1. NSC 81/1, the Conclusions of which were approved by the President on September 11, contains no direct reference to the present contingency, where Chinese communist troops are being engaged in North Korea. Paragraph 19 is interesting as a possible policy parallel:

20. In the event of the open or covert employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel:

b. The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China.

b. As long as action by U. N. military forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, the U. N. Commander should continue such action and be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U. S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U. S. courses of action.

c. The United States should take the matter to the Security Council with the purpose of condemning the Chinese Communists as aggressors.

2. NSC 73/2, which does not represent approved policy, but was 'adopted as a working guide with the understanding that final recommendations to the President regarding U. S. actions in the event of any of the contingencies envisaged therein,' has the following direct reference in paragraph 10-2 to the present contingency:

10. Korea. Specific actions to be taken in general accordance with paragraph 3:

b. In the event of the overt use of organized Chinese Communist forces in Korea:

(1) The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China.

(2) As long as action by U. N. military forces now committed or planned for committal in Korea offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, such action should be continued and extended to include authority to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U. S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U. S. courses of action.
There is also the following general reference made in paragraph 38:

38. In the event of any new single overt act of aggression by Soviet satellite armed forces in the Far East, the United States, subject to specific consideration of detailed cases set forth in paragraphs 39-41 below, should:

a. Attempt to localize the conflict.

b. Take all possible counter-measures short of seriously impairing the ability to execute emergency war plans.

c. Seek the support of its allies and take appropriate steps in the UN.

d. Concurrently recognize the increased strain on the fabric of world peace arising from a further act of aggression following on the Korean episode.

(Cia. policy)

3. NSC 63/2 contains no relevant statement bearing on the present situation.