 SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

(IT IS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT NO DISTRIBUTION OF THIS REPORT BE MADE OUTSIDE OF THIS AGENT.)

1. BACKGROUND.


2. MOSADDEG'S GOVERNMENT HAS POWERFUL POPULAR SUPPORT.

   A. MJJIS OPPOSITION TO MOSADDEG COLLAPSED ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1951. ANDOL RASMEH PASPAZI ZADE ANNOUNCED THAT THE OPPOSITION WOULD SHED TO ATTACK THE GOVERNMENT AS LONG AS THE OIL DEBTORS WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SOURCES REPORT, HOWEVER, THAT THE COLLAPSE OF THE OPPOSITION IS TIGHT. THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE IS ALL-ADVICE TO THE OPPOSITION.
B. MODERN RELIGIOUS GROUPS, WHO AT ONE TIME WERE SUPPORTED FROM KASHMIR AND FROM HIS PRO-DOSSARIAN STAND, NOW BALANCED TO THE NATIONAL FRONT BANNER. IN A LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 1951 NUZAR SAFAVI, LEADER OF THE SYDAM-AL-DIN, Wrote PERSIAN WITH KASHMIR; A LETTER FROM PERSIAN TO DOSSARI (THE OUTSTANDING SPIRITUAL LEADER OF IRAN) TO THE SHAH ASKED HIM TO SUPPORT DOSSARI.

C. KASHMIR'S ENDURING INFLUENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT HAS DEMONSTRATED ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1951 BY THE GENERAL CLOSING OF THE BAZAARS THROUGHOUT THE NATION AT HIS REQUEST AND BY THE ORDERING OF THE PARLIAMENTS HE SUPPORTED IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT ON THE SAME DAY.

D. THE SHAH HASCOME A STAND IN FAVOR OF DOSSARI, AND AT LEAST BIDGE 17 SEPTEMBER HAS REFUSED TO LISTEN TO BRITISH ENTREATIES TO RALLY OPPOSITION IN FAVOR OF SIGNED ZIA TABATABAI. AT DOSSARI'S REQUEST THE SHAH HAS ORDERED THE PRINCESS ABBAFI OUT OF THE COUNTR (WHO LEFT IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1951), THEREBY SHOWING THAT HE WOULD NO LONGER (WHAT IS, FOR THE TIME BEING) CONDONE COURT INTRIGUES IN POLITICAL MATTERS.


3. THE BRITISH POSITION IN IRAN HAS COLLAPSED.

A. 50 1950 3.4 (1)}
C. THE CAMPAIGN OF INVIDIATION SUPPORTED BY CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT AND CONTRIBUTED BY MULLAH KARIM (BUT NOT CONVINCED BY KUSHERI) HAS CONTRIBUTED TOWARD CURRENT ELIMINATION OF BRITISH-SUPPORTED OPPOSITION.

(SEE ALSO PARAGRAPHS 2 A ABOVE).

1. THE SOVIET UNION IS IN A RELATIVELY STRONG POSITION TO SEIZE ADVANTAGE.

A. THE TURKISH PARTY HAS GREAT POTENTIALITIES. ALTHOUGH INSIDE INFORMATION IS INCORRECT, THE FOLLOWING CLUES ARE IMPORTANT:

(1) AS EARLY AS 1946 THE TURKISH PARTY ORGANIZED WORKERS IN ADAWAN TO A POINT WHERE THEY SUCCESSFULLY STAGED A GENERAL STRIKE.

(2) SINCE THE BAHDAN VALIYA, THE TURKISH HAS ENJOYED GREATER FREEDOM OF ACTION WITH CORRESPONDINGLY INCREASED EFFICIENCY.

(3) IN 1950 THE TURKISH ORGANIZED PEACE FRONT GROUPS.

(4) IN DECEMBER 1950 THE TURKISH WAS IN A POSITION TO STAGE THE ESCAPE OF TEN OF ITS LEADERS FROM THE TEBRAN JAIL.

(5) IN APRIL 1951 THE TURKISH QUICKLY TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE IMPOTENCI OF BRITISH LABOR RELATIONS IN ADANAN TO STAGE ANOTHER SUCCESSFUL GENERAL STRIKE.

(6) IN JULY 1951 THE TURKISH WAS ABLE TO MASS TEN THOUSAND DEMONSTRATORS IN THE STREETS OF TEBRAN AND ORGANIZE THEM IN SEMI-MILITARY ORDER.

(7) IN THE PAST YEAR THE TURKISH HAS BEEN GROWING SUCCESSFUL IN CONDUCTING LARGE SCALE PROPAGANDA.

(8) AN ESTIMATE OF TURKISH AND FRONT GROUPS FOR THE TEBRAN AREA IN SEPTEMBER 1951 WAS A MAXIMUM OF THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND, WHICH APPEARS TO BE A CONSIDERABLE INCREASE OVER A YEAR AGO.

(9) THE ECONOMIC SITUATION STAYS TO EXPERIENCE A FURTHER, WHICH PAYS THE WAY FOR FURTHER INCREASE IN THE POWER OF THE TURKISH PARTY.

B. THE POLICY OF THE NATIONAL FRONT AT THIS TIME PLAYS DIRECTLY INTO SOVIET HANDS.

(1) IT HAS CAUSED MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN LONDON AND WASHINGTON.

(2) IT CALLS FOR THE PHYSICAL EXPULSION OF THE BRITISH FROM IRAQ.

(3) IT HAS UNDERMINED THE PRESTIGE OF THE ANGLO-SAXON POWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
(1) It lays the groundwork for a common front of Nationalists in the Near East against Anglo-Saxon "imperialists." (This policy, favorable to the Soviet Union, can be carried out much more securely by the Mosaddeq government, a Moslem government, than by a Turkish government.)

(2) The Soviet "siding" with Iran at the Security Council in early October 1951 has increased sympathy for the Soviets even in the ranks of the National Front.

6. Note, however, that Soviet influence in Iran has to contend with:

(1) the army, police, and gendarmerie which represent in the hands of the Shah and the government comparatively well-organized, centralized, and massive repressive forces, with noteworthy shortcomings such as penetration in certain quarters, corruption, and so forth.

(2) popular resistance to communism which stems from religious sentiments and a revival of nationalism.

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