Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of November 9 and greatly appreciate your courtesy in setting forth the situation which confronts your country. I deeply regret that the efforts which have been made during your presence in Washington to find a solution to the oil controversy have not succeeded. It is my earnest hope, however, that the differences which exist between your country and Great Britain can soon be narrowed to the point where an agreement is possible.

Your request for financial assistance will, I assure you, be given most careful consideration in the light of the well known desire of the United States to be of assistance to the people of Iran. I am sure that you realize that this is a very complex matter and, although your request will be handled in an expeditious manner, there is insufficient time remaining before your departure for any decision to be made.

I very much regret that my absence from Washington renders it impossible for me to see you again before your departure. It was a very great pleasure having you as a guest in the United States.

Please accept my very best wishes for a pleasant return journey to Iran and my hope that you will some day visit us again. My kindest reciprocate your kind sentiments, and express to you the best wishes of the United States for the happiness and welfare of the Iranian people.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Prime Minister of Iran

Mr. Hopkins: The President would like this put in the private file.
President has signed letter to Prime Minister Mossadagh. Hereewith is text for advance delivery by you to the Prime Minister this afternoon.

Text of letter is as follows:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of November 9th and greatly appreciate your courtesy in setting forth the situation which confronts your country. I deeply regret that the efforts which have been made during your presence in Washington to find a solution to the oil controversy have not succeeded. It is my earnest hope, however, that the differences which exist between your country and Great Britain can soon be narrowed to the point where an agreement is possible.

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Please accept my very best wishes for a pleasant return journey to Iran and my hope that someday you will visit us again. May I heartily reciprocate your kind sentiments. And express to you the best wishes of the United States for the happiness and welfare of the Iranian people.

Very sincerely yours,
Harry S. Truman"
TO: MR. CHARLES MURPHY, KEY WEST, FLORIDA

PRIME MINISTER MOSADEQ OF IRAN INTENDS TO DEPART THURSDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 15. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE, IF POSSIBLE, THAT THE PRESIDENT REPLY TO HIS LETTER OF NOVEMBER 9 BEFORE HE LEAVES. THIS LETTER TRANSMITTED TO YOU BY COURIER NOVEMBER 12. FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER MOSADEQ:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 9 AND GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR COURTESY IN SETTING FORTH THE SITUATION WHICH CONFRONTS YOUR COUNTRY. I DEEPLY REGRET THAT THE EFFORTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE DURING YOUR PRESENCE IN WASHINGTON TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE OIL CONTROVERSY HAVE NOT YET PROVEN SUCCESSFUL. IT IS MY EARNEST HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT THE DIFFERENCES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN YOUR COUNTRY AND GREAT BRITAIN CAN SOON BE NARROWED TO THE POINT WHERE AN AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE.

YOUR REQUEST FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE WILL, I ASSURE YOU, BE GIVEN MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BY MYSELF AND BY THE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. I AM SURE THAT YOU REALIZE THAT THIS IS A VERY COMPLEX MATTER AND, ALTHOUGH YOUR REQUEST WILL BE HANDLED IN AN EXPEDIENT MANNER, THERE IS INSUFFICIENT TIME REMAINING BEFORE YOUR DEPARTURE FOR ANY DECISION TO BE MADE.

I VERY MUCH REGRET THAT MY ABSENCE FROM WASHINGTON MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO SEE YOU AGAIN BEFORE YOUR DEPARTURE. IT HAS BEEN A GREAT PLEASURE HAVING YOU AS A GUEST IN THE UNITED STATES. PLEASE ACCEPT MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR A PLEASANT RETURN JOURNEY TO IRAN AND MY HOPE THAT YOU WILL SOME DAY VISIT US AGAIN. MAY I HEARTILY RECIPROCAT YOUR KIND SENTIMENTS, AND EXPRESS TO YOU THE BEST WISHES OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE HAPPINESS AND WELFARE OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE.

VERY SINCERELY YOURS,

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED

SIGNED WEBB

ER. DEPT. GUIDELINES, JUNE 22, 1979

By NLT, NARS, Dated 1979

CONFIDENTIAL
His Excellency,
Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh,
Prime Minister of Iran
Air Mail

The President,
Key West,
Florida.
November 12, 1951.

Dear Mr. President:

I hate to intrude on you at any time, especially when you are down on the sands of Florida, getting some sun and a well-earned rest. But a matter has come to my attention which will be extremely important in the next few days. I thought I must write you. After you receive this letter, I may take the liberty of telephoning you further about it.

