Cir 124

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D.C., 27 April 1946

Effective until 27 October 1947 unless sooner rescinded or superseded

UTILIZATION OF NEGRO MANPOWER IN THE POSTWAR ARMY POLICY

To effect the maximum efficient utilization of the authorized Negro manpower in the postwar period, the War Department has adopted the following policy:

Negro manpower in the postwar Army will be utilized on a broader professional scale than has obtained heretofore. The development of leaders and specialists based on individual merit and ability, to meet effectively the requirements of an expanded war Army will be accomplished through the medium of installations and organizations. Groupings of Negro units with white units in composite organizations will be accepted policy.

IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY

In order to develop the means required for maximum utilization of the authorized manpower of the nation in the event of a national emergency the following will obtain:

1. The troop basis for the postwar Army will include Negro troops approximately in the 1 to 10 ratio of the Negro civilian population to the total population of the nation.

2. To meet the requirements of training and expansion, combat and service units will be organized and activated from the available Negro manpower. Employment will be in Negro regiments or groups, separate battalions or squadrons, and separate companies, troops or batteries, which will conform in general to other units of the postwar Army. A proportionate number of these units will be organized as part of larger units. White officers assigned to Negro organizations will be replaced by Negro officers who prove qualified to fill the assignment. In addition, Negro manpower with special skills or qualifications will be employed as individuals in appropriate overhead and special units.

3. Additional officer supervision will be supplied to units which have a greater than normal percentage of personnel within the AGOT classification of IV and V.

50% or more Class IV and V, 25% increase of officers.
70% or more Class IV and V, 50% increase of officers.

Increased officer personnel will be of company grade.

4. The planning, promulgation, implementation, and revision of this policy will be coordinated by the Assistant for Planning and Policy Coordination, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, War Department General Staff.

5. Officers will be accepted in the Regular Army through the operation of the present integration policy without regard to race.

6. The present policy of according all officers, regardless of race, equal opportunities for appointment, advancement, professional improvement, promotion, and retention in all components of the Army will be continued.

7. Negro Reserve officers will be eligible for active duty training and service in accordance with any program established for other officers of like component and status. All officer requirements for expansion of the Regular establishment as distinguished from the Regular Army and for replacement, regardless of race, will be procured in the existing manner from current sources; namely; ROTC honor students, Officer's Reserve Corps, direct appointments, graduates of officer candidate schools, Regular Army appointments from the Army of the United States and graduates of the United States Military Academy.

Circular No. 124-- "Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy", April 27, 1946. Army, Record Group 220: Records of the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.
8. All enlisted men whether volunteers or selectees will be accorded the same processing through appropriate installations to insure proper classification and assignment of individuals.

9. Surveys of manpower requirements conducted by the War Department will include recommendations covering the positions in each installation of the Army which could be filled by Negro military personnel.

10. At posts, camps, and stations where both Negro and white troops are assigned for duty, the War Department policies regarding use of recreational facilities and membership in officers' clubs, messes or similar organizations as set forth in paragraph 19, AR 210-10, WD Memorandum 600-45, 14 June 1945, and WD letter, AG 353.8 (5 July 44) OB-S-A-M) 8 July 1944, Recreational Facilities, will be continued in effect.

11. Considering essential military factors, Negro units will be stationed in localities and communities where attitudes are most favorable and in such strength as will not constitute an undue burden to the local civilian facilities.

12. Commanders of organizations, installations, and stations containing Negro personnel will be responsible for the execution of the War Department policy. Maximum latitude is authorized in the solution of purely local problems.

13. Commanders of all echelons of the Army will insure that all personnel under their command are thoroughly indoctrinated with the necessity for the unreserved acceptance of the provisions of the policy.

14. WD letter (AG 219.21 (10-9-40)M-A-M) 16 October 1940, War Department policy in regard to Negroes, is rescinded since the policy expressed therein has been amplified and superseded by the policy enunciated herewith.

