Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to maintain his operations.

This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces became accustomed to this form of warfare. His tactics of infiltration are not contributing to his pioleural losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under rigorous climate, terrain and battle.

Of even greater significance than our tactical success has been the clear realization that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated and wanted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war.

He lacks manufacturing bases and lines raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even modest air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as trucks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.

Fortunately, the world's potential might will have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, massive aid does not offer vulnerability immunity in such situations. Control of the sea and air, which in turn cause control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past.

When this control exists as in our case and is coupled with the inferiority of ground firepower, as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however emotional, or the most gross indifference to human loss.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since Red China entered upon its undeclared war in Korea. Red China understands how much activity of the United States Forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has shown its complete inability to accomplish the force of arms the conquest of Korea.

The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depopulate the Korean peninsula is an unequivocal war crime in Korea, and that the United Nations Forces can defend South Korea from these threats.

These basic facts being established, there should be no insurmountable difficulty arising if decisions on the Korean problem are reached by extraneous issues not directly related to Korea, such as Peiping and China's past in the United States.

The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That is the paramount concern. Apart from the military area of the problem, there are issues resolved in the course of events, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.
Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it would be needless to say I stood ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the army forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no notice may justly have been given, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.