INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

5-1-X

Action

NEA

Info

FRO  New Delhi

TO: Secretary of State

No: 1409, October 2, 9 p.m.

Dear DEPT PASS TOKYO; SENT 1409, RPTD INFO LONDON 67, TOKYO 13

In our conversation yesterday morning I reviewed with Nehru the Korean situation in considerable detail. He had read three proposals recently made at Panmunjom for handling prisoners, and he found them most forthright, stating they seemed reasonable and was glad we had put them forward.

Pointing out one of the proposals almost exactly same as he had made to me last April.

Asked him to tell me frankly how we could improve handling of armistice negotiations. I added although we often considered we knew only how to improve negotiations, patience and more patience was the key. He said he had no suggestions nor did he have any criticisms, which could only emphasize we must maintain our patience.

I asked him what he thought stood in the way of settlement. He said he simply did not know, one week had one theory and another week had another theory.

Asked him his best guess as to Soviet attitude. He said that our estimate was better than his but he inclined to feel that the Soviets did not want an armistice this time, first because they are able to tie down UN troops without losing their own; second because they are willing to test out new military equipment; third because continuing the war gave them leverage over the Chinese and because their dependence on the West for military supplies. He added that with some feeling he had been disappointed recent indications of Soviet-Chinese relations but he did not feel any of us had much idea of what went on in Moscow.

Told him I was glad he had reliable new Ambassador to Peking and hoped as soon as he began to send meaningful reports from him we would be willing to discuss them in confidence with me. Stated I felt conditions for settlement (not now) at least as good as they had been expect year from now (not now), that regardless of political parties American leaders and people wanted peace in Korea to be followed by Korean peace and then broad Asian settlement.

Pointed out

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-3409, October 3, 9 p.m. from New Delhi.

Pointed out that longer Korean struggle went on stronger will be arguments favor arming Japanese in order bolster security north and east Pacific and take some of pressure off US. Said we realized this will lessen whatever small chance there might be Russia and China pulling apart; that although unlikely any decisions will be made near future this future possibility that from practical point view we all had to face.

Said Chinese must understand our reasoning well as we and if they had slightest desire for real settlement now (rpt now) time to let us know. I emphasized that I giving him only my personal opinions; that was in no (rpt no) way speaking for my govt.

Nehru appeared very thoughtful and said he understood our problem but that we shld likewise understand Chinese Commie concern over ring US bases just off China coast.

I said we had been forced fight our way 6,000 miles across Pacific to stop Asian aggression of few years ago; that our lack defenses had cost us hundreds of thousands American lives and we not (rpt now) prepared repeat same old process. Added US bases were threat to Chinese only if Chinese had aggressive plans and that he himself had been unable tell us how we old persuade Chinese Commies only solution is broad Asian agreement starting with peace in Korea.

In my guess Nehru will cable Nagavan in Peking for report and possibly ask him to again ask Chinese Commies what they intend to do. Even though he does nothing, such conversations effective in convincing Nehru our earnest desire for peace; in associating with us psychologically in discussing possible approaches to difficult Chinese; and in facing them more squarely on Chinese for continued lack agreement.

BOWLES

NOTE: Relayed to Tokyo 1-2-52 10:40 p.m. 30.