15. The above stated policy is the direct result of the Report made by a "Board of Officers on Utilization of Negro Officers in the Post-War Period," convened 4 October 1945 by the direction of Secretary of War. The following approved Board Report is published for the information of all concerned:

REPORT OF BOARD OF OFFICERS
ON UTILIZATION OF NEGRO MANPOWER IN THE POST-WAR ARMY

26 February 1946

I. PURPOSE

A. Statement of the Problem: The Board was directed in a memorandum dated 4 October 1945 to prepare a broad policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the military establishment, including the development of means required in the event of a national emergency.

The proposed policy and means will cover:

1. Broadening the professional base of Negro personnel in the Regular Army.
2. Organization of Negro units.
3. Implementation and revision of policies by a Staff Group.
4. Induction and training of Negro personnel.
5. Indoctrination of all ranks throughout the Service in the policy promulgated.
The plan proposed is based upon the lessons of experience and envisions maximum efficiency in the use of all authorized manpower in the event of another emergency straining every resource of the nation.

B. Plan of Investigation: The Board has concerned itself with an examination of past and present War Department policies, their effectiveness during the period between World Wars and in World War II, and the advisability of continuing these policies during the post-war period. In the course of its proceedings, the Board has obtained a free expression of the views of representative military and civilian leaders.

Essentially the problem has resolved itself into the following questions:

1. How shall Negro personnel be utilized in the Army in the event of another national emergency?
2. What basis of Negro personnel is necessary in the post-war Army in order to provide for rapid expansion in time of war?

3. What shall be the scope of the War Department General Staff and of subordinate commanders in implementing any policy adopted?
4. How shall authorized Negro personnel be selected, processed, trained and assigned?
5. Shall changes in policy be adopted and promulgated immediately?

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

A. GENERAL ASPECTS OF NEGRO MANPOWER POTENTIAL

The United States of America has just successfully concluded a global war which strained her manpower, industry and material resources to the utmost. Every citizen of the democracy was called upon to exert the utmost effort as part of the National team. That every citizen did so, to the limit of his and her ability, is history.

The natural and artificial resources of any nation are dependent upon and reflect the vigor of her manpower. An intelligent patriotism is imperative, if the nation is to vindicate the past, maintain the present, and rise to its future destiny.

LESSONS GAINED FROM WORLD WAR II

Lessons of primary military interest gained from the experience of the last five years are:

That there is a limit to the amount of manpower available in the nation to form a modern military organization capable of prosecuting the major war;
That the manpower available, of itself, varies in quality.

The principle of economy of forces clearly indicates, therefore, that every effort must be expended to utilize efficiently every qualified available individual in a position in the military structure for which he is best suited. It follows logically that we must always strive for improvement in the quality of the whole.

THE NEGRO MANPOWER POTENTIAL

The Negro constitutes approximately 10% of the civilian population of the United States. He is not a separate or isolated racial group; he is a part of the American citizenry, and of the American people, a part of the American family.

Negro manpower present in the Armed Forces, both in the regular services and the National Guard, is a qualified and capable manpower reserve as is the Negro work force in the Nation. It is the duty of both the government and the employer to utilize this manpower to the end of national welfare, national security, and national efficiency.
An impartial review and analysis of the progress made by the Negro citizen between World War I and World War II, particularly in the last five years, has led this Board to the conclusion that comprehensive study involving the Negro manpower of the nation in the military establishment is timely.

The Negro is a bona fide citizen enjoying the privileges conferred by citizenship under the Constitution. By the same token, he must defend his country in time of national peril. Testimony presented to this Board has indicated that the Negro is ready and eager to accept his full responsibility as a citizen.

It follows therefore:

That the Negro, desiring to accept his legal and moral responsibility as charged by the Constitution, should be given every opportunity and aid to prepare himself for effective military service in company with every other citizen who is called.

That those charged with the utilization of manpower in the military establishment have an equal legal and moral obligation under the Constitution to take all steps necessary to prepare the qualified manpower of the nation so that it will function efficiently and effectively under the stress of modern battle conditions.

