TO:  GINSEI TOKYO JAPAN

MR:  DAY 09980  26 AUG 50

From SHERIF Johnson PERSONAL FOR MacArthur

The President of the United States directs that you withdraw your message for National Recognition of Veterans of Foreign Wars, because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations.
HERE IS THE TEXT OF GEN. MAC ARTHUR'S MESSAGE TO THE 51ST
NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT OF THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS: GLENN A.
LEWIS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE
UNITED STATES

YOUR INSPIRING MESSAGE OF THE 17TH HAS MOVED ME DEEPLY
AND I TRUST THAT YOU WILL CONVEY TO ALL OF MY COMMANDERS-IN-
ARMS OF THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS ASSEMBLED ON THE
OCCASION OF OUR 51ST ANNUAL NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT MY ASSURANCE
THAT THEIR CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT WILL GIVE THIS COMMAND
MUCH ADDED STRENGTH TO MEET THE TESTS OF BATTLE WHICH ARE
IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. TELL THEM THAT I AM HAPPY TO REPORT
THAT THEIR SUCCESSORS IN ARMS ARE ENGAGING THE ENEMY ALONG
OUR BATTLE LINES IN SOUTH KOREA ARE EXEMPLIFYING THAT SAME
HIGH STANDARD OF DEVOTION, FORTITUDE AND VALOR WHICH
CHARACTERIZED THEIR OWN MARCH TO VICTORY WHEN THEY THEM-
Selves ENGAGED IN COMBAT IN THE FIELD. FROM SENIOR
COMMANDERS THROUGH ALL RANKS, THEIR TACTICAL SKILL, THEIR
INVINCIBLE DETERMINATION, AND THEIR FIGHTING QUALITIES
AGAINST A FANATICAL FOE, WELL TRAINED, EXPERTLY DIRECTED
AND HEAVILY ARMED, HAVE UPHOLD OUR COUNTRY'S FINEST
TRADITIONS. TOWARD VICTORY, HOWEVER DIFFICULT THE ROAD,
THEY ARE GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF THEMSELVES WHICH SHOULD MAKE
EVERY AMERICAN HEART BEAT WITH PRIDE AND INFINITE SATIS-
FACATION.

IN VIEW OF MISCONCEPTIONS CURRENTLY BEING VOICED CON-
CERNING THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORMOSA TO OUR STRATEGIC
POTENTIAL IN
POTENTIAL IN THE PACIFIC, I BELIEVE IT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST TO AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO STATE MY VIEWS THEREON TO YOU, ALL OF WHOM HAVING FOUGHT OVERSEAS UNDERSTAND BROAD STRATEGIC CONCEPTS. TO BEGIN WITH, ANY APPRAISAL OF THAT STRATEGIC POTENTIAL REQUIRES AN APPRECIATION OF THE CHANGES BROUGHT IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST WAR. PRIOR THERETO THE WESTERN STRATEGIC FRONTIER OF THE UNITED STATES LAY ON THE LITTORAL LINE OF THE AMERICAS WITH AN EXPOSED ISLAND SALIENT EXTENDING OUT THROUGH HAWAII, MIDWAY AND GUAM TO THE PHILIPPINES. THAT SALIENT WAS NOT AN OUTPOST OF STRENGTH BUT AN AVENUE OF WEAKNESS ALONG WHICH THE ENEMY COULD AND DID ATTACK US. THE PACIFIC WAS A POTENTIAL AREA OF ADVANCEMENT FOR ANY PREDATORY FORCE INTENT UPON STRIKING AT THE BORDERING LAND AREAS.

