Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to maintain his operations.

This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactic has definitely failed him as our own forces have become seasoned to this form of warfare. His tactics of infiltration are not contributing to his plesseal losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under rigorous climate, terrain and battle.

Of even greater significance than our tactical success has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, had China, of such concentrated and limited military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war.

Our immense manufacturing bases and lines of raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as trucks, heavy artillery and other refinements which have introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.

Formerly his great material potential might well have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, massive alone do not affect vulnerability inherent in such sophistication. Control of the sea and air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past.

When this control exists as in our case and is coupled with the inferiority of ground firepower, as is the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bribery, however fantastic, or the most gross indifference to human lives.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since North China entered upon its undeclared war in Korea. Even under limitations within new restrictive activity of the United Nations Forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrued to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish its goals in mass the conduct of Korea.

The army therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from the inherent effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through extension of our military operations to other coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

These basic facts being established, there should be no insurmountable difficulty in arriving at decisions on the Korean problem as long as the same are resolved on fundamentals related to the problem, such as Formosa and China's east in the United Nations.

The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That is not the paramount concern. Apart from the military areas of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.
Within the area of my authority as military commander, how-
over, it would be needless to say I stood ready at any time to confer
in the field with the commander in chief of the armed forces in an
earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of
the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no
notice may justify hostilities, might be accomplished without
further bloodshed.