ASSIGNMENT DIFFICULTIES IN WORLD WAR II

During the national emergency just concluded, approximately 909,000 Negroes, including reserves and volunteers, were selected for use in the Army. These men were obtained from a reservoir of approximately 2,463,000 Negroes who registered for service. In the placement of the men who were accepted, the Army encountered considerable difficulty. Leadership qualities had not been developed among the Negroes, due principally to environment and lack of opportunity. These factors had also affected his development in the various skills and crafts.

CORRECTIVE MEASURES

In the opinion of the Board, many of these difficulties can be overcome by forward planning, and by the development of a broader base of trained personnel, both officer and enlisted, than that which existed prior to World War II. This nucleus can assimilate a much larger proportion of the available Negro manpower than was done heretofore.

EFFECTS OF THE WAR

No study would be complete that failed to evaluate the collateral education gained by every Negro man and woman during the war years. The imprints of travel of bettered living and health conditions, plus the increased financial resources, have left a mental stamp which will persist and continue to become more articulate.

During the last few years, many of the concepts pertaining to the Negro have shown changing trends. They are pointing toward a more complete acceptance of the Negro in all the diversified fields of endeavor. This trend has been noticeable to a greater extent in the Northern and Western sections of the country. The Negro to a greater extent has been accepted in industry, and in administrative and scientific fields, both as individuals and groups, with good results. This increased acceptance has been translated into increased status of Negro.
acceptance has resulted in better wages which automatically raised his standard of living. Of more importance from a military viewpoint, however, are the opportunities which have been afforded the Negro to expand his knowledge of the trades and skills. The latter have a ready market in the intricacies of a modern military machine.

Many Negroes, who, before the war, were laborers, are now craftsmen, capable in many instances of competing with the white man on an equal basis. This change in the industrial status has, further, allowed the Negro to give his children more and better education. In many colleges and universities of the North and West, the Negro student is accepted solely on the basis of his individual merit and ability. This rise in the technical and cultural level of the Negro has, in turn, given him a more articulate voice in government.

**RELATED PERTINENT DATA**

The Negroes' increasing capability for participation in society and government is evident from consideration of the facts below:

Growth in Educational Attainments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Negroes, World War I</th>
<th>Negroes of 12 Southern States, World War II</th>
<th>Other Negroes, World War II</th>
<th>Whites of U.S., World War II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 8 years Grade School</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 4 years High School</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 or more years of College</td>
<td>few</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rate of Negro Emigration from the South**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratio of Negroes who came from North of Mason-Dixon Line:</th>
<th>World War I</th>
<th>World War II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Increase in Negro Participation in Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent of all persons employed by Federal Government in Washington who were Negroes</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of above Negroes whose jobs were custodial</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Increase in Industrial Experience**

The great expansion of industry during the war gave the Negro greater opportunity to gain industrial experience than ever before. The War Manpower Board reports that Negro participation in defense industries increased from 3% in 1942 to 8.3% in 1944, or over 100%. This increase in industrial experience is an important factor when considering manpower from the standpoint of national defense.
These three factors of education, craftsmanship, and governmental participation have enhanced the military value of the Negro. A broader selectivity is now available than was heretofore possible, with a resultant beneficial effect on military efficiency.

**SCOPE AND NATURE OF POLICY**

While the lessons learned from the service of the Negro in the war just concluded are still fresh in our minds, and while the people as a whole are still military minded, it is the considered opinion of this Board that a progressive policy for greater utilization of the Negro manpower be formulated and implemented now, if the nation is to establish its military structure on the experiences of the past. The nation should not fail to use the assets developed through a closer relationship of the races during the years of war.

The policies prepared by the War Department should be progressively flexible. They should envision the continued mental and physical improvement of all citizens. They should be implemented promptly. They must be objective by nature. They must eliminate, at the earliest practicable moment, any special consideration based on race. They should point towards the immediate objective of an evaluation of the Negro on the basis of individual merit and ability. They should point towards a long-range objective which visualizes, over a period of time, a still greater utilization of this manpower potential in the military machine of the nation.

**REQUIRED ACTION**

Courageous leadership in implementing the program is imperative. All ranks must be imbued with the necessity for a straightforward, unequivocating attitude towards the maintenance and preservation of a forward-thinking policy.