ALL OF THIS WAS CHANGED BY OUR PACIFIC VICTORY. OUR STRATEGIC FRONTIER THEN SHIFTED TO EMBRACE THE ENTIRE PACIFIC OCEAN WHICH HAS BECOME A VAST BOWL TO PROTECT US AS LONG AS WE HOLD IT. INDEED, IT ACTS AS A PROTECTIVE SHIELD TO ALL OF THE AMERICAS AND ALL FAIRWAYS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREA WE CONTROL TO THE SHORES OF ASIA BY A CHAIN OF ISLANDS EXTENDING IN AN ARC FROM THE ALBUTIANS TO THE MARIANAS HELD BY US AND OUR FIVE ALLIES. FROM THIS ISLAND CHAIN WE CAN DOMINATE WITH AIR POWER EUROPEAN PORTS FROM VLADIVOSTOK TO SINGAPORE AND PREVENT ANY HOSTILE MOVEMENT INTO THE PACIFIC. ANY PREDATORY ATTACK FROM ASIA MUST BE AN AMPLIFIED EFFORT. NO AMPHITRIBUTS FORCE CAN BE SUCCESSFUL WITH OUR CONTROL OF THE
CONTROL OF THE SEA LAKES AND THE AIR OVER THESE LAKES IS ITS
AVENUE OF ADVANCE. WITH NAVAL AND AIR SUPREMACY AND MODERN
GROUND ELEMENTS TO DEFEND BASES, ANY MAJOR ATTACK FROM CON-
TINENTAL ASIA TOWARD US OR OUR FRIENDS OF THE PACIFIC WOULD
COME TO FAILURE. UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS THE PACIFIC NO
LONGER REPRESENTS INHABITING AVENUES OF APPROACH
FOR A PROSPECTIVE INVADER -- IT ASSUMES INSTEAD THE
FRIENDLY ASPECT OF A PEACEFUL LAKE. OUR LINE OF DEFENSE IS
A NATURAL ONE AND CAN BE MAINTAINED WITH A MINIMUM OF
MILITARY EFFORT AND EXPENSE. IT INVOLVES NO ATTACK
AGAINST ANYONE NOR DOES IT PROVIDE THE BASTIONS ESSENTIAL
FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, BUT PROPERLY MAINTAINED WOULD BE
AN INVINCIBLE DEFENSE AGAINST AGGRESSION. IF WE HOLD THIS
LINE WE MAY HAVE PEACE -- LOSE IT AND WAR IS INEVITABLE.

THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF FORMOSA IS SUCH THAT IN THE
HAND OF A POWER UNFRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES IT CONSTIT-
UTS AN ENEMY ALIEN IN THE VERY CENTER OF THIS DEFENSIVE
PERIMETER, 100 TO 150 MILES CLOSER TO THE ADJACENT FRIENDLY
SECTIONS -- OKINAWA AND THE PHILIPPINES -- THAN ANY POINT
IN CONTINENTAL ASIA. AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE IS ON FORM-
MOEA A CONCENTRATION OF OPERATIONAL AIR AND NAVAL BASES
WHICH IS POTENTIALLY GREATER THAN ANY SIMILAR CONCENTRATION
OF THE ASIATIC MAINLAND BETWEEN THE YELLOW SEA AND THE
STRAIT OF MALACCA. ADDITIONAL BASES CAN BE DEVELOPED IN A
RELATIVELY SHORT TIME BY AN AGGRESSIVE EXPLOITATION OF ALL
WORLD WAR II JAPANESE FACILITIES. AN ENEMY FORCE UTILIZ-
ING THESE INSTALLATIONS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE COULD INCREASE
BY 100 PERCENT.
BY 100 PERCENT THE AIR EFFORT WHICH COULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST OKINAWA AS COMPARED TO OPERATIONS BASED ON THE MAIN- 
LAND AND AT THE SAME TIME COULD DIRECT DAMAGING AIR ATTACKS 
WITH FIGHTER TYPE AIRCRAFT AGAINST FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS 
IN THE PHILIPPINES WHICH ARE CURRENTLY BEYOND THE RANGE OF 
FIGHTERS BASED ON THE MAINLAND. OUR AIR SUPREMACY AT ONCE 
WOULD BECOME DOUBTFUL.

AS A RESULT OF ITS GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION AND BASE POTENTIAL, 
UTILIZATION OF FORMOSA BY A MILITARY POWER HOSTILE TO THE 
UNITED STATES MAY EITHER COUNTER-BALANCE OR OVERTHROW THE 
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN FLANK OF 
THE U.S. FRONT LINE POSITION. FORMOSA IN THE HANDS OF 
SUCH AN HOSTILE POWER COULD BE COMPARED TO AN UNSINKABLE 
AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND SUBMARINE TENDER IDEALLY LOCATED TO 
ACCOMPANY OFFENSIVE STRATEGY AND AT THE SAME TIME COUNTER 
DEFENSIVE OR COUNTER-OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BY FRIENDLY FORCES 
BASED ON OKINAWA AND THE PHILIPPINES. THIS UNSINKABLE 
CARRIER-TENDER HAS THE CAPACITY TO OPERATE FROM 10 TO 20 
AIR GROUPS OF TYPES RANGING FROM JET FIGHTERS TO B-29 TYPE 
BOMBERS AS WELL AS TO PROVIDE FORWARD OPERATING FACILITIES 
FOR SHORT-RANGE COASTAL SUBMARINES. IN ACQUIRING THIS 
FORWARD SUBMARINE BASE, THE EFFICACY OF THE SHORT RANGE 
SUBMARINE WOULD BE SO ENSURABLY INCREASED BY THE ADDITIONAL 
RADIUS OF ACTIVITY AS TO THREATEN COMPLETELY SEA TRAFFIC 
FROM THE SOUTH AND INTRODUCE ALL SEA LAKES IN THE WESTERN 
PACIFIC.
PACIFIC. Submarine blockades by the enemy with all its de-
stuctive ramifications would thereby render a virtual
certainty.

