July 12, 1950

Dear Paul:

I put down the following thoughts to clarify my own mind in a recurrent pattern of discussion that the 9:30 meetings have, and to invite correction where it may be needed.

1. Our future course in Korea.

   a) The Immediate Future.

      As I see it, we have got to put in the force necessary to reoccupy to the 38th. All seem agreed on this so long as the Chinese and the Soviets do not officially come in. This means, I suppose, that if we are forced out, we have to come in again as quickly as possible.

      If the Chinese come in, it seems to me that the same is true. As to widening the theater of operations by attacks on Chinese territory generally, as against attacks on forces coming in - I should think this unless as constituting an invitation to the Russians to join the Chinese under their treaty.

      If the Soviets come in, I should think that we still have to fight it out in Korea unless and until the war becomes general. At that point general military judgment might well be different.

      I see a lot of objections to these conclusions.

      But I do not see that they add up to a possible alternative.

Do you have a different view?

[Handwritten note: TOP SECRET]
b) The longer-run future.

If we succeed in reoccupying the country, the question of garrisoning it and supporting it arises.

This is expensive, requires troops needed elsewhere and presents a hard program to continue domestically. But I do not see how to avoid it. It seems too abstruse to ask the country to sacrifice men and money to retake Korea to support the UN, and then let it slip away by default. I do not know how long this situation would continue, particularly in the light of changing conditions, but I cannot see the end of it.

In other words, as the Virginians say, we have bought a colt.

2. Purpose

Here I do not see how we can put out of our control – by invoking UN action, for instance – the denial of the island to the Communists as long as (1) we wish to maintain our present, or a better position, in the Pacific, and (2) as long as the Chinese and Soviets are a militant menace there.

If this is so, we ought to define positions on the subject which will give us adequate time and try to make others understand the facts of life.
3. The Chinese Communists in the U.N.

Here again,