**B. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION OF COMBAT PERFORMANCE—WORLD WAR II**

1. **General**

   A careful analysis of the combat service performed by the Negro in World War II indicates clearly that:

   The participation of the Negro in World War II was in many instances creditable, and definitely contributed to the success attained by our military forces.

   No analysis would be complete, however, that fails to evaluate the disadvantages under which the Negro entered the conflict and which militated against his success.

2. **Disadvantages Accrued to the Negro**

   The records and testimony indicate that:

   (1) Although it was definitely known that the Negro manpower would amount to approximately 10% of the manpower available for war, plans were not prepared prior to World War II for mobilization and employment of major units of all arms. This resulted in some instances in a disproportionate allocation of lower bracket personnel to combat elements.
(2) Likewise, no provisions were made initially for utilizing the Negro manpower in supporting type combat units. These eventually embraced all categories. This latter condition apparently resulted from the pressure initiated by the Negroes themselves.

(3) The initial lack of plans for the organization and utilization of the wide variety of combat units was reflected in frequent reorganization, regrouping, and shifting from one type of training to another. For example, some engineers and artillery were thus affected.

(4) Evidence indicates that in some instances units were organized without definite T. of O. and E. and without a general prescription as to the missions for which organized. This was an expedient to offset the lack of plans when manpower was suddenly made available in large numbers.

(5) The above factors, when added to the definite lack of information as to ultimate time and place of assignment and mission to be assigned the various units, was undoubtedly confusing to the Negro mind and may have become a contributing cause for some of the reported failures in combat.

(6) Official reports on Negro units do not reflect many factors which may have been contributing causes of the sub-standard performance in combat.

An over-all far-reaching factor which affected adversely the efficiency of combat units of all types was the shortage of trained subordinate leaders. This shortage stemmed directly from limitations for which the Army was only partially at fault. Environment and lack of administrative and educational advantages in pre-war days greatly handicapped the Negro in the performance of his wartime duties.

3. Advantages Accrued to the Negro

Likewise in estimating the combat record of performance, careful scrutiny must be given to the advantages which accrued to the units from the Negro manpower and the resultant benefits derived therefrom. Consideration must be given to the facts that:

(1) First-class equipment and materiel, and ample munitions for training purposes, were made available.
(2) Favorable training areas and aids were placed at the disposal of commanders and in many cases, especially in combat units, normal training periods were extended to insure adequately trained units.
(3) Experienced white commanders were assigned to direct training and to lead the major elements into action.
(4) The combat units were carefully staged into the theater of operations and all echelons of command were briefed meticulously prior to entry into action.
(5) Reorganization and regrouping were practiced with the objective of enhancing the chances of success of the units involved.

4. Deductions of Facts

Certain facts were deduced from a careful check of the records and the testimony of commanders, observers and participants in the war just terminated, and arrived at after weighing the advantages and disadvantages previously outlined.

These are:
These are:

1. There is substantial evidence to indicate that the least proficient performance has been derived from combat units which were required to close with the enemy to accomplish a prescribed mission.
2. In general, relatively slight losses were experienced by Negro infantry units.
3. There was ample evidence to show that in certain instances small infantry composite units, Negro Platoons in White companies when ably led were eminently successful even though relatively heavy casualties were suffered.
4. The Board likewise was convinced from evidence that the Negro soldier will execute in satisfactory manner, combat duties in some units of the Army for example, an artillery battalion.
5. Evidence definitely indicated that the largest use of Negro manpower was in the service type units, and that in this field they demonstrated their highest degree of efficiency. However, some service units functioned directly in support of combat units, being to all intents and purposes a part of them. Many of these elements performed most creditably.

5. Summary

From the evidence presented by the most experienced commanders, the Board cannot fail to conclude that the results obtained by all units are in direct proportion to the leadership demonstrated. The failures of Negro units have in almost every case been attributed to the lack of leadership qualities of junior officers and non-commissioned officers. Leadership, therefore, must be stressed and the development of all attributes which contribute to this and must be the prime objective of those responsible for the training of the postwar Army. In this endeavor, most benefit will be derived from the broader scope of activities which have been opened to the Negro during five years of war.