Should Formosa fall and bases thereafter come into the
hands of a potential enemy of the U.S., the latter will have
acquired an additional “flight” which will have been obtain-
ed and can be maintained at an incomparably lower cost than
could its equivalent in aircraft carriers and submarines
borders. Current estimates of air and submarine resources
in the Far East indicate the capability of such a potential
enemy to extend his forces southward and still maintain an
imposing degree of military strength for employment else-
where in the Pacific area.

Historically, Formosa has been used as a springboard for
just such military aggression directed against areas to the
south. The most notable and recent example was the utiliza-
tion of it by the Japanese in World War II. At the out-
break of the Pacific war in 1941, it played an important
part as a staging area and supporting base for the various
Japanese invasion convoys. The supporting air forces of
Japan’s army and navy were based on fields situated along
southern Formosa. From 1942 through 1944 Formosa was a vital
link in the transportation and communication chain which
stretched from Japan through Okinawa and the Philippines
to Southeast Asia. As the U.S. carrier forces advanced
into the Western Pacific, the bases on Formosa assumed an
increasingly
INCREASINGLY GREATER ROLE IN THE JAPANESE DEFENSE SCHEME. SHOULD FORMOSA FALL INTO THE HANDS OF AN HOSTILE POWER, HISTORY WOULD REPEAT ITSELF. ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL WOULD AGAIN BE FULLY EXPLOITED AS THE MEANS TO BREACH AND NEUTRALIZE OUR WESTERN PACIFIC DEFENSE SYSTEM AND MOUNT A WAR OF CONQUEST AGAINST THE FREE NATIONS OF THE PACIFIC BASIN.

NOTHING COULD BE MORE FALLACIOUS THAN THE THREATENING ARGUMENT BY THOSE WHO ADVOCATE APPEASEMENT AND DEFENATISM IN THE PACIFIC THAT IF WE DEFEND FORMOSA WE ALIENATE CONTINENTAL ASIA. THOSE WHO SPEAK THIS DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE ORIENT. THEY DO NOT REALIZE THAT IT IS IN THE NATURE OF THE ORIENTAL PSYCHOLOGY TO RESPECT AND FOLLOW AGGRESSIVE, RESOLUTE AND DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP — TO QUICKLY TURN ON A LEADERSHIP CHARACTERIZED BY TIMIDITY OR VACILLATION — AND THEY UNDERESTIMATE THE ORIENTAL MENTALITY. NOTHING IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS HAS SO INSPIRED THE FAR EAST AS THE AMERICAN DETERMINATION TO PRESERVE THE BULWARKS OF OUR PACIFIC OCEAN STRATEGIC POSITION FROM FUTURE ENRUGCATION. DOON OF ITS PEOPLE FAIL ACCURATELY TO APPRAISE THE SAFEGUARD SUCH DETERMINATION BRINGS TO THEIR FREE INSTITUTIONS. TO PURSUE ANY OTHER COURSE WOULD BE TO TURN OVER THE FRUITS OF OUR PACIFIC VICTORY TO A POTENTIAL ENEMY. IT WOULD SHIFT ANY FUTURE BATTLE AREA FIVE THOUSAND MILES EASTWARD TO THE COASTS OF THE AMERICAN CONTINENTS, OUR HOME COAST; IT WOULD COMPLETELY EXPOSE OUR FRIENDS IN THE PHILIPPINES, OUR FRIENDS IN
OUR FRIENDS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, OUR FRIENDS IN INDONESIA, OUR FRIENDS IN JAPAN, AND OTHER AREAS, TO THE LUSTFUL THRUSTS OF THOSE WHO STAND FOR SLAVERY AS AGAINST LIBERTY, FOR ATHEISM AS AGAINST GOD.

THE DECISION OF PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON JUNE 27 LIGHTED INTO FLAME A LAMP OF HOPE THROUGHOUT ASIA THAT WAS BURNING DIMLY TOWARD EXTINCTION. IT MARKED FOR THE FAR EAST THE FOCAL AND TURNING POINT IN THIS AREA'S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM. IT SWEPT ACROSS IN ONE GREAT MONUMENTAL STROKE ALL OF THE HYPOCRISY AND THE SOPHISTY WHICH AS CONFUSED AND DELUDED SO MANY PEOPLE DISTANT FROM THE ACTUAL SCENE. — END OF MESSAGE.