INITIAL FOREIGN REACTION TO GENERAL MAC ARTHUR'S DISMISSAL

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This is an intelligence report; nothing in it is to be construed as a statement of US or Departmental policy or as a recommendation of any given policy.

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This survey is based on material available up to April 13, 1961.
Western Europe. Reports from Western European capitals reflect a very strong approval in press as well as official circles with the action taken by President Truman. Though there was fairly widespread recognition of MacArthur’s military prestige and frequent criticism of the UN for failing to provide him with clear policy direction, outspoken defense of MacArthur came only from Falange circles in Madrid. Western European approval of MacArthur’s removal was based on the following: (1) the hope, if not the belief, that the chances of a peaceful settlement in the Far East had been increased; (2) the belief that the dismissal would tend to limit the Korean war; (3) the belief that it meant there would be no question of Europe’s primary importance over Asia in US strategic planning. There was a general feeling that the dismissal had strengthened Western unity. The Communist press gave relatively little attention to the dismissal which it ascribed to the pressure of world peace opinion, and declared that this action involved no fundamental change in US aggressive policy in Korea.

Soviet Bloc. The USSR and the Soviet Bloc reacted quickly to MacArthur’s dismissal. Moscow has stressed that he failed as a military commander and has insisted that American Far Eastern policy will remain unchanged despite the change in command. According to Moscow commentary, the US objectives in removing MacArthur were: (1) to blame him for failure of the Far Eastern policy, (2) to give courage to America’s European allies, and (3) to drown the voice of the peace partisans. The Eastern European satellites have claimed a victory for the “peace front.”

Near East. Truman’s action was generally approved in the Near Eastern countries. In Turkey the press commented that the US has now given great proof that it wants peace with Red China. The Indian press said the chances for a peaceful settlement had increased, and in Pakistan some editorials expressed the view that the action should dispel fear in the USSR and Red China of attack on the Chinese. In Egypt and Israel the President’s decision was viewed as being of great importance for the future of world peace.

Far East. MacArthur’s removal came as a shocking surprise to the Far East. While the General was widely acclaimed for his accomplishments in the area, the reaction to his removal varied: official reaction was guarded but not directly critical; sources close to the Philippines and Chinese Nationalist Governments, however, expressed profound fears about the repercussions of the move on US policy toward Communism in Asia; the Japanese expressed a strong sense of national loss and concern about
their future status with particular reference to the peace treaty; Indonesian and Malayan opposition was dismissed with favor; and the Communist reaction generally parrotted the Kremlin line. There has been no reaction thus far from the Chinese Communists.

Latin America. Reports on reaction are available from only a few Latin American countries (Cuba, Colombia, Argentina, Guatemala, Dominican Republic) and in most of these, the President’s action was generally applauded in the press. A government-controlled paper in the Dominican Republic, however, doubted the “wisdom and prudence” of the recall, which it regarded as “comforting” to the Communists.
United Kingdom

Official and Parliamentary reaction. MacArthur’s ouster was greeted with obvious relief in official and parliamentary British circles, although the move came as a surprise to Whitehall and approval of it was coupled with testimony to the military prowess of the General. Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison indicated that MacArthur’s dismissal harmonized with the British view that a military commander must be subordinated to his political chiefs. Winston Churchill, speaking for the Conservatives, associated himself with this view. Minister of Defence Emanuel Shinwell, reflecting the initial jubilation over MacArthur’s removal, openly gloated over the President’s decision. The official feeling was that the step might now pave the way for a new approach to Communist China to end the Korean war and reach a Far Eastern settlement. On the same day that the President acted, the British Government revealed its desire to have Red China associated in the completion of a Japanese peace treaty. The timing was awkward but apparently coincidental rather than planned, and the British position on this question is regarded as tentative and subject to discussion.