A corollary to this first objective is clearly defined, for it leads directly toward the second objective.

Infantry must be made more effective. When the quality of the close combat elements composed either wholly or in part from the Negro component is raised to the level desired and expected, the Army of this nation will be immeasurably improved.

In implementing the recommended program, all types of Negro units should be included in the peacetime Army. These units should eventually be officered by Negro officers. In organizing units, a preference should be given to combat-type units, especially infantry units, in which the Negro has demonstrated the least degree of efficiency. The training of these units should stress initiative and command ability on the part of the Negro soldier in order to improve his character and confidence, educate him to assume responsibility, raise his morale, and better prepare him to assume the duties of a combat soldier.

After weighing the evidence carefully and objectively, it seems evident that certain remedial action can and must be taken. By so doing, the War Department will enhance the military value of this potential and thereby increase the efficiency of the armed forces of the nation.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Having considered the factual and other official materials made available by the War Department and the oral testimony of over 60 military and civilian wit-
nesses, this Board has arrived unanimously at the following conclusions:

1. A comparison of the Selective Service Records in two wars indicates that the Negro manpower which may be expected to become available to the Army in case of another national emergency will no doubt exceed that of World War II.

2. Considering the advances made by the Negro civilian during the period between World War I and World War II and the increase in numbers available for military service, it is concluded that adequate plans were not prepared for the ultimate utilization of this manpower.

3. The advancement of the Negro in education, skills and crafts and resultant economic betterment definitely indicate that if prompt and adequate steps are taken at this time, a greater and more efficient use can be realized from this manpower in the military establishment of the future.

4. In the light of past experiences, it is believed that many of the difficulties and much of the confusion encountered in the placement of the Negro manpower during the Selective Service period of World War II could have been eliminated had War Department policies been fully implemented.

5. The experiences gained in the utilization of the Negro manpower in two major wars lead to the definite conclusion that if remedial action is taken by the War Department at this time, many of the apparent deficiencies of the Negro soldier can be eliminated and more efficient results derived from this manpower is the future.

6. Many of the deficiencies of leadership attributed to the Negro soldier in the past can be eliminated by creating in the postwar Army, for purposes of expansion, a broader Negro base of both officers and enlisted men to assist in the training of the peace-time Army and to provide cadres and leaders to meet more efficiently the requirements of the Army in the event of a national emergency.

7. Creation of a broader Negro base in the postwar Army logically includes organization of appropriate elements of any female component.

8. To insure understanding and a basis for planning purposes there must be established a ratio of Negro to white manpower in the postwar Army. This ratio, for the present, should be that which exists in the civil population.

In World War II some types of Negro units demonstrated greater proficiency than others. In general, service units have performed in a more satisfactory manner than combat units. Likewise, some units have consistently better combat records than others. In organizing or activating Negro units to create a broader base in the postwar Army, it is concluded that combat units be stressed.

10. For efficient results, the implementation and progressive development of a general policy in preparation for full utilization of Negro manpower in a national emergency will require the closest cooperation and coordination with the War Department, between the War Department and field commanders, and between local commanders and local civil officials.

11. Creation of a War Department General Staff Group of selected officers, experienced in command, who can devote their time to problems involving minority racial elements in the military establishment is necessary to insure adequate and continuous coordination and cooperation in implementing policy. Creation for the same purpose of a similar group on the staff of each major command is necessary.

12. The War Department policy announced for the administration and utilization of minority groups in the postwar Army should be carefully coordinated with policies of the sister services.

13. Testimony before this Board has indicated that units composed largely of
officer supervision in training and in the field than units composed of personnel of normal distribution. It is concluded, therefore, that attachment of officers to units including abnormal proportions of personnel in Grades IV and V on the A.G.C.T. scale is necessary when time is the critical factor, as it will be under war conditions or under a system of universal military training. This procedure is not necessary in the Regular Army in peacetime.

