Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations.

This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces became accustomed to this form of warfare. His tactics of infiltration are not contributing to his plessural losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under rigorous climate, terrain and battle conditions.

Of even greater significance than our tactical success has been the clear realization that within a short time, both China, as such segregated and wanted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war.

This has manufacturing bases and lines of raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even minimal air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successfull ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other refinements which has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.

Formerly, his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, mass production alone is not sufficient vulnerability inherent in such activities. Control of the sea and air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past.

When this control exists as in our case and is coupled with the inferiority of ground firepower, as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to human lives.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since hostilities entered upon the undeclared war in Korea. Even under atrocities within now restricted activity of the United Nations Forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to overcome the forces of arms the communist forces.

The enemy, therefore, must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depopulate the Korean peninsula effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through cessation of our military operations to its coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty arising in decisions on the Korean problem if it can be resolved on its own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's past in the United Nations.

The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That in the present concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.
Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it would be needless to say I stand ready at any time to confer with the commander in chief of the armed forces in any urgent effort to find any military action whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which so many justly have sacrificed, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.