Press and public reaction. The press bemoaned the dismissal of MacArthur as a sensational development in American politics and international affairs. Except for the Communist Daily Worker, which regarded the step as proof of MacArthur’s failure to win a decision in Korea, news and comment indicated implied approval of the President’s “bold and courageous” decision to remove MacArthur, who had become a symbol for the British of a type of military-political adventurism that threatened to embroil the UK in an all-out war in the Far East. This feeling was especially keen among leftist periodicals like the New Statesman and Nation and the Tribune. Before the President acted, most British press correspondents in the US were predicting that he would not dismiss MacArthur because of the fear of unfavorable political repercussions, so that when the step was taken it was all the more startling. The main points made by the press included the following: (1) the principle of the subordination of the military to the civilian branch of government has been restored; (2) the chance of a pacific settlement in the Far East, however forlorn and uncertain, had increased; (3) the removal of MacArthur had re-established the importance of the European Theater in strategic planning by the Western powers; (4) the need had increased for a clear statement of the objectives in the Korean war, and peace efforts through the UN should be increased to bring the war to a close on honorable terms.
First reactions of the non-Communist Paris press to MacArthur's dismissal were of surprise and relief. Some official circles apparently were relieved rather than surprised. The French Government has declared itself "in complete agreement" with Truman's statement that his was a "military decision." The French newspaper Le Monde commented that the decision would "facilitate the work of the four Deputy Foreign Ministers in what is felt in France to now be a more relaxed atmosphere in Europe. Non-Communist evening newspapers of April 11 agreed that general war had been postponed by the move, that Europe would be consulted on UN policy in the Pacific, and that Europe had been reassured at a position of first importance in world affairs. Awareness was expressed of the many problems created by the shift, chiefly in the United States, as well as surprise at Truman's courage in view of MacArthur's military record, to which tribute was paid. Le Monde feared that MacArthur might view the shift as a personal victory and become "more determined than ever." While Communist papers considered the dismissal as proof of the influence of the "world-wide pacifist wish," they also hastened to predict that "MacArthur's politics will continue without MacArthur."

Independent leftist and center morning papers of April 13 generally agreed, as expressed by Figaro, that Truman's decision had "saved occidental unity, and reaffirmed the wish for peace and the democratic ideal that animates it." It was also assumed that there was general US as well as European support of the President's move. Gaullist Le Monde was the only paper which viewed the US political split in terms of seriously divided public opinion as to whether the Far East or Europe was the primary danger spot in world affairs.

3. Italy and the Vatican

Universal approval from extreme right to extreme left marked the Italian press reactions to the President's dismissal of General MacArthur. Official comment endorsed the Truman decision. Both Foreign Minister Sforza and Prime Minister de Gasperi welcomed the act, which they interpreted as tending to limit the war in Asia and as emphasizing the importance of Europe. Two large conservative newspapers pointed out that the President's decision involved a reassessment of the importance of Europe over that of the Far East as well as of efforts to limit the Korean war. There was general agreement in the non-Communist press that the removal of the UN commander was a step toward peace in the Pacific. The eminent Notarist, Luigi Savastrevoli, writing for the independent liberal La Stampa, stated that the dismissal of the General placed the responsibility on...
Mao Tse-tung to take the next step to solve the Korean conflict. While the Communists also welcomed MacArthur's removal, they declared that a fundamental change in US foreign policy was necessary to secure peace. According to Reuters, circles close to the Vatican welcomed the President's action as tending to strengthen democratic unity.

4. Belgium

The only expression of opinion from official Belgian sources came from Premier PoulSEN, who declared in a press interview that he preferred to withhold comment until he had "thought twice about it." While declaring it "undeniable" that MacArthur had assumed too much authority, he stated that the General's great popularity in the United States was also "undeniable."

The Belgian non-Communist press gave very extensive and generally approving coverage to the President's action, and there was some speculation that the opportunity for a peaceful settlement of the Korean hostilities had been considerably enhanced thereby. By contrast, the Communist press played down the incident, declaring that notwithstanding the removal of MacArthur for revealing American war plans, the "American rulers" had not abandoned their "criminal designs" upon China.

5. Netherlands

Although recognizing the superior military capabilities of General MacArthur, both the Netherlands Government and the Netherlands press generally considered removal of the UN commander as eminently wise. Government circles believed that the General's replacement would facilitate negotiations of a Far Eastern settlement by the United Nations. Independent left-wing Het Parool commented that MacArthur's dismissal could not solve the United States and the United Nations from further modifying their attitude toward Communist China. Extreme right-wing De Rotterdam, on the other hand, declared that although General MacArthur was unable to distinguish between his mission as a soldier and the province of political leadership, the Administration in Washington had also failed to arrive at any positive line of action. Communist De Waard held the view that as a result of MacArthur's open statement that the Korean war would involve an attack upon Chinese territory, which was the true objective of American policy, President Truman had been compelled to remove him from command in the Far East.