14. The training advantages accruing from a favorable climatic or terrain conditions should be evaluated against the factor of unfavorable community attitude with its resultant effect on both training and morale. Troop locations should be selected after a consideration of these opposing factors, due regard being given in all cases to the fact that small civilian communities are incapable of absorbing large numbers of military personnel regardless of race. Exceptions to this principle may be necessary in the event of universal military training, for general efficiency of the military establishment, or in the interest of national security.

15. Regardless of source or procurement and of racial antecedents all officers of all components of the Army should be accorded equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional improvement as prescribed by law and regulation; and all officers should be required to meet the same standard for appointment, promotion, and retention in all components of the Army.

16. The sources of potential officer material can be extended and fostered through the medium of a more comprehensive ROTC and an Army leadership school program.

17. Processing of all personnel entering the army, whether volunteers or selectees, through reception and training centers promote and maintain the efficiency of the Army and will insure proper assignment of individuals.

18. The high reenlistment rate of professional privates in Negro units has in the past denied entry into the service to much potential officer and noncommissioned officer material. Economy and efficiency demand that men of low intelligence and education who have proven incapable of developing into specialists or leaders be eliminated from the service at termination of the first enlistment. Any policy implemented should include all races.

19. There are many places in the framework of the overhead units at army installations where Negro personnel with special skills can be utilized to advantage as individuals. Periodic surveys of the installations are necessary to determine such positions.

20. Experiments and other experiences of World War II indicate clearly that the most successful employment of Negro units occurred when they were employed as units closely associated with white units on similar tasks, and a greater degree of success was obtained when small Negro organizations were so employed.
21. Experience, education and tolerance on the part of all personnel of the Army will serve to rectify many of the difficulties inherent in a mixed or composite unit.

22. Present War Department policies pertaining to the administration of educational, recreational and messing facilities and of Officers' clubs at posts, camps and stations where racial minority elements are located are considered adequate for the present and should be continued in effect.

23. The adoption and promulgation without delay of a broad, comprehensive and progressive policy for the utilization of Negro manpower in the postwar Army will stimulate the Negro's interest, eliminate some of the frustrations, improve morale, and facilitate the development of individual ability and leadership.

24. The adoption and promulgation of a policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the military establishment will not in itself achieve the desired result.

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Steps must be taken concurrently to inform and indoctrinate all ranks of the military establishment concerning the importance of the national security of the successful accomplishment of the program.

25. The approval and promulgation of a constructive and progressive policy involving the utilization of this manpower potential should be effected without delay. By such procedure the War Department will indicate clearly an endeavor to capitalize on and benefit from the lessons learned in the school of war.

26. Existing laws, regulations and official publications should be examined for determination of any conflict with the proposed policy envisaging a greater utilization of Negro manpower.

27. Publication of the approved policy by the War Department will facilitate an understanding attitude insofar as the press of the nation is concerned and thereby indicate that a progressive program aimed directly at the objective of more effective manpower utilization is being implemented.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Policy

In order that authorized Negro manpower may be utilized with maximum efficiency during the postwar period, this Board recommends that the War Department adopt, promulgate and implement the following policy:

To utilize the Negro manpower in the postwar Army on a broader professional scale than has obtained heretofore, and through the medium of installations and organizations, to facilitate the development of leaders and specialists to meet effectively the requirements of an expanded war Army.

B. Implementation of Policy

In order to develop the means required for maximum utilization of the authorized manpower of the nation in the event of a national emergency, it is further recommended.
1. a. That combat and service units be organized and activated from the Negro manpower available in the postwar Army to meet the requirements of training and expansion and in addition qualified individuals be utilized in appropriate special and overhead units.

   b. The proportion of Negro to white manpower as exists in the civil population be the accepted ratio for creating a troop basis in the postwar Army.

2. That Negro units organized or activated for the postwar Army conform in general to other units of the postwar Army but the maximum strength of type units should not exceed that of an infantry regiment or comparable organization.