It is about the Persian situation. My interest in it, as you know, is only as a bystander and as one who came to know the Persian people and to develop a great admiration and affection for them. The immediate occasion for writing this letter is a luncheon which I had with some of Mossadegh's staff.

Persia is, I think, at a very important crossroad. British influence is never going to play any part in the future of that country. The British are anathema to the Persians and always will be. Whether that is justified or not is not the point. It is a fact and that I know from my own personal knowledge picked up during my traveling in Persia.

American influence can be tremendously high. If you, as the representative of the American people, can be a symbol of salvation for all the people in that vast area the Middle East—On one condition. And that condition is that Mossadegh goes back with a good deal for Persia and the Persian people and does not return empty-handed.

If Mossadegh returns empty-handed, American influence in Persia will be very low. If Mossadegh goes back with a good deal for Persia, American influence and prestige will be that you made it to be in Greece that very dark day in Greece's history.

The choice that the Persian leaders has is not a wide one. They are dealing with a powerful public opinion and that public opinion will propel any public leader much faster than he may want to go. If Mossadegh goes back empty-handed, America and the British both will be effectively of the picture and Russia will be in it. Russia will be
not as a matter of conscious choice but because all the people
of Persia will throw to an increasing degree their influence
and weight behind the Tudeh Party. The Tudeh Party only a few
years ago bad three members in the Cabinet and they were taken
cut out only because of the dauntly action of my Ghashghai friends
down in South Persia. But on this oil issue 99 per cent of the
Persian people are for leaving the British out entirely, for a
square deal for the Persians, and for a liquidation of the British
investment.

I do not know and it is none of my particular business
what the precise stage of the negotiations with Mossadegh is on the
oil issue. But I do know from this luncheon talk that Mossadegh
needs time to work out the oil problem. Persia is in a desperate
financial situation. If Russian influence enters Persia, it will
be a very dark day. It would be not even the last choice of
Mossadegh but it would be the last choice of hundreds of thousands
of Persians if they can get no real help from America.

What the Persians need is $10,000,000 a month for
twelve months. They need it as a loan or as a grant. They put
it up to me as a request for a loan paying regular interest.
They need it so the British oil concession will not be used as
a club over them while they are in desperate financial straits.
Without that loan Mossadegh feels he will go back empty handed
and that the consequences will be evil for Persia.

What I am trying to do is to pass on to you, Mr.
President, as accurately as I can the factual picture as I
see it. Perhaps it is all unnecessary and perhaps you have been
told this dozens of times. But I do want to add to the factual
picture my own personal plea to you that Mossadegh not go back
empty handed. I am not familiar with all the details of this
problem but if one thing I am certain and that is that Mossadegh
represents Persia. He represents the small people of Persia
just as you represent the small people of America. He is a
wealthy man, an aristocrat. But he is nevertheless close to
the heart of the people of Persia on this oil matter. There is
no political alternative to Mossadegh in Persia. If he fails
as he will if he returns empty handed, Persia faces the Army
on the right and the Communists on the left. And the record
of the Army is too vicious for the Persian people to long endure.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

The President,
Key West,
Florida.

Air Mail
My dear Mr. Connolly:

In the absence of the Acting Secretary, I am transmitting a letter addressed to the President by Prime Minister Mosadeq of Iran.

The Department's views and recommendations on the substance of the Prime Minister's letter will be transmitted subsequently by the proper authorities.

Sincerely yours,

William H. Brownlee
Director,
Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

Enclosure:

Letter to the President by Prime Minister Mosadeq of Iran.

Mr. Matthew J. Connolly,
Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:

Unfortunately, my sojourn of more than two weeks in Washington and the best efforts of the higher authorities of the United States Government have not been productive of any result towards the settlement of the oil dispute between Iran and England. Therefore I have decided to leave this country on Thursday, November 15. Because of your absence from Washington, I will not, to my great regret, be able to bid you a personal goodbye. Therefore, I beg your permission to offer in this manner my heartfelt and sincere thanks for the very warm reception and welcome which has been accorded to me in this beautiful capital city of yours. Meanwhile I deem it necessary to bring some points to your consideration.