6. Spain

The Madrid press gave full coverage to the MacArthur ouster, and,
although government and military spokesmen refused to comment, editorial reaction in the press was widespread and sharply divided. Typical of the Falange reaction was that of the prominent commentator Pedro Gomes Aparicio, who declared that this was the most "obvious mistake" Truman could have made, and that MacArthur's "opinion that aggressive expansionism must be met by determined vigor is replaced by the suicidal softness of a neo-appeasement that has been unable to learn from the grave defects of Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam." Among those in favor of the General's removal was the Monarchist organ ABC, which stated: "MacArthur is a great general and would have been invaluable to his country and to the West had he not dallied in things beyond his concern, namely, party politics and diplomacy." Catholic Ya wrote that "Mr. Truman has clearly shown that he is not a man who cowards even before his generals."

No comment is available from Portugal.

7. Scandinavia.

Press reports from Scandinavia indicated strong approval of the President's action. There seemed to be general satisfaction that the President had clearly demonstrated that MacArthur's views were not official US views. Opinion was divided, however, on the encouragement that MacArthur's removal would give to a negotiated settlement in the Pacific. Without excusing MacArthur's conduct, there were several references to the failure of the UN to provide clear direction in the Korean conflict.

In Sweden, the dismissal of MacArthur was interpreted both as a peace signal to Peking and a sign that President Truman would not stand for re-election. Liberal Aftonbladet also echoed a general sentiment in all three countries that the President had acted courageously but had run a big risk in dismissing the General because of the latter's popularity in the United States. By the morning of the 11th there was considerable press concern lest the domestic agitation in the US over MacArthur might strengthen "Asia first" sentiment to the detriment of Europe.

In Denmark, Independent Aftenbladet declared there would be no tears shed over the General's departure, and Radical Liberal Romanbladet described as "disastrously wrong" MacArthur's political and military judgments. It was also felt that the President's decision would relieve European anxieties and that the way had now been prepared for the Chinese and Soviets.
to demonstrate their desires to negotiate for an end to the Korean hostilities.

In Norway, Finn Moe, the foreign editor of the Labor Party organ, Arbeiderbladet, who is also chairman of the Storting's Foreign Affairs Committee, warned that the extreme seriousness of the situation in Korea had not been resolved by the removal of MacArthur and that those who hoped the Communist attitude would change as a result would probably be disappointed. According to Moe, the most important next step was for the democracies to unite more firmly and to agree on a joint policy, something that the removal of the UN Commander should facilitate.

According to the Communist organ, Friheten, the President's action had been forced by the pressure of world peace opinion but there would nevertheless be no change in "aggressive" US policy in Korea.

8. West Germany

Consensus of West German papers was that the President's courageous action was necessary, though some independent middle-of-the-road papers (Berliner Tageblatt and Anekdote, Munchner Merkur, Rhein-Neckar Zeitung) made the political indecisiveness of the Western camp responsible for the general's political statements and regretted his dismissal. The paper of the rightist Deutsche Partei said that only the Communists would benefit from MacArthur's removal. But most important papers hailed the dismissal; for example, Frankfurter Rundschau (left of center) called it a sacrifice proving that the US wishes genuine partnership with the West and that this would strengthen Eisenhower's position in Europe. CDU (conservative) press service felt that Truman would be backed by US public opinion in spite of MacArthur's popularity, while Die Welt (Hamburg, left of center) said the President risked a political crisis at home for the sake of unity in the Western camp. The South-West German radio (Baden-Baden) said that the President's action dealt a shattering blow to the Republican Party.

Vice-Chancellor Blaschke and other officials refused to comment but federal security chief Theodor Blank said he would like nothing better than to have MacArthur named military adviser to the Bonn government. Opposition Socialists leader Schumacher approved the dismissal.

9. East Germany

Communist propaganda organs ascribed MacArthur's dismissal to
the success of the peace campaign in Western Europe and to growing dis-
content with the Korean war in the US. It was claimed that the Western
European Governments and the Australian Government pressed by the de-
mands of their people, acted through their ambassadors in Washington to
demand MacArthur’s dismissal. The bankruptcy of US policy was thus
proved to the world. But in spite of this victory the peace-loving nations
of the world were exhorted to redouble their efforts because MacArthur’s
successor in the Far East, Ridgway, is another war criminal who must
be removed. Truman, thus, had not altered his warmongering policy, but
only dismissed its most vociferous exponent.

The Communist press also grasped the opportunity to reiterate
the long list of MacArthur’s “war crimes” and to remind its readers that
Truman’s withdrawal of his A-bomb statement was a similar instance in
which he had been forced to give way in face of resistance of peace-loving
nations.

