of shaping internal public opinion and the world-wide apparatus of Communist Parties and front organizations gives it a unique position in psychological warfare. In addition, as the first government to develop propaganda as a major peace-time weapon it has fashioned effective techniques marked by simplicity, repetition, and black-and-white analysis. Moscow's propaganda strategy of always identifying the USSR with progress and the US with reaction, appropriating "liberation of peoples" and the "defense of peace" as exclusively Soviet symbols, and utilizing the traditional liberal formulae of "democracy" and "liberation" can at least confuse its audience, if not convince it.

c. An intangible yet nevertheless real factor benefiting the USSR is the existence of non-Communists, despite their growing realization of the meaning of Communism, to admit that the standards and aims of the USSR are different from their own and that the Soviet program carries with it a terrifying menace to their way of life, if not their existence. History and Communist statements together clearly demonstrate
The fate that ultimately awaits any group that believes in the possibility of lasting coexistence with the Communists. Since non-Communists are understandably reluctant to accept this dire conclusion, the USSR is able to benefit from non-Communist pronouncements to rely upon a difficulties-will-work-themselves-out philosophy and to fail to take adequate counter measures.

1. Soviet capability to prosecute successfully its struggle against the US is subject to a number of vulnerabilities. The USSR has shown that it is acutely aware of these vulnerabilities and has taken extreme precautions to guard against them. They cannot, therefore, be expected spontaneously to produce results. They are, however, of such nature as to suggest that systematic exploitation though external pressure might bring about a decisive weakening in the Soviet power position, or a reversal in Soviet policies.

2. The USSR is immediately most vulnerable in connection with the maintenance of control over its expanding empire. The Soviet imperial system by its very nature permits of no flexibility in the degree of Moscow’s mastery. Any departure from complete subservience simultaneously constitutes, in the eyes of the Kremlin, an inadmissibly doctrinal heresy and a dangerous breach in the line of authority.

This rigidity benefits the USSR by making extremely difficult the development of any opposition operation. But it also necessarily breeds conditions that magnify enormously antipathy toward external domination. It virtually precludes a real consolidation of Soviet rule, assuming that real consolidation requires firm roots among the population. More than this, it creates a prospectively explosive situation, one wherein there is especial susceptibility to pressures and one wherein an all-encompassing blow can be quickly, though not easily, dealt the Russian master. In particular it lays the basis for the following types of conflicts:

(i) Opposition of the subject state, as a state, to the master state. The
USR makes no effort to disguise the fact that its relationship to its satellites is that of superior to an inferior. Recognition of the primacy of the USSR is set forth as the "sacred duty" of all Communists -- i.e., Communist heads of states as well as others. In no instance to date has Moscow failed to press its own national interests at the expense of conflicting satellite interests, and it has given no indication that it ever will. Moscow has shown no hesitancy ever disregarding the cultural and religious sensibilities of its subject peoples, and has systematically and ruthlessly exploited them. This state-to-state relationship which Moscow has deliberately established has laid the foundation for a state-to-state reaction (e.g., Nagasaki).

(2) The instrument through which Moscow exercises its control in satellite states -- national Communist Parties reinforced by Soviet agents -- creates the possibility of conflicts developing between peoples and their governments. The satellite governments are not only unrepresentative of the populations, but are in large measure alien to them. None has achieved even popular acceptance, much less support. All depend on undisguised and unfettered force for their retention of power and even among the instruments of force -- the police and the armed forces -- loyalty to the government is questionable.

(3) The rigidity of Kremlin control makes difficult accommodations and adjustments among competing personalities within the leadership of the satellite Communist parties and thus creates situations highly favorable to schisms and conflicts which, under certain circumstances, might destroy the entire Soviet control mechanism. Moscow demands of what it considers the dominant group in the Party adoption and strict adherence to a fixed line. Dissidents are required either to come over or fall into the rank of "enemies." The result is to create in every satellite element a Party leadership which, given opportunity, might be willing to turn against the
b. The USSR is also vulnerable with respect to its domination of Communist Parties in still independent countries. Pressures for individual or group deviations have always existed within the international Communist movement and have contributed to an annual loss of a heavy percentage of Party membership. Since the war, pressures have increased because of the crowding of Party rolls by poorly screened and indoctrinated members; the sharper revelation of the clash between local nationalist aspirations and Soviet demands; Moscow's demand that Party members publicly announce their intent to support the USSR against even their own countries in event of military conflicts; and, finally, the example of Tito.

