A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
on
UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

September 1, 1950

WASHINGTON

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NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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References:
A. NSC Action No. 336
B. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Future United States Policy with Respect to Korea", dated July 17 and August 30, 1950

Pursuant to the President's request the enclosed report on the subject, prepared by the NSC Staff, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury at the next regularly scheduled Council meeting on Thursday, September 7, 1950.

It is recommended that, if this report is adopted, it be submitted to the President for consideration with the recommendation that he approve the Conclusions contained therein and direct their implementation by all executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what United States course of action with respect to Korea would be best calculated to advance the national interests of the United States.

ANALYSIS

2. The present United Nations action in Korea is being taken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950. The Resolution of June 25 called for "the immediate cessation of hostilities", called upon "the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel", and called upon all U. N. members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." The Resolution of June 27 noted the failure of the North Korean authorities to comply with the resolution of June 25 and recommended that "the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

3. In a third resolution (July 7, 1950), the Security Council requested the United Nations to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized that these forces fly the U. N. flag. In response to
this resolution, General MacArthur has been designated Commander of the U. N. forces in Korea. The Republic of Korea has also placed its forces under General MacArthur's command.

4. The political objective of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949.

5. The United States has strongly supported this political objective. If the present United Nations action in Korea can accomplish this political objective without substantial risk of general war with the Soviet Union or Communist China, it would be in our interest to advocate the pressing of the United Nations action to this conclusion. It would not be in our national interest, however, nor presumably would other friendly members of the United Nations regard it as being in their interest, to take action in Korea which would involve a substantial risk of general war. Furthermore, it would not be in our national interest to take action in Korea which did not have the support of the great majority of the United Nations, even if, in our judgment, such action did not involve a substantial risk of general war.

6. As U. N. forces succeed in stabilizing the front, driving back the North Korean forces, and approaching the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U. N. members which are supporting the Security Council resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities are confined
to Korea or spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

7. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will passively accept the emergence of a situation in which all or most of Korea would pass from its control, provided it believes that it can take action which would prevent this and which would not involve a substantial risk of general war. The Soviet Union may decide that it can risk reoccupying Northern Korea before United Nations forces have reached the 38th parallel, or the conclusion of an arrangement with the North Korean regime under which Soviet forces would be pledged to the defense of the territory of the "People's Republic of Northern Korea". Alternatively, the Soviet Union might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities are still in progress south of the 38th parallel. In view of the importance of avoiding general war, we should be prepared to negotiate a settlement while refusing terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of the aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

8. Although it does not appear likely that Chinese Communist forces would be used to occupy North Korea (because the Soviet Union probably regards Korea as being in its own direct sphere of interest), this contingency cannot be excluded. It also seems unlikely that Soviet or Chinese Communist forces will be openly employed in major units in the fighting in the southern part of the peninsula, for it is believed that neither the Soviet Union nor the Chinese Communists are ready to engage in general war at this time for this objective.
It is possible that the Soviet Union may endeavor to persuade the Chinese Communists to enter the Korean campaign with the purpose of avoiding the defeat of the North Korean forces and also of fomenting war between the United States and the Chinese Communists should we react strongly.

9. It is possible, but not probable, that no action will be taken by the Soviet Union or by the Chinese Communists to reoccupy Northern Korea or to indicate in any other way an intention to prevent the occupation of Northern Korea by United Nations forces before the latter have reached the 38th parallel. In this unlikely contingency it would seem probable that the Soviet Union had decided to follow a hands-off policy, even at the expense of the loss of control of Northern Korea. Only in this contingency could the U. N. forces undertake ground operations north of the 38th parallel without a substantial risk of general war. It is difficult to appraise this risk at this time, and our action in crossing the 38th parallel would create a situation to which the Soviet Union would be almost certain to react in some manner. While the risk of Soviet or Chinese communist intervention might not be lessened if only the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) forces conducted the operation north of the 38th parallel, the risk of general hostilities as a result of such intervention would be reduced. In no circumstances should other U. N. forces be used in the north-eastern province bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.

10. It will be desirable to bear in mind in the contingency stated in paragraph 9 both the importance of securing support of the
majority of U. N. members for any action that might be taken north of the 38th parallel and the advantage of establishing a record that will clearly show that every reasonable effort has been made to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel. At some point after the U. N. forces begin to take the initiative and to drive back and destroy the North Korean forces, terms of surrender should be offered. The question of the acceptance of such terms by the North Koreans would of course be determined by the U.S.S.R. in the light of its appraisal of its interests under all the circumstances then existing.

11. The U. N. forces are clearly committed by the Security Council resolutions to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel and there is a clear legal basis for taking such military actions north of the 38th parallel as are necessary in accomplishing this mission.