10. Austria

The Austrian non-Communist press generally labelled MacArthur’s
dismissal as a regrettable but necessary step and as proof of the President’s
peace policy. Only one disapproved: a conservative popular daily
(Nehas Volksblatt) commented that though the general failed in convincing
Truman that the decision against Communism should be made in Asia this
does not necessarily prove that he was wrong.

Austrian Communist papers cheered free peoples of Western Europe
for forcing this decision on Truman. The inexcusable reason for MacArthur’s
dismissal (failure to obey President’s orders) was called childish; according
to Communists the President used MacArthur as a sounding board to try
test world reaction to secret decisions being made in Washington before
committing the US. His dismissal does not mean the end of the threat to
peace, because another warmonger, Eisenhower, will now redouble his
efforts. Removal of the aggressive general, however, should be incentive
to all peace-loving peoples to redouble their efforts.
The USSR and the Soviet satellite bloc have by and large been quick to react to the removal of General MacArthur from his Far Eastern command. Moscow thus far has stressed MacArthur's failure as a military commander and insisted that American Far Eastern policy will remain unchanged despite the change in command. The Eastern European satellite bloc has claimed victory for the "peace front."

Moscow quickly noted without comment MacArthur's removal. Subsequently, in a broadcast to Europe in several languages, Moscow insisted that "MacArthur did nothing that disagreed with the aggressive policy of US ruling circles." His removal came about "because, first and foremost, MacArthur failed as supreme commander." His troops repeatedly defeated by the North Koreans and the Chinese "volunteers"; and "MacArthur became, for the peoples of the Far East and all the world, the personification of greedy US policy." According to the Moscow commentary, ruling circles in the US had three objectives in dismissing MacArthur: "First, they would like to blame the failure of their disastrous policy in the Far East on MacArthur. Second, they hope to give courage to their European allies, who have been frightened by the indignation of their peoples against efforts to spread the war in Asia. Third, they want to drown the voice of the peace partisans, who demand a peaceful settlement in Korea."

A Literary Gazette article by Pavel Krylov, which was broadcast on April 12, asserted that the replacement of MacArthur does not mean abandonment of the "adventurous policy." However, "the replacement is convincing testimony of confusion in the den of American warmongers."

Satellite broadcasts have heavily emphasised the role that the "popular forces" and the "peace" movement have played in effecting MacArthur's removal. A Budapest broadcast in English asserted that MacArthur's removal from command "shows the strength of the popular forces all over the world who have protested MacArthur's swashbuckling conduct in the Far East." An East Berlin home service commentary, stating that the General's removal "shows up the limits of US war policy," described the event as a direct effect of the "peace" movement (see under Germany).

In claiming a victory for the "peace movement," satellite propaganda has also been quick to assert that no policy change will ensue. Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet are accused by Berlin of being "two war criminals not a whit better than MacArthur. This should suffice as a
reputation of the Western propaganda barrage we may expect tomorrow morning, which will tell us that MacArthur had to go because of his differences with Truman. The Russian Hour broadcast in Vienna went even further in "analyzing" the reasons for MacArthur's removal, approaching the event from a global standpoint: "The plans of Truman and Acheson are long-term plans, and they are not plans of peace. Truman and Acheson need time -- time to complete their rearmament program, time for preparing a new aggressive war against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. An adventurer, MacArthur wanted to get going right away. This is the sole difference and the reason why he had to go."

III. FAR EAST

1. Japan

The initial Japanese reaction to the news of General MacArthur's release was a combination of surprised shock, a sense of natural loss, and concern over the prospective disruption of occupation working relationships and of the progress being made toward a peace treaty. Prime Minister Yoshida, after refusing to comment initially, announced on Wednesday that the Japanese Government had received assurances from Washington that General MacArthur's retirement implied no change in US policy toward Japan and the Far East nor did it affect US determination to press for an early peace treaty. Yoshida promised full government cooperation with General Ridgway.

Comment from other government and political party sources has been guarded, although containing numerous expressions of regret at the department of the General. The Chief Assistant Secretary, according to the Central News Agency, "hinted at unfortunate timing, but declined elaboration." The Secretary-General of the Socialist Party forewarned "further aggravation of the international situation" but expressed confidence in continued US efforts for the peace and independence of Japan. The Communist Party was most outspoken, attributing MacArthur's recall to the "intensified contradiction and conflict among imperialist nations." Editorial comment eulogized the General's service to Japan and treated his recall as a US domestic issue and generally followed the theme established in Yoshida's statement.