Moscow has shown grave concern over these inherent dangers. It has set as the first task of all Parties the establishment of safeguards against them. So far, no actual weakening of Soviet domination is known to have taken place in any national Party. Yet in France, Italy, and Japan the immediate potential for deviations is high. In other countries, prospects are less bright, but everywhere, given developments which would intensify existing pressures, significant challenges might be made to Kremlin mastery.

c. The magnitude of the economic task which the USSR has assumed in the creation of its southeastern empire cannot help but cause considerable difficulties under the best of circumstances. Under systematic pressure it might well result in widespread repercussions. Although the USSR is still in the early stage of industrialization and faces severe limitations on its ability to accelerate its development, it has, at least in an economic sense, taken on responsibility for large areas and populations that are poor in resources, backward in development, and no longer free to benefit from normal economic ties with Western countries. It has thus created an economic vacuum which it, with a per capita consumption of $200 per year, is powerless to fill.
Apart from its general economic deficiencies, the Soviet orbit -- including
the USSR -- faces a number of particular shortages which, if exploited through such
devices as export controls, might interfere with even the maintenance of present
levels of production in important sections of the economy. Among raw materials,
the most important shortages are tin, crude rubber, and certain non-ferrous metals.
Among industrial items are spare parts for the large quantities of machinery and
equipment secured from the West; precision instruments; complex machine tools;
special purpose bearings; and electrical equipment. Railways equipment is also short.

4. The Soviet system of internal control contains seeds which, given opportunity,
could provoke real difficulty. The dictatorial police methods have inspired fear
and subservience -- perhaps even respect -- but not devotion and willing support.
The very attributes that make the Soviet Government alien to its own peoples, how-
ever, are attributes that have proved extraordinarily effective in keeping the
people in hand. During periods of great crisis, the Kremlin, no matter what its
other deficiencies, demonstrated a mastery, if ruthless, ability to cope with any
internal threats to its own power. Appeals to the people against the government
might somewhat widen the existing schism, but the only circumstances which could
conceivably cause it to develop into an open break are great external pressure, or
a conflict among the individuals who hold governmental power.

There is ample evidence that within the Communist hierarchy there is almost
constant struggling and jockeying for position by individuals and factions. But
these are struggles for advantage within the existing leadership, that of Stalin.
So long as Stalin remains active there can hardly be a challenge to his absolute
authority, nor a break in the external solidarity of the Politburo. With Stalin's
death or incapacitation, the situation may be quite different. It may prove im-
possible to transfer Stalin's mantle to a successor or successors without the
occurrence of disruptive incidents, regardless of what provisions may be made to
handle Stalin's succession. A contest might conceivably develop which would en...
The central power that the basic antagonism of the people toward the governmental system would come into play and produce a decisive change.

On the basis of known evidence, however, this is improbable. The situation in the aftermath is today less conducive to a complete split than it was on Lenin's death when there were two leading claimants to leadership -- Stalin and Trotsky -- and when a number of fundamental questions as to the basic course to be followed were still unresolved. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the Communist Party never then proved strong enough to sustain the shock of prolonged internal dissension without being forced to relax to the slightest its iron control mechanisms.

The miserable low standard of living which the Soviet population endured during the war years has not been raised appreciably since the return of peace and causes widespread dissatisfaction among the people. The split of morale experienced after the successful conclusion of the war was further strengthened by Stalin's promise in February 1946 that rationing would take place in the "nearest" future, that the postwar Five-Year Plan would increase the supply of consumer goods, and that prices would be lowered. Subsequent events, however, tended to dash the raised hopes. In the autumn of 1946 prices on rationed food and clothing were nearly tripled. Nationalization was not ended until December 1947 and even then prices were reduced only slightly. Moreover a sacrifice was demanded from the people in the form of denationalization of the rural. This struck most heavily the peasants who had accumulated stocks of cash from private transactions during the war. Peasants also received severe blows through a 1948 increase in taxes on their private activities, new restrictions on opportunities to market their privately-held produce, and mounting attacks on the small individual holdings of land and stock still left to them. Workers meanwhile have continued to be subjected to the harsh labor laws adopted as war-time necessities, and in certain industries their production norms were raised as to 25 percent in 1947 without a concomitant wage increase.
Soviet intellectuals probably have had better material conditions in the past couple of years than either the workers or peasants. Nevertheless, they have been subjected to special dehumanizing restrictions. The relative freedom for expression that they enjoyed during the war was ended in 1945. Since then they have been subject to a constant propaganda campaign and allowed to produce only what accords with current Politburo doctrine.