12. Military actions north of the 38th parallel which go beyond the accomplishment of this mission as, for example, to accomplish the political objective of unifying Korea under the Republic of Korea, are not clearly authorized by existing Security Council resolutions. Accordingly, United Nations approval for such further military actions is a prerequisite to their initiation. Should such approval not be forthcoming, accomplishment of this political objective would not be feasible. It would have to be recognized that a stalemate freezing the U. N. forces indefinitely in Korea or returning to the status quo ante June 25, would be undesirable.
13. Soviet domination of North Korea has brought with it the
pattern of police and propaganda control well known throughout the
Soviet world. Since the existence and stability of a unified Korea
must in the long run depend largely upon the Korean people them-
selves, the tasks of the United Nations will include the reorienta-
tion of the North Korean people toward the outlook of free peoples
who accept the standards of international behavior set forth in the

CONCLUSIONS

14. Final decisions cannot be made at this time concerning the
future course of action in Korea, since the course of action which
will best advance the national interest of the United States must be
determined in the light of: the action of the Soviet Union and the
Chinese Communists, consultation and agreement with friendly members
of the United Nations, and appraisal of the risk of general war.

15. The United Nations forces have a legal basis for conducting
operations north of the 38th parallel to compel the withdrawal of the
North Korean forces behind this line or to defeat these forces. The
U. N. Commander should be authorized to conduct military operations,
including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations in
pursuance of a roll-back, north of the 38th parallel for the purpose
of destroying the North Korean forces, provided that at the time of
such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major So-
viet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry,
nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea.
U. N. operations should not be permitted to extend into areas close to the Manchurian and U.S.S.R. borders of Korea.

16. Concurrently U. N. forces should be developed and plans should be perfected with a view to the possible occupation of North Korea. However, the execution of such plans should take place only with the explicit approval of the President, and would be dependent upon prior consultation with and the approval of the U. N. members.

17. The United Nations Commander should undertake no ground operations north of the 38th parallel in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, but should re-occupy Korea up to the 38th parallel. Bombing operations north of the 38th parallel should not be discontinued merely because the presence of Soviet or Chinese Communist troops is detected in a target area. However, if the Soviet Union should announce in advance its intention to reoccupy North Korea, either explicitly or implicitly giving warning that its forces should not be attacked, the matter should be immediately referred to the Security Council with the stated purpose of securing the cooperation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) in U. N. action to achieve the unity and independence of Korea. Since such cooperation would not be forthcoming, an attempt should then be made in the General Assembly to secure the condemnation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) for flouting the will of the U. N. majority. Military action against North Korean troops south of 38 would continue, but action north of 38 should not be initiated or continued and if any U. N. forces are already north of 38 they should prepare to withdraw pending further directives from Washington.
18. In the event of the open employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th parallel, the U. N. Commander should defend his forces, make no move to aggravate the situation, and report to Washington. The same action should be taken in the event that U. N. forces are operating north of the 38th parallel and major Soviet units are openly employed. In either of these events the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the assumption that global war is probably imminent. Accordingly, the United States should immediately:

a. Make every effort in the light of the circumstances to localize the action, to stop the aggression by political measures and to ensure the unity of the free world if war nevertheless follows. These measures should include direct diplomatic action and resort to the United Nations with the objectives of:

   (1) Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful settlement and the conditions upon which the United States would, in concert with other members of the United Nations, accept such a settlement.

   (2) Consulting with members of the United Nations regarding their willingness to join with the United States in military opposition, if necessary, to the aggression.

b. Give consideration to the possibility of a direct approach to the highest Soviet leaders.

c. Consult with selected allies to perfect coordination of plans.
a. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the eventuality of global war, and therefore prepare to execute emergency war plans; but should, in so far as it has any choice, enter into full-scale hostilities only at the moment and in the manner most favorable to it in the light of the situation then existing.

b. While minimizing United States military commitments in areas of little strategic significance, take action with reference to the aggression to the extent and in the manner best contributing to the implementation of United States national war plans.

19. In the event of the open employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel:

a. The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China.

b. As long as action by U. N. military forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, the U. N. Commander should continue such action and be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U. S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U. S. courses of action.

c. The United States should take the matter to the Security Council with the purpose of condemning the Chinese Communists as aggressors.
20. In the event of an attempt to employ Soviet or Chinese Communist units covertly south of 38, the United Nations Commander should continue the action as long as he believes his forces capable of successful resistance.

21. The United States should immediately make an intensive effort, using all information media, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United States and to direct it toward the Korean Communists, the Soviet Union, and, depending on the role they play, the Chinese Communists, as the parties responsible for the destructive conflict. Special assistance should be given to the field commander and the U. S. Embassy in Korea to augment their present propaganda and information programs. The Government of the R.O.K. should be encouraged to increase its propaganda output and should be given material assistance in this effort.

