SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

DEPT PASS TOKYO; SENT 1409, RPTD INFO LONDON 67, TOKYO 33

In our conversation yesterday morning I reviewed with Nehru Korean situation in considerable detail. He had read three proposals recently made at Panmunjom for handling prisoners and he most forthrightly stating they seemed reasonable and was glad we had put them forward.

Pointing out one of three proposals almost exactly same as he had made to me last April.

Asked him tell me frankly how we could improve handling of armistice negotiations. I added although we often frustrated we knew only hope was patience and still more patience.

He said he had no (rpt no) suggestions nor did he have any criticism and would only emphasize we must maintain our patience.

I asked him what he thought stood in way of settlement problem. Said he simply did not (rpt not) know; one week had one theory and another week had different theory.

Asked him his best guess as to Soviet attitude. Nehru stated our estimate shld be better than his but he inclined feel Soviets did not (rpt not) want armistice this time; first because are able tie down UN troops without any loss to them themselves; second because were able test out new military equipment; third because continuing war gave them leverage Chinese Comms. because their dependence on Soviets for military supplies. Stated with some feeling he been disappointed recent indications Soviet Chinese relations but he did not feel any of us had much idea of what went on Moscow.

Told him I glad he had reliable new Ambassador Peiping and hopes as soon as he began got meaningful reports from him he will be willing discuss them in confidence with me. Stated I felt conditions for settlement now (rpt now) at least as good and perhaps better than we cold expect year from now (rpt now); that regardless political parties American leaders and people wanted truce in Korea to be fol by Korean peace and then broad Asian settlement.

Pointed out
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2-41409, October 2, 9 p.m. from New Delhi.

Pointed out that longer Korean struggle went on stronger will be arguments for slowing Japanese in order bolster security north and east Pacific and takes some of pressure off US. Said we realized this will lessen whatever small chance there might be Russia and China pulling apart; that although unlikely any decisions will be made near future even future possibility that from practical point view we all had to face.

Said Chinese must understand our reasoning well as we and if they had slightest desire for real settlement now (rpt now) time to let us know. I emphasized that I giving him only my personal opinions; that was in no (rpt no) way speaking for my govt.

Nehru appeared very thoughtful and said he understand our problem but that we shld likewise understand Chinese Commie concern over ring US bases just off China coast.

I said we had been forced fight our way 6,000 miles across Pacific to stop Asian aggression of few years ago; that our lack defenses had cost us hundreds of thousands American lives and we not (rpt now) prepared repeat this same old process. Added US bases were threat to Chinese only if Chinese had aggressive plans and that he himself had been unable tell us how we old persuade Chinese Commies only solution is broad Asian agreement starting with peace in Korea.

In my guess Nehru will cable Ragavan in Peking for report and possibly ask him to again ask Chinese Commies what they intend to do. Even though he does nothing, such conversations effective in convincing Nehru our earnest desire for peace; in associating with us psychologically in discussing possible approaches to difficult Chinese; and in facing ours more squarely on Chinese for continued lack agreement.

BOWLES

NOTE: Relayed to Tokyo 1-2-52 10:40 p.m. GC.