

8 March '47

Mr. Clifford:

I do not believe that this is the occasion for the "All-out" speech for the following reasons:

1. Insufficient time to prepare what would be the most significant speech in the President's administration. Much more time is necessary to develop the philosophy and ideas and do justice to the subject. I think that the President should have two weeks to prepare such a speech.
2. There has been no overt action in the immediate past by the U.S.S.R. which serves as an adequate pretext for the "All-out" speech. The situation in Greece is relatively "abstract"; there have been other instances - Iran, for example - where the occasion more adequately justified such a speech and there will be other such occasions - I fear - in the future.
3. The public is not prepared. Public acceptance and support - the unity of all the people - must come after the "All-out" speech. Nothing would be more disastrous than to have such a speech divide the country. I believe an "All-out" speech will have a divisive effect if delivered too soon. A series of Presidential and Cabinet speeches and Executive Department actions will be necessary to educate and inform the public to the point where the "All-out" message can be delivered and have the desired effect. The time to begin this education is now, and the forthcoming speech should be one of a series, building up as rapidly as possible to the great climax - the "All-out" speech.
4. The "All-out" speech delivered on the opening of the Moscow Conference would, in my opinion, destroy that Conference which gives promise of producing an acceptable Treaty of Peace for Austria, if not for Germany. The President must not be charged, as was Roosevelt, with torpedoing a major World Conference before it has had a chance.



For these reasons, I believe that next week's message should be limited in scope. I recommend as a subject "U.S. Responsibility for European Reconstruction."

Respectfully,

Confidential

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