The reasons for the passage of the oil nationalisation law have been explained to you by me in person and you have also seen the many messages exchanged with Iran during the last few months. Therefore I will not reiterate these reasons. As you are well aware, Iran's efforts to put the Nationalisation law into effect met with unwarranted objections on the part of the government of Great Britain. These developments prompted your recommendations for a friendly settlement of the dispute. You have been cognizant of the fact that my Government immediately welcomed your suggestions with all good will and that we requested the Honorable Averell Harriman to come over to Teheran to consult with us on the question. As a result of
the consultation with the latter, the Iranian Government in conjunction with the Mixed Parliamentary Oil Committee drafted a formula as a basis for the future negotiations with the British Government. The contents of this formula were as follows: first, that the British Government should formally recognize the nationalization of the oil industry, and secondly, that all the activities pertaining to the exploration, extraction, and the exploitation of oil should be in the hands of the Iranian Government. This formula received the mutual agreement of both governments. As a result, a British Government Delegation came to Teheran to start negotiations. As you have observed, the British Delegation contrary to the contents of the said mutually accepted formula presented a number of proposals, and then left Teheran suddenly after that. The Iranian Government, which was unwilling to have the negotiations severed, prepared a new set of proposals with the knowledge of Mr. Averall Harriman. These were submitted to the British Government Delegation. The Iranian Government showed a conciliatory attitude, that is, to the utmost possible limits within the framework of the Nationalization Law but all our efforts were of no avail. Further, you have observed the Iranian Government's conciliatory attitude with respect to the enforcement of the law regarding the "take-over" of the properties and installations of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The same attitude also has been observed with respect to the British technical staff. This conciliatory attitude reached its height during the sojourn of Mr. Harriman
in Teheran. This attitude was even used by the opponents of our Government as a pretext to criticize its oil policy.

You are undoubtedly informed of the fact that the Iranian Government did not desire to see any delay caused in the export of oil to its foreign customers, and in order to facilitate continuing export we asked the captains of the oil tankers to sign a simple receipt disclosing the amount of oil which had been received by them for transport. It also proposed to the British technical staff to work for the Iranian Government with the same salaries and allowances which they had enjoyed with the former Company. Besides this the Government offered to keep intact the regulations of the former Company in the administration and management of the oil industry, insofar as these regulations are not contrary to the Oil Nationalization Law. But unfortunately no fruitful result came out of this conciliatory attitude of the Iranian Government. And the procedure followed by the agents of the former Company resulted in the closing up of the various installations in the oil regions of Iran. That is to say, at a time when all the means of activity were prepared for functioning, and the British technical staff were at their different posts, all of the installations were deserted and left inactive. With this attitude shown by the British it became clear to us that they were not ready to settle the oil question. Instead with the stoppage of the oil receipts and other acts
aimed at bringing about economic deterioration in Iran the British have tried to force our Government to accept their proposals.

The Iranian Government being cognizant of this fact and not being willing to be confronted with such an undesirable situation, resolved to start its own activities in the oil industry; the Government clearly saw that the very presence of the British technical staff who had refused to accept employment with the Iranian Government would be a barrier to new activities. Therefore we decided to put an end to their residence in the oil regions. The Iranian Government referred this decision to Mr. Averell Harriman. The latter was requested to inform the British Government of the fact that unless new negotiations were started the decision relevant to the expulsion of the British technical staff would be carried out.

Mr. Averell Harriman did not deem it appropriate for himself to intervene in the matter; therefore, the Government was obliged to send a new note through the Minister of the Court proposing a new basis for negotiations in which the utmost consideration had been given to the expectations of the other party. The said note was submitted to the British Ambassador in Tehran; but it was rejected without any due study by the British Government. The developments being such, and the Iranian Government being disappointed in its hopes of resumption of negotiations was compelled to cancel the residence permits of the British technical staff in the oil regions with the agreement of the Mixed Parliamentary Board.
Meanwhile, the British Government which had interpreted our good will as a sign of weakness, answered our conciliatory attitude with the dispatch of warships to the neighborhood of our coastal waters. The British brought additional economic pressure upon Iran in various ways, and in order to prevent the Iranian Government from enforcing its decision relative to the expulsion of the British technical staff (which was equivalent to the stoppage of exploitation activities in the oil regions) they referred the dispute to the Security Council, basing their claims upon unfounded arguments. This step taken by the British Government forced me to come in person to the United States of America and defend the rights of my country.

Having come to the United States of America, I availed myself of the rare opportunity to accept your very kind invitation to come to Washington, pay you a visit, and have the privilege also of visiting your honorable colleagues. One point which must be emphasized here and which has indebted me greatly is the fact that during my sojourn here the higher authorities of the State Department have shown the utmost good will in finding a solution for the settlement of our problem; but unfortunately their good offices have not come to a fruitful result. I am quite gratified to think that with all the preoccupations in my mind about the internal affairs of my country I have arrived at the very positive conclusion because of my sojourn here in Washington, namely, that the American Government and people have come to know that in spite of the good will of the Iranian Government for the
settlement of the dispute the Government of Great Britain is not willing
to arrive at a settlement; but is rather procrastinating and awaiting
the results of the forseen economic crisis in Iran.

