A. Suggested organization of talks

Saturday morning: Korea (Military operations and rehabilitation)

Lunch

Saturday afternoon: Japan, Philippines, others

Late afternoon: Private talk between the President and General MacArthur

Dinner

Saturday evening: President's press release, staff talks, any loose ends.

B. Korea

1. Points for possible emphasis

   a. United Nations character of both military operations and post-hostilities reconstruction.

      General MacArthur should be complimented for the splendid way in which he and his command have responded to the United Nations aspects of the Korean problem; he should be given the full flavor of United States public and Congressional opinion on the United Nations side.

   b. Although we look forward to fullest United Nations responsibility in Korea, the United States must assume occupation responsibilities in North Korea and carry on with relief and rehabilitation throughout Korea, until the United Nations is ready to go ahead with an effective program.

   c. In working out political questions such as reunification, we shall be able to influence the situation greatly, but our influence must be exercised through the United Nations and to the general satisfaction of the United Nations.
d. We must do everything we can to localize the conflict in Korea. Politically, we must assure the Chinese and the Soviets that they are not being threatened militarily in Korea but we must also keep before them the recklessness of active intervention on their part. Militarily, we must use extreme measures to prevent incidents involving United Nations forces and Chinese or Soviet forces or territory.

2. Points for possible questions

a. How feasible is it to consider the use of only Korean forces in the extreme north of Korea and Asiatic forces (Indian, Pakistani, Philippine, Turkish, etc.) in the general area of the 39°-40° parallel, with United States forces more generally in the south? Should we make a strong effort to find Asiatic troops as a “buffer” between United States forces and the Manchurian and Siberian borders?

b. What are General MacArthur's views on what we should plan to do about war criminals? Should we consider war crimes trials for other than military war crimes?

c. What are General MacArthur's own views about Soviet and Chinese intentions re Korea? Are we faced with the prospect of long and costly guerrilla warfare? If so, must we not look toward a more effective anti-guerrilla operation, combining military and psychological-political warfare?

d. The United Nations Commission will be confronted with a complex problem in the timing of elections in Korea. There will be strong opinion not to hold elections in the immediate aftermath of the fighting, but to delay until “peaceful processes” have begun to be restored. What are General MacArthur's views about the timing of elections?

e. The United Nations will have a major relief and reconstruction program on its hands. Except for the United States, many United Nations contributions will be in kind—foodstuffs, raw materials, services, etc. What are General MacArthur's views about the major priorities for United States assistance through the Army and BIA prior to assumption of responsibility by the United Nations?
6. Japan

1. Points for possible emphasis

   a. We intend to proceed promptly to the conclusion of a peace settlement with Japan and will not let Soviet or Chinese Communist disagreement hold it up.

   b. We shall try to get Japan into full membership in international organizations as quickly as possible, particularly in the specialized agencies of the United Nations.

   c. Since we must get Japan on a self-sustaining basis as soon as possible, we should free the energy and resourcefulness of the Japanese themselves from unessential restraints.

2. Points as possible questions

   a. As the Korean situation is wound up, will there be a political problem in Japan if United States forces return to Japan to resume the same role they had before June 25?

   b. How much further can we go now in turning additional responsibilities back to the Japanese?

   c. What is the Japanese reaction likely to be to the type of peace treaty we now have in mind?

   d. On what general scale does General MacArthur think United States assistance to Japan will be required over the next two years?

D. Pacific Pact or Security Arrangements

Possible question for General MacArthur:

The Australians are insistent about some form of security arrangement in the Pacific. Other governments have raised the same issue. The question is being studied in Washington but no conclusions have been reached. What are

General MacArthur's
General MacArthur's views about collective security arrangements in the Pacific? Should we go beyond commitments to Japan and the Philippines—except for the general commitments in the United Nations Charter?

E. Philippines

We consider that we have a vital interest in the Philippines and that we must do everything necessary to insure its safety and reasonable stability. We face a formidable task in political, economic and military phases of the situation. Does General MacArthur have any advice on the present mess in the Philippines?

F. Formosa

1. Emphasis on long-range considerations:

We have full appreciation of the strategic position of Formosa and of General MacArthur's views on this subject. But we also have very much in mind the general international situation and the moral and practical value of keeping the support of an overwhelming majority of the United Nations for our action in the Far East. Our present tactic is directed toward getting international support for the military neutralization of Formosa and for an international determination that the problem of Formosa must be settled by peaceful means.

2. Question for General MacArthur

Any conclusions or impressions which General MacArthur would be able to pass on in connection with the findings of his recent Survey Mission on Formosa would be helpful.

G. General situation in the Far East and Communist intentions in Asia during 1950.

It would be interesting to have the broad views of General MacArthur on the general situation in the Pacific.

October 15, 1950