3. That in the event of universal military training in peacetime additional officer supervision is supplied to units which have a greater than normal percentage of personnel falling into A.G.C.T. classifications IV and V.

4. That a staff group of selected officers whose background has included command troops be formed within the G-1 Division of the staff of the War Department and each major command of the Army to assist in the planning, promulgation, implementation and revision of policies affecting all racial minorities.

5. That there be accepted into the Regular Army an unspecified number of qualified Negro officers; that officers initially selected for appointment in the regular establishment be taken from those with experience in World War II;

that all officers, regardless of race, be required to meet the same standard for appointment.

6. That all officers, regardless of race, be accorded equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional improvement; and be required to meet the same standard for appointment, promotion and retention in all components of the Army.

7. That Negro officers to meet requirements for expansion of the regular establishment and for replacements be procured from the following sources.

   (a) Reserve officers, including ROTC graduates, who shall be eligible for active duty training and service in accordance with any program established for officers of like component and status.
   (b) Candidates from the ranks.
   (c) Graduates of the United States Military Academy.
   (d) Other sources utilized by the Army.

8. That all enlisted men, whether volunteers or selectees, be routed through reception and training centers, or other installations of a similar nature to insure proper classification and assignment of individuals.

9. That reenlistment be denied to Regular Army soldiers who meet only the minimum standards.
10. That surveys of manpower requirements conducted by the War Department include recommendations covering the positions in each installation of the Army which could be filled by Negro military personnel.

11. That groupings of Negro units with white units in composite organizations be continued in the postwar Army as a policy.

12. The principle that Negro units of the postwar Army be stationed in localities where community attitudes are most favorable and in such strength as will not constitute an undue burden to the local civilian population be adopted; exceptions to this principle to be premised on the basis of military necessity and in the interest of national security.

13. That at posts, camps and stations where both Negro and white soldiers are assigned for duty, the War Department policies regarding use of recreational facilities and membership in officers' clubs, messes or similar social organizations be continued in effect.

14. That commanders of organizations, installations and stations containing Negro personnel be fully cognizant of their responsibilities in the execution of the overall War Department policy; and conversely that they be permitted maximum latitude in the solution of purely local problems.

15. That the War Department, concurrently with promulgation of the approved policy, take steps to insure the indoctrination of all ranks throughout the Service as to the necessity for an unreserved acceptance of the provisions of the policy.

16. That approval and promulgation of a policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the postwar Army be accomplished with the least practicable delay.

17. That upon approval of this policy steps be initiated within the War Department to amend or rescind such laws and official publications as are in conflict therewith.

18. That the recommended policy as approved by the War Department, with reference to the utilization of the Negro manpower in the postwar Army be unrestricted and made public.

/s/ Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.  
ALVAN C. GILLEM, JR.  
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army  
Chairman

/s/ Lewis A. Pick  
LEWIS A. PICK  
Maj. Gen., U. S. Army  
Member

/s/ Winslow C. Morse  
WINSLOW C. MORSE  
Brig. Gen., U. S. Army  
Member

/s/ Aln D. Warnock  
ALN D. WARNOCK  
Brig. Gen., U. S. Army  
Recorder, without vote

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The Board of Officers, in a supplementary memorandum, approved the following statement with regard to the objectives of its Report:

"Objectives: The Board visualizes at this time only two objectives:

"The Initial Objectives: The utilization of the proportionate ratio of the manpower made available to the military establishment during the postwar period. The manpower potential to be organized and trained as indicated by pertinent recommendations.

"The Ultimate Objective: The effective use of all manpower made available to the military establishment in the event of a major mobilization at some unknown date against an undetermined aggressor. The manpower to be utilized, in the event of another major war, in the Army without regard to antecedents or race.

"When, and if such a contingency arises, the manpower of the nation should be utilized in the best interests of the national security.

"The Board cannot, and does not, attempt to visualize at this time, intermediate objectives. Between the first and ultimate objective, timely phasing may be interjected and adjustments made in accordance with conditions which may obtain at this undetermined date."

(AG 291.2 (20 Apr 46))

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:
EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
The Adjutant General

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Chief of Staff