Comments on President Truman's radio address have so far been reported only from the Japanese press Asahi and Mainichi, major Tokyo
papers, both said that a solution of the Korean hostilities is now up to
Communist China. Asahi added that the President's pronouncement
"will greatly reduce the gap which has hitherto existed between Great
Britain and the United States and, in the end, fortify US policy in the Far
East." The national radio network commentary concluded that President
Truman wielded his "tremendous authority" to enforce the national
Europe-first policy in order to maintain the diplomatic cooperation of the
other Western powers. However, "to take a serious view in Europe
does not mean to take a light view of Asia. It may be believed that the
United States will push ahead its fixed policy of building up Japan as a
stabilizing force in Asia. We should, more than ever, do our utmost for
the rehabilitation of the Fatherland without any anxiety."

3. China

A. Communist China. There has been no reaction so far from the
Chinese Communists.

B. Formosa. The Chinese Nationalist Government has maintained
an official silence on the removal of General MacArthur, but has made its
dismay quite clear through unofficial channels. The first reactions came
through the Hongkong bureau of PANA, a pro-Nationalist news agency.
PANA reported some Hongkong opinion as feeling that "the democracies
will lose the war in Korea, which defeat will eventually lead to that of the
Third World War." The PANA despatch from Taipei was more restrained
in its tone. Nationalist officials, while making no official statements, were
reported as being seriously disturbed over MacArthur's removal, but felt
that General Ridgway was a very competent successor. The chief fear of
the Chinese, as expressed by PANA, was the future role of Taiwan. A
Reuters despatch from Taipei reports the belief expressed by the Chinese
that the removal of MacArthur is a victory for the British.

3. Korea

A. South Korea. President Syngman Rhee expressed deep regret
at the sudden "resignation" of General MacArthur, but commended the selec-
tion of General Ridgway as his successor, praising him as "a great soldier
and statesman."

B. North Korea. After a 36-hour delay, the North Korean radio
finally announced the dismissal of General MacArthur. His dismissal was

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explained as a consequence of his military failure and his disagreements with United Nations members.

4. Philippines

The removal of General MacArthur came as a shock to the Philippine people who had almost unanimously felt that the General should be given a freer hand in his campaign against Communism. The Philippines felt that the policy dispute between MacArthur and Truman showed MacArthur to be a champion of bold defense against Communism as opposed to the appeasement tendencies of the US and British. Consequently, his removal is regarded as an example of "high international intrigue" and a disappointing indication of President Truman's submission to political pressure. While several Legislative leaders of all parties have expressed their concerns over the removal of MacArthur, official opinion on the controversy has been held to a minimum for fear of jeopardizing the impending US aid program to the Philippines. President Quirino at first refused to comment other than sending a telegram to General MacArthur expressing the Philippine people's love for the General and inviting him to visit the Philippines. President Quirino, however, has been reported to have said that President Truman's speech clarified the matter for the Philippine people.

The Herald, a pro-administration paper, expressed the view that before a showdown with Communism was possible, the American people must have a showdown among themselves, as must the Western Powers. The Manila Times, a reliable independent paper, represented Philippine reaction as follows: The Communists have wanted MacArthur's recall and as a result of this action their hand has been immeasurably strengthened; the freedom-loving peoples of East Asia have been told that they are fighting Communist imperialism. With MacArthur gone, they are left with the unfortunate impression that the elements of this imperialism will now have a free hand in the Far East; this action changes nothing in the situation of the democracies vis-à-vis the totalitarian powers in the Far East -- except perhaps a shaking of confidence.

5. Indochina

Reactions in Indochina are limited to several broadcasts by the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" ("DRV") radio. The true reason for MacArthur's recall, declares the Ho radio, is that the "American aggressors and satellite troops in Korea" have met a "resounding defeat." For this reason President Truman is said to have characterized the General as "incapable" -- not because he issued one more "casual, arrogant" statement. The "DRV" radio queries as to what refuge General de Lattre will seek when he meets the same fate as MacArthur, inasmuch as the former has no plantations and mines to which he may retreat.
6. Indonesia

The Indonesian reaction to the dismissal of General MacArthur has been favorable to the policies of President Truman. Mohamad Rumi, Indonesian Foreign Minister, stated that the firing of the General would contribute to a solution of the Korean problem and added that the determination of policy was the business of statesmen and not of generals, despite the admiration one might have for the achievements of General MacArthur.

