

May 14, 1952

Mr. Arthur Cox
Psychological Strategy Board
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Cox:

Pursuant to the conference held in my office on May 9, 1952, there is enclosed herewith an outline, prepared by the Displaced Persons Commission, which is intended as a suggestion of the sort of thing General Smith might cover in executive session with respect to H.R. 7376. The hearings are scheduled to commence on May 22, before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee.

For your information there are also enclosed the following:

President's Special Message to the Congress, March 24,
H.R. 7376 (Celler) and summary of principal provisions
H.J. Res. 411 and summary of principal provisions

As you know, H.R. 7376 implements the principal objectives stated by the President in his Special Message. You will note, however, that it does not provide for the use of lost visas as recommended by the President for issuance to displaced persons whose case could not be completed by the cut-off date of December 31, 1951.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID D. LLOYD

Enclosures



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1. Scope of problem effecting refugees from communism
 - (a) numbers, kinds of people
 - (b) usefulness for intelligence purposes, etc.
2. Central role of United States position on refugees in "cold war".
3. Information concerning propaganda use by communists of refugees who returned back behind Iron Curtain, and deleterious effect of such return upon Free World.
4. Serious harm to security and protection of the United States by failure to provide:
 - (a) migration outlet for refugees from communism;
 - (b) reception facilities, etc.;
 - (c) "education or training so they can prepare themselves for useful and productive work in the North Atlantic community" (see President's Message)
5. Importance of effective migration program covering refugees from communism and general overpopulation, in terms of
 - (a) Western Germany, Austria and Italy
 - (1) national elections of 1953 (Italy, April; Germany, July)
 - (2) current anti-communist or anti-totalitarian campaign
 - (3) general political stability
 - (b) NATO
 - (1) morale of Western Europe
 - (2) security of NATO forces
 - (3) number of potential troops that would be available (Kersten amendment)
 - (c) Resistance behind Iron Curtain
 - (d) Continuing sources of intelligence for United States.

