
"The Administration's advantage over MacArthur is that it can argue from a far wider fund of fact and experience about Russia and the world at large," Eric Severad (CBS) observed, continuing: "This is, after all, a global issue, as MacArthur freely agreed, though he would not argue the global aspects of it." Taking a similar view, Raymond Bering (ABC) concludes that MacArthur, "at the end, by refusing to be drawn into a discussion of global policy, hurt his case for an extended war against China since it must rest on being globally sound." Clifton Utley (NBC), also sympathetic to the Administration policy, makes a similar point.

The New York Times believes the President and Mr. Marshall "spoke not as commanders of a local theatre of war, but as men upon whom has been thrust the leadership of the free world in a global struggle against Communist imperialism." The Washington Post commands the President for "rising to the occasion" in the speech. According to the Post, "He rested his case upon a common policy with our Allies. He is abundantly right." Walter Lippmann muses that the question of "America's destiny" lies behind the debate—whether the US is to become a great imperial power or the "guardian and protector of the Atlantic community and of the Western civilization which is at home within it" as the Administration would have it. Lippmann leans strongly toward the latter "destiny."
Meanwhile, James Reston (New York Times) declares: "The Truman Administration has risked splitting the entire republic in order to demonstrate its determination to defend a policy accepted by all its allies. But it now appears that the allies not only are failing to do what they can to support that unified policy in Korea, but are selling extraordinary quantities of strategic materials to the enemy." Reports of the allied trade with Red China, and their "coolness" toward an embargo are deplored by many observers, including the Baltimore Sun, San Francisco Chronicle and the leading Hoover supporter. But the Washington Post suggests that Americans remember how much help the Chinese Communists got from the US through Chiang "before we loosed hot words upon our Allies," and Joseph Nash (Christian Science Monitor) contends that the China trade is one way of providing Chinese guerrillas with arms.

However, the attitude of the Allies serves as a point of contention with the Administration policy from several observers. The Washington Star remarks: "If one has helpful Allies, it is desirable, of course, to retain them. In the Korean war, however, they have been something less than indispensable. The President must realize that the trade with Red China, coupled with the failure of our Allies to make larger contributions to the actual fighting in Korea, explains why a good many Americans look with a wistful eye on the usefulness of the UN in the Korean war." The Philadelphia Inquirer protests that Secretary Marshall's position "Leaves America still in the hands of Allies whose attitude is a major factor of a gigantic problem for the UN which is highlighted, day by day, by the shocking American casualties in Korea."

David Lawrence takes strong issue with the testimony of Secretary Marshall, claiming it reveals "that America, already contributing the bulk of the military forces and the supplies, has surrendered her independence of action and her leadership and has abandoned 350,000 Americans to the winds of foreign cabinets." The Saturday Review is unimpressed by the views of either the President or Secretary Marshall, and maintains: "Would it not be hazardous to go it alone then to continue to let ourselves be hamstrung against our better judgment, by so-called allies who insist on working both sides of the street? Can we expect our troops in Europe if we aren't in Asia?" Edwin C. Hill (ABC) charges that the Secretary "follows the familiar line of appeasement," and Henry Wallace (ABC) and Fulton Lewis (ABC) are critical of the Administration's case.