Mohammed Yamin, highly influential and outspoken leftist member of the Indonesian Parliament, while comparing MacArthur as a strategist to "Hannibal... and Napoleon Bonaparte," stated that his dismissal would have an important beneficial effect on Indonesia's policy, in that "every such exercise of discretion by the American State Department" would contribute to the favorable development of an independent Indonesian foreign policy of "friendship with Asian nations... not leaning toward either bloc." In this, he echoed the general Indonesian sentiment that MacArthur's removal would facilitate a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern questions, making much easier the task of maintaining Indonesian neutrality. Yamin further asserted that the removal of MacArthur strengthened the Indonesian hope of acquiring Western New Guinea. The feeling has prevailed in Indonesia that MacArthur exerted powerful influence in favor of continued Dutch control of that potentially strategic area.

7. Malaya

British official quarters in Singapore generally approved the dismissal of MacArthur because it was believed that his actions were likely to involve a general war. It was also felt that his statements furnished material for Communist propaganda to the effect that the US desired such a war.

The Singapore Standard (an Aw Boon Haw paper, independent Chinese daily) of April 11, 1951 stated that General MacArthur's flouting of superiors is not based on his individual whim but is a reflection of two conflicting policies in the US. It goes on to say that MacArthur is the mouthpiece of influential American political elements who believe world war has already begun in Korea and should be fought in Asia. It concluded that unless these forces are restrained, no stern or tactful appeals to MacArthur will stop an extension of war in Asia.
1. Turkey

The MacArthur story took all headlines in the Turkish press, but editorial comment was relatively restrained. Zafir, organ of Democrats Government Party, supported Truman action, stating: "From an administrative point of view it is impossible not to approve the decision of Truman unconditionally." It considers MacArthur an advocate of drastic action in the Far Eastern zone. "By relieving MacArthur Washington has given greater proof that it wants peace with Red China..." Kufret, organ of the Nations Party, in an editorial supported the President's action, calling MacArthur the "Emperor of the East" because of the powers invested in him. It called the action the most important from the standpoint of the outcome of the Korean war and preservation of world peace, stating that MacArthur's "independent action had begun to be a threat to world peace. Even American public opinion violently shrinks from putting up with the results of the war to come with China." Hurras, the pro-Republican People's Party organ, took a wait-and-see attitude. La Republique (French edition of Independent Istanbul Cumhuriyet) interpreted MacArthur's replacement as an indication that the defense of Western Europe will now take precedence over the MacArthur proposals for a more active campaign in Asia.

2. India

President Truman's decision was admired as a highly courageous step in the Indian press, in view of the substantial popularity MacArthur has in the US. It was generally seen as offering new chances for a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict and for the improvement in relations between Communist China and the democratic nations. Indian political observers even saw the possibility of substantial changes in the US Far Eastern policy, but they thought this would depend on the reaction of American public opinion to Truman's decision. A feeling of relief was general in the Indian capital, which had become increasingly jittery at MacArthur's controversial statements.

3. Pakistan

Endorsing the President's action, a Pakistan editorial observed: "Truman had to dismiss MacArthur because of the pressure of the Allies and in view of political strategy in the Far East. The fact is that America and her Allies do not wish to wage a decisive war against Communism in the East... MacArthur could not agree with this strategy." Other editorials
believe that his dismissal will increase the prestige of the US and the Allies and also create a healthy reaction in the USSR and Communist China since it should dispel fear of attack on the Chinese.

4. Egypt

The Agence France Presse, in a radio message from the Egyptian capital, via Paris, said: "The news of replacement of General MacArthur, announced by the Egyptian State radio, is considered in competent Egyptian circles as of capital importance for the future of world peace. Official circles refuse to comment in detail on this event, the repercussions of which will be great on world policies," but point out, nevertheless, that President Truman's decision proves that "the White House has understood the danger to which MacArthur's belligerence exposed the world, and the reluctance of numerous friendly countries has permitted the United States and the United Nations to become involved in Asia in a dangerous campaign which could lead to a world conflagration."

"The Secretary General of the Arab League, Assam Pasha, stated that he was satisfied with President Truman's decision, which proves that the intervention of the Asiatic countries and the Middle East in favor of a peaceful solution of the Korean conflict is beginning to bear fruit. The strongest opponent of this intervention was MacArthur, who seemed to believe that a preventive war was the only remedy." 