22. In order to effect the reorientation of the North Korean people, to cause defection of enemy troops in the field, and to train North Korean personnel to participate in activities looking to unification of the country, the following steps should be taken:

a. Establish the principle that the treatment of P.O.W.'s, after their transfer to places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, and for the tasks specified above.

b. Set up immediately on a pilot-plant scale an interrogation, indoctrination and training center for those P.O.W.'s now in our hands in Korea. Personnel in charge of this project must be
selected with the greatest care, taking into consideration Korean or Far Eastern experience, language qualifications, and temperamental aptitude. Full advantage should be taken of World War II experience in the indoctrination of German and Japanese prisoners of war, of experiences in Greece, and of recent experience with Soviet escapees.

23. In preparation for the possible eventual retreat or sudden collapse of North Korean forces, the United States should immediately discuss with certain friendly members of the United Nations the terms to be offered the North Korean forces. This will serve to develop support for action north of the 38th parallel to accomplish the political objective of the United Nations in Korea in the event that the terms are rejected and there is no evidence of a substantial risk of a clash with Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. If the terms offered are not accepted, the U. N. Commander should continue his efforts to destroy as many of the enemy as possible before they retreat across the 38th parallel. He should request new instructions before continuing operations north of the 38th parallel with major forces for the purpose of occupying North Korea. He should not in any circumstances permit the use of U. N. forces other than R.O.K. contingents in the northeast province or along the Manchurian border.

24. If operations are undertaken to occupy northern Korea, the United Nations Commander should, in consultation with the Government of the R.O.K., determine the timing and method of subjecting occupied territory north of the 38th parallel to its jurisdiction. He should forbid, as commander of the U. N. forces, reprisals against the
forces, officials, and populace of North Korea, except in accordance with international law, and take such measures as are within his power to secure compliance with this directive.

25. In performing their mission beyond the 38th parallel, the general posture of the United Nations forces should be one of liberation rather than retaliation. An effort should be made to encourage the voluntary adherence of ever larger areas of North Korea to the R.O.K.. The United Nations forces should attempt to exert a stabilizing influence during the transition period. They should endeavor to conduct themselves in such a way as to emphasize the non-aggressive and temporary nature of the U.N. occupation.

26. When organized armed resistance by the North Korean forces has been brought substantially to an end, the United States should attempt to reduce its share of the U.N. responsibilities for Korea, and announce its desire to do so, without, however, implying any unwillingness to fulfill its U.N. commitments. The R.O.K. forces, operating under principles established by the U.N. Commission for Korea, or such body as may be established to take its place, should take the lead in disarming remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activity should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea with minimum participation by U.N. contingents, unless the Korean forces alone should prove unable to cope with the guerrilla activities.

27. The United States should recognize that the Government of the R.O.K. will have to take strong measures against Communist efforts to cause trouble in Korea and that it may require support in
these measures from the United States. At the same time, the United States should recognize that social and economic reforms will be necessary in order to reduce the Communist menace to manageable proportions.

28. The United States should advocate in the United Nations the adoption of the following principles to govern the action of the United Nations in Korea in the post-hostilities period:

a. The unification of Korea should be arranged by representatives of the Korean people chosen in free secret-ballot elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, the elections to be held under the auspices of the United Nations.

b. The Government of the R.O.K. should be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted on problems arising in connection with the unification of Korea.

c. An obligation rests upon the members of the United Nations to contribute to the solution of the tremendous economic, social and political problems certain to confront a unified and independent Korea. Asiatic members of the United Nations should be urged to make a substantial contribution to the assistance program in view of their special regional interest in Korea.

29. In consonance with the above principles, the United States should take the following steps:

a. Take vigorous action through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly to assure and solidify United Nations support of necessary action in Korea.
b. Be prepared to announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and the general aims and principles which the United States believes should underlie such a solution.

g. When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend or urge others to recommend the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with the principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

30. The United States should urge that the U. N. Commission on Korea or such body as may be established to take its place be charged with continuing consideration of Korean problems and instructed to make recommendations as to the size and character of the military and internal security forces needed by the R.O.K.. The U. S. should recommend that the U. N. Commission should consider the desirability of permanent neutralization of Korea accompanied by political undertakings by the R.O.K. and by other states separately to refrain from any aggression. The question of U. N. guarantee should be studied but no U. S. commitment on this point should be made at this stage.

31. The United States should urge that U. N. forces be retained in Korea until a stable, unified, and independent state has been
firmly established and should be prepared to make available United States forces as a contingent of the U. N. forces for the purpose of deterring renewed aggression or internal strife. The number of our forces should be reduced so far as possible, however, and should serve only in conjunction with other U. N. contingents, preferably including some Asiatic contingents.