Another potentially troublesome condition is the separatist and nationalist feeling among the many minority peoples of the USSR. Over 40 percent of the Soviet population is non-Russian, and many of these are basically antagonistic toward Great Russian rule. Soviet policy toward minority peoples is to allow the trappings of autonomy while maintaining real power centralized in Moscow. That this policy has not proved entirely successful is evident from World War II experiences when a number of minority groups, including large elements from among the Ukrainians, proved unreliable.

Despite their discontents minority peoples will continue powerless by themselves to translate their discontents into effective actions under normal circumstances. With foreign assistance and encouragement, or under stress of a great internal crisis, the minorities would without doubt take maximum advantage of any opportunities offered them. Otherwise they appear to have no choice but to continue their submission to Kremlin control.

A major threat to the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda and indeed to the very appeal of Communism is the disparity between Soviet myths of a Communist Utopia and Soviet reality. Moscow has managed to preserve its myths to a large extent by strict control of travel to and from the USSR and by its worldwide propaganda apparatus. Since the war, however, the revelations of Soviet excesses and disillusioned foreign Communists, the exposure of Soviet methods by Tito, the anti-national acts of foreign Communist Parties, and the policy of the USSR itself have seemed to create an increasingly greater understanding in the non-Communist world.
the true meaning of Communism. Moscow's acute sensitivity to this vulnerability has been clearly demonstrated. It attempts to guard against it by always taking an offensive line, forcing non-Communists to demonstrate their own systems. But the progress already achieved suggests that intensified efforts may well produce important effects.

VI. Moscow's basic strategy is meant to take advantage of its unique capabilities and to minimize the dangers of its vulnerabilities. Consequently the U.S. has shown that under existing conditions its immediate intention is to employ means short of committing Soviet armed forces in military action.

This does not mean that Moscow eschews the use of military force. Communist armies or guerrillas have operated in China, Indochina, Greece, Korea, and Indonesia. Soviet troops by their presence have assisted Soviet strategy in Eastern Europe, Germany, Austria, and Italy. In the future, Moscow also looks forward to the indirect and direct use of force. Soviet armed strength, substantially enhanced by the development of an atomic weapon, continues to be increased. Authoritative Communist spokesmen openly prescribe armed struggle as the only correct strategy in colonial areas and call for revolution as the ultimate tactic in industrial countries.

Continued use of military force by local Communists can thus be expected, but there is no evidence that the USSR deliberately plans to employ its own armed forces in an all-out assault against the West in the near future. It is always possible, however, that the increased confidence recently shown by Soviet leaders might lead to miscalculation of Western determination and capacity to resist. Consequently, the chance of an unplanned military conflict appears to be increasing.

Soviet preference to use its special capabilities rather than its own armed forces results not only from an awareness of the unfavorable inequality between present Soviet and Western power potential, but also from a pragmatic estimate that the less risky and less costly means are proving successful. The U.S. based on a large part of constant exerting pressure on all areas where Western security or will be ...
...sit is limited — whittling away at the extremities of the Western power position and simultaneously seeking to undermine the centers of power — not only serves to strengthen the USSR for any military war with the West, but presents the dangerous possibility that the Kremlin can achieve its aim of forcing the ultimate defeat of the US without ever having to resort to direct military involvement with the US.

The success of this strategy thus far is clear. In addition to the war-like absorption of 380,000 square miles of territory, the new Soviet empire now ranges from the Elbe to the South China Sea. The USSR has suffered setbacks in Europe and Asia, but except for Yugoslavia, these setbacks consisted of failures to make new gains, and not the loss of what Moscow actually possessed. Obviously neither these gains nor setbacks are necessarily permanent. Yet in the world situation at this moment, the possibility of the USSR sustaining further losses is decidedly less than its chance of making additional gains.

That the USSR itself is operating on this premise is demonstrated by the mounting militancy that characterizes recent Soviet moves in Asia and Europe. This hardening of Soviet policy not only toward the Atlantic powers, but also toward the satellites, foreign Communist parties, and the Soviet people themselves arises from Moscow’s eagerness to exploit the new opportunities presented by the expansion of the Soviet empire and its determination to preserve and extend control over its previous gains.

In Asia the USSR faces the problem of insuring control over Communist China. This is made difficult by the absence of Soviet troops in China, the development of the Chinese Communist apparatus as Mao rather than directly by the USSR, the inability of the USSR to provide substantial economic aid, and already existing antipathy toward the USSR among the Chinese people, including some Chinese Communists. Yet at this present time the prospect of the Chinese Communists striking out on a course independent of Moscow’s desires is not supported by available evidence.
Prospects for further Communist expansion in Asia appear brightest in Indochina, where Moscow's recognition of Ho Chi Minh at least implied support for his military action.