6. Israel

Israeli delegates to the UN were quoted (New York Times, April 13) as saying MacArthur's dismissal clears the air and makes for stronger unity at the UN. Editorial and radio comment in Israel generally approved the President's action. In an English broadcast to Israel on April 11, the Voice of Israel commentator said that MacArthur was too controversial a figure to stay and that his dismissal was a gesture for closer unity among the UN forces in Korea. While the action did not necessarily open the way for talks with Peiping, a definite factor barring negotiations had been removed. "Indirectly," he said, "it carries the State Department's implied disassociation with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek's and President Syngman Rhee's methods of governing. General MacArthur openly and warmly supported these men, but in Washington the Administration is not inclined to lend them open support, while in the other Western capitals major political elements, themselves anti-Communist, regard them as unacceptably reactionary and anti-liberal and an embarrassment to the Western cause. There is no
Indication that Washington is at all dissatisfied with General MacArthur's other task, the occupation of Japan, despite bitter Soviet criticism and a certain amount of distrust in British Commonwealth capitals. It was only logical that the General's successor as United Nations Commander in Korea should be an American. Now that the war has fallen into the general pattern of hostilities of most major wars, the need would appear to be for a first-rate conventional commander who will confine his activities to fighting and let others make the political pronouncements. President Truman evidently regards General Ridgway, a former Assistant Army Chief of Staff in this light."

In a broadcast to Israel on April 18, radio commentator "Politicus" said: "The President, who more than once has shown that he does not shrink from bold and grave decisions when he considers them to be vitally necessary, has taken the step which he found necessary upon realizing that the leopard in Tokyo could not change its spots. MacArthur's letter to the Republican leader in Congress was merely the straw which broke the camel's back. The new attempt by the dismissed general to assert that he did not disregard his instructions may have been made with an eye on the election propaganda which he is preparing to make in the United States. It is doubtful, however, whether he will be able to blind the people and to hide the fact that he is a general who never ceases from meddling in politics. It is not true that MacArthur failed in his military task in Korea. It is true, however, that he failed and caused others to fail in the political sphere... From now on... the door has been opened for a cease-fire and for peace negotiations with Peiping. President Truman has given striking proof that his policy is to prevent expansion of the Korean war into a general war in Asia. Whether MacArthur has been eliminated from the stage of international politics is another question. He now can openly voice his extremist views concerning the Soviet Union and Chinese People's Republic and Chiang Kai-Shek. The MacArthur who dons himself in the cloak of the revered hero of Corregidor will be no less dangerous to American democracy than the MacArthur who was Supreme Commander in Tokyo... "
Reports on reaction in Latin America to the dismissal of MacArthur are as yet available for only a few countries. Reaction is reported predominantly favorable in the press of Cuba (including one Communist paper, Última Hora), and Colombia, and generally favorable in the press of Argentina. In Guatemala, the only paper reported thus far to have commented on the matter, semi-official Diario de la Mañana (often a mouthpiece for Communist ideas), applauded Truman's decision and also implied that the dismissal was in part due to MacArthur's military failures. In the Dominican Republic, one government-controlled paper (El Caribe) doubted the "wisdom and patience" of the recall of MacArthur, which it regarded as "comforting" to the Communists, and a second government-controlled paper (La República), while recognizing the need for Truman's action, appeared to advocate continued utilization (in an unspecified manner) of MacArthur's experience in efforts to bring peace to Korea and halt Communism in Asia.

The consensus was that the recall of MacArthur was necessary in order to maintain (1) the democratic principle of the superiority of the civil authority over the military and (2) the unity of the anti-Communist allies. Communist Última Hora (Cuba) attributed the removal of MacArthur to the "failures of US foreign policy and of its intervention in Korea."

A relatively large number of papers felt that the recall of MacArthur was favorable to peace. This idea was held by Communist Última Hora (Cuba) as well as by non-Communist papers. More specifically, Última Hora noted UN satisfaction with Truman's action, expressed belief that it would facilitate "peace moves," and stated that the US was "up a blind alley" in Korea and that it must accept Nehru's terms if it wanted to solve the problem. The non-Communist papers held that the removal of MacArthur would open the way to negotiations with the Chinese Communists or at least would stave off an extension of hostilities so that the Western powers might build up their armies to a point where a general war might be avoided.