Another point which must be brought to your consideration is
that the British policy of procrastination with respect to the non-
enforcement of the "Harriman formula" can be explained in the following
manner: the British subjects are in possession of concessions in certain
other countries; in case the "Harriman formula" is carried out, and the
exploration, extraction and the exploitation of oil is ceded to the
Iranian Government it is probable that the respective governments may want
to have similar privileges, thereby causing heavy losses to the revenues of
the concession owners. But it must be remembered at this juncture that
such receipts are comparatively insignificant in comparison with the heavy
expenditures which the great powers are making for armament purposes;
hence it would be advisable for them to seek the satisfaction of the
countries who have granted concessions, and in this way help the furtherance
of world peace and security.

Now that the situation has reached its tragic climax in order
to obtain some positive result from my journey to this country, I beg
your indulgence for a moment to draw attention to the critical economic
situation of my country. I assure you that you are perfectly aware of the
current situation in Iran; and further it is known to you that this
economic crisis has started from the days of World War II. The Iranian people basing their belief upon the Atlantic Charter and on the promises given by the great powers for the freedom and the independence of all nations have suffered great sacrifices to attain the desired aim. During the Iranian occupation our country put at the disposal of the Allied Forces all of its productive agencies. Its means of communications were all equipped to ensure the progress of the cause of the Allied powers. As a result of its cooperative spirit, Iran won the title of "Bridge of Victory". But this participation in the war also caused the finances and the national economy of our country to suffer terribly. Our economic health became extraordinarily weak. The cost of living index rose ten fold, because of the unprecedented volume of note issue, and because of repercussions to the long stay of the allied occupation forces.

During the Tehran conference which was held in the year 1943, the heads of the Allied Powers testified to the importance of our participation and praised the many sacrifices made by our nation in the common cause. In a formal declaration, we were given the promise of financial help after the termination of the war. We are in no way regretful for the sacrifices we have made; but we were both sorry and bewildered when we found that none of the wartime promises materialized in the post war era. On the contrary, the agents of old fashioned imperialism blocked Iran's chances to
develop its own resources, the most important of which is oil. They started by bringing forth the supplemental agreement which was meant to reinforce the legally invalid agreement of 1933. They hoped that the passage of this agreement by the Najeebs would enable them to continue their old imperialistic policies. Through clever artifices and intrigues, they succeeded during the first post war years in blocking American financial aid to Iran even though great quantities of economic assistance were going to former enemy countries. The imperialist agents also interfered with Iran's attempts to obtain assistance from international organizations.

This was not all. Their policies created havoc in our internal finances resulting in a large budget deficit. Our development projects were also neutralized by the same methods.

There is no doubt that this difficult situation can be gradually mended. My Government is of course compelled to take steps to ease the present crises. There will be reforms in the national budget and reduction of unnecessary expenditures. We will continue our efforts to arrive at a normal economic condition.

However, I am compelled by the force of the present circumstances to make the frank avowal that our economic situation is so critical at the moment that urgent remedies are in order. Otherwise the present apparent calm will be disturbed and the outcome will be harmful to the cause of the free world, and to the peace. We know that such an outcome is contrary to
your own good intentions.

It is obvious that a serious internal crisis in Iran could have repercussions that might place the government of the United States in a difficult world situation. We believe that in light of the great responsibility taken by the United States in world affairs it is only logical and right that your country would have a great interest in seeing the situation repaired before it reaches a critical point.

We therefore hope that the United States will consider the possibility on this critical occasion of allotting to Iran some immediate financial help, the source of which might be found for example in the recently ratified appropriations for foreign aid or any other source at your disposal. By reason for mentioning the said appropriations is that they have already been ratified. As a result of our mutual conversation I have realized that to contract a loan from any other sources would require many formalities and a lapse of time that are in contradiction to the exigencies of the moment. But I must make one point clear. I am not seeking United States aid on a gratuitous basis. We would consider any funds that the United States Government advanced as loans. We pledge to pay back any such loans with the proceeds of our oil revenues.

I await with gratitude your decision on this matter before my departure from Washington.
In conclusion, I deem it necessary to offer my sincere thanks for the generous hospitality which has been extended to me by the American authorities. This letter conveys to you my farewell. Please accept my heartfelt prayers for your own health and happiness and for the welfare of the friendly American nation.

I avail myself of this opportunity to repeat to you, dear Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Very sincerely yours,

Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh

/The President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

November 9, 1951.
The President of the United States
of America,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.