Soviet recognition of Indonesia and Moscow's conciliatory gestures toward India and Pakistan indicate an effort not only to strengthen the existing reluctance of the Asian countries to become directly involved in East-West differences, but also to capitalize on their sentiment of restricting Asia for the Asians. That this is only a temporary tactic is demonstrated by the statements in Soviet journals that conditions in colonial areas are now favorable for accelerated Communist action.

Continued fighting in Indochina, Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines, the susceptibility of China's neighbors to Chinese Communist pressure, the serious friction between India and Pakistan and Afghanistan and Pakistan, the enormity of the economic and social problems that confront the new governments of Southern Asia all combine to keep this area in an essentially fluid situation. To prevent stability Moscow's strategy calls for aggravation of differences among individual Asian states, including those of the Near East, so as to forestall any formation of an actual bloc, and intensification of internal frictions to hamper political and economic development. While Communist and non-Communist guerrilla activity in Southeast Asia is causing direct disruption, Communists in the Near and Middle East are still largely in a preliminary stage of organization and agitation, but the conditions under which Communism thrives remain without any clear prospect of imminent improvement.

b. In Europe during the five postwar years the USSR has succeeded in cementing control over its Eastern European satellites, with the highly significant exception of Yugoslavia. The local governments have been reorganized to exclude leaders not completely subservient to Moscow. All anti-Communist organizations, including the church, have been severely curtailed or eliminated. Despite the conflict between Soviet interests and satellite interests and the basic antipathy of the satellite peoples toward Communism, neither the satellite leaders, if they were willing, nor
the people have the capabilities alone to lead their country out of the Soviet orbit.

Evans in Albania, isolated from the rest of the satellites as a result of Tito's defection and subject to Greek and Yugoslav pressures, the Communist regime has increasingly strengthened its position.

Tito's defection with the resultant adverse repercussions for Soviet policy represents for Moscow a continuing challenge that it finds increasingly difficult to handle. External economic, political, and psychological pressures and attempted internal sabotage and subversion have failed, so that for Moscow the only remaining alternative to overthrow Tito is to resort to military force.

In the rest of Europe, Soviet strategy is immediately directed at nullifying US efforts to achieve a greater unity of action among the Western powers. Moscow clearly indicates that it considers Germany the keystone. With Stalin's conciliatory message to the Germans last October, the USSR embarked on a policy of openly appealing to German nationalism. Without committing itself, the USSR is holding out to the Germans prospects of a unified country, a peace treaty, and the end of the occupation in return for German support of Soviet policy. Moscow's aim is not only to drive a wedge between the Western Germans and the Eastern powers, but also to divide the Western powers over the question of whether a recovered Germany is to be welcomed as a potential ally or feared as a potential military threat and economic competitor.

Present Soviet capabilities in Western Germany are limited, although Moscow is seeking to compensate for the weakness of the Communists by directing them to pursue an increasingly militant line. Soviet prospects at present are less likely to be improved by Communist promises than by the failure of the Bonn government to provide an adequate standard of living for the Western Germans.

In Western Europe, Soviet capabilities have declined. French and Italian Communists remain politically isolated, and, despite their mass party and youth movements, Soviet influence is negligible.
control over large segments of organized labor, they have been unable to carry on effective political action by themselves. As in Germany, they have turned to a more militant line that involves attempts to harass ERP shipments and threats to sabotage local armament production. In essence Moscow has discounted the possibility of Western European Communists coming to power through parliamentary means, and has committed them to a course of action that is likely to reduce further their local political standing, yet possibly increase their disruptive effect on US plans.

Although Communist expansion in Western Europe has been blocked by the initial effects of ERP and by the comitant of US power under the Atlantic Treaty, Moscow gives evidence that it considers those obstacles only short-term. Given a continued failure to correct the disparity between prices and wages and provide agricultural reforms, or the cessation of US economic assistance, or the development of a general depression, Moscow is prepared to capitalize immediately on resultant new opportunities.

g. With respect to the United Nations, Moscow has demonstrated that it will be treated with increasing cynicism. A complete break with the UN does not now appear planned, but future Soviet participation will more than ever be limited and directed in such a manner as to achieve maximum benefit for particular tactical moves which the USSR is making in various parts of the world.